Pakistan’s LoC ceasefire move: A ploy to avoid FATF blacklisting? The Quint 31 May 18
In a hot-line conversation on Tuesday, the scheduled day for talks each week, Indo-Pak Director General’s of Military Operations, ‘agreed to fully implement the ceasefire understanding of 2003 in letter and spirit forthwith.’ A near identical statement was issued which stated that both sides, ‘agreed to ensure that henceforth the ceasefire will not be violated. In case of any issue restraint will be exercised and the matter will be resolved through utilization of existing mechanisms of hotline contacts and border flag meetings.’
No joint statement was issued as both sides adopt different terminologies for the border. While India terms the Jammu border as the IB, Pak terms it as the ‘working boundary. As per Indian details, in 2017 there were 860 ceasefire violations and this year there have been 908 so far. Pak figures are 1,813 ceasefire violations in 2017 and 1,321 this year. Both sides normally blame the other for the violations. However, for once in Jan this year, the Indian army chief, General Rawat stated ceasefire violations are being initiated by the Indian army along the LoC as part of counter terrorism actions targeting those Pak posts, which abet infiltration.
Two questions rise. Firstly, why did Pak choose this time to request for a ceasefire? Secondly, will it hold or is only a means to gain time?
Why did Pak choose this time? This aspect is all the more surprising as Pak has not succeeded in large scale infiltration into Kashmir, wherein it could sit back and let the infiltrated militants continue to burn the valley, while it watches. It is slowly losing its hold in the valley as the movement is now being run by locals, rather than Pak exported terrorists. The image of the Hurriyat, which is its creation has been dented by the revelations of Durrani, claiming it was established, guided, funded and supported by the ISI.
While Indian retaliation has been stronger than Pak and damages to their side have been immense, including local population, this is not the first time such a situation has occurred. While the initial ceasefire in 2003 held for a few years, its deterioration has been evident since 2016. Hence, the reasons may be different.
31st May is the handing over of the reins of the nation to an interim government for conduct of elections. This sets in motion the process of elections to establish a new government. Elections in Pak are in Jul, the conduct and “MANIPULATION” of which remains the responsibility of the deep state. In all probability, the next PM would already have been decided by the army chief. He can only opt between Zardari and Imran, with Zardari emerging as the dark horse. Elections imply movement of troops from multiple locations to the interiors, hence could lead to a reduction in force levels, which needs a ceasefire.
Jun is the meeting of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to determine whether Pak is placed in the ‘Grey’ or ‘Black’ list for supporting terror groups. Unless it indicates a change in its approach to its neighbours, it is headed for the ‘Black’ list. It would need to display a reduction in support to militant groups. What better way than reduced infiltration due to a ceasefire.
Rains are approaching. Pak posts would have been damaged immensely by strong retaliation. It would need to rebuild them, which it cannot do, unless peace reins. While it may have militants to cross, it can afford to delay the same till it is ready to recommence firing. For India, a peaceful LoC implies easier monitoring for infiltration, while an active LoC divides attention of troops.
China too would have been prodding Pak for improving relations with India. After all its investments in Pak are immense and unless relations are normal, they would always remain under threat. The pressure would have been more applied on the Pak army, rather than the civilian government, as the date announced by Pak seems to indicate.
With no civil government worth the name in Pak in situ from today, the only available element for talks is the Pak army, which would continue to dominate the scene despite whoever they make as the puppet PM. Hence, Pak could be conveying the message General Bajwa, their army chief, is open to dialogue to resolve Indo-Pak issues. India is unlikely to bite the bait for multiple reasons of its own.
Firstly, it is against Indian government policy, to talk to the Pak army, as it is unwilling to give similar importance to its own forces. Its High Commissioner in Islamabad is possibly the only one who has not called on the army chief, while every other nation’s representative has. The mention by Dulat, the former Indian head of Raw and co-author of the book, The Spy Chronicles, that India must invite the Pak army chief, to India has merit.
Secondly, India would also be moving into the 2019 election mode, hence the government would be unwilling to risk dialogue, fearing a failure. India would never consider a meeting between the army chiefs of India and Pak in a neutral venue as it has always kept the Indian army well away from diplomacy. Finally, based on past experiences, the Indian government has never trusted the Pak deep state.
The declared ceasefire has a rider, which needs to be considered. The statement, ‘In case of any issue restraint will be exercised’, has multiple meanings. In an emergency, to push through militants, Pak may suddenly act. India is then supposed to exercise restraint and employ communication lines to open dialogue, which it may not, as opening fire is an indicator of infiltration.
The other issue emerging is whether the ceasefire would hold? Logically, it would hold for the moment, because of the reasons listed above. Probably, it would hold till end Jul, as by then the new government would be in place and the army is back to its normal routine. The FATF decision would also have been implemented either way. Pak would also be hoping that in the meanwhile, India takes the bait and suggests a move forward in talks involving their army chief. China too may now quietly prod Delhi to take advantage and seek a lasting solution.
Will the government of India read the signs and take advantage of the scenario remains a mute question? Fear of failure and talking to a uniformed entity would impact the government’s views. If it ignores the signs, then it may another missed opportunity. However, either decision is fraught with political risk.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army