Indian armed forces
Review the intake process to reduce shortfall levels in the armed forces CENJOWS 06 Aug 18
In a reply to a question raised in parliament, the government stated that the army faces a shortfall of 7,298 officers. The statement read, ‘As on 01 Jan 2018, the authorised strength of the army was 49,933 but it has 42, 635’. This shortfall impacts the lowest levels of leadership. It is this cutting edge of leadership which has ensured victory in all wars which the army has fought. Most of those who led and sacrificed their lives in Kargil was this level of leadership.
In the present era, it is not that the numbers who apply for joining the armed forces are low. In fact, almost 3 Lakhs attempt the UPSC exam, held jointly for the National Defence Academy (NDA) and the Naval Academy. Of these approximately 8,000 to 10,000 are called for the next level, based on their performance in the written exam, which is the Services Selection Board (SSB). It is from this that the final lot is selected. Thus, when viewed in totality, the selection percentage is 0.13%. This is just the case with one entry, there are similar levels of selection for the other entries.
The NDA entry has significance as it deals with those graduating from school. As a youth matures, his beliefs harden, which becomes difficult to change even with training. This impacts the qualities which the army seeks amongst its officers. Hence, selection percentages at the SSB reduce with senior level entries, whether they be the short service, engineering or law graduates.
Thus, analysing statistics alone, it is incorrect to state that the armed forces are not popular anymore, as has been mentioned by some veterans and policy makers and has become the general belief. While there would always be competition between multiple career options, the numbers appearing indicate that the armed forces remain reasonably popular.
The questions which arises is, whether the right material is missing or that the army selection process needs to undergo a change. The selection process comprises of two parts, the written exam and the SSB.
As far as the SSB is concerned, they are clear in their outlook. The candidate must possess qualities essential for him to be a commissioned officer in the armed forces. They have no quotas in selection. Some batches may result in zero selection, while others may have reasonable numbers selected. The pattern of SSB has been studied and perfected over the years, hence does not warrant any major change. Shortfalls may be acceptable, but dilution of standards would not. The feed into the SSB is from those selected post the UPSC exam for the basic NDA entry.
What requires deliberation and reassessment is the methodology adopted to shortlist candidates by the UPSC. The written exam is theoretical and based on science, mathematics, general knowledge and English, all covered in two papers, mathematics and general ability. The mathematics paper is of 300 marks and the general ability is of 600.
The top 8 to 10,000 are selected for undergoing the SSB. While the armed forces do not seek rocket scientists alone but rocket scientists with personality, hence only theoretical knowledge should not be the deciding factor in the written exam. For those seeking admission in the Technical Entry Scheme (TES) after class 12, engineering or law graduates there is no entrance exam, but only an SSB. The cut off for the TES is minimum 70%, while for others it is having obtained the degree.
Since the qualities that the army desires are far more than just academics, which can be enhanced through the education pattern adopted in the NDA, there is a need to reconsider whether the written exam should be only theoretical or also include some aspects of psychological or IQ tests. The written should aim to select those who appear to possess qualities and the basic IQ essential for the services.
It should feed the right level of candidates for the SSB, not based on the theoretical model adopted for other central services. As in the case of the TES, a basic cut off can be considered as the qualifying mark. It should be noted that the seniority within a batch on commissioning of officers is not based solely on academics but on the overall performance of the individual through his training.
Accepting the present academic model may be a simple solution catering for the large numbers which apply, but in this case, many deserving and possessing the right qualities are ignored only because they do have not meet the academic cut off in the written exam. For all other civil services, the selection process is a collection of written exams, checking theoretical knowledge and a simple interview by a panel. The armed forces seek qualities more than theoretical knowledge.
For the TES, engineering and law graduates, it is assumed that since they possess the relevant degree or required percentage, they would have basic knowledge. The same could be adopted for those seeking to join the NDA also. The percentage could be lowered as compared to the TES.
Since the written is the prerogative of the UPSC, this aspect has generally been ignored. Since those who qualify are more tuned towards academics and do not clear the SSB, it is assumed that the right material does not apply for the armed forces.
There is therefore a need to study the existing system in totality involving the Defence Institute of Psychological Research (DIPR), service HQs and the UPSC. The NDA written papers could then be modified for determining IQ and basic qualities which the military seeks, while not impinging on the tests being conducted by the SSB. The aim should be to feed the right candidates for the SSB. The academic levels would be handled by the cut off percentages. This may result in higher selection rates and reduce existing shortfalls.
Theatre commands back in the limelight CENJOWS 30 Jul 18
Theatre commands are back in the limelight. Multiple articles have appeared in the press recently, either justifying or seeking to delay its implementation. It does appear that services, other than the air force have been seeking its implementation, while the air force and its supporters have been criticizing the same.
The commencement of the debate was an article in CENJOWS by Rear Admiral Monty Khanna, presently posted in the Defence Services Staff College. He stated in his article that from his interactions with officers from all services, it emerges that the Air Force is responsible for delaying the establishment of theatre commands.
He has in various parts of the article, challenged the myth by which the air force is justifying its demands of keeping airpower centralized, rather than allocating it to operational commands. This is the reason, he claims, that other services have begun raising their own elements of air power, resulting in chipping away of the IAF roles. The latest in the case being the army, which has proposed purchase of six Apache helicopter gunships for the army aviation.
The second article was an op-ed supporting the air force view by Air Marshal Narayan Menon in The Tribune, wherein he states that the nation should first concentrate on making up its deficiencies and only then consider the creation of theatre commands. He justifies his argument on the Chinese and US models which commenced this approach only after obtaining self- sufficiency in defence production.
The third article was by Praveen Sawhney, who also validates the air force view and states that the air force has enough flexibility and hence should remain in its present form, under centralized control. His logic is based on three pillars. The first is that modern warfare would be fought on six battlefields, land, sea, air, cyber, space and electronic.
He believes that China would move ahead with non-contact war employing long range precision weapons instead of a land war. In this case, it would be the air force which would lead the war and not the army, an aspect which the army is unwilling to accept. He adds, the present strategy by military powers with nuclear weapons is military coercion. He quotes Op Parakram as an unsuccessful military coercion. He is of the belief that it was India which sought peace after Doklam in Wuhan and terms it as a successful military coercion from the Chinese.
His second pillar is that theatre commanders would add another level between the service chiefs and the existing independent service commands. Finally, in the event of a two-front war, air power would need coordination from air HQs, rather than theatre commanders.
Clearly, there are two sides. The air force and its supporters on one and the rest on the other. There is no denying the fact that theatre commands, where all resources of a sector are employed in cohesion to maximum advantage, is the need of the hour, especially when we consider shortages in equipment profile.
As against the comments by Sawhney, once theatre commands are created, the existing single service commands may undergo a change. Some would be closed, while others amalgamated as part of theatre commands. The service chiefs, who presently remain ‘force providers and force employers’ would become only ‘force providers’, while theatre commanders would be ‘force employers’.
While most quote the Chinese example, it is worth noting that the discussion for establishing a hotline between the two countries is held up on the issue of theatre commands. While China has one command deployed against India, we have three army and two air force commands against them. Thus, they seek the hotline between the two countries to terminate with the DGMO on the Indian side and their theatre command, while India claims it should terminate with the Eastern Army Command.
For the allocation of air power, all commanders are aware of the shortfall of resources. As compared to the US, which maintains expeditionary commands and hence cannot reallocate resources easily, India’s theatre commands would be based within the nation and hence reallocation and redeployment is always feasible. After all, theatre commands would function as entities working for a common goal, not in isolation. Thus, air HQs would still be able to, depending on the operational situation, reallocate resources.
Claiming that future wars would be dominated by airpower may be correct for the initial phases. Only employment of airpower or missiles from both sides is unlikely as it may lead to near equal destruction, but not subdue the other. Neither nation would seek to enhance the same to a nuclear level. Ultimately the battle would move into traditional domains involving the navy and the army. China would attempt to capture its claim lines and reduce the power of the Indian navy, if it seeks to force India onto the bargaining table.
If, out of the six spheres of operations, as stated by Sawhney, India is seeking to make joint commands to handle three, then keeping service specific commands, located at large distances from each other for the other traditional spheres is illogical. While the Indian armed forces may not have the advantage of a modernized armed force, akin to China, however it does have terrain advantages, which can only be exploited if all resources are employed in a coordinated manner and war is not considered to be service specific.
There is a mention of the air force being unwilling to accept the concept as it is likely to lose vacancies, while the army would gain. This is an immature thought, as the intention is to enhance war fighting capabilities of the nation, rather than seeking to maintain a rank structure. The appointment of theatre commanders would be a government decision and each one appointed would be capable of understanding multiple dimensions of conflict, his colour of uniform notwithstanding.
The entire argument misses out of the fact that in no nation have the pillars of the military accepted theatre commands on their own, as it has impinged on the power of service chiefs. In every case, it has been a push down by the government, which has understood the requirement of the same. In China, it was a direct order from Xi, while in the US it was the passage of the Goldwater Nichols act. In Canada, the amalgamation of the services was pushed through and resulted in either the sacking or resignation of seven senior officers, including the first CDS. Paul Hellyer, the then Canadian Defence Minister, has amply described the same in his book, ‘Revolt of the Admirals’.
In India, based on the objection of the air force, the defence minister has sought the simplest way out, by stating that jointness emerge from bottoms up. Thus, she has pushed decision making on the subject into the dustbin. The government needs to take the issue by the horns and push a legislation down creating the same. Unless it does so, the armed forces would continue to operate in separate silos, considering operations in their independent domain, rather than maximising war potential.
The Integrated Defence Staff must be effectively utilized CENJOWS 26 Jul 18
The three services appear to be moving in different directions, ignoring the one binding factor, which should have been exploited to the hilt, the HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS). Though without the appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), this body remains toothless, yet if utilized imaginatively under the guidance of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), it could become a tool for effectively handling common issues which concern the three services.
Services conducting studies on their own on for improvement to their specific cadre may be hampered unless other services are on board. The army chief has ordered a cadre review of the army, post a gap of thirty- five years. The aim is to consider options for reducing its internal ranks for two major reasons. The first is to reduce the gap between the army and the civil services and the second is to ensure that those who miss promotional avenues ultimately retire at a much more senior rank, thus enhancing levels of satisfaction.
It has clearly missed the fact that while independent services can conduct their own cadre review, the ultimate decision would need to approval of the others. While promotions within services is an internal matter and concern the vacancies and strength of their own cadres, they cannot reduce ranks and offset the inter-service rank protocol. Even if accepted by the government, it would cause embarrassments in joint service establishments. Hence, ideally it should have been, akin to the pay commission, a common study involving all the services.
