Are calls for downsizing of the army realistic? CENJOWS 06 Apr 18

Are calls for downsizing of the army realistic? CENJOWS 06 Apr 18

Introduction

There has been a spurt in suggestions on downsizing of the Indian army, since China took the giant step of announcing last year that it would cut its PLA strength, while increasing the strength of the PLA navy and strategic forces. The calls gained pace post the announcement of the defence budget, picking up steam after the release of a report by the Standing Committee on Defence quoting the army vice chief’s comments on the negative impact of the budget on defence preparedness.

Chinese downsizing

Facts behind Chinese troop reductions generally remain shrouded in mystery. As per Global Security on PLA reductions, the PLA began in 1949 with 5.5 million soldiers. It then had an officer to enlisted man ratio of 1:1, since the army consisted of illiterate peasant volunteers. In 2007, the PLA had a 33% officer ratio, which remains far higher than any other nation. The PLA has been downsized regularly since it came into being in the 1950’s to offset this skewed balance amongst other factors. It downsized in the fifties, but when the Korean war took place, its strength rose to 6.3 Million. It was reduced by one million in 1985, 500,000 in 1997, 200,000 in 2003 and the latest is a reduction of 300,000 in 2015.

The Chinese have justified their downsizing by stating that it is seeking to create a leaner and meaner army, by reducing its flab, while enhancing the strength and capabilities of its navy and strategic forces. Its force reductions have focussed on few major areas. These are strengthening their navy, air force and strategic forces, reducing officer and NCO ratios with enlisted men, removing administrative organizations, merging units and transferring certain non-PLA units like the railway troops. It has been able to reduce manpower by creating joint commands by reducing logistic echelons, which earlier remained in place to support independent services, but presently one echelon supports all.

The possible Chinese PLA strength as per known details in 2017 post its last reduction was 2 million. It would continue maintaining its large reserve militia force of 1.5 million, not considering an armed police force of a million. The Chinese model, referred to recently by the army chief, General Bipin Rawat, was to develop its armed forces capability alongside development of its economy. India on the other hand has ignored armed forces capabilities for economic development, except post any crises.

Reducing Indian armed forces flab

While there is logic in cutting down the flab of support echelons in the Indian case, however reduction of the tooth has other connotations. The Indian tooth to tail ratio, implying those supporting the fighting forces is 1:1.5 including civilians paid from the defence budget. The Indian armed forces are a legacy from the British era, where logistic echelons were essential to support fighting forces of the second world war era, especially in the Burmese and Malayan campaigns. For a long time, the army felt that in a war, it would be left alone to maintain, sustain and fight the enemy. However, in the present context, that is far from reality.

With better communication lines, there has been a change in development across the nation. Thus, support in operations would be much more forward than earlier. Further, residents of border areas would prefer staying back and caring for their property rather than withdrawing to rear areas as earlier. This would provide the army with reasonable local support also during operations. Thus, it would imply national effort in times of war, rather than the armed forces catering for everything themselves, as was the case decades ago.

Multiple committees created by the government have recommended reduction of the tail. The Krishna Rao committee of the eighties and the Shekatkar committee recently are two examples. Post the Shekatkar committee recommendations, the government announced its decision to reduce 57,000 military personnel from the tail. However, it has refused to take any decision to reduce the civilian component, fearing labour issues impacting vote banks. Thus, the tail which could be further reduced has been largely left untouched.

Why the tooth should not be reduced

Reduction of the tooth, quoting the Chinese example, needs to be considered with care. The environment within and surrounding the two nations are vastly different. China as a nation has disputes with all its neighbours, however in every case, it is China which claims territory, rather than its adversaries, India being an example. Hence, nations which border China need to be alert of Chinese intent rather than it being the other way around.

This implies that nations around China need to defend their territory from Chinese misadventures, rather than China defending its own. Indian forces are deployed on the watershed, securing the passes, in their prepared defences which are regularly maintained and upgraded. Chinese forces on the other hand are in depth and have very few defensive positions prepared as India has. Therefore, it would be China which would launch an offensive into Indian territory, rather than being the other way around.

China shifting focus to its navy and strategic forces is to counter the US and its allies, which have begun challenging Chinese growing hegemony in the South China Sea and the oceans around, as its army would play a limited role. Chinese capability development is therefore aimed at countering US might in its areas of interest, rather than its immediate neighbours.

In India’s case, standoffs are on the rise as China seeks to push demand for its claim lines. All these occur in areas considered ours, rather than across the border, in Tibet. If troop density is reduced, there are always possibilities of China occupying the passes, adding to own discomfiture. To increase pressure on China by threatening to launch a counter offensive, in case of Chinese misadventures, India has commenced raising a corps for offensive operations.

