Is a Koreas’ like resolution possible in Indo-Pak case? ORF 03 May 18

Is a Koreas’ like resolution possible in Indo-Pak case? ORF 03 May 18

The conclusion of the summit between North and South Korea was monitored across the globe. With cameras rolling it was excellently choreographed by both leaders. It indicated the setting in of a bonhomie not seen in the peninsula for decades, especially as tensions had risen to a peak in the last one year, when North Korea conducted a series of nuclear and missile tests.

The world had doubts on whether it would succeed, on whether it would bring forth a mention of denuclearization and peace. Most importantly, what would the North demand in return for the same. The results are now out and have been warmly received across the globe.

This was also the day when Modi met Chinese President Xi Jinping for talks on re-setting Indo-China relations. It was also the day when Mohamed Faisal, the Pak Foreign Ministry spokesperson urged India to resume bilateral talks, as Indo-Pak tensions have the possibility of leading to a nuclear war. An op-ed in the Dawn, over the weekend, also suggested India and Pak moving towards a similar agreement.

The Korean joint statement comprised of three basic parts, Inter-Korean exchanges, enhancing military contacts and establishing peace. Amongst inter-Korean exchanges was implementing all previous agreements, establishing liaison offices, encourage active cooperation, exchanges and visits, resolve humanitarian issues and project a common Korean team for the next Asian games in 2018.

On the military front, it included ceasing all hostility, transforming the de-militarized zone into one of peace within a week, resolve the maritime dispute and conduct frequent defence ministerial and working level meetings to solve pending military issues.

On the peace front, the agreement stated to strictly adhere to a non-aggression agreement, carry out disarmament in a phased manner with reduction in military tensions and increased confidence building. Finally, it mentioned that the ultimate objective is to achieve a nuclear free Korean peninsula. The process forward involves diplomatic and military diplomacy moving simultaneously hand in glove.

The only rider in the statement was to pursue trilateral or quadrilateral meetings involving the US and China with a view to declaring an end of the war and establishing a ‘permanent and solid’ peace regime. This would put both the US and China as equal partners in the exercise. This has possibly been added as the US and China have been ardent supporters of the two regimes. It would ensure that both Korean nations have the backing of one super power in the future, who would guarantee its safety.

The hostility between the two Korea’s has been ongoing since the end of the Korean war over six and half decades ago. While North Korea has nuclearized, the South is protected by a US nuclear umbrella. The South has become an economic powerhouse, the North remains backward, withdrawn and economically weak. The two Koreans, with a similar culture are thus vastly apart in every way. There have been similar summits earlier, but none has been able to resolve issues.

When looked in our context, the joint statement is almost akin to what ails Indo-Pak relations. The major difference between the two is that the Koreans ultimately seek reunification, whereas we seek a solution to Kashmir. Analysing the joint statement in our case would indicate where there could be similarities and whether this historic meeting could be replicated in our sub-continent.

In the case of Inter-Korean exchanges, issues common to India and Pak are implementing all existing agreements and declarations including the ceasefire agreements, holding dialogue and negotiations, encourage exchanges, visits and contacts and resolve humanitarian issues that resulted from Kashmir’s divide. Every government in J and K has always demanded open borders and greater people to people contacts between the population on both sides of the LoC.

Assessing the military aspects of the agreement, commonalities too would stand out. The first is to cease all acts of hostilities against each other. The second is to convert the border (demilitarized zone) into one of peace by stopping all hostile acts. The third is to resolve the sea border to prevent accidental clashes. In our case, it would involve avoiding arrest of fishermen who inadvertently stray across. Finally, hold frequent defence ministerial and working level meetings to discuss and resolve military issues. In our context this could aim at resolving ceasefire violations while enhancing confidence building measures. Under the peace regime, the only common factor is strictly adhering to a non-aggression agreement that precludes the use of force.

The difference in perception remains on the involvement of other powers. Pak is keen for involving other nations, including the UN in negotiations, whereas India desires only bilateral meetings based on the Shimla agreement.

The two Koreans have also had exchanges of fire and border skirmishes alongside propaganda being projected by both sides. However, there has not been any proxy war being played out brazenly as in the Indian subcontinent. This if ceased could benefit both nations.

The reason why the Korean agreement would succeed and bring about an era of peace is because the two leaders, who met and negotiated the settlement hold complete sway over their nation. While Moon Jae-in, the South Korean president heads a democratic government, Kim Jong-Un is the supreme leader of the North. Their words and decisions would be implemented in letter and spirit. More importantly is their belief and trust that civil and military diplomacy can move forward simultaneously thereby reducing tensions and enforcing peace. Hence, thaw in the Korean peninsula would come at the same pace as tensions which rose to a peak in the last one year.

However, the Indo-Pak scenario has differences. The proxy war in Kashmir, infiltration of militants, terror strikes and building an anti-India hype has alienated the two nations. Every Indian government has taken a step forward to reach out to its Pak counterpart, only to be pushed back by a terror strike. The Pak civilian government desires peace but lacks control over its own army, hence chances of success remain bleak.

Yet, observing the nature of agreement signed between the Koreans, there is a ray of hope that if the right approach is adopted, an era of peace could emerge. If the two governments can interact at a discreet level, seeking to push a common framework of peace while letting working groups, including the Pak and Indian army negotiate military aspects, it could usher in a change.

While the civilian leadership negotiates peace and stability and decides the broad framework, military leaders negotiate ceasefire and terrorism related issues. Ignoring military diplomacy as at present, would result in continued tensions and status quo, as within Pak, it is their army which is involved. There are always limits to which civil and military diplomacy can succeed in isolation, however when combined, much more can be achieved. Akin to the Koreans, we need to consider a combined civil-military diplomacy model for a solution in the Indian sub-continent.