Post the army accepting the AV Singh committee recommendations in Dec 2004, it was forced down on the other services by the then government, despite their objections. For the army this occurred because of lessons learned during the Kargil conflict, which required to be implemented to enhance operational effectiveness. The other services were not similarly impacted. This may not be the case now, as the study is aimed at improving service conditions for other than operational reasons. Hence, if for some reason, one of the other services rejects it or raises queries, then it may end up as an exercise in futility.
If a cadre review is proposed to be realistic and pushed through the government for approval, then it would need to involve all three and be realistic in meeting the aspirations of the officer cadre of the armed forces, not the army alone. With joint backing, it may become difficult for the government to reject. The same logic may not hold good for JCOs and other ranks of the three services as their terms and conditions for enrolment and service vary.
It must therefore be a task for the HQ IDS to be the lead agency, seeking inputs from all three services, evolving a common consensus and pushing forth a common rank structure for the three services as also a common retirement rank. This would ensure that rank protocol between the three services is maintained. Processing independent reviews would provide the government with excuses for rejections.
A similar approach is essential for handling the grant of Non-Functional Upgradation (NFU). It may be released soon, either through the courts or by the government. However, service conditions being at variance with the civil, it would need to be modified for implementation by the armed forces. Here again the services cannot operate in independent silos while evaluating its allocation but would need to have a common policy. The lead agency in this case again must be the HQ IDS.
The government on its part appears to be keen to ensure the three pillars of the military operate in independent silo’s and dissension remains within them. It therefore seeks to adopt measures, including allocation of modernization funds to enhance the divide. Till recently, the Defence Secretary functioned as a de-facto CDS, as he resolved inter-service differences mainly concerning allocation of budget. The creation of the Defence Planning Committee under the National Security Advisor (NSA), makes him the de-facto CDS. To ensure he has complete control, HQ IDS has become the secretariat of the committee.
Without involving the IDS, the army cadre review would remain only on paper, unlikely to be accepted as the government would desire a similar exercise from the other services. NFU, even if granted would need to be implemented on a common platform across the armed forces, failing which it would come under criticism and lead to another collection of legal battles which would hamper its effective implementation.
The three service chiefs therefore need to work in closer coordination, especially on issues which impact all and effectively employ HQ IDS for evolving a common solution. Ignoring it and working independently is the easiest way of ensuring that the government rejects an independent service’s proposals, despite the army being the dominant service in the case of its cadre review.
Funds crunch forcing army to slow down raising of mountain strike corps ORF 19 Jul 18
The armed forces for once are facing a shortfall of funds impacting every sphere of their activity, whether it be stocking of critical ammunition, upgrading military capabilities or the raising of the mountain strike corps. Maintaining a modern military is essential as also is internal development and provision for social projects within the country, the constant ‘bread versus butter battle’. This message was amply conveyed by the government in this budget. It implied cut down wasteful expenditure or be responsible for shortcomings for your own manpower and capabilities.
The army has woken up and is now contemplating measures to overcome shortfall of funds. It is now being forced to think of rightsizing, reducing echelons and creating forces from within its own resources. It has been forced to consider alternate means to create funds for procuring critical ammunition.
There are multiple aspects to a reduced defence budget which indirectly impacts the armed forces and needs to be considered in totality by the government. The most impacted service of a reduced budget is the army, which needs to enhance force levels, as the raising of the mountain corps indicates, modernize its forces while simultaneously cater for rising pensions, as its members retire earlier.
Inhouse it is by itself working tirelessly to cut down costs. It has ordered a study to evaluate service conditions for its soldiers by looking at options of enhancing retirement ages by five years. This would have multiple advantages. Firstly, it would reduce the pension budget, secondly it would continue with trained and motivated soldiers for a longer duration while finally helping soldiers to overcome family liabilities for an additional period. The major disadvantage would be an increase in average ages of the fighting echelon.
It has also ordered a study to evaluate reducing various echelons to cater for raising of new units for the mountain strike corps and enhancing funds essential for modernization from within its own resources. This has evolved from the realization that the enhancement in the defence budget is unlikely in the coming years. Most importantly, despite all promises, no contribution can be expected from the MoD.
There are many organizations which form part of the MoD, which are more than redundant in the present age and whose closure could contribute to the availability of funds for the armed forces and could also lead to a further reduction in the defence budget. While military farms are under closure, the Military Engineering Service (MES) is another mammoth organization which should follow the same pattern. Outsourcing the services rendered by this organization would drastically reduce costs and provide better services and facilities.
The other is the Director General Defence Estates, a service termed by the Comptroller General for Defence Accounts (CGDA), another MoD controlled organization, as the most corrupt service in India. As far back as 2010, it was recommended for closure and its specialist personnel transferred to the Army HQs. Anthony too had threatened to close this service, but nothing moved. It continues to perform similarly, has been responsible for piling over 13,000 land cases in courts, which would cost the exchequer over Rs 5000 crore to settle. The MoD must revisit the recommendations of the CGDA and come to a decision.
The next which should be on the chopping block are redundant ordnance factories. Those manufacturing clothing and other material readily available in the open market need to be shut, their premises sold, money transferred to the exchequer. Maintaining them remains a drain on the MoD budget. Similarly, with the opening of defence production and R & D to the private sector, does the government still need to maintain over 30 laboratories which they maintain at an exorbitant cost. Only those essential for specialist research need to continue and be funded.
Reorganization at the apex level of the armed forces resulting in the appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and creation of theatre commands would enhance the functioning of the armed forces as also reduce some common aspects like amalgamation of individual supply chains and controlling HQs. It would impact the budget as requirements would be amalgamated and redundancies removed. Many logistic echelons and storing agencies could be brought together, cutting costs. By creating the Defence Planning Committee under the National Security Advisor, the government has all but written of this decision.
The government is aware that the mountain strike corps, which was sanctioned years ago was aimed at creating a strike capability into Tibet, which India desperately lacks at present. It would also be a deterrent to China in case of misadventures. Its firepower was already in the process being enhanced. Forcing the army to delay plans for its raising has left the army with only a defensive capability against China, removing its offensive component. Yet, the MoD has not even attempted to consider options which could assist the army in raising the same.
For a nation, facing multiple challenges in national security and two nuclear armed neighbours, who despite all out reach by the Indian government, still claim Indian territory, enhancing capabilities is essential. Possibly there is no other nation in the world facing such a hostile environment.
The raising of military capabilities must be an ‘all of government approach’, not leaving a service to handle its own shortcomings. Yet, all the government does is make promises, without seriously fulfilling any. The defence minister on the other hand announces in a press conference that her ministry is effective and that there is no ‘policy paralysis’.
Cadre review requires considering harsh realities CENJOWS 12 Jul 18
General
The army is in the process of carrying out its cadre review for officers after a gap of 35 years. As per government orders, the same is to be scheduled every 5 years. Immense water has flowed under the bridge during the gap between the reviews. Internal concepts and promotional procedures are still based on the era of seventies, disgruntlement and anger within the officer community is on the rise, parochialism and favouritism is the order of the day, those being side lined for promotion is increasing by the year and operational commitments are on the increase. The MS branch is almost unable to manage its officer cadre.
Officers from the services, who wear the same uniform and work as tirelessly are side lined only because they wear a different lanyard, while those from supporting arms who have been at the forefront of all operations post 1971, feel they are second class citizens. The army has failed to realize that any future war, especially in mountainous terrain, where it is most likely to occur, would be one of logistics and degradation of objectives, as Kargil proved. Anti-terrorist operations involve officers from the entire spectrum, but when it comes to dues, many branches feel they have been short sighted.
Disillusionment and anger also flows from large numbers of supersessions at every level and lack of realistic vacancies. Pyramidical structure would have supersessions, however it can be offset by innovative means and financial packages. Assured promotions, without privileges can be considered to continue keeping the officer community motivated. A fallout of disillusionment is increased medical categories, either due to perceived failures or anger against the system.
Desired scope of the review
Thus, the cadre review needs to look at the existing structures, methodology of promotions, enhancing vacancies, rightsizing the officer cadre thus creating a family of officers who have a hope for the future within the service. However, to be able to do this, it needs to accept harsh internal realities which have harmed the system over the years.
It is known across the board that in a pyramidical structure, the smaller the permanent cadre, the better are chances of promotion and accordingly, higher the morale. Every youngster who joins the academy and graduates has hopes and dreams for his future. By side lining majority at the first opportunity results in an increased disgruntled officer cadre, which should not be the aim. Hence the intention should be to create a structure which would be a modified pyramid.
Right size the officer cadre
Shortfalls exist mainly at the junior level, which is where it hurts the army the maximum. The fact that this shortfall can only be made up by enhancement of the support cadre, is well established. However, unless made lucrative in monetary terms or by providing alternate opportunities it would never attract the desired calibre. Banking on side stepping into CAPFs would never occur as none would desire an influx of army officers who have completed their service, as it could impact their internal promotional prospects. Hence shortfalls would continue. The bulging middle level cadre is an aspect which the army needs to reconsider.
Thus, the need to right size. The army must only cater to its core responsibilities removing from its cadre, organizations which can be manned by veterans or the support cadre, post their contractual service. A few prominent organizations, whose responsibilities can be shelved are discussed below, there would be many more.
The National Cadet Corps is the first organization which needs to be reorganized. This was also part of the Shekatkar committee recommendations. The army should only provide staff at the apex level, thus maintaining control. At lower levels it should be staffed by the retired/ support cadre who reside close by. They could be employed akin to ECHS clinics where local staff is hired for management of the clinics.
The other organizations where serving officer strengths could be considered for removal are mundane appointments in DRDO, Ordnance Factories and DGQA (Director General Quality Assurance). These could be given to the support cadre and they become a permanent part of these organizations, removing them from the army’s strength and hence pension bill. There would be many more inhouse organizations which could also face a similar axe.
Management of the officer cadre
Appointments
The next archaic rules are those which govern appointments and promotions. Appointments are linked to promotions. Denying operational appointments at the junior level to officers from the services is a flow from the seventies. In the current environment junior officers from the services have more operational experience than officers of most arms and supporting arms, less the infantry.
All service officers undergo a compulsory two-year tenure with an operational infantry unit and a similar one with the RR or AR subsequently, as compared to possibly only one done by officers of other arms. By considering them for operational appointments at the junior level would open doors for select capable officers from the services contributing at higher levels in the years ahead, rather than being side lined only because of they were commissioned into a service years ago.
It would provide a level playing field for those are capable, talented and possess merit. It would also change the working ethos of the army and to some extent mitigate the anger within the services community.
Promotions
Promotions for the officer cadre beyond the colonel’s level are based on two structures, meant to run parallel but are anything but that. The two structures for senior promotions are general cadre and non-general cadre. The general cadre implies fighting arms and some selected from supporting arms. All others form part of the non-general cadre. Vacancies are accordingly allotted and tilted towards the general cadre, based on its larger strength.
