Indo-China relations

Indo-China relations

Enhancing confidence between India and China (English version) Rakshak news 22 Aug 18

The Chinese defence minister, Wei Fenghe, is visiting India along with a delegation comprising of 25 members including a host of generals this week. This is his third visit abroad since assuming his appointment, the first two being to Russia and Belarus. His arrival follows the visit by Lt General Liu Xiaowu, the deputy commander of the western theatre command last month. The Indian army’s eastern army commander has returned after a delegation visit to China.

The visit is important as India and China seek to enhance confidence building measures post the Doklam standoff. There have been increased interactions from both sides, including the summit between PM Modi and Xi Jinping in Wuhan. It was after this summit that the speech given by the PM in the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore assumes significance.

Modi was expected to openly criticize Chinese expansions in the South China Sea and raise his support for the Quad, but unexpectedly he raised neither issue. He stated, ‘I firmly believe that Asia and the world will have a better future when India and China work together in trust and confidence’. This was an indicator that both nations are now moving forward to improving relations, rather than being confrontational.

Indian actions in Doklam forced China to construct shelters and house its troops in Doklam, an action they had never expected. It changed Chinese perceptions of the Indian army and its resolve. It showed the neighbourhood and ASEAN nations, that India would defend its allies. Standoffs have occurred in a few locations post this incident, however each has been resolved peacefully.

The Indian navy in recent times has enhanced its footprints in the Indian Ocean and is increasing its presence amongst ASEAN nations by conducting naval exercises with nations of East Asia. On the other hand, Chinese navy presence, including that of submarines is also increasing in India’s backyard. Chinese bases in India’s vicinity are also on the rise, thus opening doors for a possible clash.

This visit is another step in enhancing higher level interactions between the two nations thus building trust between the two countries. There are some major issues which need to be discussed and implemented for ensuring peace and understanding.

The first issue is the installation of hot lines between the two countries. Both nations have cleared the need for establishing hot lines, however its end points are yet to be finalized. China seeks a hot line between its Western Theatre Command, responsible for the Indian border and the Indian DGMO, as India has three different army commands facing China in different sectors.

India on the other hand is of the view that with the establishment of theatre commands, decision making on the Chinese side has shifted to the Central Military Commission (CMC), hence the hotline should be between equivalents, implying the DGMO (or his equivalent) in the CMC. Simultaneously, India should not be averse to a second hotline between the Chinese Western Theatre Command and the Indian army’s Eastern Command.

The second major issue which needs to be resolved is establishing of rules to avoid a naval clash in the future. The two navies, operating in the zones of dominance and interest of each other have a high possibility of encountering one another in an adverse situation. Mechanisms need to be set in place to ensure that a naval clash does not occur.

Indo-Pak relations is also likely to be discussed. China has openly supported Pak in all its endeavours and has ensured that Pak is always a counter balance to India. With a change of guard in Islamabad, the Chinese defence minister would be carrying a message for India that the new government should be engaged to reduce tensions in the subcontinent. This would enhance the security of CPEC, which transits through disputed territory.

The visit, if successful, would reduce Indo-China border tensions and bring about better understanding in an area which has been strewn with conflict. However, with diverse views on both sides, an easy solution may not be forthcoming.

Why do nations fall into the Chinese debt trap? Bharat Shakti 26 May 18

There are many nations which are falling into the Chinese debt trap. In some cases, it is involvement with faulty projects with Chinese funding, while in others it is a case of being unable to clear loans linked to the Belt Road Initiative (BRI). Some of these nations are being compelled to part with strategic assets as they are unable to clear their dues. As the BRI expands, more nations are likely to follow suit. In India’s vicinity it is Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Pakistan and the Maldives.

In the case of Sri Lanka, China offered billions of dollars of loan to the previous government of Mahinda Rajapaksa for new infrastructure projects, post the end of the civil war. The new government was stuck with unpaid loans of over USD 8 Billion, for which it took the decision to hand over the Hambantota port to China for 99 years.

In Myanmar, China had financed the Myitsone Dam, which was foreclosed by the government in 2011. It was a project doomed to fail as local inhabitants were against it from its commencement. Initially China offered to buy 90% of the electricity produced, changing the ratio once work commenced. While the project was to cost USD 3.6 Billion, at the time of foreclosing, Myanmar owed China USD 800 Million. China is now compelling Myanmar to hand over controlling rights to the strategic deep-sea port of Kyauk Pyu, which was initially planned for a 50:50 partnership. This port would form a major link to its BRI as also enhance security concerns for India.

The case of Pak is well known. Pak imports 60% of its military hardware from China as well as banks on China for the complete funding of the CPEC. It has recently been taken a loan of USD 1 Billion, in two instalments, at high interest rates from China, only to shore its foreign exchange reserves which fell below manageable levels.

To add to its problems, it had initially offered immense concessions to Chinese firms. Finally realizing that it is heading for deep trouble, it has declined to sign Phase II of the Free Trade Agreement with China, as it could further jeopardize their economy. Gwadar port has been handed over to China for forty years and there are reports of China building a naval base close to it. Pak’s repayment of USD 5 Billion a year to China would commence soon, which would be beyond its financial capability, forcing it to surrender greater assets to it.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) Managing Director, Christine Lagarde, stated in the BRI conference in Beijing recently, that while it is showing signs of progress, it possesses potential debt risks for partner countries involved. She added that the initiative can provide much needed infrastructure financing to partner countries but should not be considered a free lunch by those nations. BRI can lead to problematic increase in debt, which could create balance of payment charges.

According to a report issued last month by the Washington Centre for Global Development, eight countries on the BRI route may already have trouble servicing debt due to increased levels of borrowing from China. These include Pakistan, Djibouti, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Maldives, Montenegro and Laos. It also found 23 countries at risk of ‘debt distress today’ due to BRI borrowing.

The Chinese response to debtors has been inconsistent and not in terms with practices adopted by international lenders working with economically weaker nations. In few cases debt has been forgiven, but in most, disputed territory or control of infrastructure has been demanded in lieu.

The Chinese approach of advancing loans is at variance to that adopted by the IMF. The Governor of the Peoples Bank of China, Yi Gang, stated in the same BRI conference, ‘Ensuring debt sustainability (is) very important’. He added that it was just as important to consider ‘how to expand domestic infrastructure investment and how to improve public investment while taking advantage of external resources.’ Developing nations welcome the Chinese approach as the IMF places stringent conditions on debt management, implying delaying developing much needed infrastructure, whereas China finances for infrastructure. The two approaches are almost the opposite.

Logically it is not that national governments are unaware of the risk of taking high interest loans from China, which come with an interest rate of 4% and beyond, as compared to much lower interest rates from other international financial institutions. Further, labour involved in construction of infrastructure is Chinese, thereby neither enhancing employment avenues in the recipient nation.

Governments are aware of long term risks but seeking to shore up the economy in their short term in power, ignoring long term impacts, results in placing nations under debt. Since funds come for infrastructure development, nations opine that the investment would boost the economy in the short term enabling them to pay back.

Rex Tillerson, the erstwhile US Secretary of state summed up the Chinese approach when he stated, ‘Beijing encourages dependency using opaque contracts, predatory loan practices and corrupt deals that mire nations in debt and undercut their sovereignty, deny them their long term self-sustaining growth.’ Others have termed it as ‘debt trap diplomacy’ implying offer of honey of cheap infrastructure loans, with the sting of default coming if smaller economies cannot generate enough cash to pay their interest down. Many new governments have also ordered investigations into alleged Chinese bribery of their predecessors, which have led to the nation being shackled by unpayable loans.

Some nations have begun to realize the futility of taking loans from China, Nepal being an example, which rejected Chinese offers for a dam construction. Most have fallen for the game, seeking to build infrastructure, which has failed to generate the desired funds for repayment.

In our own neighbourhood, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Pakistan have already taken huge Chinese loans. Nepal may soon be the next, as it has decided to join the BRI. As these nations fall into the debt trap, Indian security concerns rise. These nations lack internal stability and hence their army plays a stabilizing role from behind the throne.

The government of India must either employ military diplomacy or openly engage with the powers behind the throne to convince them of preventing their governments from falling into Chinese debt traps, forcing them to surrender important military infrastructure to China. While governments may come and go, the army in these countries would continue to provide stability and dominate politics from the back seat, hence should be openly engaged.

Bringing Indo-China relations back on track The Excelsior 02 May 18

Xi Jinping was the first leader whom PM Modi hosted in his home town Ahmedabad in Sept 2014 and Xi responded by hosting Modi in Xi’an, his own home town in May 15. Since then, the two have met on multiple occasions as both nations are part of multiple international organizations, where heads of state meet. Despite all tensions both leaders have always spoken, contrary to the Pak leadership, where despite being on the same table in a conference, no words are exchanged.

Unaddressed issues remain between both nations. These are not merely border and confrontation, but also trade, international groupings, enhancing ties in domains each considers its own backyard as also blocking the other in international forums. It is against this backdrop that the two leaders met.

The intention of the summit was to reset ties, establish communication for deescalating any crises and moving forward in areas of mutual interest. Only part of the issues discussed would be placed in public domain as was evident from the announcements made by both sides. Most aspects would be handled quietly by respective governments and would slowly become visible with minor tweaking in policies.

The reality is that both are growing powers, militarily and economically, and have the capability to challenge the other. Neither is a pushover. The fact that they are neighbours with an unresolved border problem, for which there is no easy military solution is also evident. For China, Tibet is always a thorn on its side and hence, it views activities of the Dalai Lama in India as a threat to its national security. Indo-China border issues are one sided. India has no claims on Tibet, while China claims Indian territory.

For China, India’s unwillingness to join the BRI makes its construction of the CPEC a stand-alone project, as also Indian attempts to isolate Pakistan places China in a difficult position. China cannot ignore Pak, nor stop supporting it, however needs to maintain a suitable relationship with India. When it comes to choosing between the two, India will be the loser. As Chinese investments grow in Pak, so will its support.

Further, India’s growing military to military ties to nations in China’s backyard and ASEAN is viewed with suspicion by China, as is Indian proximity to the US and Japan and participation in the QUAD naval exercises. Hence to send a positive message just prior to this visit, India turned down the request by Australia to re-join the QUAD.

For India, Chinese support to Pak including employing its veto power in the UN Security Council against declaring Masood Azhar as a global terrorist and blocking Indian entry into the NSG are mere irritants. These only impact India’s international standing.

Chinese forays into India’s immediate neighbourhood including the taking over of the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka and possibly controlling 70% stake in the Kyauk Pyu port in Myanmar add to our security concerns. Increased Chinese foray into the Maldives is another contentious issue. China advancing loans and seeking to push its way into India’s immediate neighbourhood remains a matter of concern.

The standoff in Doklam needed to be resolved as early as possible as neither nation would have desired an escalation of the incident. China is aware that the changed Indian military would not be a pushover and any serious incursions would be met by a strong response. Escalation into war over an issue which could be resolved by other means would damage both.

Hence, while immediate resolution of the boundary dispute remains a distant dream, a conscious decision to continue engagement is the only option. China would needle, as remaining quiet would indicate a surrender of its claim lines, which it would never accept. However, needling would remain within acceptable levels.

