How we manage our borders The Statesman 13 Jul 15
India shares its international boundary with six different countries. In addition it has a maritime boundary of over 7200 Kms. With some of our neighbouring countries we have an excellent relationship, in the case of a few, the border areas tend to lend themselves to heightened insurgency, and with others, the border dispute is yet to be settled. This has over a period led an increase in the terminologies meant to define the borders. The terminologies range from the simple international border, to what the Pakistanis call the ‘working boundary’ to the line of control, to line of actual control and onto the actual ground position line. These terms have been prevalent through the years and have existed due to various reasons. Mandarins in South Block understand the impact of each of these terms and the manner of dealing with them.
While resolving the border issues is the responsibility of the government, and not something I would want to get into, however, what I would want to highlight is the method of management of the border and responsibility of the same to the nation.
A simple analysis of the border would bring forth that borders with Nepal and Bhutan, pose no threat, except for possibly they being used as routes of ingress for terrorists or anti national elements. The Bhutan border has also been used by insurgent groups which would establish camps inside Bhutan and operate from there. Joint operations have been launched earlier and would continue on an as needed basis to deal with such groups. The border with Myanmar was in the news recently, when in response to a strike by the NSCN (K) militants an operation was launched to strike and destroy their camps, which was immensely successful. The border with Bangladesh also has insurgent groups with their hideouts within their country, as also cattle and other smuggling and immense demographic migration. Therefore with four of the six countries, there is no direct military threat but definitely an indirect threat of terrorists or insurgents.
With Pakistan, the border is volatile, whether it be the international border or with any other term. Movement of terrorists, smuggling and violations of cease fire is very frequent. With China, while movements of terrorists and insurgents are low, however border violations and standoffs are a regular feature.
The coastline is vast and has a number of prized off shore assets as also a large maritime zone. Protection of the same especially post the Mumbai attack of 2008 assumes importance.
The international border with Pakistan and Bangladesh is the responsibility of the Border Security Force, which functions under the Ministry of Home. It would soon possibly also assume the responsibility of the Myanmar border too. The Line of control and beyond along the border with Pakistan is the responsibility of the army. The border with Nepal and Bhutan is manned by the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB), which also functions under the Ministry of Home. The Chinese frontier is manned by the army and in some parts by the Indo Tibetan Border Police (ITBP). Interestingly the ITBP is also under the Ministry of Home.
The maritime boundary is well manned as both the Coast Guard and the Navy, responsible for the same, come under the same Ministry of Defence. Here there is complete cohesion and cooperation.
Since the agencies responsible for the protection of the borders are immense and also report to different ministries, therefore the question- who is truly responsible for the security of the country? It is easily said, the government of India, but then within the government who?
With no major threat envisaged from the Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh borders the responsibility of that remaining with the Ministry of Home sounds logical, since in their case, most of the incidents would come within the purview of the Home Ministry. However, considering the possibility of increased terrorist movements through Nepal the placing of BSF along the border rather than the SSB could be a better option.
However the multitude of agencies responsible for the Pakistan and Chinese borders, reporting to different channels makes it absurd to manage.
Along the Chinese border the army has for long been crying for operational control over the ITBP, and the same is logical too, as the ITBP is deployed in permanent locations, and some of these are sensitive too, yet for reasons unknown, the same has never been implemented. How can the army, which is responsible for the sanctity of the border task and ensure implementation of plans unless the forces deployed are placed under their control or at least under the control of the same ministry.
The same is the case along the Pakistan border. The BSF especially in the working boundary and beyond is responsible for its actions through its own channels and thus in a number of cases valuable intelligence of either force goes a-begging due to inter force rivalry. The army too has its problems, as it does not trust the BSF, due to lack of integration at varying levels, including in the holding of weapons and equipment. Therefore joint plans are never joint and operations and one force concept of employment never truly happens. This results in delicate handling of the other force in peace and could lead to major issues in actual operations due to complete lack of cohesiveness in planning and training.
This shortcoming was also raised by the Border Management task Force and the Group of Ministers report post the Kargil committee which stressed the importance of one border one force responsibility. It had also stated that multiple forces, with varying command and control structures would always lead to lack of accountability.
The concept propagated of one border one force was ideal, and logical, and aimed at preventing any misadventure. It would also ensure that accountability and responsibility would be clear in peace and would lead to a complete coordinated operation in war. Since Kargil, the country has faced no major challenge hence laxity in the government on national security has set in. As the report stated, “The political, bureaucratic, military and intelligence establishments appear to have developed a vested interest in the status quo. National security management recedes into the background in times of peace and is considered to be too delicate to be tampered with in times of war.”
The government must consider taking the right step forward now, rather than wait for the next crises before implementing remedial measures based on another Group of Minister’s report.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army