The term fighting arms is presently derelict and has no relevance. Post 1971 all operations involving the army, whether it be Siachen, Kargil or duels along the LoC have only witnessed the participation of the infantry, artillery and engineers. The armoured and mechanised infantry, considered as fighting arms, have been missing. Hence, the term needs to be re-considered and those that form a part of it re-constituted.
The overall intention must be to provide a level playing field. Tilting the balance towards a limited segment of the army creates disgruntlement and anger within the system. The cadre review should consider changing the rules established post 1971 and take a more realistic approach.
Comparison with Group A services
Realistically army officers being ‘commissioned officers’ are a notch above all Group A services. However, by pushing forth letters of unacceptable equivalence and enhancing their own promotional avenues by the bureaucracy, this aspect has gained prominence. Salt has been added to the wounds by the grant of Non-Functional Upgradation to these services, further enhancing their status. The army, having a pyramidical structure, with limited vacancies would always be at a disadvantage. This issue has been in the limelight in recent times with the cadre review of the AFHQ-CS cadre approved.
While it may be difficult to completely close the gap, however options exist for its reduction.
Recommendations
The army must first decide on its cadre strength, by considering the removal of all non-military organizations to which it contributes. This would determine a reduced middle level cadre. This decided then it would need to move on a two-front approach. Firstly, it should open pre-mature retirements for those who desire it and secondly offer permanent secondment to those PSUs, DGQA and DRDO organizations to which it provides officers. This secondment in the long term would be for the support cadre, who finish their contractual service.
NCC must be reorganized on the lines of the Shekatkar committee reforms and the involvement of the serving reduced.
It should also consider reduction of ranks, to bring them at par with the civilian cadre and alongside it enhancement of salary akin to their model. Simultaneously should be upgradation of appointments. Upto the early eighties the CO of a unit was a Lt Col, which was subsequently upgraded. There was an initial uneasiness, but which settled with time. The same can be considered now.
With upgraded appointments, there would be an increase in vacancies. Officers missing their selection board at the Colonel’s level should be considered by a separate board for staff and be promoted accordingly. This staff cadre should also be considered for promotion to maybe one or two more levels. This could result in a modified pyramid. This will be an incentive as also a motivating factor for the officer cadre, majority of whom are side lined at an early age.
Most importantly, the cadre review should consider creating a level playing field for all arms and services, wherein the deserving rise on merit, rather than because of the lanyard that they wear. The archaic rules of the seventies need to be revisited with the realities of the present as also promotion and appointment policies reconsidered.
Conclusion
The cadre review should aim to create an army which is a team and operates in cohesion where the functioning of each arm and service is recognized and appreciated. It should possess at its disposal only those organizations which are essential and reduce its strength to manageable levels.
Palampur military station can shame most cantonment boards (English Version) Rakshak News 12 Jul 18
The armed forces live either in cantonments, responsibility of maintenance and provision of facilities in which is the responsibility of the Defence Estates Cadre (DGDE) or in military stations, which are run by the armed forces, without the interference of the DGDE.
The DGDE has been stated to be amongst the most corrupt organizations in the country. Post the emergence of land scams across the country, defence minister AK Anthony warned the department to clean up its act. The Comptroller General of Defence Accounts recommended disbandment of the DGDE due to widespread irregularities. Its recommendations also included transfer of DGDE’s functions, activities and expert manpower to the land directorates of the three services. However, like all recommendations suggesting cuts, this too went under the carpet.
While cantonments are clean, however their services, being under the control of DGDE, leaves much to be desired. The same is the case with townships run by Public-Sector Units (PSUs), where minimum emphasis is given to management of facilities. Military stations on the other hand are far better organized and have better amenities.
Palampur is an excellent example of a military station whose facilities and amenities have enhanced the quality of life of its residents. A visit to Palampur would open eyes of those seeking to improve living conditions and enhance management of infrastructure for common use, whether they be members of the DGDE, municipalities or independent townships run by large PSUs. Facilities in Palampur have been created with minimum expenditure, are self-sustaining and cater for the health of its residents.
While facilities including cleanliness, orderliness and provision of amenities, common to most military cantonments can be found in Palampur, there are additions, which distinguish it from others.
In the current environment of security threats to military stations, Palampur has created a centralized Incident Control Centre (ICC), manned 24 X 7. The ICC monitors the station through a collection of state of the art video cameras. In case of any suspicious movement, a system of bulk messages and alarm measures have been installed for different sectors of the cantonment, depending on the threat. To further enhance early warning to residents there is a public-address information system covering almost the entire station. This enables residents to be forewarned whenever there is any suspicious movement or a breach of security.
The station, with multiple military units is a non-paper burning station. All waste paper is shredded and then sent to a central facility where it is recycled to produce items of regular use including file covers, note pads, gift bags etc. Since it employs material which would have otherwise been destroyed, the facility is easily self- sustaining.
Waste management is also different from most municipalities or cantonments. Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs) ensure that residents do not discard waste carelessly. The almost 1500 kg waste generated in the station daily has almost half as biodegradable. This is converted, using an organic waste management plant, into useable fertilizer/manure which is now available to residents for their use.
To further build on the Prime Minister’s aim of moving towards a cashless economy, the station has gone beyond the common mandate. All military canteens run by the three services across the country have no cash transactions. Palampur has gone beyond. It has introduced its own smart cards, available locally for all facilities that the station provides, including vegetable and grocery shops as also cafeterias. Cash is not acceptable.
To assist residents in their daily requirements as also control use of vehicles during office hours there are a collection of battery operated cars moving through the station, available to residents. It enables residents to avoid using their own transport, thus saving on fuel. It also benefits families with small children who need to visit shops for daily needs, medical or social facilities.
For ensuring better health, all raw vegetables being delivered to army establishments within the cantonment are centrally cleaned using an Ozone air sprayer to remove harmful chemicals which may have been used for artificial ripening.
If a military station with limited revenue can provide such facilities to enhance the quality of life of its residents, it can easily be implemented by cantonment boards, municipalities and PSU townships which have multiple sources of revenue. It is a must visit location for representatives of organizations seeking to care for their residents.
Give short service a fillip in army Deccan Herald 04 Jun 18
Reports surfaced last week that the army, faced with a growing salary budget and an immense officer shortfall, has moved a proposal to increase intake of Short Service Commission (SSC) and correspondingly reduce the number of permanent commission officers. The MoD appears satisfied with the proposal, which also involves offering some lumpsum payments to those who serve 10 or 14 years as SSC.
The present ratio between the permanent and SSC is 4:1, implying the ratio between the main and support cadre, with the permanent being the main. This ratio is skewed. Realistically it should have been the reverse, in case disgruntlement and supersession levels of the main cadre need to be reduced.
For any army it is essential to have larger numbers at the junior level. Thus, the AV Singh Committee (AVSC), formed in 2001, had recommended an initial ratio of 1:1.1, whereas abroad the ratios vary around 5:1. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) had in Oct 2008, approved a reduction in the permanent cadre, which is finally being floated now.
The MoD is likely to agree to approve a proposal of two months’ salary per year for those completing ten years’ service and four months salary for those completing 14 years (for the last four years). The army had also suggested a year’s study leave a professional course for a better second career for those serving ten years and two years for those serving for 14. Medical benefits and Ex-servicemen facilities, less pension, is also on the cards.
The pyramidical structure of the armed forces leave many officers missing the boat at various levels. The first selection board is generally with 14 – 15 years of service, at an age of 35-37. Those who miss the cut continue serving till retirement at the age of 54. They are joined by others who miss out on promotion at different ranks.
The splitting of the cadre into main and support would imply a smaller number remains for consideration for promotion and hence there are fewer superseded. The major problem is to make the support cadre lucrative, inviting youth to subscribe to it.
A report from 2014 stated that the government was considering extending the service of the SSC to 18 years. By retiring them at 18, they would be denied pensionary benefits, for which a minimum service of 20 is essential. Other benefits like medical etc would be provided.
A report of Apr 2015 stated that special emphasis was being given to this in the army commanders conference, then chaired by General Daljit Singh. The options stated then are akin to the present proposals forwarded to the MoD. The major stumbling block was clearance from the finance ministry, which was not forthcoming. A report in Jan this year stated that the Short Service Commission Officers Association (SSCO), based in Hyderabad had decided to move the supreme court for pensions.
The fact remains, that these officers after having given the best part of their youth to the security of the nation cannot be dumped, without a proper exit plan. There have been ideas projected for lateral move of SSC officers, post their contractual service in the army, to various Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) and other government cadre as also seeking to involve the industry to absorb them.
While such ideas may sound good on paper and in discussions, the reality remains that the MoD has even been unable to push other ministries and states to strictly adhere to the government laid reservations for ESM. Reservations for ESM in every Group (A to C) were laid down in 1979 and varied from 10 to 20%. There is no monitoring mechanism to ensure that these quotas are being implemented. Data gleamed on the same from multiple sources a year ago proved that most states had only 1-3% of ESM quotas filled.
Hence, sidestepping into CAPFs may never happen physically, though promises may be made. In case it does happen, they would remain outcasts. The only force where they would be accepted and amalgamated would be the Assam Rifles. Similarly, tapping the corporate may never be the option. There would be promises made, sidestepping may happen, but only for a very limited duration.
Therefore, unless considered alternatives exist, this scheme would fail. One option could be permanent secondment into the DRDO and Quality Assurance, in vacancies which are presently occupied by the armed forces. Another option could be permanent seconding into the Territorial Army and reducing direct enrolment of volunteers. A third option could have them being permanently adsorbed into the NCC, details of which would need to be evaluated. NCC could then become part of the MHA, rather than the MoD. This could help reduce the permanent cadre from non-essential appointments.
Unless there is fool proof mechanism for absorbing SSC officers, who are not selected for permanent commission nor desire to leave, the system can never be made attractive. Denying them pensions may seem an ideal thought now, however considering the experience of the courts in dealing with women officers and the fact that the SSCO is already moving court, the same may happen again. It would then be fait accompli.
DPC commences its act CENJOWS 23 May 18
The first meeting of the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) headed by the NSA, Ajit Doval, was held early this month. It being the first meeting, a statement mentioned, ‘No major decision was taken. The meeting, which lasted for around two hours, discussed the key challenges ahead and how to address them’. Another statement mentioned, ‘The members deliberated on the geo-strategic landscape and agreed to chart a time bound action plan in keeping with its broad mandate’.
An article by Nitin Gokhale, post the meeting, states that the DPC decided to concentrate on a few issues in the short and mid-term. These include formulating a National Security Strategy (NSS), building military infrastructure along India’s land and maritime borders and creating indigenous capability to manufacture ammunition.