Politically, post his election as President for life, Xi Jinping is amongst the strongest rulers in the world, with no one possessing any authority to challenge his power, unless a wrong step embarrasses China. This step could possibly flow from an Indo-China border clash. Modi on the other hand would be facing re-election next year, hence would desire peaceful relations with no major border issues, which could hamper his chances. Any wrong step could be exploited by a desperate opposition.

In the external environment, China would consider the US and its actions as their main threat, rather than India. Thus, reducing confrontation with India would benefit it. Simultaneously India would seek to avoid confrontation with China enabling it to concentrate on domestic issues rather than facing military threats on both its borders, including a collusion between China and Pak.

Both nations therefore view the other as a threat to their power and domination in their respective regions as also in international groupings. With such vast perceptions and differences, finding common ground may appear difficult, especially as both are moving towards strengthening their armed forces and economy. The world views India as the only nation capable of taking on the Chinese dragon in Asia, an aspect not lost sight of in China, adding to differences.

Thus, logically expecting one to bend in favour of the other is expecting the moon. Enhancing trade and reducing balance of payments, while enmeshing the two economies with greater investments as announced would ensure that any border situation does not go beyond dangerous levels. Agreeing to continue with border talks while enhancing military to military engagements, without seeking an immediate solution, leaving it for the future is ideal, as has been announced. It basically conveys that both nations would avoid changing status quo in disputed regions.

Collaborating in an economic project in Afghanistan is a welcome step forward. It would enhance cooperation while opening doors for China in the country. This would also ensure that Pak protests are reduced on Indian involvement as Chinese participation exists.

While talks may be positive however no agreements being inked could leave most in doubt on a possible outcome. The meeting aimed at resolving issues which could be handled in the immediate future without too much give and take. Contentious disputes have been left for the future. Expecting either nation to change its stand in one meeting appears illogical. The fact that two leaders reset ties which had drifted apart is itself a forward step. Immediate solutions were neither expected nor announced.

The cost of being China’s friend The Statesman 20 Mar 18

Is China a genuine friend of Pak or is just claims to be. Its actions at the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) meeting prove it is exploiting Pak’s weakness to further its own agenda.

During initial discussions of the FATF, China, Saudi Arabia and Turkey withstood US pressure and were standing shoulder to shoulder with Pak, in preventing a US backed proposal from being approved. However, in a subsequent discussion, post US insistence, Saudi Arabia and China jumped the fence, leaving Turkey all alone supporting Pak. The result was Pak being placed on the ‘Grey’ list for not doing enough and possibly even the ‘Black’ list alongside North Korea and Iran, if it fails to submit a satisfactory proposal.

China justified its action by informing Pakistan that it ‘did not want to lose face’ by supporting a move which was doomed to fail. While Saudi Arabia, representing the Gulf Cooperation Council, was convinced by the US to change its stance, there are similar claims that India convinced China for the same, by promising to back it for the Vice Chair of the FATF, which would ultimately give it the chair.

China had never hesitated to support Pak in international forums earlier, whether it was blocking Indian entry into the NSG, claiming a similar status for Pakistan or in the UN Security Council (UNSC), where despite every other member seeking to declare Masood Azhar as a UN designated terrorist, China refused, employing its veto power. China like the rest of the world was aware that Pak was likely to be censured in the FATF, hence it could create for Pak a breathing space, thus enabling it to wriggle its way out in a couple of months, without being subjected to the humility of the Grey list.

China did nothing, neither pressurizing others, nor moving a motion in this regard. It supported Pak initially but changed stance rather fast. No nation, especially China, would suddenly turn its back towards a supposed ally, unless its seeks its own interests over that of Pak. If it could face the UNSC alone, refusing to buckle under any quantum of pressure in the Masood Azhar case, then the FATF should have been a cake walk. Immense international lobbying including from India and the US did not make China budge on admitting India into the NSC, then just an offer of the Vice Chairmanship from India may not alone have convinced it to do a volte face.

China was aware that Turkey was still holding ground and would not bend. For it to convince one more nation to join hands with it to block the move would not have been too difficult. The fact is that it announced its reasons to Pak after the meeting, not before, also indicates that it had ulterior motives. Chinese actions are always well thought out. It has never rushed nor changed stance easily, hence why now?

There are claims that China, when it dumps Pak in international forums, the earlier being the BRICS summit in 2017, seeks to convey a message to Pak, that it can only do so much and no more. Secondly, the same terror groups which it supported in the UNSC have criticized China for its policies on Moslems in the Xinjiang province. Reports of China negotiating with the Baluch Freedom Fighters for security of the CPEC and being in talks with the Taliban are indicative that it is slowly believing that Pak will not change its policies, which could haunt Chinese interests in the long term. It is also feasible, that when closed door interactions with Pak to change its terror support policies fails, then it adopts international forums to convey its displeasure. This could have been one such forum.

Behind all these possibilities are also issues of practicality and long-term goals. China is aware that Pak, despite its economy growing at over five percent is facing shortfalls of foreign exchange reserves. In a short span of three months, Pak was forced to borrow USD 1 Billion in two instalments of 500 Million each from the Industrial and Commercial bank of China at a high interest rate of 4.5% solely to maintain reserves. With it coming onto the ‘Grey’ list and increased pressure from the US and India, unless it acts, it would find international funding drying up.

This shortfall in funding would also impact its armed forces, mainly the army, as any government which steps in post the National Assembly elections in Jul, would need to balance national finances. This would drastically hamper their capability development forcing it to either solely bank on nuclear weapons to ward of Indian threat or turn towards China with a begging bowl.

This is where China would step in, possibly being the only nation, willing to invest in a troubled Pak. Its granting loans at high rates of interest would make the Pak economy totally dependent on it. Further, its military supplies to Pak, presently over 60%, would only increase. China also has no choice as it has already invested a substantial figure in Pak and cannot pull back now. Pak would akin to Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Myanmar fall into the Chinese debt trap.

China has in one swoop has pushed Pak into a corner from which only it can extricate it. On the outside it would appear as a friend and a benefactor, while the truth is that it has forced Pak on its knees making it bank on Chinese high rate of interest loans to survive.

China is known to never support any nation, unless there is some return for it. It has never believed in granting largesse to nations, always loans. It has, despite claims of friendships ‘deeper than the oceans, higher than the mountains’ proved that its own interests come first, others be damned. If Pak still cannot see through the Chinese game, then it remains a victim of its own short sightedness.

Up and downs in Indo-China relations The Excelsior 19 Mar 2018

Indo-China relations have been witnessing a see-saw effect in recent times. The Doklam standoff had pushed the relations to the nadir. Even at present there are claims that Chinese presence continues in Doklam while it continues developing facilities in the region. India, on the other hand recently reversed its stand and issued instructions that political leaders and public servants should avoid attending Dalai Lama events, which have the possibility of impacting Indo-China relations. It stopped just short of restricting the Dalai Lama from visiting Arunachal Pradesh or addressing the media, to which the Chinese regularly protest.

Despite growing differences between the two, economic trade is on the upswing, with the balance of trade continuing in China’s favour. The two nations appear to be countering each other’s areas of interest. While Chinese forays into India’s neighbourhood is on the ascendency, so is India’s growing proximity with ASEAN nations, whose heads of state were chief guests for the Republic Day parade. Chinese investments and offers for joining the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) are being accepted by India’s immediate neighbours while nations of the ASEAN are increasing defence cooperation with India. India’s growing proximity to Vietnam is being strongly objected to by China.

There have been comments and counter-comments from both sides on enhanced naval powers being aimed at solely countering the other. India continues to refer to the Chinese string of pearls, implying naval bases in the Indian Ocean surrounding India and its naval forays into India’s backyard. China on the other hand, claims Indian naval engagements with other nations are aimed at countering it.

India’s reluctance to be drawn into Xi Jinping’s flagship project, the Belt Road Initiative (BRI), has immediately impacted its success. China has made numerous suggestions for India to join, but since the CPEC transits disputed territory in POK, India has been compelled to turn it down. China seeking to pacify India has officially refused to support Pak’s case for Kashmir, with the intention that India may change its mind. This one action by India has hit Chinese hopes on the BRI.

India’s growing proximity to the west, its joining the Quad, conduct of the Milan exercise, developing its missile power have all been criticized in Chinese government mouthpieces, as it visualizes these actions as a direct threat to China. India on the other hand closely monitors Chinese developments and increasing military infrastructure in Tibet but avoids criticizing.

China has staunchly supported Pak, denied India its rightful place in organizations like the Nuclear Supplier Group and objected to Indian support to nations in its immediate neighbourhood, enhancing distances. Chinese diplomatic actions including vetoing the declaring of Masood Azhar as a global terrorist, despite multiple engagements and international pressures, have openly pronounced their pro-Pak stance. Chinese media continuously resort to ‘blow hot, blow cold’ messages, occasionally patting India, mostly criticizing Indian actions.

The Chinese foreign Minister, Wang Yi, recently stated that the ‘Chinese dragon and Indian elephant must not fight but dance with each other’. He implied that the two nations must shed mental inhibitions, manage differences and meet half way to enhance bilateral ties. India responded positively stating that it is willing to work with China to enhance ties.

Thus, there has been an attempt to move forward positively. The next scheduled meeting of the top leadership, Modi and Xi Jinping, is scheduled in the middle of the year, when Modi travels for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting to China. Each time such events draw close, there is an extra effort put forth by both nations to improve relations and push differences into the background. Neither desires that meetings between the top leadership is impacted in any way. The resolution of Doklam last year was one such example.

However, on both sides, the press and the uninformed strategic thinkers play on irrelevant issues to raise media hypes within the nation. Doklam, in recent times, was a clear example. The Chinese press lambasted India and even threatened war, while the Indian government maintained a mature stance. Facts about the reality of recent Chinese actions in Doklam remain mired in confusion. The reality is different.

Doklam has always been under Chinese control, part of it remaining disputed between them and Bhutan. For India, status quo or enhanced military presence of Chinese forces in the region or even creation of structures and helipads is no major issue. Similarly, even constructing roads in the region away from the standoff site, provided it does not threaten Indian defences or Bhutan is of no concern. Hence, India only monitors Chinese actions, without objecting.

Further, in such trying weather conditions, Chinese troops staying in temporary structures is clearly an indicator of them seeking to counter Indian domination, rather than threatening Indian interests. This has been repeatedly stated by the army chief and defence minister in their comments, yet doubts remain within the media.

For India, the Dalai Lama would always be a trump card. China, fearful of his influence in Tibet desperately seeks to curb his activities. The recent note issued by the Cabinet Secretary restricting attendance at the Dalai Lama’s events led to the shifting of the high- profile event planned for commemorating the Dalai Lama’s sixty years in exile from Delhi to Dharamshala. This action alone would indicate a change in India’s stance and would be viewed positively by China, thus reducing diplomatic tensions between the two.

With Xi Jinping anointed as ‘President for Life’ there is a possibility of increased Chinese assertiveness in its foreign policy. There would be greater push for the BRI, seeking to draw in more nations into its fold. Chinese demands on Indian territory would remain unchanged. Meetings between the two leaders would result in conciliatory comments, however not much would change.

China would continue to expand its reach into India’s immediate neighbourhood, while India would enhance its outreach with ASEAN. The two nations would remain a challenge for each other, but near symmetry in nuclear and military capabilities, with close economic bonding would result in both being wary of the designs and strategic intentions of the other. Peace and resolution of the boundary dispute would remain miles away, possibly to be handled by the next generation.

