Why the violence in Islamabad has a resonance in India’s Panchkula Daily O 26 Nov 17
There were two recent incidents, one in India in Panchkula, where the supporters of Ram Rahim, the self-styled Godman had entered the city and camped for a couple of days before his sentencing and the other across the border, in Islamabad where protestors seeking reversal of amendments to the election act had been on a sit in since the beginning of Nov. In both the cases there was an expectation of violence when action to evict them would be undertaken. In Panchkula, even if Ram Rahim was sentenced, which he ultimately was, violence was likely. Yet in both cases the governments oscillated and delayed action.
Putting aside the fact that the reasons behind the two protests were different, so was the number of protestors, however there were some similarities and limited variations in the manner in which they were tackled. In both cases protestors had begun gathering in the city, well before the anointed event and the governments, in one case the state and in Pak’s case the centre, chose to turn a blind eye.
The governments were primarily concerned with their own survival. The Haryana leadership had tapped Ram Rahim to endorse them for votes, hence was unwilling to turn against his supporters, fearing a political backlash, while the Pak government was worried about the forthcoming elections as also the courts, which was threatening to place Nawaz behind bars. It was finally the courts which compelled the governments to act, once it realized that the protests could turn ugly.
In both cases, as a precautionary measure, the governments had requisitioned immense police and central armed police forces (CAPFs). In Panchkula, CAPFs began arriving on the morning of the sentencing, whereas in Islamabad they were in the city, but away from the scene of protests. The initial assault on the protesters were launched by police and CAPFs, which failed. Analysing the causes would again bring in similarities.
The major cause of the failure was that the initial assault was ill conceived and uncoordinated, hence was expected to fail. Had it been done at night or early morning, in both cases, there would have been a reasonable chance of success. As videos and news reports indicated, the police ran from the scene, adding to a growing feeling of confidence amongst the protestors. This happened because the governments had underestimated the strength and determination of those protesting, who were passionate on their cause.
Another similarity was that both governments hesitated, solely to avoid a political fallout, hence permitted protestors to hold the city to ransom, while they contemplated action. While the Pak protests would end up as a national level crisis, the Haryana protests challenged the state, leading to a verbal blame game between the chief Ministers of Punjab and Haryana, which is bound to be exploited by other political parties in the future.
The difference between both nations controlling the situation was the reaction of the army, which was ultimately inducted, however the time frame of induction was different. In Haryana it moved in near simultaneous to the failure of the CAPF and police actions, whereas in Pakistan, it was a day later. In Pak, the army chief was aware of the gravity of the situation, even before eviction actions were launched, however seeking to place the government in an embarrassing situation, initially refused to involve the army in controlling the situation.
The Director General, Pakistan’s Inter Services Public Relations (DG ISPR), tweeted on Saturday, the day of the initial attempt to break the protests, that their army chief had telephonically informed the Prime Minister, to handle the dharna peacefully avoiding violence from ‘both sides’. He even mentioned that this was in national interest. Interestingly, he placed state security personnel and protestors on the same platform as far as violence was concerned. His tweet implied that the army would not get involved, unless initial attempts failed, and the government embarrassed.
In Haryana on the other hand, the army was on standby and employed almost simultaneous to eviction actions by the police and CAPFs had failed. There were no comments by the army on not employing its troops, after all India is a true democracy and the army is dutybound to respond when called. Thus, peace was restored early, with little loss to state and property. Casualties in Pak’s case would be much higher, as the army delayed induction.
There were needless casualties in both cases. These were mainly due to police firing, which could have been avoided had timely action been taken to evict unlawful protestors. The blame for the failure in both cases were given to the politicians who contemplated, while the protestors gathered strength and amassed weapons. Neither government admitted that they were aware that the protestors had come planned to agitate and cause violence, in case the decision was not in their favour.
However, as per reports in the Panchkula case and would shortly flow in the Islamabad case, the tactical action of removing protestors from the site, by the state police, was flawed because of lack of information on their determination and the uncoordinated and piecemeal employment of security forces. The similarity in failure is compounded that there was enough time to coordinate and plan a cohesive and forceful action. Interestingly, in Pakistan’s case, the police, until they fired teargas, never realized the direction of wind was against the very use of gas, something which should have been known since they had time.
Ultimately, securing vote banks and avoiding political turmoil delay decision making, especially when handling situations which have a possibility of escalating. Inducting police and CAPFs without a cohesive plan and in an uncoordinated manner is bound to lead to embarrassing situations, seeking the deployment of the army. It would also enhance needless casualties. When everything fails, it is the army. In Panchkula, timely induction restored the situation in a short time, in Pak, delay in induction would prolong the crises, adding to the discomfiture of the government.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army