The Doklam tangle and its aftermath Cover Story Fauji India Aug 17

The Doklam tangle and its aftermath Cover Story Fauji India Aug 17

Doklam is a narrow plateau which lies near the tri-junction of India, Bhutan and China. The plateau is at the base of the Doka La, a pass China claims and is located on the watershed. The plateau is fifteen Kms from Nathu La, the border trading post between India and China. It was through this post that Indians participating in the Mansarovar yatra were to transit, which China cancelled as the first fallout of the standoff. The plateau occupies the southern part of the Chumbi valley, a part of Tibet, which juts deep towards India, separating Sikkim from Bhutan. It is officially disputed between Bhutan and China. India is not a party to the dispute; however, India does get involved when the location of the trijunction is concerned. The trijunction is the point where the borders of India, China and Bhutan meet.

China claims that the trijunction is Mount Gipmochi (also called as Gyemo Chen), located three Kms South of the Doka La, whereas India and Bhutan consider it to be Batang La located four Kms North of the Doka La. The Chinese claim, if accepted, would permit them to construct their present road upto the Jampheri Ridge, a part of Bhutan, where during war India deploys some forces and from where the terrain gradually descends into South Western Bhutan and then onto the strategically located Siliguri Corridor.

The area was peaceful with China not professing any claims till the sixties. In the late sixties, it began road construction activities in the region. China presently quotes the 1890 China- Britain treaty to insist on the location of the tri-junction. Bhutan on the other hand rightly justifies its stand stating that the treaty demarcates the boundary between India and China and not Bhutan. China, understanding the strategic significance of the area began increasing pressure on Bhutan to accede the area, as a swap for other disputed territory. Bhutan resisted. Bhutan is the only neighbour of Chinese which does not have diplomatic relations with it.

The two nations had agreed via written agreements of 1988 and 1998 that both would maintain peace and status quo in the region, till the issue is resolved. From 2004 Chinese pressure increased on Bhutan. China presently has roads and tracks moving into the Chumbi valley. Some are under observation from Indian posts. This road if constructed would bring China almost upto the Jampheri Ridge, thus enhancing risks to the Siliguri corridor.

The Siliguri corridor is a narrow stretch of land that connects India’s North-Eastern States to the rest of the country. It is aptly termed as the ‘Chickens Neck’. Nepal and Bangladesh lie on either side of the corridor. Bhutan lies to the North. At its narrowest point, it is twenty-seven Kms wide. All rail and road communications transit through this region. Though heavily defended, however the possibility of it being severed always exist. Hence for India, accepting Chinese claims upto Mount Gipmochi would enhance vulnerability of the corridor. China is aware of this sensitivity and thus was seeking to alter the status quo.

The present crises commenced in the second week of Jun when a small Chinese patrol entered the area and demolished bunkers constructed by the Bhutanese army on the Doka La, a few years ago, however, are rarely manned. Indian troops occasionally occupied these bunkers. China remained silent for a few days, awaiting Bhutanese reactions. When it found none forthcoming, it proceeded to its next stage.

On 16th Jun, it moved in a PLA road construction company with full equipment, intent on commencing construction of the road. They were confronted by the Royal Bhutanese Army (RBA). The RBA informed them about previous agreements including the one of 1998, which stated maintenance of status quo. Hot words were exchanged and there was also some jostling, however the Chinese refused to budge. Bhutan then raised the issue with India. Two days later, Indian troops moved in when it realized that China was seeking to unilaterally alter the status quo.

India and Bhutan have close relations and are guided by the latest treaty initialled in 2007. This friendship treaty states that neither government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other. India maintains an Indian Army Training Team (IATT) and an Engineer Border Roads company in Bhutan. India and China also have an agreement of 2012, wherein both agreed to maintain status quo till the issue was resolved between them and the third party, implying Bhutan. India watched the developing situation and reacted when it was convinced that Chinese intentions were to change status quo.

For Indian troops to move in and deploy, preventing China from proceeding forward, the decision would have been taken at the highest level. Indian position on the issue and its reasons for getting involved was clarified by India’s foreign minister, Sushma Swaraj, when she gave a statement in parliament. She stated, ‘As long as it was between China and Bhutan, we had nothing to do with it, but since this deals with the trijunction point, it affects our security position.’ She went on to add, ‘If China, unilaterally changes the status quo of the trijunction point, it is a straight challenge to our security’.

Thus, while the plateau per se falls in the disputed area between Bhutan and China, the end point of Chinese intentions is to change the location of the trijunction to suit their military plans. Hence, while the standoff is in an area not under dispute between India and China, the road under construction would become a major threat to Indian security needs. Chinese objections against India stem from the point that India has crossed the border and challenged Chinese forces in their territory and interfered on behalf of Bhutan, an independent country, in an area not under dispute with them.