On the other border is Pakistan, which has remained an adversary since the two nations parted on religious lines. No government has been able to move forward on peace talks, as the Pak army, which controls the nation from the back seat on most occasions and from the driver’s seat occasionally, does not desire it. Four wars have been fought yet tensions remain the same. The Shimla agreement failed to resolve Kashmir and since then the relationship has been steadily moving downhill.

The LoC remains active, with regular firing and casualties on both sides. It needs to be manned with strength not only to ensure its sanctity but also to deter infiltration, which Pak regularly resorts to. Though firing has stopped in the Siachen Glacier, yet it cannot be left unoccupied, as Pak could grab parts of it, since it remains un-demarcated. This could have strategic implications for India.

Terror strikes on Indian soil are countered by similar actions across the border. Defences are maintained in strength to deter any adventurism as the border remains unconfirmed. In the present environment troops are deployed in layers to prevent infiltration. Forces, both defensive and offensive are maintained in a high state of readiness all along the border, as tensions between the two nations remains high. All formations in peace locations also remain on six to twelve hours warning schedule and are regularly exercising their operational role.

Internally, the army is also involved in battling insurgencies in Kashmir and the North East. Most formations employed in counter insurgency have this as their secondary task, their primary being either defensive or offensive along the Northern, Western or Eastern borders. The Rashtriya Rifles (RR) leading the insurgency in Kashmir, remains the only force whose primary role is counter insurgency.

Recently, the Chinese military spokesperson, Colonel Ren Guoqiang, stated, ‘I am very confident that military cooperation (between China and Pak) will help facilitate our state to state relationship and also in maintaining regional peace and international stability’. He made this statement post China supplying Pak with a powerful missile tracking system.

This statement is clearly a hint on both alluding to a two-front option, which would be India’s major nightmare, if not correctly addressed. Therefore, ensuring defence of both borders with the belief that it may not be possible to move troops deployed along the LoC or LAC from one theatre to the other, during hostilities with one adversary becomes a binding factor in defence planning.

Nuclear Factor

There is a belief that since all three nations possess nuclear weapons, chances of an all-out conflict remain low. Both India and China have a ‘no first use’ nuclear doctrine. A standoff may escalate as Doklam did threaten to, however the operations would most likely be under a nuclear shadow but would remain conventional.

Pak, fearing India’s declared ‘cold start’ doctrine, has deployed its tactical nuclear missiles forward at Gujranwala and Pano Aqil. It has continuously threatened India with a pro-active nuclear strike, in case India launches any offensive. India would, in case it takes a decision to launch, aim to keep it below the nuclear threshold, by restricting its terminal objectives.

Thus, possession of nuclear weapons alone may not be a deterrence against war. Only strong conventional capabilities may be a deterrent, which remains India’s shortcoming.

Conclusion

India remains the only country in the world which has hostile nuclear armed adversaries on both its borders, who continue to claim large parts of its territory while supporting secessionist and militant groups within. Both the nations remain wary of India’s growing economic prowess and rising international stature. Thus, the Indian army remains amongst the most committed ones of its kind in the world.

In this context, seeking to reduce manpower, especially of its teeth, is pushing its already over committed force deeper into operations, with almost no breaks. Such action is detrimental in maintaining operational effectiveness of the fighting force. Further Indian central police forces are neither trained nor equipped to function independently in counter insurgency tasks.

It should also be understood by those desiring that the nation adopt the Chinese model, that despite all constraints, the army continues to ensure security of the nation and its institutions, enabling rapid economic development. Its conventional force capacities and capabilities must therefore continue being enhanced as threat levels and capabilities of our adversaries continue to rise. Reducing the tail may be logical but tampering with its teeth would be detrimental.

Attempting to ape the Chinese would be catastrophic for national security. Thus arm-chair strategists, who are presently drunk by the power of their pen, need to reassess their ideas with realism, rather than jump and copy nations who face no threat, rather threaten others.

Reconstituting missile and UAV forces Bharat Shakti 03 Apr 18

With enhanced dependency on missiles the time is ripe for discussing whether India should reconsider reconstituting its missile and UAV forces. The Indian missile forces remain under the artillery for manning and training only but are segregated for employment and deployment. With the growing proliferation of UAVs, the issue to be considered is whether we need a separate UAV force or continue with the present concept, where the artillery continues to man and train the users, with deployment and employment under respective force commanders, akin to missiles. Internationally, the concept of employment of missiles also varies.