China will soon annex Pak as its province 03 Mar 18

Recent reports indicate that China is moving at a fast pace to annex Pakistan as one of its provinces. In other countries where China has invested, and the nations have been unable to pay, they have had to hand over strategic assets to China for prolonged durations, Sri Lanka and Myanmar being examples. In the case of Pakistan, China already has strategic control over its major asset Gwadar, as also of almost all its mineral wealth.

The first report was of China granting Pak an additional USD $ 500 Million as loan to Pak for it to tide over its financial crises. The Pak economy is in dire states with diminishing foreign exchange reserves. The loan was granted at a rate of 4.5%. This is the second loan Pak has taken from the same Chinese bank, the earlier being in Oct last year of the same amount. Pak’s dire financial state is being well exploited by China.

The second was of the Pak senate ‘recommending courses of the official Chinese language being launched for current and prospective Pak CPEC human resource’. This contrasts with other nations, where those investing learn national language and customs of the countries in which they are operating. Hence, Pak appears to be bending backwards to satisfy China.

The third report pertains to the Pak government examining a proposal to replace the US dollar with the Chinese Yuan for trade between the two nations after reports emerged that China had ‘temporarily’ suspended funding for the CPEC over corruption issues. The exchange rate of the Chinese Yuan is controlled by the Chinese government hence Pak would end up losing rather than gaining.

The fourth was of the Chinese government bypassing the Pak military and directly negotiating with the Baluch Liberation Front (BLF) for ensuring security to the CPEC in ‘troubled’ Baluchistan. There are reports of China bribing the freedom fighters. Thus, they would be free to target the Pak army and leave the CPEC, which would benefit China. Though the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson denied the same, however comments by Pak were contrary. Pak’s comments were guarded stating that anyone could interact with the BLF, if it benefitted the nation.

Fifthly, is China’s support to the JeM and its leader Masood Azhar. It has repeatedly blocked the UN from designating him as a global terrorist. It is this group which has been responsible for most recent strikes in India, including Pathankot and Sunjuwan. Thus, it would now appear that China would soon be controlling anti-India operations of the ISI. Sixthly, is the increased presence of Chinese troops even as far south as Rajasthan, constructing defences for the Pak army.

Seventhly, there are reports of China constructing a naval base at Jiwani, near Gwadar. While Gwadar is already on a forty-year lease to China, this base would enable China to officially deploy forces in Pak. For the present both China and Pak have denied the same. Finally, a consortium of three Chinese bourses have purchased a forty percent ownership of Pakistan’s only stock exchange in Karachi, thereby gaining control over the Pak economy.

Pak did appear to indicate some strength of character by cancelling the Daimer-Bhasha dam project to be constructed with Chinese funding, stating difficult financial terms. However, the deep penetration by China in every aspect of Pak society continues unabated.

Diplomatically, militarily and economically Pak is already completely dependent on China. It has slowly taken over the Pak economy, supplies maximum military hardware to them and when international agencies refuse to grant them loans, it comes to the rescue. Diplomatically, it continues to shield Pak in international forums, employing its veto to protect Pak from being censured. Now it appears to be becoming more deeply involved with the country.

Its talks with the BLF is clearly a direct interference in the internal affairs of Pak and goes against the very character of the state. India would never permit any nation to interact directly with any group or leader who operates against the state. The very desire of the Pak NSA to meet the separatists or their being invited by the Pak Consulate for talks had led to calling off official dialogue between the two nations. In Pak’s case it gave a rather muted statement.

So evident is the control that the murder of one Chinese national in Pak, has the government on edge. China demands arrest of those responsible, which the local authorities fail to ensure, only adding to further pressure from China. Pak has created a special force only to ensure security of the Chinese employed in the construction of the CPEC.

Pak is soon scheduled to commence repaying back China at an annual rate of five billion dollars a year, solely for its investment in the CPEC. This is in addition to repayment for loans it has taken for shoring up its economy from China and other international borrowers. Financially repayment may be almost impossible as most Chinese companies in Pak have special tax privileges and the earning accruing from Gwadar would be ninety percent with China. As debts mount so would Chinese demands.

Since it already controls the Pak economy and Gwadar, logically the next step would be controlling its foreign policy and military. Thus, the friendship claimed to be ‘deeper than the ocean’ is the Chinese way of adding to its territory, without as much as firing a single bullet.

The recent warning of placing Pak on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list, with Chinese acceptance is adding to Pak’s woes and faster takeover by China. It is known that Pak would never be able to provide a satisfied plan of action to avoid being ‘grey listed’, hence would be economically more affected. Pak would find it difficult to take international loans to survive, hence would be forced to bank on Chinese largesse, falling deeper into their trap.

China is aware, that though it may gain control of Pak’s assets and even enhance its hold on the country’s policy, but an economically weak nation, packed with militants and hardliners would become more of a burden than an advantage in the long term. This is the time for India to commence forcing Pak into an arms race, breaking its economy and pushing it against the wall, even adding to Chinese problems of shoring up a bankrupt Pakistan. This may compel China to restrict Pak’s policy of supporting terror groups.

India and China battle for domination in South Asia CENJOWS 20 Feb 18

Introduction

Post the declaration of emergency in Maldives, China has continuously threatened India about interfering militarily in the island nation. Initially the Chinese stand was that it was an internal matter and hence outside interference was unwarranted. It even prevented the UN from discussing the topic, with support from Saudi Arabia and Russia. It has now changed tack and even offered to mediate between various political parties. The ex-President Nasheed, now in exile in Sri Lanka and the one who invited China to establish its mission in the country, has been regularly calling for Indian military intervention.

Simultaneously, India moving at a fast pace, has secured a naval base in Seychelles for 20 years and signed an agreement for Indian naval ships to use the port of Duqm in Oman. Chabahar port, now partially operational, though presently only for commercial use, could with time become a refuelling destination for Indian naval vessels. India’s efforts at setting up 10 coastal surveillance radar systems in Maldives appears to be slowing down, with the ongoing crises. India had set up three, the last in 2015, but they are, ‘not transmitting’.

Competition rising in South Asia

Indo-Chinese competition for dominating South Asia is on the rise. Post the first-ever dialogue between the foreign ministers of China, Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Chinese state controlled daily, Global Times, issued a scathing article on India’s approach to South Asia. It stated, ‘India should stop treating those small countries around it as its mistresses and showing no tolerance when they interact with other major powers.’ It went on to add, ‘They (India) believe that South Asia and the peripheral area of India should be New Delhi’s turf. Every nation in the region should respect only India and reject developing relations with other countries.’ This was possibly because of close interaction which India maintains with its neighbours seeking to ween them away from Chinese influence.

Expanding Chinese footprints

China has over the years been expanding its footprints in South Asia, adding to India’s woes. While Modi did follow the policy of ‘neighbours first’, China, with its financial might has bulldozed its way into India’s neighbourhood, challenging India’s policy of ‘neighbours first’. An analysis of Chinese projections into the region would indicate new threats that India faces.

In Nepal, the new government under Oli, though yet to take office, is likely to be pro-China as per his stance in his earlier stint. He had accused India of supporting the Madhesi movement, which led to a blockade of the country. Though India still controls the tap to Nepal, as its oil, gas and other imports transit through India, a China shift could be worrisome. The recent meeting between Sushma Swaraj and Oli did indicate signs of a rapprochement, but with greater Chinese influence, a thaw is unlikely.

The Doklam crises was also Chinese attempts to pull Bhutan out of the Indian camp. It has been stalled for now, but Chinese presence remains in the region. China has been making overtures to Bhutan to agree to a swap on pending border disputes. A high-level India delegation comprising the NSA, foreign secretary and the army chief were there recently to discuss the post-Doklam assessment. China would continue planning forays challenging India-Bhutan relationship and pulling Bhutan away from India.

In Myanmar, China brought forth a collection of rebel leaders, whom they had tacitly supported over the years for peace talks with the present government, thus proving to be invaluable for the future of Myanmar. While peace is still years away, Suu Kyi knows Myanmar cannot move forward with peace, without Chinese support.

After the Chinese financed Myitsone dam, in the Kachin state of Myanmar, was suspended, the government was compelled to enhance Chinese share in the port project at Kyaukpyu, as it owed China USD 800 Million. This project in Rakhine will give China prized access to the Indian Ocean. It was initially meant to be on a 50:50 basis, but after the failure of Myitsone dam, it is likely to be changed to 85:15 in favour of China.

The Sri Lankan government has handed over the Hambantota port to China on a ninety-nine years lease, to offset a loan of US $ 8 Billion it had taken from China. However, to ally Indian fears, Sri Lanka stated that Chinese naval ships would not be permitted there. Maldives has signed a free trade agreement with China, clearly choosing China ahead of India. It has also endorsed China’s maritime silk road project, a part of the Belt Road Initiative (BRI). After increased pressure from India, their foreign minister visited India and aimed to assuage Indian fears, but with the present crises everything seems to have stalled.

China is fast becoming the single largest individual investor in Bangladesh. The countries have signed a 13.6 Billion USD agreement of trade and investment. China has also promised to provide loans of upto 20 Billion USD. Bangladesh recently procured two submarines from China at a cost of USD 203 Million.

Pakistan is almost a Chinese province, while it seeks to actively be involved in Afghanistan also. China is supposed to be developing a naval base close to the Pak-Iran border, adjacent to Gwadar. While China and Pak have refuted this claim for the present, reports of China assisting Pak in improving defences along the Indo-Pak border in Rajasthan are flowing in. Pakistan’s latest borrowing of $ 500 Million from China makes it more indebted to it. China seeks to expand the OBOR project into Afghanistan, where it may not succeed as Indian influence is high, hence its frustration.

Impact of Chinese expansion

In every case, where China advances loans, it is at a much higher rate of interest. In return it seeks facilities and resources. Nations around India are slowly moving into the Chinese lap, necessitating a shift in policy from India. With a naval facility already established in Djibouti, another in the making near Gwadar, Hambantota and possibly Kyaukpyu, the Chinese string of pearls would be almost complete. While Chinese naval threats may not be prominent at present, they would increase as Chinese naval power develops faster than India. Hence, India cannot ignore developing its military might.

Presently India can defend itself from threats from China, however the future would need to be catered for. It has also demonstrated that it would stand by its friends. However, economically it cannot compete with China. Hence, while it seeks to support its neighbours and has proved it in the Doklam crises that it would not back down, it has been unable to support the financial demands of the neighbourhood. Further, India grants loans on a project to project basis, which take immense time to fructify. There have been occasions when Indian backed projects never even take off.

Local politics

Nations on India’s periphery on multiple occasions resort to India bashing, thus moving closer to China, for petty temporary political gains. It is currently on in Maldives, where newspaper editorials even termed PM Modi as anti-Muslim. Similarly, the previous Sri Lankan President Rajapaksa moved into the Chinese lap adding to India’s security concerns. The Bangladesh opposition leader, Khaleda Zia, when in power strongly projects an anti-India stance.

Increasing security concerns

The army’s concern on China flexing its muscle was evident when Indian army chief, Bipin Rawat, in his press interaction on pre-army day stated that Chinese transgressions along the LAC had increased manifold and that China was trying to put pressure on India. In the Raisina dialogue he mentioned that though relations are back to pre-Doklam days, however India remains wary. He also stated that we are looking at diplomatic and military partnering with countries of the region as we cannot allow our neighbourhood to drift away from us.

