Army faces shortfalls in high-end ammunition (English Version) Rakshak News 25 Apr 18

Army faces shortfalls in high-end ammunition (English Version) Rakshak News 25 Apr 18

A report in the press last week stated that the army, in its latest conference of senior officials termed the army commanders conference, deliberated on its holding of ammunition stocks, both in quality and quantity. The army, as per government directives is expected to be prepared for a two-front war, involving both China and Pak operating in collusion. Adding a third dimension of continuing insurgency in Kashmir makes it a two and a half front war.

The recent air force exercise, Gagan Shakti, wherein all air power resources were mobilized, which initially operated on one front, then shifted emphasis on the other was a clear example of the military preparing for the same. Even if China does not commence operations, forces deployed on the Chinese front cannot be shifted to handle operations with Pak.

The armed forces were initially meant to cater for ammunition for a forty-day war, hence reserve of ammunition was accordingly stocked. With all nations in the region possessing nuclear weapons and concern in the international environment of a conventional war moving into the nuclear domain, the duration of an expected war was reduced from forty to ten, implying ten days intensive war. This means that ammunition stocks for all forces deployed on both fronts for every type of weapon system should be available for a minimum of ten days of intense conflict.

This ammunition is spread across the nation from troops deployed along the border to major depots in depth and keeps moving forward as operations progress and expenditure occurs. While in actuality all forces would not be fighting at the same level, hence management of ammunition would be feasible to meet the army’s requirement from reserves maintained in depots.

Ammunition stored is dependent on shelf life. Hence, it is regularly rotated, as newly procured ammunition moves into storage, older ammunition is shifted to training. The more complex the ammunition the shorter is the shelf life. Rockets and missiles have shorter shelf life as compared to others, basically because of the electronic components which form a part of it. These are also costlier. There are varying storage requirements for diverse types of ammunition.

With paucity of funds the army is now being forced to compromise and reconsider its priorities. As per newspaper reports, ammunition variety like the Smerch rockets, Konkors missiles, anti-tank ammunition and influence mines would not be procured. Thus, their holdings would drop to less than the desired levels. Such a decision, though hard needs to be adopted as the government is unwilling to release additional funds. An option of re-examining critical ammunition and possibly extending its shelf life, based on its condition may have to be resorted to. This is however only a short time emergency measure.

Shortfall of specialized ammunition has been impacted as most of it is still in the import category. Indigenously manufactured ammunition may still be readily available. While the budget has impacted defence preparedness, the government must reconsider its allocation as shortfalls in ammunition is unacceptable.

Shortfalls can never be made up, even in a prolonged period as every year, more ammunition would have reached the end of its shelf life. Hence with very little likelihood of the government releasing additional funds in the coming years, the shortfalls would continue adding to security concerns.

In addition to shortfalls in ammunition, the army is also being forced to reconsider its requirement of procuring spares for equipment moving into the vintage phase. As an equipment grows older, its cost of maintenance increases. If new equipment to replace the same is in the pipeline, then the decision is logical, however, shortfalls even in the capital budget would not provide the army with the luxury of such procurements. This would result in lower levels of equipment availability, which remains undesirable.

This combined action would open doors to adversaries to continue with their provocative actions as an army with shortfalls would never be fully prepared for operations. While the soldier would fight to the last man with all that is provided to him, however ensuring that he has the right equipment in the right quantity and in the right place is the responsibility of the government. If it fails to provide the same, them it is playing with national security, which is detrimental.

What government setting panel headed by Ajit Doval for defence planning means for armed forces Daily O 22 Apr 18

The government announced last week of the creation of a new mechanism, termed as the Defence Planning Committee (DPC), under the chairmanship of the National Security Advisor (NSA), Ajit Doval. It would be a permanent body and have as its members the Chairman Chief’s of Staff Committee (presently also a service chief), other service chiefs, foreign secretary, defence secretary and the expenditure secretary of the finance ministry. The member secretary would be the Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff (CISC).

The DPC, as per the press release, is slated to prepare a draft national security strategy, undertake a strategic defence review and formulate an international defence engagement strategy. The idea behind its creation is to establish a mechanism which could undertake integrated planning to enable the forces to meet the challenges in the emerging complex international security environment.

