A recent press statement suggested that within the military there appears to be a disagreement, in the establishment of Unified Commands. This flows from the views being projected by service HQs on the Shekatkar committee report, which had recommended establishing Unified Commands in the country. This is in sharp contrast to another recent event where the three service chiefs stood shoulder to shoulder and released the new Joint Doctrine. The concept of establishing Unified Commands, also termed ‘Integrated Theatre Commands’ was presented to the Prime Minister in the Combined Commanders Conference, held at the Indian Military Academy in Feb this year and possibly was considered favourably by him and Parrikar, the then defence minister. It would have been the first major step in enhancing joint war fighting capabilities within the military.
For a layman, a Unified Command would have complete control over all resources of a theatre of operations under one commander, who would be responsible for operations in that theatre. India presently has seventeen different service commands handling its borders and training. Under the Unified Command concept this would drastically reduce to possibly just four or five. Interaction and sharing of resources between different branches of the military is presently handled at the service HQs level and remains a tedious process, fraught with uncertainties as each service seeks to handle its part of operations first, prior to sharing resources with others. Almost all major military powers, including China and the US have shifted to the Unified Command concept. This concept apart from integrating war fighting, economizes on resources and staff, as also enhances joint operations, the need for the hour.
An analysis of Indian threats and possible conflict scenario would indicate why an opposition exists on the concept. India has land disputes with both its main adversaries, Pakistan and China. Hence operations would be primarily land based, supported by air power, indicating army domination. Naval operations would, in case of Pakistan be coordinated with operations of the southern theatre, while with China may remain as standalone. Hence Unified Commands would predominantly be army and air force heavy, with the navy being involved only with the southern theatre against Pakistan. The eastern naval sector could be better handled by an already existing Unified Command, Andaman and Nicobar Command, which presently remains almost resource less.
Within the military, while the army supports the concept, the navy and air force appear wary, each for their own reasons. The air force claims that due to limited resources, they would be compelled to shift air power from one theatre to another, implying east to west and vice versa, hence cannot assure complete allocation of resources at the outset. Further, in the opinion of the air chief, the US wages war away from its shores, thus is unable to resort to sidestepping of resources and has therefore adopted this concept. In case of China, his opinion is that this was implemented to reduce the power of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). The navy contends that while jointness in operations is essential, it has wider roles, which could be hampered once resources are permanently allocated. Behind these objections, there remains a lurking fear, that the army, solely due to its size and importance would gain dominance and control, overriding others.
The true unstated reason is that service chiefs are afraid of losing control of their respective service to commanders, possibly emanating from other branches, which in my opinion, is myopic. It is firstly essential to counter the service chief’s objections. Under the Unified Command system, basic resources could remain allocated, with additional being made available from other theatres, once hostilities are imminent. This logic could nullify the air chief’s reservations. Pulling out resources, for other tasks in the maritime sector, could always be done on the directions of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) or if he has not been given the powers, the defence minister. With available communications and mobility, such decisions can be taken and implemented with no time delay. Other nations have accepted this concept to enhance joint operations and not for any other reason, as the air force contemplates.
The true stumbling block, of the service chiefs losing control means that their role would change from force employers to force providers and trainers, implying once resources are allocated to commanders, their role comes to an end. This would reduce the importance of their appointment, a fear which prevents them from adopting this approach. Logically though, the system would benefit the nation in terms of resources, ability to handle adverse situations and enhance joint operations.
No nation in the world has ever been able to enforce this change in concept in a democratic manner. There has always been opposition from service chiefs, mainly due to losing control over their service. It has always been pushed from the top by the government. The US enforced this through the Goldwater Nichols act of 1986, while China enforced this through directions issued by their present President, Xi Jinping. An interesting case was that of Canada, where Paul Hellyer the defence minister, contemplated unification of the three services as early as 1967. The navy, then the most powerful service objected. However, the unification was bulldozed by the government, not before seven senior serving officers of two and three star ranks, including the first CDS were forced into retirement. The government ultimately got its way. This has been amply elucidated by Hellyer in his book, ‘Revolt of the Admirals.’
In India too, this change is essential to ensure success in future operations. This would be the harbinger for the appointment of a CDS, essential for enhancing coordinated operations. This is the first government in decades which does not require to seek political consensus and has a Prime Minister who is willing to bring changes for the betterment of the nation. He should bulldoze this change and enhance national security, unlike his predecessors, who spent decades seeking political consensus. However, his first priority is to appoint a full time defence minister, to commence reforms.