Pak- China collusion on CPEC could endanger the subcontinent Rakshak News portal 13 Dec 17 (English Version)
It is an established fact that Pakistan has placed all its eggs in one basket, which implies China and the China Pak Economic Corridor (CPEC). It’s deep state’s policy of supporting terror groups, enhancing internal fissures and increasing insecurity is such that the world has ignored Pak in its development, leaving it as a country deep in debt. Comments from all walks of Pak society are only on the benefits which may accrue from the CPEC.
While internal support to the CPEC is immense, its true costs, terms of engagement and method of repayment are yet kept under wraps. From limited official inputs flowing from Pak, the Gwadar port has almost been handed over to China, with 91% of income going to China for the next forty years. Thus, clearly Pak is moving beyond the way of Sri Lanka, who only had to hand over the Hambantota port on lease for ninety-nine years due to its inability to repay loans. Pak has already handed over Gwadar for forty years, with the rest of CPEC costs yet to be announced. The impact on Pak’s economy is likely to be such that much more would be at stake for the nation.
This implies that as a nation it would remain under debt to China not only for the present but possibly for generations. Work on the CPEC had almost come to a standstill as China re-evaluated its terms of funding, based on changing internal insecurities. It is internationally known that Chinese rates of interest are much higher than most other nations including international funding agencies, hence smaller nations who borrow from China end up as their satellites, Zimbabwe being a clear example. India had advised nations in its immediate neighbourhood to avoid getting into this state, which most have adhered to.
In Pakistan’s case, Chinese funding is much higher than most other countries where China has invested. It has already pledged approximately forty-six billion dollars, with more in the pipeline. Such a large investment is being done in a country, where instability increases by the day. The recent Islamabad sit-in by religious groups, propelling of Hafiz Saeed to form his own political party, side lining of main stream political parties, ongoing terror strikes by the TTP and freedom struggle by the Baluch freedom movement only indicates that the future is likely to be more unstable. If these groups are permitted to contest the next elections, it would add to problems. For China the investment is an amount which it can ill afford to lose.
To add to uncertainties is the CPEC passing through disputed territory, compelling India to reject join the OBOR project. Non-participation by India, a growing economic and military power, with immense influence in the sub-continent is likely to impact its financial viability. China has attempted numerous tricks to attract India to join, which India has shunned. Thus, any future Indo-Pak conflict may impact the entire project, which China can ill afford. China would have anticipated part of the uncertainty, not the whole. It re-evaluated the impact of its investment and announced its willingness to continue funding, provided the Pak army takes over the project, thus supporting the army over the polity. It had no choice, but to go ahead, alongside a stronger presence of the PLA for ensuring security, as it has already pumped in enough funds. PLA forces have already been noticed in Sindh, POK and along the CPEC, an aspect meriting security concerns for India.
Further, to propel the Pak armed forces, the only force capable of securing the corridor, it would apart from funding and strengthening it, also seek to operate alongside it for security purposes. It must ensure that the Pak army is strong enough to deter India from launching any pre-emptive strike to threaten the security of the corridor. Further, in case there is any threat of an Indo-Pak conflict, it would have limited options to secure its investments.
The limitations imply just two options, supporting Pak by either launching an offensive or broker peace. India has presently shown immense restraint, despite provocations by Pak. Therefore, India would only contemplate an offensive option, if all other avenues of controlling Pak fail. Despite naming and shaming Pak in every international forum, India has continuously called on the international community to reign in Pak, to no avail.
Hence, in case of a major terror strike within the country, in case Pak fails in Kashmir, India may be left with no option but to launch a limited conventional strike, risking escalation. Assured Chinese support may preclude Pak from escalating to a nuclear level.
China to protect its investments, loss of which could threaten the stability of the Xi Jinping, may have no option but to posture forces to support Pak. This would be aimed at preventing India from switching forces and resources from one front to the other. In case India does call the Chinese bluff, then it may even launch a limited offensive on Indian soil.
Pak’s deep state has continued on its path of self-destruction. It has destabilized its internal political situation by placing mainstream political parties on the backfoot, while openly supporting religious and fundamentalist groups, to gain a stronger hold on the country. These groups, if in control of the nation and free from restrictions, would enhance their terror operations in India, compelling India to react.
China, which has invested vast sums on the project, would not sit idle and let its investments sink. It would be compelled to act. India, therefore faces a possible risk of a two-front war, solely due to the Pak deep state’s manipulations. Hence, whenever the service chiefs claim that India needs to be prepared for a ‘two-front war’ they are right.
A Pak-China collusion, solely to ensure Chinese investments, is very much on the cards in the near future. The government of India needs to realize that it cannot ignore defence preparedness hence must ensure that capabilities to counter a two-front offensive are created at the earliest.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army