Shekatkar committee and the CDS The Excelsior 18 Jan 17
The defence ministry had formed a committee under Retired General Shekatkar to recommend measures to enhance combat potential of the army and re-balance defence expenditure. The committee submitted its report in end Dec. It suggested a slew of measures to arrive at cost cutting and reducing manpower. Manpower reduction was recommended not from the military alone, but also from various departments under the Ministry of Defence (MoD), which have outlived their utility, in this age of outsourcing and modernization. This would require serious consideration, considering the likely protests by unions. Further the committee also stated that piecemeal acceptance of its recommendations would not achieve the desired results. The final decision of implementing, remains with the ministry.
One of its major recommendations was the creation of the post of ‘Chief of Defence Staff’ (CDS), an appointment hanging on a limb since the Kargil Committee report, post the conflict. Every government since then, continued to state ‘political consensus’ is being sought, but nothing moved. Rumours were ripe last month on General Bakshi, being appointed as the CDS. Most democratic nations across the globe have adopted the system, since it ensures smooth functioning and coordination between the military and political leaders.
The military is the only organ in any country, where there is no lateral intake. All individuals start from the bottom and make their way up, gaining professional knowledge and expertise at every level, through ground experience and attending knowledge enhancing courses of instruction. Hence, expecting civilians, irrespective of their capability to understand and handle matters military is asking for the moon. This is equally applicable to the bureaucracy which considers the MoD as their prime preserve. For a defence minister appointed for a limited duration, with other political roles and responsibilities, the detailed functioning of the military remains a mystery, through most of his tenure, irrespective of his intelligence and perseverance. Therefore, ideally a single point advisor, forming part of the ministry, who would be able to provide desired inputs, is the order of the day.
In the present environment, the budget will always be limited. Each service perceives a war scenario as only affecting that service, hence seeks a larger piece of the cake. Between the services, the army has the largest manpower and requirements considering its role of border management and battling insurgency, while the navy and the air force are cost intensive and at the same time enhancing their capability takes considerable time. With no central authority to coordinate or even create a common threat perception, it is left to the defence secretary to finally recommend to the minister what should be the priority for procurement. This results in skewedness of the budget as he possesses limited knowledge on matters military. It is for this reason that he is regularly taken to task by the parliamentary committee of defence for poor planning and even poorer implementation. Hence a single headquarter, under the CDS, coordinating planning and procurement as also providing the right advice is essential.
As Kargil, Myanmar and even the surgical strike proved, all operations of the future would never be single service based. In most sectors in India, it would involve the army and the air force and in some sectors all three services. Hence, coordination between the services assumes greater importance. Without a head of the military (CDS), the coordination is left to service headquarters themselves, which is never ideal, as each service head bases his views on matters concerning his own service. In simple terms, there is complete lack of joint-ness (a specific military term), which is presently the order of the day.
Ideally, for a democracy like India, the CDS along with his organization, the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), which already exists, should be a part of the MoD. This would integrate the military and the government to a level which would enhance efficiency and coordination between the ministry and the military. It would imply reorganizing the MoD to have two separate entities, the military and the bureaucracy. All matters military would flow from the CDS to the defence minister and matters concerning civil, finance, recruitment, resettlement, etc would flow from the defence secretary to the minister. Coordination between the two on issues of procurement and policy would still remain.
Governments in power since the Kargil committee report delayed implementing the appointment of the CDS for a variety of reasons. The two most pronounced reasons were protocol between the CDS and the cabinet secretary and secondly, fear of a coup, if one individual is given complete control of the military.
The protocol issue has led the bureaucracy to prevent the government to even consider such a move. It could have been dealt with in a mature manner, letting the cabinet secretary be a notch above the CDS, after all, India is a democracy. All other secretaries are junior to the service chiefs and would remain so, in the case of the CDS also. Whether he is made a five star or a four star being placed first among equals, matters little. The appointment is essential for military efficiency and enhancing military cohesiveness, hence should be enforced for the national good.
The most illogical reason is fear of a coup. The recent example of Turkey, clearly proves that unless all armed police forces are under the army, a coup is impossible. In India, other than the Assam Rifles, all Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) are under the ministry of home and have their own cadre. Further, India has never had a coup culture and democratic norms are such, that the military is kept away from the government, hence has no knowledge of running a government. In India, the army commanders and equivalents are force commanders, not the chief. Hence any attempt would need the cooperation of many, which is nigh impossible. In Pakistan, the rangers, while in Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Rifles, both equivalent to the BSF, are under the army, which provides the forces to ensure successful coups.
While the government would easily reduce military manpower, it may find it difficult to cut civilian flab, as unions would hold sway. The CDS is now an essential necessity, as security challenges facing India increase, defence expenditure rises and the military must justify its ‘bang for the buck’. The government has indicated its willingness to take strong decisions and by appointing a CDS and integrating the MoD and IDS, it would have implemented major defence reforms, pending before earlier weak coalition governments. If Modi does so, he would be a true strategic reformer.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army