Since the commencement of the standoff, troops have been facing each other, eyeball to eyeball, being replaced every two hours, with weapons facing downwards, indicating no aggressive intent. Indian comments throughout the over a month-long standoff have been muted with no indication of hostility. India has only defended its action and been seeking status quo. It has throughout been claiming that diplomatic channels are open and it seeks a diplomatic solution to the crises. It has never indicated any aggressive content.

Chinese state controlled media, has on the other hand, been building war hysteria, seeking to pressurize India to back down. It even downplayed the meeting between the Chinese premier and the Indian Prime Minister on the side lines of the G-20 summit. They have specifically stated that there would be no talks unless India withdraws from Chinese territory. Remarks have emanated threatening India of war and to drive home the point, China has shared details of conducting live firing exercises in the region, moving forward additional stores and equipment as also conducting tests of its latest battle tanks.

Diplomatically China continues to exert pressure. It briefed envoys of G20 nations stressing their point of view and even stating that Chinese patience could run out and war is a possibility. Its state controlled press continues building an internal hype. To further enhance pressure on India, China commenced moving its submarines and warships into the Indian Ocean.

While India closely monitors the situation, it seeks to avoid a confrontation. It has continually been seeking talks, which China denies. Back channel diplomacy between the two nations aimed at seeking a solution would be in progress. Differences in perceptions, media hypes and insistence on justification of stand by both countries leave small room for manoeuvre. However, despite the rhetoric and warmongering, neither nation desires escalation.

Localised offensive military actions by China, seeking to gain advantage, could blow into a full-blooded conflict, if it fails to achieve its aims. Further, any military action implies preparation, movement of equipment, ammunition, stores, troops and other related activities. Additional troop movements would be easily visible across the entire LAC. With modern satellite and other monitoring devices available to both nations, such activities have not yet been reported. Hence, China may be threatening, however would be seeking a solution through diplomacy.

There are other diplomatic impacts on the standoff. China has border disputes, including the South China Sea issue, with almost all its neighbours. They would be watching the developments keenly. If China resorts to military action and fails, they would also begin claiming their rights. India’s neighbours, mainly Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh would also have their own interests. India standing up for Bhutan will convince others that it can bank on Indian support. If India succumbs to Chinese pressures, it may quite likely push them into the Chinese camp. Hence a military solution would harm both.

The nineteenth National Congress of the Communist party of China is scheduled towards the latter part of the year. Xi Jinping would be seeking to gain another term. He has already begun removing potential opponents from the scene. A conflict wherein China does not achieve its aims would close all options for him and provide his detractors enough fuel. Further, China pulling back unilaterally would also be harmful. Hence, the situation requires a carefully crafted diplomatic solution, with face saving and win-win to both.

Economically, China has more to lose. The two nations economy is intrinsically linked. China’s largest market is India. Any offensive action could impact its economy as Chinese products would be locally banned and Chinese factories made redundant. Further the balance of payments is in China’s favour, which would also be impacted.

India also is wary of letting the standoff become a cause for conflict. Pakistan, presently in political turmoil, facing flak from the US, solely dependent on China for aid, support and military hardware, may be compelled to take advantage of the situation and add to India’s woes by enhancing threat on its western borders, mainly J and K. It may not get involved in an open conflict, but could enhance tensions along the border by escalating ceasefire violations and enhancing infiltration to increase pressure within the valley.

The Indian economy is showing signs of growing at a satisfactory pace. If tensions increase and a conflict becomes imminent, it could impact it. India would be compelled to divert funds for emergent defence procurements, impacting social and developmental programs. While India has the tacit support of many nations, their interceding, except at the international levels is unlikely. Thus, India would also lose.

In the ultimate analysis, the situation does demand a face saving solution acceptable to all sides. India has a sole demand, maintain status quo. China desires, India withdraw unilaterally. Bhutan, on whose behalf India interceded, desires status quo. If the requirements of the three nations are to be considered, then options are limited. Thus solutions, though limited can emerge. In case china agrees to maintain status quo, India would have no hesitation in pulling back first and letting the RBA monitor the withdrawal of China.

Militarily, both nations would be losers, in case even a localized conflict is resorted to. Media hype and warmongering has only added to internal pressures. Hence, astute diplomacy may be the only way forward. With the BRICS summit fast approaching, the desire of both nations would be to seek an amicable resolution at an early date. Maturity in governments from both sides could pave the way for a solution thus ending tensions.