Military diplomacy is a solution

A factor which the Indian government has overlooked is that all countries in the neighbourhood have their army playing a significant role in domestic politics. Hence, military diplomacy should be employed to project long-term impacts of accepting high interest loans from China for short term political gains and compelling the nation to hand over critical defence facilities in return. Political leaders may change in these countries, but the military would remain close to the throne. With rising military to military contacts, the government must exploit this approach.

Options for India

Chinese forays into the region which India considers under its direct influence is a warning to the government to reconsider its neighbourhood policies, failing which, the region could come under Chinese influence, adding to Delhi’s woes. If India is to reduce Chinese influence, it could either increase own financial support or using its economic and diplomatic clout compel international financial institutions to grant loans to countries falling into Chinese debt traps.

Military diplomacy should be exploited to the hilt for projecting Indian concerns with neighbouring army chief’s advising their governments against seeking short term political benefits by taking high interest loans. Finally, Indian military power of the future needs to be invested in today, failing which we would be open to Chinese threats in the years ahead.

Doklam re-emerges into limelight The Daily Excelsior 31 Jan 18

Doklam went into slumber post the mutual withdrawal by both forces, after a tense 73 days standoff. One adverse incident during the standoff could have snowballed into an embarrassing situation for both nations. There were press reports from the Chinese side threatening India, which it ignored, indicating its maturity. India also rightfully handed over the crises for resolution to the MEA. Hence, throughout the standoff, it was the MEA which conducted press briefings and made the requisite statements, with the army remaining in the background. It was ultimately a diplomatic resolution to a military issue.

Recent reports have indicated increased Chinese presence in North Doklam. A few articles in the press, by those with limited inputs, are also projecting increased Chinese build up and infrastructure development in the region, thus predicting a likely repeat by China. It was also politicized by the Congress, targeting the government, seeking an explanation on the same.

Chinese media propaganda on Doklam is on the rise, which is swallowed by their Indian counterparts, both print and electronic. This leads to the opposition seeking explanations from the army and the government. Such actions benefit the Chinese as it implies increased pressure on the Indian government from within. The truth remains distant.

The army chief had in his pre-army day address very categorically mentioned the facts. China has constructed temporary infrastructure in North Doklam, an area which has always been under their control. The Doklam standoff occurred because they had ventured to South Doklam, which remains disputed between Bhutan and China and commenced road construction. This road could have resulted in them claiming permanency as also altering status quo thus enhancing India’s security concerns. It was with this reason that India ventured into the region.

While they have moved back, the structures including tents, toilets and watch towers remain. Whether China would move back in strength post winters or remove the structures is a wait and watch scenario. The future would now depend on Chinese and Bhutanese talks, when they do commence. India remains deployed in strength on the watershed, holding dominating heights, to monitor the region where the standoff had occurred. It remains prepared to counter any Chinese attempts to change status quo in the region.

India considers Doklam to be a disputed territory between Bhutan and China, while China claims it belongs to them. Any comments on the status of the region from Indian officials, invites a strong response from China, like it occurred post the army chief’s comments. Talks between the two to resolve the issue have made no headway. With India, the dispute is the location of the tri-junction, on which again no progress has been forthcoming.

Presently there is no direct threat from China. However, in the past few years, transgressions from China have been on the rise. There have been standoffs in multiple locations, mostly resolved by military to military contacts and discussions. With increased Chinese aggressiveness on its claim lines, the chief was right when he stated that we need to shift focus from the western to the eastern borders.

Most of the Indian armed forces, eight fighting commands from all the three services, are focussed towards the west with only one each of the three services facing the east. Infrastructure development on the Chinese front was restricted because even the army opined that China could take advantage of the same.

There is a vast difference in perceptions now. Infrastructure is being developed at a rapid pace. Deployment along the watershed remains strong, being strengthened regularly. India is planning to deploy its greater military might, including Rafale aircraft, BrahMos missiles and the yet to be inducted 155mm Guns in the region. A mountain strike corps is under raising. Thus, focus is shifting from the west to the east.

China has been aggressive in its claims with nations, with whom it has had disputes. Its present threats to Taiwan are an indicator that China would pursue all its claim lines. Since the standoff at Doklam resulted in the Chinese backing down, there would be another situation, in the same or different region, compelling India to react, possibly differently and at a time of Chinese choosing. China cannot accept being snubbed by India.

While many have claimed that continuing Chinese presence and build-up in Doklam appears to be an indicator of a repeat Chinese action, it is most unlikely. China would never repeat the same mistake again, knowing how India would react. If Doklam was aimed at changing the status quo of Indo-Bhutanese relationships, then it may attempt something different to achieve the same aim.

Simultaneously, neither would China seek to enlarge the dispute, beyond local levels. There is immense at stake, financially, diplomatically and militarily. If it fails, then its international power would take a beating. Further, China would not gain much in a conventional war, as the Indian armed forces remain fully prepared. It also cannot consider raising the stakes to nuclear levels for local gains. It also cannot consider an all-out offensive as it would involve other nations with whom India has security tie-ups in the region. Local actions by China are aimed at conveying that there are disputes which remain unresolved. With varying perceptions on the actual border, there is unlikely to be any easy solution to the border issue.

In the long term, India needs to be prepared for increased Chinese aggressiveness and deny China even from contemplating increasing the scope of the conflict. The successful trials of the Agni V missile did invite adverse comments from China, as it opens the country to Indian counter nuclear strikes, thus adding a deterrent to any Chinese plans. Deployment of other force multipliers, including BrahMos, would restrict the Chinese to resort to local actions, for which India remains well prepared.

China would continue with its transgressions and local offensive actions, continuously testing Indian military resolve and conveying the disputed nature of the LAC. This should be anticipated, and forces prepared for speedy deployment. Hence developing infrastructure should remain a priority. The deployment of force multipliers should be speeded up to deter China from taking the dispute beyond local levels. The reality as aptly put forward by the army chief, ‘China may be a powerful nation, but we are not weak either’ should be our mantra.

What could the Chinese be planning for Doklam? ORF 22 Dec 17

Doklam was in the news for almost three months this year, until the standoff concluded in Aug. In recent days, it is back, with reports of Chinese enhancing its activities in the area close to Doklam plateau including construction of buildings, gun emplacements and enhancing its deployment in the region. Speculations are ripe on possible Chinese intent including recommencing road construction or resorting to offensive actions. These speculations are based on analysis of satellite images of the region.

The recent meeting between Sushma Swaraj and her Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, in Delhi, underlined the fact that Doklam ‘severely tested’ the bilateral relationship between the two countries. They accepted that its peaceful resolution avoided a major confrontation. It also b that brought home the fact that there is lack of mutual trust between the two nations, which should be re-created.

Resolving this complex issue may be the agenda of the next round of talks between the Indian NSA and the Chinese Special Representative. Recent press statements indicate India’s unwillingness to separate Doklam from border talks, which China desires. The distance between the two nations has also increased in recent times as China has become more assertive in its territorial claims with all its neighbours and India has indicated its intent on not backing down from what it considers as being against its national security. Hence enhancing confidence building measures between the two nations becomes all the more important.

There are other issues which also add to differences between the two countries. These include Chinese veto on Hafiz Saeed, unwillingness to change its stance on India entry into the NSG and Indian reluctance to join the BRI, including claiming that the CPEC flows through disputed territory. The growing trade deficit is also a matter of concern for India. Indian growing proximity to the US, supplying military hardware to Vietnam and continued Chinese support to Pakistan, adds to the distrust. However, it is Doklam which has again come into the limelight as a possible flashpoint.

China has done little in reducing the earlier tensions of Doklam, while India has taken no action, other than protecting its national security concerns. Doklam is likely to again become a spoilsport between the two nations. Winters are severe in the area hence little offensive action could be expected during this period. However, this sudden interest by China, enhancing its troop density, building infrastructure and increasing its firepower resources in the region has been raising eyebrows in Indian strategic circles.

The questions being debated include likely Chinese intent in the region of reigniting the Doklam fire or pressurizing Bhutan to dump India in its favour. China has presently confined all its activities to the region under its control and has not commenced any offensive action to provoke India. Will it take another step to provoke India or only hold its own area in strength to continue to apply pressure on India? Most importantly, even if Doklam reoccurs, it may again be a localized action, rather than an across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) action, spread along the front.

Doklam was closely monitored by all nations of the region with varying intent. Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal were observing Indian support to Bhutan and its determination to withstand a belligerent China. Other nations in South East Asia were observing Chinese reactions, as a possible lesson to resolving their own border disputes in the future. Hence, both countries needed to hold onto their stance, for ensuring their international stature and reputation.

Satellite images do not indicate any enhanced force levels across the LAC, other than Doklam. Hence, any action by China is aimed at being a localized action, likely to offset its decision to withdraw prior to the BRICS summit in Aug. China has never repeated an action, hence it may not recommence road construction. It may attempt something different. This would be aimed at countering Indian defensive advantage as also to offset any counteraction by India it has enhanced force levels as a deterrent measure.

It may adopt options including nibbling disputed Bhutanese territory, which India would not be able to officially counter, akin to its actions in Doklam, thus pushing Bhutan to seek talks, moving them into the Chinese fold. This would over time, reduce Indian control and support to Bhutan. It could also commence employing the Doklam plateau as a training ground, increasing force presence in the region, denying India the ability to counter. Regular movement of vehicles in the region would create tracks, which could be converted to a road at an earliest opportunity.

It could also aim at enhancing the quantity and quality of patrols to regions it claims as its own, including those under dispute. These as a sign of assertiveness would be countered by India, but would provide them with the advantage as they have taken the first step. India has no claims beyond the watershed, hence would remain on the defensive.

The infrastructure that it is creating in the Doklam region, would always be to its advantage in future operations, an action which should compel India to re-evaluate its defensive strategy, its existing deployment and infrastructure development. China historically has never easily backed down and is unlikely to especially when it has increased its assertiveness. It was compelled to this time for political reasons, but unlikely every time.

Tensions and disagreements, despite a series of meetings may not end soon. India needs to be wary, wargame options which could be adopted by China, from the advantage it has gained by enhancing force levels and infrastructure in Doklam and be prepared with contingency plans. India should also realize, that the possibility of China repeating its earlier mistake of undertaking an activity, which could be easily countered by India is unlikely, hence may attempt something different.

Doklam and beyond Amar Ujala (Hindi) 03 Sep 17

The Doklam standoff is finally over. Media on both sides will claim victory for their nation, stating national objectives have been achieved. In reality, it has been success of diplomacy and a mature approach to resolving contentious border issues. In logical terms, it has been a win-win for all nations involved.

India and Bhutan were only seeking status quo. The road, if constructed, would have enhanced vulnerabilities for both, as also cemented Chinese claims to the area, making any future talks irrelevant. There was no ego involved, even if India withdrew first, after all the territory was disputed between Bhutan and China.

For China, they have controlled and patrolled the area and would continue to do so, until a solution is arrived at in talks between Bhutan and them. The only loss for them has been the decision of not constructing the road. The road if even constructed away from its present alignment may not have faced any major objections, as it would not have threatened the security of both nations.

The issue was too small for a prolonged standoff and worsening of relations, including threats of war, especially as the nations have closely interlinked economies and face greater challenges. Credit should go to the perseverance and maturity of both governments, which quietly negotiated a settlement, despite media glare and pressures, which have been face and ego saving.