An NSS draft exists, whether it would accept it or recommence its own study on the same, remains to be seen. Without infrastructure, the armed forces were hampered in countering threats, whether it involved Andamans and Nicobar or the Chinese front. Monitoring it and clearing multiple road blocks which delay its development requires a top down push, which would now be given.
Ammunition is a major criticality, holding of which was low enough for the government to note with alarm. Dependence was either on the Ordnance Factories (OFB) or import. Creating infrastructure within the country would result in multiple benefits. It would reduce dependence as also create employment and enhance investment, while saving critical foreign exchange.
The mandate of the DPC includes formulating a defence and national security policy, creation of sub-committees to assess defence diplomacy, defence manufacturing and eco systems and defence capability development. The major reason for India not issuing any official national security document in the last 70 years has been lack of political consensus and governments not establishing coordinated and synergized departments to formulate policies on national security.
Thus, despite its multiple shortcomings, it is the first time that a committee comprising key stake holders has been created. The message it clearly conveys is that a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) is ruled out for the moment, however, its present composition sends a positive signal, provided it continues to function over the years and completes its mandate in a desired timeframe.
Developing defence capabilities is a time-consuming process and is ideal when the three services are integrated. However, with the establishment od the DPC, the NSA would function as the de-facto CDS, seeking to formulate a common procurement plan based on emerging threat perceptions. As Late Mr K Subrahmanyam had stated in the Kargil Committee report, ‘Long range planning must become an article of faith with us, if crises management and adhocism is to be avoided and the nation is to be provided with a sound and desired defence capability’.
Developing structures to meet future challenges also impacts national economy. As is known, India has been the largest importer of military hardware in recent years, solely because of its reliance on the DRDO, which apart from rocket technology and a few limited fields, has failed or produced equipment below acceptable standards. International procurements are costly on the exchequer. Orders placed by the present government in the international arms market would only be fully inducted and integrated into the armed forces after possibly a decade. Such lead time is normal. Further, no nation can ever be a major power by imports alone.
The nations from whom India imports would always place riders while providing hardware. Despite any international grouping, all nations consider their own national interests prior to those they are closely associated with. The US applying CAATSA, impacting Indian plans to procure the S-400 missile system and other hardware from Russia as also placing sanctions on Iran, which may impact Indian interests, are a case in point. Therefore, reliance must be on developing an in-house industrial base. The sympathy accorded to DRDO and OFB must end and these made to compete with private and international concerns, planning to establish factories in India, under Indian terms and conditions.
The aim of the DPC needs to be clear. It must look at the international security environment at least 15 to 20 years ahead and the challenges which India is likely to face. These challenges would be multiple, implying economic, domestic and military. These need to be assessed considering what would be Indian interests at that phase. It is probable that by then India would have secured its own frontiers and expanded its bases to counter challenges away from its shores and been a power beyond the immediate region.
While assessing these challenges the likely capabilities and strength of our major adversaries need to be factored in. Realistically, China would remain a threat, despite all bonhomie between the leaders, not only militarily, but also in the diplomatic and economic environment. Pak, if assessed, would either be subjugated by China or a nation struggling to survive economically and engulfed with internal crises. Instability in the neighbourhood would always remain a concern. India’s internal threats would need to also be factored in.
Some emerging threats could be handled diplomatically or politically, some would need a strong military deterrence. It should remain noted that the power of diplomacy only exists if backed by resolute military power. As Netanyahu, the Israeli Prime Minister, had stated in his address in Delhi, ‘The strong survive. You make peace with the strong. You make alliances with the strong. You’re able to maintain peace by being strong.’
Based on these emerging challenges and its NSS, would emerge the strategic planning guidance for desired capabilities which the armed forces would need and the manner of their procurement. This would result in the creation of a joint capability plan for the short, mid and long term. It would factor in the economic health of the nation and a realistic share of the budget. An unrealistic planning, without economic backing is fruitless and would be a failure.
Some equipment may continue to be purchased from the international market, whereas the majority would need to be developed internally. Thus, defence planning, procurement and development of an in-house industrial base is essential. Unless considered now, they would be unavailable in the desired period.
If the DPC is seeking to complete its task in a realistic timeframe, then it needs to incorporate think tanks, educational institutions and experts into the multiple sub committees that it proposes to create. Service HQs within themselves may be insufficient.
The DPC has undertaken an immense mandate for itself, which if it succeeds would fulfil a major void in Indian security planning. Once requisite policies are created and accepted, future governments would only need to revisit them and make minor amendments with passage of time. The ultimate question, whose answer would flow with time, is whether this is another committee set up to delay reorganizing higher defence management or is it the answer to futuristic Indian defence planning?
Army faces shortfalls in high-end ammunition (English Version) Rakshak News 25 Apr 18
A report in the press last week stated that the army, in its latest conference of senior officials termed the army commanders conference, deliberated on its holding of ammunition stocks, both in quality and quantity. The army, as per government directives is expected to be prepared for a two-front war, involving both China and Pak operating in collusion. Adding a third dimension of continuing insurgency in Kashmir makes it a two and a half front war.
The recent air force exercise, Gagan Shakti, wherein all air power resources were mobilized, which initially operated on one front, then shifted emphasis on the other was a clear example of the military preparing for the same. Even if China does not commence operations, forces deployed on the Chinese front cannot be shifted to handle operations with Pak.
The armed forces were initially meant to cater for ammunition for a forty-day war, hence reserve of ammunition was accordingly stocked. With all nations in the region possessing nuclear weapons and concern in the international environment of a conventional war moving into the nuclear domain, the duration of an expected war was reduced from forty to ten, implying ten days intensive war. This means that ammunition stocks for all forces deployed on both fronts for every type of weapon system should be available for a minimum of ten days of intense conflict.
This ammunition is spread across the nation from troops deployed along the border to major depots in depth and keeps moving forward as operations progress and expenditure occurs. While in actuality all forces would not be fighting at the same level, hence management of ammunition would be feasible to meet the army’s requirement from reserves maintained in depots.
Ammunition stored is dependent on shelf life. Hence, it is regularly rotated, as newly procured ammunition moves into storage, older ammunition is shifted to training. The more complex the ammunition the shorter is the shelf life. Rockets and missiles have shorter shelf life as compared to others, basically because of the electronic components which form a part of it. These are also costlier. There are varying storage requirements for diverse types of ammunition.
With paucity of funds the army is now being forced to compromise and reconsider its priorities. As per newspaper reports, ammunition variety like the Smerch rockets, Konkors missiles, anti-tank ammunition and influence mines would not be procured. Thus, their holdings would drop to less than the desired levels. Such a decision, though hard needs to be adopted as the government is unwilling to release additional funds. An option of re-examining critical ammunition and possibly extending its shelf life, based on its condition may have to be resorted to. This is however only a short time emergency measure.
Shortfall of specialized ammunition has been impacted as most of it is still in the import category. Indigenously manufactured ammunition may still be readily available. While the budget has impacted defence preparedness, the government must reconsider its allocation as shortfalls in ammunition is unacceptable.
Shortfalls can never be made up, even in a prolonged period as every year, more ammunition would have reached the end of its shelf life. Hence with very little likelihood of the government releasing additional funds in the coming years, the shortfalls would continue adding to security concerns.
In addition to shortfalls in ammunition, the army is also being forced to reconsider its requirement of procuring spares for equipment moving into the vintage phase. As an equipment grows older, its cost of maintenance increases. If new equipment to replace the same is in the pipeline, then the decision is logical, however, shortfalls even in the capital budget would not provide the army with the luxury of such procurements. This would result in lower levels of equipment availability, which remains undesirable.
This combined action would open doors to adversaries to continue with their provocative actions as an army with shortfalls would never be fully prepared for operations. While the soldier would fight to the last man with all that is provided to him, however ensuring that he has the right equipment in the right quantity and in the right place is the responsibility of the government. If it fails to provide the same, them it is playing with national security, which is detrimental.
What government setting panel headed by Ajit Doval for defence planning means for armed forces Daily O 22 Apr 18
The government announced last week of the creation of a new mechanism, termed as the Defence Planning Committee (DPC), under the chairmanship of the National Security Advisor (NSA), Ajit Doval. It would be a permanent body and have as its members the Chairman Chief’s of Staff Committee (presently also a service chief), other service chiefs, foreign secretary, defence secretary and the expenditure secretary of the finance ministry. The member secretary would be the Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff (CISC).
The DPC, as per the press release, is slated to prepare a draft national security strategy, undertake a strategic defence review and formulate an international defence engagement strategy. The idea behind its creation is to establish a mechanism which could undertake integrated planning to enable the forces to meet the challenges in the emerging complex international security environment.
As per the government order, the committee would have four sub committees. These are policy and strategy, plans and capability development, defence diplomacy and defence manufacturing ecosystem. The details of members of each committee and its terms of reference would be announced later. The inputs generated by these committees would be pursued by the defence minister.
Thus, while the organization falls under the purview of the PMO, as the NSC is a part of it and the NSA advises the PM, the processing would be done by the defence minister. The plausible reason for placing it under the PMO is to draw in members from other ministries, which may not have worked as willingly under the MoD.
India needed an overhaul in its ‘apex management of defence’. The basic role of ‘management of defence’ implies developing national security objectives and strategy from national aims and interests, long term military strategy and objectives as also evolving planning guidelines for developing military capability. It also involves implementing, monitoring and controlling military strategy and force development. Such a responsibility would involve the NSC, MoD and service headquarters. In that manner, the organization and chain of processing is beneficial.
National power flows from a combination of economic, diplomatic and military. Thus, the DPC has a combination of senior military members and bureaucrats from the economic and foreign ministries. It enables the government to avoid remodelling the NSC, which is presently IB and RAW (IPS cadre) dominated and lacks suitable representatives from other elements of power.
Further, in creating this committee, the government has once again appointed a pseudo Chief of Defence staff (CDS) in the form of the NSA. He would now be responsible to coordinate, approve and determine major procurements, defence engagement, deployment at the macro level and budgetary demands between the three services based on emerging threat perceptions. Earlier these delved on the defence secretary and the defence minister, leading to heartburns due to their lack of understanding military matters. It gives the government another excuse to avoid and delay appointing a CDS.
The issue of avoiding appointing a CDS is further highlighted by appointing the CISC as the member secretary. The CISC heads HQ Integrated Defence Staff, which is earmarked for formulating a joint military strategy, force development and coordinating force procurement based on priorities determined by emerging threats. It has been unable to perform its assigned task because of non-appointment of a CDS, thus compelling all services to process their cases directly with the MoD. By placing the CISC in the DPC, enables the NSA to function as a pseudo CDS.
Thus, control of the armed forces shifts from the defence minister to the PMO, with the NSA officiating as the CDS.
