US-Pak battle of wits rages The Statesman 16 Jan 18
Since the tweet by Trump at 4 AM on new years day, blaming Pak for consuming US funds and doing nothing in battling the Taliban and Haqqani network, relations between the two have only been spiralling downhill. The US has suspended all military assistance to Pak, issued threats and yet attempted to cajole them to act. Like always, back channels employing military to military contacts continue. Pak on the other hand has been crying as always, that its true contribution has been overlooked, US should consider its own failures prior to blaming it and the groups operate from Afghan soil, not Pak.
To further confuse the environment, it briefed the diplomatic corps stationed in Islamabad on Indian interference in their war on terror, ceasefire violations and involvement in supporting anti-Pak terror groups in conjunction with the Afghan intelligence service. As a final threat to the US, their defence minister announced suspension of all intelligence and military cooperation with them, while claiming that the aid cut has had no impact.
Factually, Pak knows that the US is aware that it has and will continue to provide support to the Taliban and Haqqani network. It may have to repeat Musharraf’s actions of turning 360 degrees and challenging those whom he supported under US pressure, provided its terms and conditions are met. Pak has adopted a strong stance mainly because it feels that the US needs it more than they need US support. This flows from a collection of reasons.
Firstly, with the Taliban and Haqqani leadership safely ensconced deep within Pak, it knows that US strikes if any, could cause immense collateral damage, worsening an already deteriorating relationship, compelling Pak to react adversely. Secondly, it is aware that without Pak support, the Taliban may not come to the negotiating table. Thirdly, it knows that the US, mainly because of its enmity with Iran, with sanctions and low diplomatic relations with Russia would require the services of the Karachi port and Pak airspace. Thus, it could always shut access adding to their woes. Finally, it is aware of Chinese support, which came as soon as the US imposed aid cuts.
Many former diplomats including Richard Olsen, the former US ambassador to Pakistan, have stated that such humiliating and penalising action against Pak may not work. He states that ‘it is likely to respond by showing how it can truly undercut our position in Afghanistan’. He also stated that, ‘the generals (in Pakistan) knew that as long as the US maintained an army in Afghanistan, it was more dependent on Pak, than Pak was on it’.
The US had made a strategy for Afghanistan and must stick to it. It was aware of the crucial role which Pak would play in it. Further, throughout its involvement, it was losing soldiers to Taliban strikes, which were being financed by the same funds which it gave Pak. Thus, indirectly it was paying Pak to kill its own. This had to change. The present decision-making leadership in the US are Afghan veterans, aware of the pitfalls and blocks which it may encounter from Pak and would have evaluated options to counter them.
There would be diplomatic and military options to enforce on Pak in case it blocked the use of the Karachi port. The US, if compelled, could establish a costly air corridor, while making it difficult for Pak in multiple ways. By enhancing drone strikes, even deeper into Pak, accepting collateral damage, while targeting the Taliban and Haqqani leadership, would lower the standing and image of the Pak army, which it cannot accept. Diplomatically it could commence removing Pak from a non-NATO ally status or even declaring it a terror supporting state, thus denying it funds from international monetary bodies.
However, unless major fears of Pak which it would have stated quietly to the US, denied publicly, remain unaddressed, it would continue to hesitate. Thus, the importance of back channel diplomacy continuing. These include denying India a significant role in Afghanistan, which it considers its strategic backyard, controlling the TTP, the Pakistan Taliban, which has safe bases within Afghanistan and the fear of failure of the US in subduing the Taliban, which could compel it to turn inwards against Pak. Officially it has only stated that it would prefer dialogue with the Taliban, rather than an offensive, fears of India supporting the TTP and increased pressures on its Eastern borders with India. It would always remain fearful that if it reduces forces on its Eastern front to employ against terror groups, India could take advantage and enhance pressures.
Chinese support to Pak, assures it of being protected from action in international forums. If China could protect Hafiz Saeed from being declared an international terrorist, it would ensure Pak is not officially chastised, despite it openly terror groups as an instrument of state policy. However, with major funding being blocked, China would become Pak’s main support base. Slowly and steadily it would devour all Pak institutions. This may be detrimental to long term US interests of obtaining cooperation from Pak.
Thus, there remains multiple issues, which unless mutually addressed between Pak and the US and resolved to satisfaction would delay Pak from effectively contributing to US operations. Trump may have spoken in frustration and anger, as he is known to tweet even before his own government is ready, but not without being aware of options available to the US to counter Pak. Thus, as a follow up to his tweet, his government has acted and enforced serious cuts in military aid to Pak. Strong comments by the leadership have only enforced the US views.
Despite all its bravado, claims and comments, Pak would act. It would only be seeking reassurances on its concerns. It was forced to change tack post 9/11 and it would do so now again, as it is aware of the implications of avoiding such an action. Pressure should continue to flow, failing which, it would backtrack.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army