The commencement of the standoff, which was a physical scuffle, videos of which were released in the public domain, was the first of its kind. Recently was the release of another video, of an incident near the Pangong Lake in Ladakh. This incident though shorter was more violent than Doklam, where in addition to pushing and jostling, was the use of stones and sticks, by soldiers of both sides, causing minor injuries. Both nations blamed the other for commencing the violence and trespassing into disputed territory.

Ladakh has witnessed regular standoffs over the years. In most cases, troops of both nations set up camp, hold placards and banners, demanding withdrawal of the other. Standoffs have generally occurred in Daulat Beg Oldi, Depsang Bulge and around the Pangong Lake. Military sources state that normally six to seven minor incidents occur each month. None of the incidents generally involve physical contact or violence. Some standoffs have even extended to a few weeks.

Presently, peaceful standoffs are moving towards more aggressive ones, though short of firing, but enhancing border tensions. Doklam has changed the manner in which the two nations would handle border disputes in the future. There would have been jostling in encounters earlier too, however, there was no public release of videos of the incident, nor were they overplayed in media circles.

Physical contact was generally avoided, however, everything changed with Doklam. Is this the future and what needs to be done to ensure that peace and tranquillity remains in place, despite incidents in some sectors.

Earlier, there was mutual respect by soldiers on both sides, where they displayed placards and banners claiming it was their territory, insisting on the other to withdraw. One side set up a barricade, both moved a respectable distance and held their ground. Tents were pitched and troops camped. Though standoffs continued, however, remained peaceful with troops on both sides maintaining distance and avoiding personal contact.

These were invariably followed by Border Post Meetings (BPMs) at appropriate levels, where disputes were amicably settled and troops withdrew, generally simultaneously. There are also regular movement of patrols upto respective claim lines, where they would leave tell-tale marks to indicate their presence, prior to withdrawing back into own territory. These tell-tale marks included repainting border pillars in national colours, discarding used packets of food items, locally manufactured products to indicate presence of force and at times even old uniforms. Post Doklam, solely due to differing perceptions, Indian calls for BPMs were refused by China. To further show its anger, traditional BPMs held on 01 Aug, Chinese PLA day and 15 Aug, Indian Independence Day, were not held.

A border which has witnessed no aggressive action, solely other than seeking to indicate claim lines, by generally peaceful means is now becoming active, with physical violence on both sides becoming the order of the day. Many China watchers would still view these two incidents as isolated, claiming Chinese display of hegemony, however, it needs to be addressed prior to it becoming the norm. Violence levels can escalate without warning, leading to embarrassment to governments, hence need to be curtailed.

The problem with escalation is that one mistake during violent standoffs, leading to a fatality, can make border tensions flare up to undesirable levels. Therefore, it becomes essential for military commanders on both sides to pass clear directions to their troops to maintain peace and tranquillity, alongside firmness and politeness. While India continues to state that it has no offensive designs, however, pushing by China can always alter status quo and convert peaceful protests into violent ones.

Media attention on both sides of the border, places governments in awkward situations. Neither can be seen to be backing down, without stating its position clearly and ensuring that its concerns are met. Doklam has proved the impact of media in moulding government reactions. While Indian reactions have remained muted, Chinese rhetoric has been continuous. Such intense media glare, especially when the border has numerous contentious points and has yet to be demarcated, can impact government actions.

The escalation in standoffs is clearly a warning to both nations to seek measures to restore confidence in diplomacy and speed up border talks. While both nations remain firm in their beliefs on respective claim lines, however, talks to curtail standoffs and limit patrolling would move a long way in rebuilding confidence. Doklam has proved to the Indian soldier that the days of 1962 are well past and the nation is prepared to counter Chinese hegemony.

Peace and tranquillity must remain along the border and talks should be a continuous process. Senior military leaders on both sides should pass directions to forces to avoid physical contact and restore confidence between respective forces. Neither desires a standoff to escalate to levels resulting in diplomatic embarrassment, making peaceful resolution difficult.

Modi travels to Beijing for the BRICS summit in the coming days. Re-establishing peace and understanding along the border, rebuilding trust and avoiding violence, must be on the agenda in talks between the two leaders. The border has generally witnessed peace and tranquillity, despite differences in perception on the definition of the border for four decades and it should continue. Violent standoffs should be brushed under the carpet.

Resolution of Doklam crises The Excelsior 20 Aug 17

The Doklam standoff has been ongoing for almost two months. What commenced on 18th Jun, shows no signs of abating. Rhetoric continues in Chinese media almost daily, threatening India with war, with occasional comments from their defence ministry and foreign office. Indian response has remained matured, seeking a diplomatic solution, neither escalating nor threatening. Bhutan, on whose behalf India interceded in the area continues to deal with India, seeking a diplomatic solution. Bhutan rarely issues a statement, except to counter Chinese territorial claims.

There have been writeups on whether the US and other allies would support India in this standoff. Most nations have commented that they would desire to see a peaceful resolution to the crises. In the ‘Realpolitik’ of today, nations may provide diplomatic support, military, unlikely. Hence, India would need to defuse the crises by itself, which it is capable off. Even if it escalates, India would need to handle the situation itself, for which it is prepared.

Militarily, neither nation seeks a confrontation. Even local actions have a tendency to escalate into a full-blown conflict, which could harm both. Local actions, involving forcibly removing those involved in the standoff may not be the answer, as it could be repeated by the other. For launching operations, one side must take the offensive. India has no desire to be the aggressor, thus it would have to be China.

Launching operations in mountains against prepared defences, irrespective of quantum of firepower, is costly in terms of casualties, with no guarantee of success. Indian defences, generally on the watershed, have been improved over the years and are presently fairly formidable. Hence, the going would be very difficult, but not impossible, for any attacker. China would have to weigh the consequences of a failure, prior to attempting one.

Media reports on forward movement of Indian forces is half baked. Troops normally move around this time for their annual operational alert. Since troops move from lower altitudes, they need to be acclimatized to the weather. This is an annual feature and is in progress, but is being blown out of proportion. China has its own problems. It’s one child norm has soldiers who have been pampered and are not as hardened as they were in earlier days.

While a diplomatic solution to the crises may appear possible, however it may not be easy, as the perception of affected nations are at variance. Media hype has brought the standoff into public domain; hence its termination must be to each nations advantage.

The conflict is on territory disputed between Bhutan and China, with India involved because of its security treaty with Bhutan. The road under construction moves towards Jampheri ridge, which is in Bhutan and defended by the Royal Bhutanese Army (RBA) and Indian forces during operations. The Jampheri ridge opens an easier avenue towards the Siliguri Corridor, also called the Chicken’s neck, a narrow stretch of land between Nepal and Bangladesh, through which move all lines of communication to the North east.

Construction of the road would also alter the status quo of the tri-junction point, which is presently disputed between India and China, thus affecting Indo-China boundary settlement. China is partially right when it claims India has transgressed into territory in which they are not involved in the dispute, hence demand the unilateral withdrawal of India.

India and Bhutan solely seek status quo of the region, till the boundary dispute is settled diplomatically between the countries. Indian troops moved in when China refused to accept protests and objections by the RBA. Media hype has now forced the countries to take a firmer stand in the dispute and compelled them to seek favourable conditions for withdrawal. Back channel discussions would help find a solution which could save face and lead to withdrawal of either side. Military talks at border meetings may not provide the answer as military personnel are bound by government stand. Failure in such talks should not be misconstrued.

India’s stand is not a rigid one. India would willingly be the first to withdraw once China either agrees to alter the alignment of the road away from the Jampheri ridge, thus reducing threat to Bhutan and the Siliguri corridor, or to no construction till the dispute over the territory is resolved, however it may continue to maintain its equipment in the location. Alternatively, China withdraws its road construction equipment and India pulls back.

The other option is the re-entry of Bhutan into the standoff, post a tacit understanding with the Chinese of non-overrunning the RBA. The RBA would replace Indian troops who would now be deployed in depth for support. The two sides would then commence dialogue, agreeing to maintain status quo till a resolution to the dispute. Finally, is the onset of winters, when road construction cannot be resorted to and both sides are compelled to pull back.

The timing of the standoff and in case China decides to adopt a military offensive solution would be more harmful to China than India. The BRICS summit is scheduled in China next month. Non-attendance by Modi, would make the summit redundant and a failure, impacting Chinese prestige, akin to the insult to Islamabad, when India refused to attend the SAARC summit. The Chinese Communist Party Congress is planned for Oct/Nov, where President Xi Jinping would be seeking a second tenure and place his nominees in the available vacancies, thus making him the most powerful President of China in a long time. Any failed action would impact his plans adversely.

In reality, the dispute also goes beyond the small plateau of Doklam. Nations in India’s periphery, Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh are watching. If India does not support Bhutan and withdraws prior to a tacit understanding of status quo or suffers major losses to China, they too could likely move into the Chinese camp. Similarly, nations in dispute with China, Vietnam, Philippines, Japan etc are observing Chinese reactions. If China displays weakness, it could result in similar incidents with other countries.

The two nations have now dug in at Doklam, with reserve and support troops close behind, ready to respond in case of any eventuality. War however is still miles away, with rhetoric being the order of the day. The hunt for a diplomatic face saving solution would continue, albeit with back channel diplomacy initially, before formal agreements. War is neither a solution, nor desirable at this stage. Till then China would continue to follow Sun Tzu’s teaching, ‘the supreme art of war is to subdue your enemy without fighting’ and hope it works as it did with other weaker nations.

The Doklam tangle and its aftermath Cover Story Fauji India Aug 17

Doklam is a narrow plateau which lies near the tri-junction of India, Bhutan and China. The plateau is at the base of the Doka La, a pass China claims and is located on the watershed. The plateau is fifteen Kms from Nathu La, the border trading post between India and China. It was through this post that Indians participating in the Mansarovar yatra were to transit, which China cancelled as the first fallout of the standoff. The plateau occupies the southern part of the Chumbi valley, a part of Tibet, which juts deep towards India, separating Sikkim from Bhutan. It is officially disputed between Bhutan and China. India is not a party to the dispute; however, India does get involved when the location of the trijunction is concerned. The trijunction is the point where the borders of India, China and Bhutan meet.

China claims that the trijunction is Mount Gipmochi (also called as Gyemo Chen), located three Kms South of the Doka La, whereas India and Bhutan consider it to be Batang La located four Kms North of the Doka La. The Chinese claim, if accepted, would permit them to construct their present road upto the Jampheri Ridge, a part of Bhutan, where during war India deploys some forces and from where the terrain gradually descends into South Western Bhutan and then onto the strategically located Siliguri Corridor.

The area was peaceful with China not professing any claims till the sixties. In the late sixties, it began road construction activities in the region. China presently quotes the 1890 China- Britain treaty to insist on the location of the tri-junction. Bhutan on the other hand rightly justifies its stand stating that the treaty demarcates the boundary between India and China and not Bhutan. China, understanding the strategic significance of the area began increasing pressure on Bhutan to accede the area, as a swap for other disputed territory. Bhutan resisted. Bhutan is the only neighbour of Chinese which does not have diplomatic relations with it.