There would however be advantages in this system. Firstly, all elements involved in projection of national power would remain under one roof. Hence, based on the nature of threat a coordinated approach would emerge, employing each element to its full capacity. Secondly, India desperately requires the creation of a national security strategy, which could then be the policy document for countering emerging threats. Lack of such guidelines implies each ministry rumbles on in isolation.
Thirdly, military engagement also implies military diplomacy and international military cooperation. It is essential in the current environment. Military diplomacy is more pronounced in nations where political uncertainty exists. While the military in these nations remains away from politics, it continues to exert power from behind the throne.
Most nations in our close and extended neighbourhood upto Africa are falling into the Chinese debt trap, forced to surrender strategic assets. This is because governments tend to view short term gains by accepting loans, which result in long term repayment issues. It is here that quiet military diplomacy would pay greater dividends than diplomacy, as military to military contacts would advise on alternate options, where loss of strategic assets is avoided. Further the military would remain, while governments would continue to change. Accepting the growing importance of military diplomacy should be accepted and implemented by the DPC.
Fourthly, the world seeks to engage militarily with India. Decisions taken on the nature and level of engagement are done without consulting the armed forces, which could lead to misinterpretation. Hence, this body is an ideal institution to firm international military cooperation and coordination.
Fifthly is the availability of funds for enhancing defence preparedness. Closer interaction between senior hierarchy at functional and decision-making levels of major ministries would enhance awareness of force capability and development requirements, which may benefit in release of adequate funds the long term.
Finally, and most importantly, the NSA implies the direct involvement of the PMO in immediate matters pertaining to national security and force enhancement. This could be effective if the NSA convinced by arguments on force shortcomings is able to open closed doors and ensure release of adequate funds.
The system may work only if all involved move forward in a coordinated manner and the organization meets at frequent intervals. If it functions akin to the Strategic Planning Group of the NSC, whose meetings are even less than infrequent, then this would result in creation of an additional elephant in government functioning. If the aim is to make the NSA a pseudo CDS, then this organization is doomed to add to problems in the years ahead.
National security has been largely ignored as respective minister’s work in closed spaces, as the present budget has indicated. If this organization can break those shackles and work to enhance defence preparedness based on realistic assessment of threat, only then would it be a worthwhile exercise.
Are calls for downsizing of the army realistic? CENJOWS 06 Apr 18
Introduction
There has been a spurt in suggestions on downsizing of the Indian army, since China took the giant step of announcing last year that it would cut its PLA strength, while increasing the strength of the PLA navy and strategic forces. The calls gained pace post the announcement of the defence budget, picking up steam after the release of a report by the Standing Committee on Defence quoting the army vice chief’s comments on the negative impact of the budget on defence preparedness.
Chinese downsizing
Facts behind Chinese troop reductions generally remain shrouded in mystery. As per Global Security on PLA reductions, the PLA began in 1949 with 5.5 million soldiers. It then had an officer to enlisted man ratio of 1:1, since the army consisted of illiterate peasant volunteers. In 2007, the PLA had a 33% officer ratio, which remains far higher than any other nation. The PLA has been downsized regularly since it came into being in the 1950’s to offset this skewed balance amongst other factors. It downsized in the fifties, but when the Korean war took place, its strength rose to 6.3 Million. It was reduced by one million in 1985, 500,000 in 1997, 200,000 in 2003 and the latest is a reduction of 300,000 in 2015.
The Chinese have justified their downsizing by stating that it is seeking to create a leaner and meaner army, by reducing its flab, while enhancing the strength and capabilities of its navy and strategic forces. Its force reductions have focussed on few major areas. These are strengthening their navy, air force and strategic forces, reducing officer and NCO ratios with enlisted men, removing administrative organizations, merging units and transferring certain non-PLA units like the railway troops. It has been able to reduce manpower by creating joint commands by reducing logistic echelons, which earlier remained in place to support independent services, but presently one echelon supports all.
The possible Chinese PLA strength as per known details in 2017 post its last reduction was 2 million. It would continue maintaining its large reserve militia force of 1.5 million, not considering an armed police force of a million. The Chinese model, referred to recently by the army chief, General Bipin Rawat, was to develop its armed forces capability alongside development of its economy. India on the other hand has ignored armed forces capabilities for economic development, except post any crises.
Reducing Indian armed forces flab
While there is logic in cutting down the flab of support echelons in the Indian case, however reduction of the tooth has other connotations. The Indian tooth to tail ratio, implying those supporting the fighting forces is 1:1.5 including civilians paid from the defence budget. The Indian armed forces are a legacy from the British era, where logistic echelons were essential to support fighting forces of the second world war era, especially in the Burmese and Malayan campaigns. For a long time, the army felt that in a war, it would be left alone to maintain, sustain and fight the enemy. However, in the present context, that is far from reality.
With better communication lines, there has been a change in development across the nation. Thus, support in operations would be much more forward than earlier. Further, residents of border areas would prefer staying back and caring for their property rather than withdrawing to rear areas as earlier. This would provide the army with reasonable local support also during operations. Thus, it would imply national effort in times of war, rather than the armed forces catering for everything themselves, as was the case decades ago.
Multiple committees created by the government have recommended reduction of the tail. The Krishna Rao committee of the eighties and the Shekatkar committee recently are two examples. Post the Shekatkar committee recommendations, the government announced its decision to reduce 57,000 military personnel from the tail. However, it has refused to take any decision to reduce the civilian component, fearing labour issues impacting vote banks. Thus, the tail which could be further reduced has been largely left untouched.
Why the tooth should not be reduced
Reduction of the tooth, quoting the Chinese example, needs to be considered with care. The environment within and surrounding the two nations are vastly different. China as a nation has disputes with all its neighbours, however in every case, it is China which claims territory, rather than its adversaries, India being an example. Hence, nations which border China need to be alert of Chinese intent rather than it being the other way around.
This implies that nations around China need to defend their territory from Chinese misadventures, rather than China defending its own. Indian forces are deployed on the watershed, securing the passes, in their prepared defences which are regularly maintained and upgraded. Chinese forces on the other hand are in depth and have very few defensive positions prepared as India has. Therefore, it would be China which would launch an offensive into Indian territory, rather than being the other way around.
China shifting focus to its navy and strategic forces is to counter the US and its allies, which have begun challenging Chinese growing hegemony in the South China Sea and the oceans around, as its army would play a limited role. Chinese capability development is therefore aimed at countering US might in its areas of interest, rather than its immediate neighbours.
In India’s case, standoffs are on the rise as China seeks to push demand for its claim lines. All these occur in areas considered ours, rather than across the border, in Tibet. If troop density is reduced, there are always possibilities of China occupying the passes, adding to own discomfiture. To increase pressure on China by threatening to launch a counter offensive, in case of Chinese misadventures, India has commenced raising a corps for offensive operations.
On the other border is Pakistan, which has remained an adversary since the two nations parted on religious lines. No government has been able to move forward on peace talks, as the Pak army, which controls the nation from the back seat on most occasions and from the driver’s seat occasionally, does not desire it. Four wars have been fought yet tensions remain the same. The Shimla agreement failed to resolve Kashmir and since then the relationship has been steadily moving downhill.
The LoC remains active, with regular firing and casualties on both sides. It needs to be manned with strength not only to ensure its sanctity but also to deter infiltration, which Pak regularly resorts to. Though firing has stopped in the Siachen Glacier, yet it cannot be left unoccupied, as Pak could grab parts of it, since it remains un-demarcated. This could have strategic implications for India.
Terror strikes on Indian soil are countered by similar actions across the border. Defences are maintained in strength to deter any adventurism as the border remains unconfirmed. In the present environment troops are deployed in layers to prevent infiltration. Forces, both defensive and offensive are maintained in a high state of readiness all along the border, as tensions between the two nations remains high. All formations in peace locations also remain on six to twelve hours warning schedule and are regularly exercising their operational role.
Internally, the army is also involved in battling insurgencies in Kashmir and the North East. Most formations employed in counter insurgency have this as their secondary task, their primary being either defensive or offensive along the Northern, Western or Eastern borders. The Rashtriya Rifles (RR) leading the insurgency in Kashmir, remains the only force whose primary role is counter insurgency.
Recently, the Chinese military spokesperson, Colonel Ren Guoqiang, stated, ‘I am very confident that military cooperation (between China and Pak) will help facilitate our state to state relationship and also in maintaining regional peace and international stability’. He made this statement post China supplying Pak with a powerful missile tracking system.
This statement is clearly a hint on both alluding to a two-front option, which would be India’s major nightmare, if not correctly addressed. Therefore, ensuring defence of both borders with the belief that it may not be possible to move troops deployed along the LoC or LAC from one theatre to the other, during hostilities with one adversary becomes a binding factor in defence planning.
Nuclear Factor
There is a belief that since all three nations possess nuclear weapons, chances of an all-out conflict remain low. Both India and China have a ‘no first use’ nuclear doctrine. A standoff may escalate as Doklam did threaten to, however the operations would most likely be under a nuclear shadow but would remain conventional.
Pak, fearing India’s declared ‘cold start’ doctrine, has deployed its tactical nuclear missiles forward at Gujranwala and Pano Aqil. It has continuously threatened India with a pro-active nuclear strike, in case India launches any offensive. India would, in case it takes a decision to launch, aim to keep it below the nuclear threshold, by restricting its terminal objectives.
Thus, possession of nuclear weapons alone may not be a deterrence against war. Only strong conventional capabilities may be a deterrent, which remains India’s shortcoming.
Conclusion
India remains the only country in the world which has hostile nuclear armed adversaries on both its borders, who continue to claim large parts of its territory while supporting secessionist and militant groups within. Both the nations remain wary of India’s growing economic prowess and rising international stature. Thus, the Indian army remains amongst the most committed ones of its kind in the world.
In this context, seeking to reduce manpower, especially of its teeth, is pushing its already over committed force deeper into operations, with almost no breaks. Such action is detrimental in maintaining operational effectiveness of the fighting force. Further Indian central police forces are neither trained nor equipped to function independently in counter insurgency tasks.
It should also be understood by those desiring that the nation adopt the Chinese model, that despite all constraints, the army continues to ensure security of the nation and its institutions, enabling rapid economic development. Its conventional force capacities and capabilities must therefore continue being enhanced as threat levels and capabilities of our adversaries continue to rise. Reducing the tail may be logical but tampering with its teeth would be detrimental.
Attempting to ape the Chinese would be catastrophic for national security. Thus arm-chair strategists, who are presently drunk by the power of their pen, need to reassess their ideas with realism, rather than jump and copy nations who face no threat, rather threaten others.
