Today, India recollects the surgical strikes launched on 29th Sep last year, across the Line of Control (LoC) into Pakistan. The event coincided, this year, with an ambush on the NSCN (K) group which has evaded talks and has been regularly attacking Indian forces and local civilians. The period leading to the anniversary also included comments by Lt General DS Hooda, who as the Northern Army Commander had overseen the strike. His successor, Lt General Devraj Anbu, also warned Pak that India could again cross the LoC, if Pak does not control terror activities.
While India recollected the event and the success of the operation, Pak continued in its denial mode, rejecting Indian claims. This was expected, and as General Hooda had stated, the main worry was a Pak counter strike, but the rejection of the strike by the Pak army, ensured that it would not occur. Pak had limited choices, as to admit was to accept a failure and demoralize even the cannon fodder Jihadi’s, while lowering the prestige and standing of the army. Denial was logical as the army controls the nation and hence any setback would be damaging in reputation. No media house could dare to go against the deep state. Further, Indian opposition politicians, who questioned the strike gave support to the Pak establishment to deny it.
A surgical strike is a difficult operation, entailing indepth planning, catering for multiple contingencies, alternate options including planning for a rescue strike in case of a part of the force gets stuck. Secrecy, need to know sharing of information and employing multiple launch and re-entry points have to be catered for. A failure in any form could spell disaster for the nation, hence is always a tension packed moment for those who had issued the go ahead, till complete. Its success indicates that all these were catered for, soldiers motivated, trained and well led.
While India decorated its heroes, who participated in the strike and released a book on Indian army heroes, with a chapter specifically covering the operation, mother’s in Pakistan, whose sons were in those terrorist camps and eliminated, would never know what happened to them. They were removed and buried under the directions of the army, hence would remain in unmarked graves for eternity and forgotten. They were in any case expendables and cannon fodder for the Pak deep state.
While the Indian army morale got a boost and the confidence of its troops increased manifold, Pak troops aware of the strike, would always remain affected, expecting a repeat anytime. Its military hierarchy and political leadership are aware of the realities and hence wary of Indian retaliation. With relations plummeting and talks nowhere on the horizon, escalation on the LoC would continue unabated.
Possibly after Pathankot, India had conveyed a quiet message to Pak, that let there be no more attacks, failing which India would be compelled to act. Pak ignored the warning, Uri occurred. The government realized that if it did not act, indicate a change in strategy to offensive actions, Pak’s behaviour would remain unchanged. The strike was launched and for a long time there were no more major attacks. The message had been understood and India’s offensive policy displayed. There are many options other than a physical strike, which India could adopt, in case it needs to hit across once again. Any action by India cannot be logically termed as an illegal operation as India claims complete J and K, with Pak continuing as forced occupiers of POK.
While a strategic shift in India’s military policy was conveyed, but has anything changed on ground after the surgical strike or have things moved further downhill. Initially the Pak army behaved, however with passage of time, the LoC has readopted to its earlier active status. The high morale of the Indian army and its recent successes as it eliminates all terrorists who seek to enter or remain within, is changing the realities in Kashmir, while conveying to Pak a clear message that we reserve the right to strike where we want to and when.
A fear of a similar or near similar strike always exists within the Pak military establishment, compelling them to move terror launch pads deeper into their territory and closer to army camps. It has also resulted in increased level of alertness of their troops.
The LoC is and would always remain active, irrespective of agreements and local level talks. Any side can escalate or commence firing, while blaming the other. There is no control mechanism. While India has no desire for activating the LoC, Pak needs to, in order to support infiltration attempts, and it does. The only time, when the LoC witnesses’ peace is when Indian retaliation makes it costly for Pak, in terms of casualties and damage to posts.
With diplomatic relations between the two nations moving downhill, US pressure building and as the recent UN General Assembly debate indicated, animosity of the subcontinent against Pak, it may be compelled to act. While the polity seeks to obliterate terror groups, the deep state has other plans. The rise of the TTP, the Pakistan Taliban, was a fallout of the attack on the Lal Masjid in 2007, resulting in over a hundred dead. A similar act against the anti-India terror groups could compel them to turn inwards, adding to Pak woes. Thus, the comments by their foreign minister, Khwaja Asif, that they are aware of the fact that terror groups are a liability, but do not possess the assets to remove them.
While Pak may have denied the strike, those in power are aware, compelling them to remain wary of Indian military intentions, it has limited options. It cannot openly reign in the terror groups, without placing their own people in jeopardy, nor can it shut their terror factories, as it is possibly a major source of employment for those radicalized since childhood. Hence, while we would continue to threaten Pak against major strikes, we cannot stop terrorists from attempting to enter the valley and ferment violence. Since both nations seek to establish moral ascendency along the LoC, it would continue remaining active, unless India makes the cost of escalation heavy to Pakistan.