Pakistan can’t blame India or US for its failures in Afghanistan Daily O 08 Oct 17
The increasing trust deficit between Kabul and Islamabad (read Rawalpindi) has been evident in recent times. The address to the UN General Assembly by the Afghan President, Ashraf Ghani, was clearly directed towards Pakistan, compelling Pak to take recourse to the ‘right to respond’. Similar were his comments during his recent visit to India.
India and Afghanistan signed, amongst a slew of agreement, one for training the Afghan police in India. India is already involved in training of the Afghan army, providing military equipment and economic aid. There is no member of the Afghan government, who has ever had a kind word towards Pakistan. In their view, Pak is a terror supporting nation.
The Afghan leadership has been buoyed by the direct warning given to Pakistan by Donald Trump on curbing terror groups. Its reinforcement by Jim Mattis, the US Defence Secretary, when he stated that the US would be closely watching Pak choices in the new Afghan policy, only added to their woes. Jim Mattis’s visit to Delhi, wherein India agreed to participate in the development and training of Afghan security personnel, caused greater worry in Pak. Jim Mattis’s statement to the senate committee that India turned down boots on the ground, solely due to considerations of Pak security cut no ice.
As a counter, the Pak Prime Minister, Shahid Abbasi, stated that Pak would never accept any role for India in Afghanistan. His words, “We don’t foresee any political or military role for India in Afghanistan. I think it will just complicate the situation and it will not resolve anything”, clearly imply the thoughts of the deep state. His other comments included the perception that Afghanistan and Kashmir are linked, as a resolution on Kashmir would bring peace to the region. There was a similar echo when the Pak foreign minister met the US secretary of state recently.
In this melee and worry, the Pak army chief rushed to Kabul last week with offers of training for Afghan army and police, aiming to counter growing Indian influence. He was also seeking to identify common measures to enhance security cooperation including joint operations against terror groups. Both nations have accused the other of supporting terror groups inimical to the other. Pak accuses Afghanistan of permitting, along with India, the existence of the IS, TTP, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA). Kabul claims Pak supports Taliban and Haqqani network.
Since the warning by Trump and the confirmatory comments Mattis, Pak feels that it is being singled out for US failure in Afghanistan. Their foreign minister stated that it alone cannot take responsibility for Afghanistan’s peace and security, nor would it permit the Afghan battle to be fought on its soil. At the same time, he also admitted that the Haqqani network was a liability, but lacked assets to tackle it.
The BLA and the TTP, both based in the mountains of Afghanistan, continuously cross the Durand Line, which remains unrecognised by Afghanistan, to target minorities and security personnel in the western provinces. Pak claims that these are supported by India and the Afghan intelligence agency. With Indian presence and involvement, less boots on the ground, only likely to increase in Afghanistan, the worry in Pak is only rising.
It has never reconsidered its flawed Afghan policy, nor even attempted to rectify it, instead has been blaming Afghanistan, India and the US for its ills and sufferings. Pak’s approach towards its western neighbour should have been more friendly and cooperative, especially since the US walked in post 9/11. Had it cooperated, India would have been kept at arms-length, the Durand Line issue nearing resolution and anti-Pak terror groups possibly struggling to survive.
With Musharraf in the driver’s seat, it felt that it could control the future of Afghanistan and make the state subservient to Pak, hence continued to support terror groups operating in Afghanistan, without any long-term analysis. It provided sanctuary to Bin Laden and the Taliban leaders, only seeking to continue to exercise control over them. With passage of time and regular change in the Taliban leadership, the group began creating its own identity and source of funding through production and distribution of opium, hence ignored Pak’s material support. Thus, they became liabilities, which Pak now fears to handle.
Had Pak handled Afghanistan with positivity, the return of Afghan refugees back to their nation would have been easier. It took the difficult path, left the nation in turmoil, hence prevented their return. It remains burdened with them and would in time have to accept them as Pak nationals as even the second generation has grown and settled there.
Its flawed approach to a fledging state, after NATO intervention, only opened doors for India to wade in, following the diktat, ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’. Once India got a foothold, it went ahead seeking to further expand the same. Its developmental projects have earned it goodwill amongst the masses and provided it a free run within the country. Attacks on Indian consulates have only enhanced hatred towards Pak and sympathy to India.
Training their army and police personnel exposes them to Indian soft power, its freedom and ethics, making them strong supporters of India. This would further alienate them from Pak. In fledgling democracies, where the elected government has instability and terrorism is a daily battle, the army has a strong foothold, as it possesses the power to hold the nation together. The same holds good for Afghanistan also. An alienated Afghan army would never accept any goodwill from Pakistan.
No inputs flowed from either side on the outcome of the visit of their army chief. Thus, probably there was no significant breakthrough. The only result was a panicky seven-hour conference of the army chief with his corps commanders.
Pak is on slippery ground, solely because of its own flawed policies. It needs to change tack, but cannot as those it needs to control, are beyond its capabilities. It may beg for time or seek to deflect the blame, but would never be able to give satisfactory results. Hence, it would only face international ire and deeper isolation in the days ahead.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army