The two nations had agreed via written agreements of 1988 and 1998 that both would maintain peace and status quo in the region, till the issue is resolved. From 2004 Chinese pressure increased on Bhutan. China presently has roads and tracks moving into the Chumbi valley. Some are under observation from Indian posts. This road if constructed would bring China almost upto the Jampheri Ridge, thus enhancing risks to the Siliguri corridor.

The Siliguri corridor is a narrow stretch of land that connects India’s North-Eastern States to the rest of the country. It is aptly termed as the ‘Chickens Neck’. Nepal and Bangladesh lie on either side of the corridor. Bhutan lies to the North. At its narrowest point, it is twenty-seven Kms wide. All rail and road communications transit through this region. Though heavily defended, however the possibility of it being severed always exist. Hence for India, accepting Chinese claims upto Mount Gipmochi would enhance vulnerability of the corridor. China is aware of this sensitivity and thus was seeking to alter the status quo.

The present crises commenced in the second week of Jun when a small Chinese patrol entered the area and demolished bunkers constructed by the Bhutanese army on the Doka La, a few years ago, however, are rarely manned. Indian troops occasionally occupied these bunkers. China remained silent for a few days, awaiting Bhutanese reactions. When it found none forthcoming, it proceeded to its next stage.

On 16th Jun, it moved in a PLA road construction company with full equipment, intent on commencing construction of the road. They were confronted by the Royal Bhutanese Army (RBA). The RBA informed them about previous agreements including the one of 1998, which stated maintenance of status quo. Hot words were exchanged and there was also some jostling, however the Chinese refused to budge. Bhutan then raised the issue with India. Two days later, Indian troops moved in when it realized that China was seeking to unilaterally alter the status quo.

India and Bhutan have close relations and are guided by the latest treaty initialled in 2007. This friendship treaty states that neither government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other. India maintains an Indian Army Training Team (IATT) and an Engineer Border Roads company in Bhutan. India and China also have an agreement of 2012, wherein both agreed to maintain status quo till the issue was resolved between them and the third party, implying Bhutan. India watched the developing situation and reacted when it was convinced that Chinese intentions were to change status quo.

For Indian troops to move in and deploy, preventing China from proceeding forward, the decision would have been taken at the highest level. Indian position on the issue and its reasons for getting involved was clarified by India’s foreign minister, Sushma Swaraj, when she gave a statement in parliament. She stated, ‘As long as it was between China and Bhutan, we had nothing to do with it, but since this deals with the trijunction point, it affects our security position.’ She went on to add, ‘If China, unilaterally changes the status quo of the trijunction point, it is a straight challenge to our security’.

Thus, while the plateau per se falls in the disputed area between Bhutan and China, the end point of Chinese intentions is to change the location of the trijunction to suit their military plans. Hence, while the standoff is in an area not under dispute between India and China, the road under construction would become a major threat to Indian security needs. Chinese objections against India stem from the point that India has crossed the border and challenged Chinese forces in their territory and interfered on behalf of Bhutan, an independent country, in an area not under dispute with them.

Since the commencement of the standoff, troops have been facing each other, eyeball to eyeball, being replaced every two hours, with weapons facing downwards, indicating no aggressive intent. Indian comments throughout the over a month-long standoff have been muted with no indication of hostility. India has only defended its action and been seeking status quo. It has throughout been claiming that diplomatic channels are open and it seeks a diplomatic solution to the crises. It has never indicated any aggressive content.

Chinese state controlled media, has on the other hand, been building war hysteria, seeking to pressurize India to back down. It even downplayed the meeting between the Chinese premier and the Indian Prime Minister on the side lines of the G-20 summit. They have specifically stated that there would be no talks unless India withdraws from Chinese territory. Remarks have emanated threatening India of war and to drive home the point, China has shared details of conducting live firing exercises in the region, moving forward additional stores and equipment as also conducting tests of its latest battle tanks.

Diplomatically China continues to exert pressure. It briefed envoys of G20 nations stressing their point of view and even stating that Chinese patience could run out and war is a possibility. Its state controlled press continues building an internal hype. To further enhance pressure on India, China commenced moving its submarines and warships into the Indian Ocean.

While India closely monitors the situation, it seeks to avoid a confrontation. It has continually been seeking talks, which China denies. Back channel diplomacy between the two nations aimed at seeking a solution would be in progress. Differences in perceptions, media hypes and insistence on justification of stand by both countries leave small room for manoeuvre. However, despite the rhetoric and warmongering, neither nation desires escalation.

Localised offensive military actions by China, seeking to gain advantage, could blow into a full-blooded conflict, if it fails to achieve its aims. Further, any military action implies preparation, movement of equipment, ammunition, stores, troops and other related activities. Additional troop movements would be easily visible across the entire LAC. With modern satellite and other monitoring devices available to both nations, such activities have not yet been reported. Hence, China may be threatening, however would be seeking a solution through diplomacy.

There are other diplomatic impacts on the standoff. China has border disputes, including the South China Sea issue, with almost all its neighbours. They would be watching the developments keenly. If China resorts to military action and fails, they would also begin claiming their rights. India’s neighbours, mainly Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh would also have their own interests. India standing up for Bhutan will convince others that it can bank on Indian support. If India succumbs to Chinese pressures, it may quite likely push them into the Chinese camp. Hence a military solution would harm both.

The nineteenth National Congress of the Communist party of China is scheduled towards the latter part of the year. Xi Jinping would be seeking to gain another term. He has already begun removing potential opponents from the scene. A conflict wherein China does not achieve its aims would close all options for him and provide his detractors enough fuel. Further, China pulling back unilaterally would also be harmful. Hence, the situation requires a carefully crafted diplomatic solution, with face saving and win-win to both.

Economically, China has more to lose. The two nations economy is intrinsically linked. China’s largest market is India. Any offensive action could impact its economy as Chinese products would be locally banned and Chinese factories made redundant. Further the balance of payments is in China’s favour, which would also be impacted.

India also is wary of letting the standoff become a cause for conflict. Pakistan, presently in political turmoil, facing flak from the US, solely dependent on China for aid, support and military hardware, may be compelled to take advantage of the situation and add to India’s woes by enhancing threat on its western borders, mainly J and K. It may not get involved in an open conflict, but could enhance tensions along the border by escalating ceasefire violations and enhancing infiltration to increase pressure within the valley.

The Indian economy is showing signs of growing at a satisfactory pace. If tensions increase and a conflict becomes imminent, it could impact it. India would be compelled to divert funds for emergent defence procurements, impacting social and developmental programs. While India has the tacit support of many nations, their interceding, except at the international levels is unlikely. Thus, India would also lose.

In the ultimate analysis, the situation does demand a face saving solution acceptable to all sides. India has a sole demand, maintain status quo. China desires, India withdraw unilaterally. Bhutan, on whose behalf India interceded, desires status quo. If the requirements of the three nations are to be considered, then options are limited. Thus solutions, though limited can emerge. In case china agrees to maintain status quo, India would have no hesitation in pulling back first and letting the RBA monitor the withdrawal of China.

Militarily, both nations would be losers, in case even a localized conflict is resorted to. Media hype and warmongering has only added to internal pressures. Hence, astute diplomacy may be the only way forward. With the BRICS summit fast approaching, the desire of both nations would be to seek an amicable resolution at an early date. Maturity in governments from both sides could pave the way for a solution thus ending tensions.

War markers missing in China standoff The Statesman 25 Jul 17

As Pakistan’s interference in Kashmir rises and ceasefire violations increase, rhetoric for teaching Pak a lesson, gain ground. Even veterans on TV discussions resort to warmongering, seemingly to enable channels to enhance TRPs. The recent standoff with China at the Doklam plateau resulted in China raising the war cry. Its former Consulate General in Mumbai, Liu Youfa, stated that Indian troops could withdraw, be captured or if the dispute escalates even be killed. The Chinese foreign office mentioned that Chinese patience may run out and the situation could escalate into open conflict.

The Indian army chief had made a statement that India has the wherewithal to fight a two and a half front war, implying an offensive war with Pakistan, a defensive with China while controlling the militancy in Kashmir, all simultaneously. The air chief had also asked the air force to be prepared for war on two fronts. The statements by the chiefs were in no way aimed at warmongering or raising the tempo. Their statements were intended to send forth messages. Firstly, it was to forces under their command, that training should be realistic and oriented towards operations. Secondly, India has the resources to enable it to engage in a conflict, if thrust upon it, despite deficiencies in equipment profile and stores.

As Clausewitz had stated, ‘war is a continuation of politics by other means’ while Georges Clemenceau said, ‘war is too serious a business to be entrusted to military men’. In a democracy, where the political leadership has complete control, resorting to war would be a political decision and the military would execute the aims set forth by the political leadership. In a sham democracy like Pakistan, it is the army which would create conditions for war, Kargil and the Parliament attack being examples. The military in a democracy, with its existing resources, needs to be prepared at all times. Thus, comments by the service chiefs were correct.

While rhetoric is acceptable, no nation would desire escalation of any situation to a war like condition. It is always a measure of last resort. In a nuclear environment, even localized actions, seemingly to prove a point, have the possibility of escalating into a full-blown conflict, the impact of which, could be devastating for the nations involved. Analysing the prevailing scenario on both our fronts would convey that while rhetoric is the order of the day, war is still miles away.

In the case of the Indo-China standoff at Doklam, for any escalation from the Chinese side, warmongering notwithstanding, there must be build-up of war equipment, acclimatization of soldiers, considering the altitudes and move forward of additional assets like airpower. While China may seek to keep operations localized, however, it would need to enhance deployment across the front to deny India an option of expanding the conflict. This would imply Indian monitoring elements would observe increased Chinese movement and activities in the region. This has presently not been witnessed, hence the rhetoric for war maybe aimed at application of pressure.

India has also not taken any step to indicate an offensive stance. When China moved additional troops behind its soldiers deployed in the standoff, India resorted to the same. Indian troops along the Chinese border may have become more vigilant and would have increased their patrols, however these would be within own areas and without any indication of hostility. Thus, while India may be prepared, however, has not resorted to any action signifying hostility. It has openly advocated diplomacy.

On the Pakistan front, both nations would prefer keeping army operations localized to the disputed region of J and K, while maintaining peace along the International border. Employing air power, may enhance hostility levels, hence presently avoided. India did have the option of expanding its operations during the Kargil conflict, which it clearly avoided. It also mobilized, post the parliament attack, as part of Operation Parakram, however, did not proceed ahead. In both cases, India had the option, but chose not to, solely because a mature government at the centre had considered the impact of war.

Even in the present context, surgical strikes, artillery duels and cross border attacks are confined to the LoC. This would keep offensive actions restricted to a disputed region, controlling escalation of conflict. Earlier Siachen also witnessed regular firing, attacks and artillery duels, but has become dormant, once Indian domination of the area was accepted and losses made unaffordable to Pak.

Nations in the region possess immense destructive power, the impact of which could be devastating in human and economic costs. War also has an impact on international standing of nations. A country seeking localization of a conflict may have to enhance its area of operations, solely because it failed to achieve its aims in a small area. This failure can impact its international stature. It is only to save face, that the Pak army even now refuses to share details of its casualties with its own populace.

Nations seek to enhance military capabilities mainly for deterrence and to engage in war only if forced, post failure of all other means. When nations have near parity in military capabilities or are aware that they cannot cow down their opponent, then the possibility of war reduces to a stalemate, which can best be resolved by diplomacy. Nuclear strikes are the only option, if operations are to be launched without warning or build up and are highly unlikely in the present environment.