Reconstituting missile and UAV forces Bharat Shakti 03 Apr 18
With enhanced dependency on missiles the time is ripe for discussing whether India should reconsider reconstituting its missile and UAV forces. The Indian missile forces remain under the artillery for manning and training only but are segregated for employment and deployment. With the growing proliferation of UAVs, the issue to be considered is whether we need a separate UAV force or continue with the present concept, where the artillery continues to man and train the users, with deployment and employment under respective force commanders, akin to missiles. Internationally, the concept of employment of missiles also varies.
Chinese missile forces, under the command of the Second Artillery Force or Second Artillery Corps, rechristened on 31 Dec 2015 as the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), controls all missiles of the Chinese army. Till 1985 they were a nuclear deterrent force based primarily on intermediate and medium range missiles. Post 1985 they were assigned intercontinental and conventional missiles as part of their inventory. Thus, all missiles in the Chinese inventory remain with them. It was also elevated from an independent branch to the fourth arm of the military alongside their army (PLA), Navy (PLAN) and air force (PLAAF).
Its missile forces are organized under six missile bases. Assigned to each base are missile brigades, meant for operating the missiles. Limited information available suggests that each base has a mixture of both, conventional and nuclear forces and are oriented towards specific missions. Missile Base 52, is solely directed towards Taiwan and is possibly the only base with conventional missiles.
The US has its nuclear missiles under the control of the US Strategic Command. Its conventional missiles, mainly cruise missiles, are deployed under the command of theatre commanders, who have the authority to employ them. This is because US theatre commands operate away from the mainland. Only nuclear weapons need an authentication from the President. The same is the norm with other western nations. Russia also has separate structures for its nuclear and conventional missile controls. Its nuclear missiles are controlled by its Strategic Rocket Forces.
In India, the artillery is responsible for the manning and handling India’s missile systems though there is a difference in the command, control and employment mechanisms. The strategic and nuclear capable missiles remain under the command and control of the Strategic Forces Command, which functions directly under the National Security Council. Its employment would be a political decision with the CCS under the PM being the authority.
Tactical missiles with conventional warheads, though again manned by the artillery are theatre specific, allocation and permission to launch would most likely be delegated to commanders at lower levels, depending on the operational scenario. Thus, in India it is the artillery which is responsible for their employment as also provides the manpower for their manning, the authority to employ them varies.
The Chinese approach considering their geopolitical requirements may appear logical, but there are drawbacks in the system. The Chinese would be aiming to create a confusion in the minds of their enemy of what it would be planning to launch, nuclear or conventional, since each base has a mix of missiles. This, if wrongly judged it could lead to escalation of conflict.
Secondly, since China has adopted this approach from the start of it inducting missiles into service, it has established structures for their training and created a cadre specific to it. Further, China faces threats not along its borders, as none of its neighbours (including India) have any territorial claims on China, but from the US. Indian actions would be a counter to a Chinese aggression.
The Indian context is different for multiple reasons. Firstly, Indian threats emanate from both its borders, as its border disputes continue to simmer. Hence, it is more likely to employ conventional rather than nuclear missiles. India possesses nuclear weapons only for deterrence and has a clearly enunciated ‘no first use’ policy. Thus, differentiating nuclear and conventional missiles is essential, if India desires to avoid escalation to a nuclear level. Further, India does not follow a theatre command concept, akin to US and China, hence its employment of conventional missiles would most probably be a decision taken in Delhi.
Secondly, the Indian artillery is tasked with degradation and destruction of the enemy’s combat potential. In the present concept, its array of equipment comprising of Guns, Mortars, Missiles, Rockets and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) together forms a formidable force, with the ability to acquire, engage employing multiple means and equipment based on target profile and range as also subsequent Post-Strike Damage Assessment (PSDA) enables seamless operations. This organization, places under one commander resources to engage upto his area of influence.
Thirdly, for India to consider raising a separate missile force would imply additional expenditure including establishing a separate training establishment and cadre. It is an expenditure which the nation can presently ill afford, unless it has sound strategic sense.
The other factor gaining prominence is the proliferation of UAVs in the battle area. With their increased advantage, they would soon be available with every unit, both in defensive and offensive roles. Infantry battalions deployed for operations would need them to monitor the area ahead for early warning, while for the artillery they are essential for target acquisition, engagement and PSDA. Offensive formations would need them to monitor enemy deployment and movement of reserves. The air force has its own requirement of locating enemy’s radar network and monitor enemy airfields.
The higher the level, the more is their requirement for reconnaissance and intelligence. In each case, the duration of flight and height ceiling would vary. Thus, across the land frontier, they are essential at every level. In case India does acquire armed drones, then the employment of these too would need to be coordinated between the air force and the army.
Hence unless there is a coordinated policy for their employment they would be cluttering up an already over polluted battle air space sharing the same with artillery gun fire, helicopters and aircraft. Creating a separate force to employ them and distribute the equipment across the entire spectrum, while seeking to coordinate their actions is nigh impossible, however laying down a policy for their employment during war is. In the present ‘no war no peace’ scenario there are no problems, as the air space remains uncluttered and their employment is unhindered.
In the overall context, there would be no requirement to change existing structures for the organization, deployment and employment of either missile forces nor UAVs. What would be more prudent is to lay down policies and establish means of communication for better coordination at different levels.
Army compelled to re-prioritize The Statesman 03 Apr 18
Post the furore created over the presentations of the vice chiefs of the three services to the Parliamentary Committee and their submitted report on poor allocation of the defence capital budget, the army chief has been constantly seeking to convey that the army’s preparedness would not suffer, despite lack of funds. In fact, in every interaction with the media, this has been a constant question, which he has been compelled to answer.
As late as last weekend he stated that the army could maintain its operational preparedness within the existing defence budget by prioritising and readjusting. He added that the process of modernization of the armed forces had begun but would not happen overnight. His words, ‘It is possible to reprioritise and readjust the budget within the existing money available, by giving operational preparedness a higher priority. This does not mean that accommodation for families are not needed, but that can take some time’. It indicates that the armed forces are under compulsion.
Listing his priorities, he stated that infantry weapons, surveillance devices for the infantry and security of army bases was highest. The requirements of the mechanized forces, artillery and air defence would be taken up in subsequent years. He even went on to state that the government was giving more approvals and if contracts were finalized, more funds would be made available.
The chief was seeming to be realistic, which he must, considering his role. Negative comments from him would convey a clash with the government, which does not augur well. The message to the government has been conveyed by the vice chiefs and hopefully it has been noted.
The three services are presently faced with an immense shortfall in capabilities. It has only been increasing by the years, as governments appear to believe that an all-out war is unlikely, especially in a nuclear environment. The truth is that war would only be unlikely if the armed forces conventionally strong and a threat to belligerent neighbours.
The service chiefs have been projecting capabilities for a two-front conflict, which is the worst-case scenario for the nation and anything under it, would be manageable. Neighbours aware of shortfalls in capabilities would seek to exploit the situation, as has been happening at present. China is aware of a depreciation in India’s military capability, hence continuously rakes up the threat of war.
Recently, the Chinese military spokesperson, Colonel Ren Guoqiang, stated, ‘I am very confident that military cooperation (between China and Pak) will help facilitate our state to state relationship and also in maintaining regional peace and international stability’. He was speaking post China supplying Pak with a powerful missile tracking system. His statement is clearly a hint on a two-front option, which would be India’s major nightmare.
China in isolation and seeking to maintain the status of its claim lines would continue with localized actions, which may not lead to an all-out conflict, however to control its spread, the armed forces need requisite capabilities for deterrence. Pak, aware that India is partially constrained due to its nuclear status and first use doctrine as also its deployment of its tactical nuclear missiles close to the border at Gujranwala and Pano Aqil, continues its unhindered support to terrorist groups. India has enhanced its counter actions along the LoC, however lack of long range artillery restricts the depth of engagement.
The Indian soldier would always fight to the best of his capability with whatever weapons he possesses. He did so in 1962 where he only fell against great odds and would do so again, as it remains the Indian military ethos. However, lack of capabilities, especially those crucial to support his actions including air power and artillery, would hamper his ability to counter.
Shortfalls in air power would hamper air superiority and domination of the air space. With lack of long range artillery, destruction of advancing enemy would be only close to own defences, reducing levels of attrition essential before battle is joined. In offensive operations, destruction of enemy positions prior to the assault, would reduce chances of success with limited casualties. The navy’s shortfalls would restrict its capability of causing desired attrition and dominating the battle zone.
The prioritization by the chief conveys that the army in specific, is compelled to concentrate on immediate deterrence, rather than taking the battle into enemy territory, which is essential for success. This would imply a defensive, rather than offensive mindset. This flows from the chief’s priorities of surveillance, security of camps and small arms. The army seeks to equip forces deployed in counter insurgency and along the LoC and LAC. Fire support and mechanized forces essential for offensive operations would be considered in later years.
Security of military camps would remain a major requirement especially in the light of recent attacks. The announcement of release of funds by the defence minister without any additional budgetary support, implies that funds allocated in the budget would be utilized. This would impact availability for other modernization. While delays in accommodation for troops may be accepted for the present, it cannot become a norm for the future. Simultaneously funds would continue being expended to make up critical deficiencies in ammunition and spares.
The finance ministry should have realized that this is possibly the first time that the complete capital budget allocated to the MoD has been expended well before the anointed period. Thus, the forces were ready with their projections and modernization demands. Further, the government being aware, that the army would deliver despite shortcomings has ignored their true demands. It never expected the issue to be cropped up by the vice chiefs and the parliamentary committee on defence.
The chief would have to manage within the budget, be forced to cut where it may impact morale to ensure operational efficiency. He would be compelled to sacrifice butter for the gun, while the finance ministry does the reverse, sacrificing the gun for butter. While threats only seem to increase, funds appear to decrease. The chief has defended the government, but would the finance ministry also assure the nation that if the armed forces need additional, they would be willing to provide.
Towards Joint Commands The Excelsior 30 Mar 18
The defence ministry recently announced new directions to enhance functioning of the two joint commands of the Indian armed forces, the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) and the Strategic Forces Command (SFC). These commands comprise of personnel from the three services who till now operated under their respective service rules and under directions of their respective service Headquarters (HQs), while deployed under the jurisdiction of the joint command. The new rules place them under the command of the force HQs, where they are operating, discarding their service specific regulations.
This small step is significant as it would enhance the functioning of the joint commands by replacing individual service control and management of forces placed under their jurisdiction. Each service has specific rules and regulations governing its members. These wary as service conditions are at variance. These regulations may remain applicable but would be implemented by the concerned joint force HQ.
It would also imply that joint force HQs now possesses the power to employ and deploy troops allocated to them without reverting to respective service HQs. It would break the shackles which has limited the operational command and control of joint forces. It may also be a precursor to increasing joint commands across the country, instead of the seventeen individual service commands existing presently.