As per the government order, the committee would have four sub committees. These are policy and strategy, plans and capability development, defence diplomacy and defence manufacturing ecosystem. The details of members of each committee and its terms of reference would be announced later. The inputs generated by these committees would be pursued by the defence minister.

Thus, while the organization falls under the purview of the PMO, as the NSC is a part of it and the NSA advises the PM, the processing would be done by the defence minister. The plausible reason for placing it under the PMO is to draw in members from other ministries, which may not have worked as willingly under the MoD.

India needed an overhaul in its ‘apex management of defence’. The basic role of ‘management of defence’ implies developing national security objectives and strategy from national aims and interests, long term military strategy and objectives as also evolving planning guidelines for developing military capability. It also involves implementing, monitoring and controlling military strategy and force development. Such a responsibility would involve the NSC, MoD and service headquarters. In that manner, the organization and chain of processing is beneficial.

National power flows from a combination of economic, diplomatic and military. Thus, the DPC has a combination of senior military members and bureaucrats from the economic and foreign ministries. It enables the government to avoid remodelling the NSC, which is presently IB and RAW (IPS cadre) dominated and lacks suitable representatives from other elements of power.

Further, in creating this committee, the government has once again appointed a pseudo Chief of Defence staff (CDS) in the form of the NSA. He would now be responsible to coordinate, approve and determine major procurements, defence engagement, deployment at the macro level and budgetary demands between the three services based on emerging threat perceptions. Earlier these delved on the defence secretary and the defence minister, leading to heartburns due to their lack of understanding military matters. It gives the government another excuse to avoid and delay appointing a CDS.

The issue of avoiding appointing a CDS is further highlighted by appointing the CISC as the member secretary. The CISC heads HQ Integrated Defence Staff, which is earmarked for formulating a joint military strategy, force development and coordinating force procurement based on priorities determined by emerging threats. It has been unable to perform its assigned task because of non-appointment of a CDS, thus compelling all services to process their cases directly with the MoD. By placing the CISC in the DPC, enables the NSA to function as a pseudo CDS.

Thus, control of the armed forces shifts from the defence minister to the PMO, with the NSA officiating as the CDS.

There would however be advantages in this system. Firstly, all elements involved in projection of national power would remain under one roof. Hence, based on the nature of threat a coordinated approach would emerge, employing each element to its full capacity. Secondly, India desperately requires the creation of a national security strategy, which could then be the policy document for countering emerging threats. Lack of such guidelines implies each ministry rumbles on in isolation.

Thirdly, military engagement also implies military diplomacy and international military cooperation. It is essential in the current environment. Military diplomacy is more pronounced in nations where political uncertainty exists. While the military in these nations remains away from politics, it continues to exert power from behind the throne.

Most nations in our close and extended neighbourhood upto Africa are falling into the Chinese debt trap, forced to surrender strategic assets. This is because governments tend to view short term gains by accepting loans, which result in long term repayment issues. It is here that quiet military diplomacy would pay greater dividends than diplomacy, as military to military contacts would advise on alternate options, where loss of strategic assets is avoided. Further the military would remain, while governments would continue to change. Accepting the growing importance of military diplomacy should be accepted and implemented by the DPC.

Fourthly, the world seeks to engage militarily with India. Decisions taken on the nature and level of engagement are done without consulting the armed forces, which could lead to misinterpretation. Hence, this body is an ideal institution to firm international military cooperation and coordination.

Fifthly is the availability of funds for enhancing defence preparedness. Closer interaction between senior hierarchy at functional and decision-making levels of major ministries would enhance awareness of force capability and development requirements, which may benefit in release of adequate funds the long term.

Finally, and most importantly, the NSA implies the direct involvement of the PMO in immediate matters pertaining to national security and force enhancement. This could be effective if the NSA convinced by arguments on force shortcomings is able to open closed doors and ensure release of adequate funds.

The system may work only if all involved move forward in a coordinated manner and the organization meets at frequent intervals. If it functions akin to the Strategic Planning Group of the NSC, whose meetings are even less than infrequent, then this would result in creation of an additional elephant in government functioning. If the aim is to make the NSA a pseudo CDS, then this organization is doomed to add to problems in the years ahead.

National security has been largely ignored as respective minister’s work in closed spaces, as the present budget has indicated. If this organization can break those shackles and work to enhance defence preparedness based on realistic assessment of threat, only then would it be a worthwhile exercise.