Hence, while with Pak, India has the option to continue escalating along the LoC, with China the only logical solution is diplomacy, since the LAC is dormant. While national ego’s and prestige may run high, nations unwilling to take the first step and back down, yet war would always remain a distant dream. Diplomacy would provide the best solution, so long as doors to talks remain open. War never occurs overnight, it takes time and its indicators are easily visible and can be acted upon.

Doklam standoff: It’s just not with India, China is rubbing everyone the wrong way Daily O 14 Jul 17

The Indo-China standoff is moving towards its second month, with both sides digging in and preparing for the long haul. The NSA is scheduled to visit China in the last week of the month for a BRICS meeting. It is to be seen if any solution would emerge during his visit. The present standoff is possibly the longest in the region till date, yet shows no signs of abating.

The rhetoric from the Chinese side seems to be blowing hot and cold at regular intervals, seeking to enhance pressure on India to back down. Diplomacy would be the ultimate answer and both sides would seek a face saving withdrawal, without altering the status quo.

There are reports about China downsizing its army to enhance levels of other forces. This is to support Chinese expansionism. China has begun moving troops to its new naval base of Djibouti, where it would soon deploy a part of its Indian Ocean fleet. This is China’s first overseas military base and a threat to the region. It is also likely to commence military deployment in Gwadar in Pakistan once the port nears completion. It has the port on lease for a forty-year period. Further, recent inputs about China paints a different picture about the country and its existing relations with the international community.

Presently China is on a crash course with the US, as it is being accused of not reigning in North Korea. The Chinese claim that it alone is not responsible for North Korea developing nuclear weapons, is cutting no ice. The bonhomie which was witnessed when the Chinese President visited the US seems to have evaporated into thin air. The US has regularly targeted China for a variety of reasons, including human trafficking, thus would seek to apply sanctions on it. To add fuel to fire, the US announced its decision to sell weapons to Taiwan, further infuriating China.

China has also threatened to go to war with the Philippines if it seeks to implement the arbitration judgement on the South China Sea (SCS), which was in its favour from the International Court of Arbitration. Vietnam has begun challenging Chinese hegemony by seeking Indian partnership in oil exploration in the disputed SCS. Chinese claims in the SCS has angered Japan, which has enhanced military cooperation with India. South Korea is also incensed with Chinese support to its northern neighbours. China’s insistence on its control over the SCS and its resources has most of its neighbours in anger. In fact, China appears to be creating more enemies than friends in recent times.

Its unfair loan policies, where it grants loans on high rate of interest and subsequently when nations fail to repay, seeks controlling rights over strategic interests has smaller nations worried. Sri Lanka and Myanmar have already faced Chinese pressures and claims. Others whom China approaches offering loans and assistance are wary and unsure. However, choices are limited, as India cannot match Chinese financial capabilities.

Its sole ally is Pakistan, as after all ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’ policy. Russia and China are presently cooperating, because the US has enhanced distance from both. Once the world order begins to change, Russia may move away, since in international relations, there are no permanent friends or enemies, just national interests and Russia’s interests lie with the west.

Its actions in the Doklam plateau was aimed at pressurizing Bhutan to switch sides from India to China. It felt the entire exercise would be a cake walk, as Bhutan would only protest, but not act. It would offer financial aid or other packages to assuage fears. The involvement of India in the process came as a jolt from the blue, hence their state controlled media reacted with vigour, even claiming India was creating conditions for a conflict. The mature handling by the Indian government, ignoring the rhetoric, while simultaneously continuing its defensive actions was the best method of conveying its displeasure without voicing it.

China is no longer a friend to any nation, its reliability as an ally reduces by the day. Nations which had come under forced Chinese influence at one time are moving away. Even North Korea, a known ally, is known to have refused Chinese overtures for dialogue on its nuclear issues. The present Chinese approach of bulldozing its way has left it with more enemies than friends, who are compelled to silence due to Chinese might. At the first opportunity, they would flex muscles.

Hence, India supporting Bhutan in countering Chinese bullying actions is justified, as strong nations must support their smaller and weaker friends, before they are sucked into the Chinese fold. Rhetoric may continue but neither nation seeks to up the ante. Diplomacy would work and peace restored, however in the meanwhile, India would have saved Bhutan from being sucked into the Chinese fold.

A test India can’t afford to lose The Statesman 11 Jul 17

The Chinese volunteering to broker peace between Pakistan and Afghanistan as also its standoff with India and Bhutan in the Doklam plateau is the latest in its attempts to change geo strategic equations in South Asia, an area which India considers to be under its influence. It had earlier attempted to woo Nepal by offering to supply oil, build roads and railways as also involve them in the One Belt One Road (OBOR) project. However, Nepal under Indian influence did not succumb to Chinese pressure, though have joined the OBOR project. With Bangladesh, it supplied submarines, offered aid and convinced them into accepting to be part of OBOR.

It has already taken controlling rights over the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka for ninety-nine years and is seeking a stake of upto eighty five percent on the Kyaukpyu port in Myanmar, a strategic deep-water port. In both these countries, it has set an example of the way it does business, offers aid, then when repayment is not possible seeks controlling rights on strategic assets. It is deeply involved in Pakistan where it is funding the CPEC and developing the Gwadar port. It is only a matter of time, before Pakistan goes the Sri Lanka or Myanmar way.

Thus, China is attempting to replace India’s hold and power in the region, with its own. In case it does succeed, it will forever alter the geo strategic equations of the region. India must prove and the Doklam standoff is the test, whether it can and would stand upto the Chinese threat and rhetoric. India cannot afford to easily back down, for if it does, it would push all countries of South Asia, including Bhutan into the Chinese fold. It is no longer a simple game of pushing and shoving, but highlights the deeper sinister designs of the Chinese.

The only solution for the present standoff would be a face saver for both sides, irrespective of who blinks first, as long as status quo of the plateau remains. This would convince South Asian countries of India’s determination, irrespective of Chinese provocations. China has always bulldozed its way with its smaller neighbours across the Asian region, Bhutan is its latest victim. South Asia is watching, waiting to see if India does prevent the Chinese from achieving their aims.

It is for this reason that state controlled Chinese media continues with its rhetoric and building up war hysteria. The Indian government remains silent, ignoring the rhetoric. There have been questions raised about the comments of the army chief, when he stated that the nation is prepared for a two and a half front war. This is a normal statement, issued by every chief to inform his command to always be prepared for a conflict and train accordingly.

War is never an easy option for either side, nor would the standoff result in one. Neither side would even consider enhancing the standoff into a skirmish, solely because neither desire it. China needs to be careful as it could be the biggest loser if it contemplates considering one. War impacts economy and could be devastating for either side, setting it back by decades. For China, it would offset its plans for developing its OBOR. Further, China faces greater threats from the US as it seeks to arm Taiwan and flex its muscles in the South China Sea, than a road construction in the Doklam plateau. This is an incident, which it never visualized, considering it was dealing with Bhutan and not India.

India is now the fastest growing economy. War would push it back, hence it seeks to avoid one. A local skirmish is equally dangerous for a variety of reasons. In case China does not achieve its local aims, which is very likely, since Indian forces are deployed on the watershed, it would have no option but to escalate. More importantly, if it fails to achieve its objectives in a skirmish, the international standing and reputation of its military would take a hammering, prompting its smaller neighbours to flex their muscles.

India is prepared, but seeks to avoid a confrontation, preferring a peaceful solution to the crises. A skirmish, especially since India is on the defensive posture and on the watershed, would tilt the scales in its favour, however would be costly in every manner. Further, the border would then become active and compel India to handle two live borders simultaneously.

It is quite possible that Pakistan would seek to take advantage of any Indo-China skirmish, which could add to our problems. Hence for India, it is much more than just standing by Bhutan. It is proving to South Asia that it can withstand pressures from China, irrespective of possible increased threat from Pakistan.

China while avoiding a direct conflict would attempt to make things difficult by re-commencing its active support to anti-India groups in the North east. It has already threatened to support an independence movement in Sikkim, which is more than a direct hint. With the Gorkhaland movement already gaining ground, supply of weapons to them would only increase difficulties.

The present standoff is now a battle of wits, with both sides seeking a way forward, saving face, while maintaining status quo for the plateau. While the two sides stand face to face, it is diplomacy which should now step forward to resolve the impasse. Either side backing down unilaterally would indicate a weakness, hence may have to be a simultaneous withdrawal or an agreement before which one withdraws first.

The South Asian geo strategic environment is India centric, which should remain so. China seeking to alter it would put India in a quandary. Hence India must be firm in its present stance, while still seeking a diplomatic and peaceful solution, before any incident triggers an escalation. It cannot let its backyard be taken over by the Chinese. The present standoff is a test bed, which we can ill afford to lose.

Facing off on the fractious border The Statesman 04 Jul 17

Recent times have witnessed increased standoffs along the Indo-Sino border with claims and counter claims. The latest incident in early June, when troops of both countries jostled physically near the tri-junction, where the borders of Bhutan, India and China meet, followed by destruction of two Indian adhoc bunkers and China simultaneously blocked the move of pilgrims to Mansarovar, has enhanced tensions. Bhutan also jumped into the fray by issuing a demarche to China for encroaching upon disputed territory. Presently, about three thousand troops from both sides stand face to face in an escalated environment. Bhutan has no diplomatic ties with China and an agreement with India for its security.

Chinese media is agog with statements that ‘India needs to be taught the rules’ of dealing with disputes along contested borders. It went on to caution Delhi not to mistake its silence as a sign of weakness. There were also comments that the Chinese government must force Indian troops to retreat to the Indian side by ‘all means necessary’ and ‘China has no desire to confront India’. China opines that since India is moving closer to the US, it has begun displaying arrogance towards it.

Chinese press statements during the visit of Modi to the US included comments that the US is seeking to exploit India to contain China, specifically referring to the announcement by Trump of a forthcoming naval exercise involving US, India and Japan. It feels that such action by India could enhance tensions between the two. India’s refusal to accept the CPEC and ignore the OBOR meet was in their view, a display of arrogance.

To add fuel to an already tense relationship was a tweet by Trump stating that China was unable to contain North Korea and a reference to North Korea in the Indo-US joint statement. A senior White House official also stated that Trump’s display of warmth towards Modi was partly aimed at the Chinese President, solely because he was unable to apply requisite pressure on North Korea. Since China vetoed Masood Azar at the UN, on his being declared an international terrorist and blocked India’s entry into the NSG, relations have never really moved ahead. Indo-China standoffs are not new, they have been an ongoing feature, though in this region after a prolonged time. Sikkim-China border has generally been accepted with very small areas of dispute, where patrols of either side visit and leave tell-tale marks, thus indicating each other’s perception of the border. The bloody skirmishes of 1967 seem to be a thing of the past.

This time the area concerned is the Chumbi Valley, a narrow stretch, jutting deep between Sikkim and Bhutan, which militarily opens the route for China to cut the Siliguri corridor, also called the Chicken’s neck, the gateway to the North East. This corridor has always been a major vulnerability for India. The road under construction by China was close to the Bhutan border, heading towards a Bhutanese post, near the trijunction, in an area disputed between China and Bhutan. Indian troops moved and deployed alongside Bhutanese forces to contain the Chinese due to existing security arrangements. Hence, Indian troops crossed the border into disputed land on behalf of Bhutan.