Post this announcement, discussion has begun taking root on possible government actions to enhance joint operations within the military and the path such action is expected to take. Ultimately the government would need to consider creation of joint commands to suit the Indian context. This would have multiple advantages including economic benefits and optimum utilization of resources. However, the Indian situation is unique as also is the Indian approach to employment of military power.
India has no territorial claims on any country nor is the nation willing to employ its forces overseas, unless requested for by the host country. It has therefore created its armed forces for defence of the nation and to deter any adversary. India also has hostile neighbours who claim parts of our territory. Neither border is tranquil hence necessitates permanent troop deployment. Since Indian forces are unlikely to operate away from its borders, any joint force structure should consist of the services which are expected to battle together in our existing environment.
Operations against both our existing adversaries would comprise of the army and air force operating in tandem, with the navy handling its operations almost in isolation. The closer the coordination between the army and the air force, the better would be the results.
Flowing from the above, the ideal scenario for India is to create joint army-air force commands responsible for its western and northern borders. The number of commands would depend on how the government visualizes the threat and the manner it adopts to allocate resources. It could be either one or two against each adversary. The navy would operate independently, but in conjunction with the joint commands.
Another aspect is enhancing the capability and capacity of the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), essential for coordinating operations between the joint commands and the Navy. Resources, mainly of the air force, would always remain below the desired level of satisfaction. Hence, there would always be a need to redeploy them from one theatre to the other, depending on the nature of threat and urgency of the situation. This could always form part of options available to force commanders, responsible for the conduct of operations in their respective domains.
Another issue which needs comprehension is under whom should the joint commands function. In the international environment, they operate directly under the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), who in turn is responsible to the defence minister. The service chiefs have no operational role in commanding their respective services. This brings forth the concept of ‘force providers and force employers’. The service chiefs are force providers, responsible for the training and manning of their respective services. Operational employment (force employment) is handled by joint command commanders, irrespective of his service.
In the Indian context, despite recommendations commencing from Kargil Committee to the latest Shekatkar Committee, the government hesitates to appoint a CDS. The main reason being the fear that complete power of the armed forces would be under one individual, which could be detrimental to the present character of the state. While nothing could be further from the truth, this fear alone has blocked the creation of joint commands and appointment of a CDS. In case the government continues to hesitate, then it would limit its options of establishing joint commands. If it still does so, then it is severely restricted in establishing their command and control structure.
Its only option would be placing them under the existing Chief’s of Staff Committee (COSC), with comprise of the three services chiefs and headed by the senior most, as the defence ministry is incapable of handling military operations being unintegrated with service HQs. Such a case would have the service chiefs in a mixed role of being force providers and employers. It would further complicate the situation as the joint force commanders would have multiple bosses. Thus, while the force commander would remain accountable and responsible, those controlling would determine the allocation of resources.
Therefore, the government would need to act sequentially in case it is serious on restructuring management of defence at the apex level. It cannot consider creation of joint commands, unless it firms up its mind on appointing a CDS. It case it continues to have doubts on the issue, then clearly the experiment with the ANC is a one-off incident, which would akin to the rest of the government’s decisions, move into the sunset. It would leave the armed forces to fight the next war with second world war structures. Its only saving grace is that our main adversary Pak remains mired in the same condition. However, with China having unified its forces, it would remain a different ballgame.
Procuring small arms for the army (English Version) Rakshak News 29 Mar 18
The rifle for a soldier is an extension of his body. It is the weapon on which he must possess maximum trust. Every soldier, irrespective of his nature of duties has a service weapon allocated to him, which is termed his personal weapon. It is this which he fires during peace to build confidence to operate the same in war. A soldier unsure of his personal weapon would never be effective in battle. That had been the bane of the army for decades.
The Indian army presently equips its soldiers with the INSAS family of small arms, manufactured by Ordnance factories, which were upgraded from the 7.62 mm SLR, also manufactured by them. The quality and capability of this weapon, like most other Ordnance factory products remains suspect. Captain Amarinder Singh, the Chief Minister of Punjab and a former army officer, stated that soldiers in his own battalion, presently deployed in the valley, prefer employing the AK series of weapons captured from terrorists to the INSAS rifles. Such is their dependability.
The Indian army’s hunt for a suitable rifle has been in progress for some time. The army had first asked for new assault rifles and carbines way back in 2005 and light machine guns in 2009. The army’s initial demands were for these weapons for all its 382 infantry battalions. The procurement process was scrapped multiple times for graft allegations, unrealistic technical parameters and even lack of indigenous options. As stated by the chief recently, the weapons now under procurement are now being earmarked for troops deployed along the borders, while for the balance it would be post the make in India option takes hold.
As per the laid down procedure, the Request for Proposal (RFP) is to be issued within 10 days of the case being cleared by the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC). The case was cleared by the DAC in Feb, while the RFP has just been issued, clearly another case of delay without justification. The initial demand has been toned down to approximately 72,000 rifles, 94,000 carbines and 16,500 Light Machine Guns, involving a cost of approximately 5,400 crores.
The suggested weapon should be of the 7.62mm calibre, which is far more lethal than the present 5.56mm. Its ammunition has a longer range, the army seeks 500m, and better accuracy. There were a few major internal hurdles which led to a delay in firming the army’s requirement. Firstly, within the army itself there were multiple views on what the calibre and capability of the weapon should be. This took time for finalization. This was essential as once inducted, the weapons would remain in service for a prolonged period.
Secondly was the DRDO insisting on offering its own developmental prototypes, Excalibur and Ghatak, for trials. There were trial tested on multiple occasions but found unsuitable for employment. To convince the MoD against the DRDO offers and demands for in-house development was equally time consuming. Even in the present context, it would still involve multiple steps before final orders are placed. These steps involve accepting offers, trial testing of all prototypes in every nature of terrain in harsh weather conditions, technical evaluations and maintainability trials.
It is only on completion of all these stages would the army decide on its final choice, which would then be pursued for clearance and negotiations opened with the vendor. In case there are complaints of kickbacks or illegal offers during the process, the entire system may collapse and recommenced from scratch. Such instances are common in defence procurements for multiple reasons.
Firstly, is fiscal impact of the deals. Secondly, these weapons would enhance own defence capability. Thus jealous neighbours would employ very possible means to ensure that the process is stalled or fails. Finally, is the battle between the contenders. Each company would seek to blame the other for kickbacks, hoping to be the sole contender. The MoD needs to be clearheaded and monitor the progress of trials with a hawk’s eye. Pushing the deal away solely for minor reasons or rumours, which are bound to surface, would deny the army the capability it desperately needs with growing threats.
Misconceptions when Generals speak The Excelsior 26 Mar 18
In a recent seminar on ‘Geo-strategic manifestations in Pakistan and implications for India’ at the Punjab University Chandigarh, army commanders of the Army Training Command (ARTRAC) and Western Command shared their perspectives. The army commander ARTRAC stated, ‘Peace on the border is difficult to achieve at the tactical level alone. Restoring ceasefire requires statesmanship not brinkmanship.’
On the other hand, General Surinder Singh from western command mentioned, ‘People keep talking about a two-front war. It is never a good idea, never a smart idea to fight a two-front war.’ To justify his comments, he added that ‘In Pakistan, the military writ runs. Sooner or later we have to talk to their military. I am convinced that on our side also, military diplomacy plays a major role.’ On China, he stated, ‘If we can improve our relations with China, we can develop the best possible leverage with Pakistan.’
The comments by the two generals have been referred to by some analysts as being against the army chief and governments views. An author even termed it as the ‘revolt of the generals’. It is anything but that and the two generals were expressing their views, which when viewed in totality are in sync.
A major drawback which remains in the context of Indo-Pak and Indo-China relations, is the deep distrust which first needs to be overcome prior to any forward movement. Pakistan has always considered Kashmir as a part of it and feels that the only option to obtain it is by creating internal turmoil in the region and drawing in the Indian army. In their army’s perception, talks would only be detrimental to their national interest.
Chinese claims on Indian territory have remained unchanged. Decades of border talks, increased economic interface and India’s acceptance of Tibet being Chinese territory has done little to break the logjam. Standoffs have only been increasing by the years. Relations have wavered up and down, but there has been no indication of peace. The proximity of China and Pak opens doors for collusion between the two against India.
Historically, it has always been the government of India which has reached out to Pakistan. It has always been at the level of government to government. This has been done with the hope that the polity would be able to reign in the deep state as peace takes hold. However, the same has never happened and talks have been impacted by terror strikes. It is with this experience that the present government has clearly laid down its policy of ‘terror and talks’ never going together. Further, with deteriorating relations any official announcement by India seeking talks would be an indicator of weakness.
India is aware that the writ of the military runs in Pakistan. Thus, statesmanship would only be plausible if the government decides to change tack and initiate talks with the Pak military, as suggested by General Surinder Singh. Alternatively, military diplomacy, involving talks between the two militaries could be the answer. The present Indian government policy of ignoring military diplomacy would never permit this option.
A small hint on political parties in a comment by the army chief in his address in a seminar in Delhi created a furore within the political class. Whether it would even accept military diplomacy, which is a norm the world over, remains a mute question. The Pak military has always been at the forefront of diplomacy and on numerous occasions, it is their army chief who takes the diplomatic initiative, as was his recent decision to move troops to Saudi Arabia. Ambassadors of every country have visited Rawalpindi and met the Pak army chief, except the Indian High Commissioner.
Indo-China relations have recently taken a downward turn. Doklam, growing Indian proximity to the West, mainly the US, flexing of Indian military muscle, its growing economy and proximity to nations with whom Chinese disputes linger have added to the distrust. Indian naval exercises with other nations including the latest 16 nation exercise, MILAN, have been viewed to have an anti-China bias.
With a slow distancing of Indo-Russian relations and their growing proximity to China has been to our disadvantage. With the CPEC moving through disputed territory, Indian options of joining One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR) have faded, adding to the distance. China has always considered keeping the threat of a two-front war open in Indian strategic circles, thus continues to arm and support Pakistan as a counter to India.
No nation desires a two-front war, least of all, India. It implies pressures from all directions, division of scarce military resources and a severe impact on its economy. Though, India would remain defensive on one front, offensive on the other, escalation of the same would be detrimental to the nation. While China has never supported Pak in any earlier conflict by opening a new front, the possibility of the same has ensured Indian resources deployed on the Chinese front have remained in place, always more alert. While possession of nuclear weapons may deter an all-out conflict spread across all regions on both fronts, however localized coordinated actions on both borders remain possible.
India has never projected an anti-China stance in the international arena. Its groupings including the ‘Quad’ with the US, Australia and Japan are only aimed at enhancing its own security needs, rather than at countering China. Conversely, it has been China which has played an anti-India stance globally, denying India entry into the NSG and supporting Pak in preventing the UN from designating Masood Azhar as a global terrorist.