Chinese missile forces, under the command of the Second Artillery Force or Second Artillery Corps, rechristened on 31 Dec 2015 as the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), controls all missiles of the Chinese army. Till 1985 they were a nuclear deterrent force based primarily on intermediate and medium range missiles. Post 1985 they were assigned intercontinental and conventional missiles as part of their inventory. Thus, all missiles in the Chinese inventory remain with them. It was also elevated from an independent branch to the fourth arm of the military alongside their army (PLA), Navy (PLAN) and air force (PLAAF).

Its missile forces are organized under six missile bases. Assigned to each base are missile brigades, meant for operating the missiles. Limited information available suggests that each base has a mixture of both, conventional and nuclear forces and are oriented towards specific missions. Missile Base 52, is solely directed towards Taiwan and is possibly the only base with conventional missiles.

The US has its nuclear missiles under the control of the US Strategic Command. Its conventional missiles, mainly cruise missiles, are deployed under the command of theatre commanders, who have the authority to employ them. This is because US theatre commands operate away from the mainland. Only nuclear weapons need an authentication from the President. The same is the norm with other western nations. Russia also has separate structures for its nuclear and conventional missile controls. Its nuclear missiles are controlled by its Strategic Rocket Forces.

In India, the artillery is responsible for the manning and handling India’s missile systems though there is a difference in the command, control and employment mechanisms. The strategic and nuclear capable missiles remain under the command and control of the Strategic Forces Command, which functions directly under the National Security Council. Its employment would be a political decision with the CCS under the PM being the authority.

Tactical missiles with conventional warheads, though again manned by the artillery are theatre specific, allocation and permission to launch would most likely be delegated to commanders at lower levels, depending on the operational scenario. Thus, in India it is the artillery which is responsible for their employment as also provides the manpower for their manning, the authority to employ them varies.

The Chinese approach considering their geopolitical requirements may appear logical, but there are drawbacks in the system. The Chinese would be aiming to create a confusion in the minds of their enemy of what it would be planning to launch, nuclear or conventional, since each base has a mix of missiles. This, if wrongly judged it could lead to escalation of conflict.

Secondly, since China has adopted this approach from the start of it inducting missiles into service, it has established structures for their training and created a cadre specific to it. Further, China faces threats not along its borders, as none of its neighbours (including India) have any territorial claims on China, but from the US. Indian actions would be a counter to a Chinese aggression.

The Indian context is different for multiple reasons. Firstly, Indian threats emanate from both its borders, as its border disputes continue to simmer. Hence, it is more likely to employ conventional rather than nuclear missiles. India possesses nuclear weapons only for deterrence and has a clearly enunciated ‘no first use’ policy. Thus, differentiating nuclear and conventional missiles is essential, if India desires to avoid escalation to a nuclear level. Further, India does not follow a theatre command concept, akin to US and China, hence its employment of conventional missiles would most probably be a decision taken in Delhi.

Secondly, the Indian artillery is tasked with degradation and destruction of the enemy’s combat potential. In the present concept, its array of equipment comprising of Guns, Mortars, Missiles, Rockets and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) together forms a formidable force, with the ability to acquire, engage employing multiple means and equipment based on target profile and range as also subsequent Post-Strike Damage Assessment (PSDA) enables seamless operations. This organization, places under one commander resources to engage upto his area of influence.

Thirdly, for India to consider raising a separate missile force would imply additional expenditure including establishing a separate training establishment and cadre. It is an expenditure which the nation can presently ill afford, unless it has sound strategic sense.

The other factor gaining prominence is the proliferation of UAVs in the battle area. With their increased advantage, they would soon be available with every unit, both in defensive and offensive roles. Infantry battalions deployed for operations would need them to monitor the area ahead for early warning, while for the artillery they are essential for target acquisition, engagement and PSDA. Offensive formations would need them to monitor enemy deployment and movement of reserves. The air force has its own requirement of locating enemy’s radar network and monitor enemy airfields.

The higher the level, the more is their requirement for reconnaissance and intelligence. In each case, the duration of flight and height ceiling would vary. Thus, across the land frontier, they are essential at every level. In case India does acquire armed drones, then the employment of these too would need to be coordinated between the air force and the army.

Hence unless there is a coordinated policy for their employment they would be cluttering up an already over polluted battle air space sharing the same with artillery gun fire, helicopters and aircraft. Creating a separate force to employ them and distribute the equipment across the entire spectrum, while seeking to coordinate their actions is nigh impossible, however laying down a policy for their employment during war is. In the present ‘no war no peace’ scenario there are no problems, as the air space remains uncluttered and their employment is unhindered.

In the overall context, there would be no requirement to change existing structures for the organization, deployment and employment of either missile forces nor UAVs. What would be more prudent is to lay down policies and establish means of communication for better coordination at different levels.