This Indian action of interceding on behalf of Bhutan added a new dimension to the ongoing tussle. In most earlier standoffs troops were deployed, carrying placards stating that the area belongs to India hence preventing the other from moving forward. Destruction of temporary structures has been resorted to earlier. India has destroyed what it has considered as Chinese built structures on Indian side and they have resorted to the same. In this case, the offensive spirit shown by both was in an area not directly Indian territory, nor disputed by India, but an area India is responsible for, as per agreements.

There were initially no comments by the Indian government, as it was seeking to downplay the incident. In Indian parlance, it was action taken to defend an area which it considered disputed and hence should be defended. It was China which released the video and made a hue and cry over the incident. While Indian press remained muted, the government controlled Chinese media was on a warpath, with comments solely seeking to stoke fires.

The Indian government was compelled to react and clear misconceptions of Chinese threats. It has squarely blamed China for the standoff and brushed aside Chinese reminders of 1962 with the Indian retaliation of 1967. Presently, both nations continue to hold their ground, with over three thousand troops of each country deployed in a standoff in difficult conditions. The area may appear to be an open patch in the video’s, but has strategic significance.

The Doklam plateau, the area in contention, has immense strategic value to all three nations, albeit for different reasons. For China, it opens doors for easier induction of forces for operations into the Chumbi Valley and Bhutan, if it decides to violate the neutrality of Bhutan, seeking to open a new avenue of approach into India. While the valley is under observation and domination from Indian positions, however, mountainous terrain is a restricting factor. Further and more importantly, a road in this region permits faster move of logistic supplies to support offensive operations, as against earlier days. For India, it is an increased threat which would need to be catered for, thus impacting force availability, deployment, employment and reserves.

All three nations are presently firm in their stance, unwilling to bend. International border disputes are never easily resolved, especially when perceptions are at vast variances. One of the sides may have to blink, it remains to be seen which one or the standoff may continue for a prolonged duration, when ultimately both sides withdraw seeking talks, basically as face saving measures. Most importantly, along the rest of the border, peace should reign as hitherto fore. This incident is a stark reminder that though there has been no firing, yet lack of faith and trust remains alongside tensions, which appear difficult to eradicate.

China’s takeover of Pakistan The Statesman 16 May 17

As per reports, China is expected to take over controlling stakes in strategic areas, due to payment issues on projects it funded in Myanmar. China is demanding rights on the critical deep sea port of Kyauk Pyu in the Bay of Bengal, which will affect Indian interests. It will obtain control easily, as Myanmar is in no position to repay China. In Sri Lanka, Hambantota port and Mattala airport, both strategically important for India have been handed over to China on long lease. The story remains the same. Sri Lanka took loans, could not repay, hence is willing to hand over the facilities including large tracts of land adjacent to the port for construction of SEZs to China, despite local resistance.

Chinese investments and subsequent takeover of strategic assets in financially weak nations follow a standard route. A simple example is the Myitsone dam in Myanmar. It was expected to cost approximately four billion dollars and was financed by China. It was doomed from the start and was finally suspended in Sept 2011. The problem is now in Myanmar’s hands. If it cancels the project, it would need to repay China for its investment made so far, which is approximately close to one billion dollars. Since its economy would not permit the same, China would seek controlling rights over strategic assets, including the port of Kyauk Pyu, in which it had also invested.

China offer loans for development to economically weaker nations at much higher rates of interest. Most projects are never completed or they do not give expected returns to enable repayment. China charges upto six percent in cases, while the international line of credit varies between point one to three percent. Japan offered India credit at an interest rate of point one percent for the Ahmedabad- Mumbai bullet train. India too charges much lower than the Chinese, but cannot match their level of investments, hence compels nations in the vicinity to accept Chinese funding.

Pakistan is the next target. China had initially planned to invest over forty-six billion dollars in the CPEC and allied projects. The amount is now estimated to be over fifty-six billion, though most of it is at an interest rate of two percent. The investment is not a grant nor a donation. Majority of it is a loan which Pakistan would need to repay. It only burdens an already debt-ridden Pak. The peak repayment would be about five billion dollars a year, as per Pak government estimates, a figure high enough to warrant internal discussions.

The Dawn released on Monday, what it terms as the CPEC masterplan. A scrutiny of the same would indicate Chinese involvement in every sphere of Pakistan’s economy, including agriculture, telecom, internal security systems, infrastructure development and construction of the CPEC. In infrastructure and agriculture, land would be provided to Chinese companies for setting up projects. A few sentences from the project report would indicate the impact China would have on Pakistan’s economy. It is stated that ‘China-invested enterprises will establish factories’, and ‘thousands of acres of agricultural land would be leased to Chinese enterprises’. Further it is stated that Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are earmarked for mineral extraction, the primary reason for the current insurgency. The report states that the biggest risk factors are political, inflation and security. An interesting part is China seeking financial guarantees from Pakistan for its investments.

There is no mention of expected income from the CPEC. The Dawn last weekend in an editorial titled, ‘Overselling CPEC’, questioned the projected figures stated by the Chief Economist of the planning commission. Even the IMF warned Pakistan that repayment would be a major concern. However, the leadership still touts the project as the only good thing to have happened to Pakistan in seventy years.

The CPEC faces major security issues. India openly objects to the same. It transits through Taliban dominated regions and Baluchistan, hence open to attacks and disruptions. Reports of Chinese workers being attacked are regular, compelling Pakistan to raise a division size force solely to protect them. It is so desperate to sell the project to its own population, which doubts its viability, that even its senior army officers sing its praises in all forums.

Chinese involvement does not stop here. Pak was to take a part loan for the construction of the Karachi-Peshawar railway line from the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The project was being handled by a Chinese firm. Post the firms objections on double financing, the loan from the ADB was dropped and is now funded by China singlehandedly. Their minister of planning and development gave this input, however refused to answer why it was now agreed, as the railways had refused it on numerous occasions, fearing monopoly and control by China. Further, as per the document, China has already acquired the Pak stock exchange and is in the process of acquiring K electric, Pakistan’s largest company which provide electricity to Karachi.

Chinese loans are in addition to vast borrowings already resorted to by Pak from external and internal sources, including the IMF. China will soon be in almost complete control of Pak economy and infrastructure. Hence Pak’s future lies in Beijing’s hands. In case Pakistan fails to repay, or in the event of its projects being targeted by hostile forces, including the Taliban, Pak would be in dire financial straits, as financial guarantees have been provided. China would not need to seek controlling rights over the strategic port of Gwadar, it already has it on lease for forty years. It could take complete control over Pakistan’s foreign and internal policies, making it beholden to Beijing. Pak would then cease to be an independent nation, except in name, rather a province no better than Xinjiang. Its present overdependence on one nation, could break its independence in the years ahead.

Battling China in the region The Statesman 14 Feb 17

A news report over the weekend stated that China has warned India to stay off its ‘own colony’ Sri Lanka. For China, India is a major competitor in Asia. On one hand, it has suggested that India join the CPEC and OBOR (One belt one road) corridors which it has initiated, as a participant, while conversely it has ensured that India is kept at a distance in every international forum. While borders remain peaceful, transgressions continue, however strong Indian response indicates that India is capable of responding. The Indo-China border dispute lingers on, with China raking the Arunachal and Dalai Lama issues at frequent intervals. Chinese actions and words have always been at variance.

To embarrass India, it has repeatedly blocked the UN from designating Azar Masood as an international terrorist, despite the west joining hands with India to push the case. It has also prevented India’s entry into the NSG. It would never accept India as an equal in the UNSC. Its support to Pakistan is well known, hence it would never permit anyone to criticize it in any international fora. It continues to arm them, ensuring that it remains a thorn in India’s military and economic development. Its involvement in the CPEC and Gwadar port only enhances security concerns for India.

China is now seeking to become a dominant power in the subcontinent, offsetting India. While it cannot influence the region directly by political means, it has begun employing its economic lever. It has enhanced its investment in Nepal aiming to reduce Indian influence and has bulldozed its way into Sri Lanka, taking over the Hambantota port on lease for ninety-nine years. Its investments in Myanmar and base in Coco Islands are designed to counter Indian domination in the Indian Ocean. It has provided submarines to Bangladesh as also increased economic investments in the country. China is in secret talks with the Taliban, while seeking to gain leverage in Afghanistan. In the Maldives, with the present government being anti-India, Chinese investments have increased and it is also likely to develop an airport there. The only country where it has yet to make deep forays in India’s vicinity is Bhutan.

Most countries in the subcontinent are economically weak. They desperately seek investments and infrastructure development. Presently, India’s influence in the neighbourhood is such that their head of state makes India their first port of call. While India provides them with aid and seeks to incorporate them in its growth, however being a democracy it takes time before promised investments take root, since funds are dependent on proposed nature of projects, as against China, which moves much faster. A clear case has been the Chabahar Port in Iran. India has yet to make any headway as it still awaits Iran’s response, prior to transferring funds for commencement of the project, while in China’s case, the intention to develop the CPEC was announced in Nov 14 and it has already been operationalized. In addition, China’s economy is five times that of India.

China’s investment in the region is pushing India to a secondary position. The investment also opens doors for Chinese goods, which are much cheaper and results in reduced Indian imports. Thus, nations end up with an adverse balance of payments, which China can subsequently exploit. India’s attempts to challenge Chinese power in both Mongolia and Vietnam made almost no progress. Mongolia buckled under Chinese economic pressures and agreed to never invite the Dalai Lama again, while gently ignoring India’s offer of aid. Vietnam though still in touch with India for military purchases, is moving forward cautiously, mainly due to Chinese offers of investment and development. Even the Philippines, a close US ally, melted to Chinese economic offers and was even willing to break its US shackles.

China may be militarily superior to India, however is unsure of challenging it with an assured guarantee of success, hence follows the transgressions route. It is also aware of Indian influence in the region, which has existed for decades. Further, militarily it cannot influence the region and has therefore commenced employing its economic power proving that economic might can change balance of power in any region.

Simultaneous to investment, Chinese media representing Beijing, warns India against interfering, blocking or hampering their investments. A clear case has been the unrest following grant of land in Sri Lanka, for which China blamed India. In Nepal’s case, it has warned India against interfering in its investment and development activities, once the anti-India government of Oli was replaced. By issuing such statements it conveys a message, that it is willing to challenge India for a leadership role in the region. As its investments in infrastructure increase, which is akin to a loan, which if the nation is unable to clear, China, like Shylock, commences seeking its pound of flesh. It has already succeeded in Sri Lanka and would soon do so in Nepal and Maldives. Recent reports indicate that Chinese submarines have begun docking in Chinese run ports in Sri Lanka, enhancing security concerns for India. While Pakistan is a Chinese province in almost every term, considering their depth of investment, the others are likely to follow.

India has been observing these developments, but has been unable to match Chinese investments or stem its actions. Its only option is to continue diplomatic engagement, as also remain a strong supporter for the region. It needs to monitor Chinese military cooperation with countries of the region. However, diplomatically we need to tread with caution, as deterioration in ties could easily push fringe nations into the Chinese fold, enhancing security concerns. For countries in the region, playing the India verses China card would benefit them in the short term, as today, they have nothing to lose, while the big brothers battle it out. The long term may be different, when China begins claiming its pound of flesh.