Countering Pak propaganda in the valley 24 May 17
The army and the nation have immense experience in handling insurgencies. We have been battling them since the fifties. The Naga insurgency began in 1958 and the Mizo uprising in 1966. A watershed in the history of the country occurred on 5 Mar 1966, when Indira Gandhi had the air force bomb Aizawl, the only time in Indian history, when we employed air power against our own. Both these have now been reasonably controlled, though incidents continue to occur occasionally. The Assam movement commenced in 1979 and situation is fairly normal. The Punjab insurgency rose to its peak in 1982 but was brought under control with the successful termination of Operation Blue Star in 1984. None of the movements were indigenous. There was always external support, either financially or with weapons and training.
In each case, the government acted by initiating talks when the army brought the situation under control. In every case, it was a combination of hard actions by the army accompanied by the employment of soft power. Social media had yet to gain root then. Information on army movements and actions spread by word of mouth, demonstrations and opposition to its cordon and search operations, especially in the North East, occurred even then, with equal ferocity, albeit different from stone throwing.
Insurgency in J and K began in the nineties and originated from the valley, spreading across the state. There was no border fencing, limited troop deployment, hence it spread rapidly, engulfing all districts, including Jammu. Most militants then were from Pak. Civilians were equally targeted as were security forces. The army moved in, slowly brought the situation under control, eliminated militancy from South of Pir Panjal and confined it to limited districts in the valley where it presently exists. The Hurriyat was then neither as powerful nor as united as they presently are. Governments in power, both at the state and centre, failed to take advantage of the situation, to resolve the issue with dialogue and seek a via media. This laxity and indecisiveness has resulted in the situation we now face.
The youth in the valley are presently being ignited by multiple means, sources unavailable at the commencement of the problem, nor even when the army regularly restored near normalcy. They are being incited by Pak sponsored Imams belting religious Jihad from the Minbars of the mosques, easily available Pak and Saudi TV channels glorifying Islam and Jihad, social media highlighting the glory of local militants, ISIS creation of the Caliphate and accompanied by money flowing freely for supporting violence and stone throwing, routed through the Hurriyat. Adding fuel to fire is the regular release of fake videos of atrocities and messages on a variety of social media sites, inciting the youth to come in mass numbers and prevent anti-militancy operations. The Indian press generally covers cities in the region and seeking high TRPs, portrays the problem as assuming dangerous proportions. In reality, the situation is different in cities and rural areas.
Simultaneously, there is a growing fear of the spread of ISIS culture in the valley, with some local militants terming the battle to be one of creating a Caliphate, contrary to the announcements of the Hurriyat. Thus, Kashmir is a complex battle ground, encompassing militancy and local youth agitations, all being fuelled by increasing reliance on social media.
In this scenario, the army appears to be losing the battle of social media, while remaining on top in controlling militancy. It’s attempts to highlight positive actions of itself and faith and trust of the rural Kashmiri on it, especially in times of crises seems to have missed their target. Similar is projection of financial impact on locals due to a second year running of no tourism. Local social media networks appear to have blanked out the positive image of the army. Surprisingly, even across the nation, this information has limited spread.
The army’s publicity cell, termed as the Additional Director General of Public Relations (ADGPI), releases details of activities and events the army conducts in rural areas of the state, where militancy prevails and the level of local participation in each of them. The cell maintains a twitter account and a Facebook page where it posts all details. However, despite its claim of large viewership, it has limited reach. A glance at the page would indicate the activities and the level of participation of the locals. An analysis of participation and faith on the army would reveal the impact it has had, compelling Syed Geelani of the Hurriyat, to announce that army run Goodwill schools should be boycotted.
The army has successfully conducted youth festivals, medical camps, skill development training, multiple children activities, knowledge enhancing tours across the nation for children from remote areas, inter village sports events, recruitment rallies and pre-selection training. Its super forty initiative, involved training forty Kashmiri students for the IIT JEE exams, of which twenty-eight succeeded. When schools in the valley were shut in the burning summer of 2016, army goodwill schools functioned unhindered. It even supported local talent in sports, Tajamul Islam, being an example. This young girl won the world sub-junior kick boxing title. None of the army conducted events were marred by protests or stone throwing. Each one had active participation.
Thus, the army needs to gear itself up for a battle of minds as the city youth continue to be misguided. It needs to be prepared for multiple challenges in the social media field. It has to counter false Pak propaganda, anti-national videos emerging from local militants, as also project its own events positively. Interviews, albeit hiding the identity of those who benefited from its facilities or who were provided succour need to be projected through every possible media. Simultaneously, it needs to counter the separatists, proving their hypocrisy. This action must gain prominence locally, options for doing so are known and must be exploited. Its social media strategy must be well-crafted, implemented by professionals. Whether it employs its existing departments or creates one specifically for this task, is an internal decision, however, it must implement it as of yesterday.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army