If India is to seek an improved relationship with China, it would have to bend and accept partial Chinese pressures. In the present context it may be joining OBOR, accepting Chinese domination and backing down from challenging Chinese hegemony in the Asian region. Even with this action, it may turn the relationship away from confrontation, but be unable to bring China to even partially reign in Pakistan. For China, Pak would always remain closer than India.
While India desires peace with both its neighbours, it appears to be the other way around with them. Indian overtures are rejected and there appears to be a collusion to pressurize India. What the two army commanders spoke at the Punjab University could ultimately be the right approach, it would be some time, before the nations in the region could even contemplate to head in that direction.
Stop these attacks on the Indian army Daily O 23 Mar 18
In an article in the Business Standard yesterday, Abhijit Iyer Mitra commented that while the budget this year has little for modernization, the fault lies with the army. He defended his argument with examples, most of which were misplaced and ill-founded. In fact, the entire piece appeared to be written without any tactical or strategic knowledge, inputs based on incomplete data and complete lack of understanding on military matters.
The only portion which makes sensible reading is his assessment of the present government’s attitude to matters pertaining to national security. The fact that the nation has had four defence ministers in as many years, with the finance minister holding the portfolio twice, yet ignoring defence preparedness, appears inexplicable.
His contention that the army should be downsized quoting the example of China is again ill conceived. China as a nation has no neighbour seeking claims on its territory, on the contrary it seeks to reclaim from all its neighbours. Thus, no nation threatens Chinese mainland unless China takes the initiative and launches operations. India on the other hand has hostile neighbours on both its major borders, seeking to grab territory. Pak claims J and K while China claims Arunachal and minor pockets in other sectors.
Both India’s borders are earmarked as ‘Line of Control’ and ‘Line of Actual Control’. This implies, if not strongly defended they could be up for grabs, by the enemy. India holds its defences generally along the watershed, implying holding the heights, which benefit the defender and put pressure on the attacker. India’s recent actions of raising a mountain corps has sound logic.
Till recently, India only believed in defending its borders against China, hence any success by them would remain to their advantage. No matter how many attacks are repelled and how strong is the defence, the attacker would achieve success somewhere, despite disproportionate losses.
By raising a mountain corps for offensive operations, it seeks to also capture some territory, which could then become a bargaining chip on the table. Anyone who has pursued history would know that discussions post 1965 and 1971, territory captured were bargaining chips during the final peace talks. Further, the threat of Indian troops moving into Tibet could cause concern to China and thus be an element preventing an all-out conflict.
Abhijit raised an issue on the army permitting shortfalls of ammunition to accumulate. He is definitely unaware that every year the army has been raising the state of its ammunition holdings to the government. This easy as it controls all depots which house them. Reports of stockholding flow at very frequent intervals and these are timely projected to the MoD. The delay has been in the inking of contracts at the MoD and shortfalls in manufacture by the Ordnance factories.
The armed forces always need to cater for the worst, while seeking to prevent that. For India, the worst is a two-front offensive, which it would always seek to prevent, but needs to be prepared for. Hence, all senior officers keep mentioning this fact. Active army strength is evaluated based on deployment on borders, troops for offensive operations and those who would still be battling militancy while the army fights a war. The tooth would need to remain strong, while the tail (supporting echelons) could be reduced. This is in progress at present.
He quoted Pak’s example of employing cheap anti-tank missiles to thwart Indian armour advantage. Again, a case of poor understanding of military tactics and strategy. Cheap anti-tank missiles are never an answer of which even Pak is aware. Any tank warfare specialist would clarify that tanks have greater range and accuracy as also better protection. Missiles are mainly a deterrent and have limited value. Pak fears Indian armoured thrusts, hence has manufactured tactical nuclear weapons as a deterrence. It has also in its nuclear strategy delegated its employment to lower levels, enhancing risks of nuclear proliferation.
He goes on to criticize the army’s version of futuristic combat vehicles, without even considering the terrain on which they would be employed. Indo-Pak borders where armour operations are envisaged range from riverine in Punjab, multi-obstacle systems in Plains and semi-desert, and open deserts. Thus, one type of vehicle should be capable of multiple employment. This would be economic in manufacture and maintenance in the long term.
His logic behind the Vice-Chiefs comment on one-third of state of art, current and vintage is again warped. While every nation would desire to have all its equipment in state of art, changing them at the drop of a hat, the same remains illogical. Thus, to be financially prudent, the concept of one-third is considered as a norm the world over. As at state of art commences induction, the vintage is withdrawn and the current moves into the vintage category. Thus, modernization is a continuous process. In case the budget is hampered as has been happening, the vintage would increase while the state of art would reduce, impacting preparedness. As Punjab CM Amarinder Singh stated about his own battalion, now deployed in the valley, soldiers prefer AK series of weapons to Indian manufactured INSAS rifles.
His concept of remedies is way from the truth. While it is always the man behind the gun which counts, but the man cannot hold vintage weapons which fail at periodic intervals. Disposal of lands or reducing a few facilities which exist in Cantonments would not change its operational efficiency. The army is aware of the environment in which it would be required to operate, has hence changed its strategic and tactical aims and is prepared for their implementation.
The army’s domination of its adversaries and denying them the ability to damage national pride is solely because of its awareness of the scenario and preparedness to counter. While it is for the government to allocate funds for defence preparedness, as it remains responsible for national security, the army being the force on ground has a right to raise its voice. Ultimately, as the army chief, General Bipin Rawat stated, the army will fight with whatever it has and would never let the nation down.
Those who lack knowledge on a subject should avoid commenting as once corrected, would indicate their shallow understanding. Further, it would convey post-truth rather than reality.
Is the government deliberately seeking to humble the armed forces? (English Version) Rakshak News 21 Mar 18
In a recent reply to a question raised by Mr Chandrashekar, a Rajya Sabha MP, on whether the government was considering grant of Non-Functional Upgradation (NFU) for the armed forces, the MoS Defence replied in the negative, stating that the case was sub judice. In the meanwhile, there has been no action on the part of the MoD to even consider raising the issue of a separate NFU to meet the aspirations of the armed forces.
Near simultaneous was the release of the report by the parliamentary committee of defence, which quoted the army Vice Chief, General Sarath Chand, stating that the budget allocation was insufficient even for payment of pending liabilities and maintaining the force in being. This was a cry of anguish as the army desperately needs modernization but is prevented by lack of funds. Further default in payments for contracted liabilities implies embarrassment and legal issues, harming its and the nation’s image.
For the first time, even the army chief spoke on the impact of lack of funds impacting readiness and modernization of the army. He painstakingly sought to inform the nation that upto 35% of the defence budget is used for national development and providing amenities in remote areas, where even state governments fail to reach. He even reassured the nation that the army is trained to fight with whatever weapons it has.
Around the same time, the government issued a letter stating that armed forces officers are to be paid Rs 97 as ration allowance, in lieu of rations. This would also be taxable. Many pointed out that this sum is even lower than that entitled to a prisoner in jail, who is authorised Rs 135, thus degrading the army officer’s status. The OROP agitation has crossed the thousand-day mark, with no progress from the government in accepting their just demands.
The above actions appear to be a part of the government’s overall initiative to lower the standing and capability of the armed forces. It cannot be accidental as the finance minister who approves all financial expenditure has been the defence minister twice in this government itself and is aware of the problems and grievances of the military.
These simultaneous decisions could have multiple impacts. Firstly, it could leave the armed forces with lower than desired capabilities in the face of mounting threats from both adversaries thus, opening doors for adventurism. Nuclear weapons may remain a deterrent against an all-out war but would no way guarantee security from an adversary attempting localized actions, as is happening at present.
Secondly, it could impact the international standing of the armed forces. The world seeks India as a counter-balance to China. International armed forces are rushing in to enhance security cooperation with India while seeking joint exercises. This is under the assumption that India has the capability to counter China. Shortage of funds would soon erode this myth and nations would fade away from seeking Indian support.
Thirdly, the non-grant of NFU to the officers of the armed forces has been the single largest morale impacting factor. It remains the only central government service to be denied this privilege. The defence minister should have bypassed her bureaucratic advisors and considered forwarding a separate case demanding the same for the military. Alternatively, they have even failed to issue a notification stating that NFU does not impact status of an individual, thereby offsetting the impact which it has created within the bureaucratic fold.
The announcement of Rs 97 as ration allowance is considered a direct insult. This was the figure allocated by the government when all items for ration for the military was procured centrally, contracted at the national level. When considered individually, it is even below that entitled to a prisoner who has committed a crime against society. Thus, the amount sanctioned is an insult rather than a grant made by the government. It conveys the impression that the government considers an armed forces officer’s requirement for meals to be even below that of a convict.
It is surprising that the MoD, which is supposed to highlight problems facing the armed forces to other ministries and seek to grant them their rightful due has decided to maintain silence on the subject. It has not even commented that it would address the issue by approaching the concerned ministry. Nirmala needs to understand that her actions determine how capable the armed forces remain and how high is their morale. Both capability and morale impact the fighting power of the military, neither of which can be ignored.
Indian army is facing a serious shortage of funds: Is the government listening? Daily O 15 Mar 18
Both army chief General Bipin Rawat and vice chief of the army, General Sarath Chand, have through various platforms expressed frustration over money allocated in the union budget to the defence sector. The army generals have complained that the allocation hardly leaves anything for modernization and upkeep of the forces. In fact, it did not even cater for inflationary growth.
The army chief stated that approximately 35% of the defence budget goes in for the nation building process, aiming to prove that the armed forces are not ‘white elephants’. Talking about how the Indian army has not kept pace with the modernization adopted by Chinese army, Rawat said while the neighbouring country has made economic progress, it has also modernized the army.
He said while India is focussed on economic growth, it has failed to think in terms of defence growth.
General Rawat said that at a time when the world is looking towards India to challenge Chinese growing regional dominance, New Delhi may not be able to rise to the challenge if it ignores the defence sector. President Netanyahu had stated in Delhi during his recent visit, ‘Only the strong survive. You make peace with the strong. Make alliance with the strong. You are able to maintain peace by being strong.’
The army chief’s comments reflect frustration that built up after the budget presented on Feb 1st failed to meet the armed forces expectations. Bipin Rawat’s comments assume significance because he has been seen as one who hardly has differences with the government. However, he has been compelled to speak up in the face of increasing threats from neighbouring countries and insurgencies in areas like Kashmir and multiple delays in the procurement process of defence equipment. It is even more surprising since the finance minister having twice held the appointment of defence minister has yet to comprehend the importance of national security and the basic requirements of the armed forces.
The Vice Chief told a Parliamentary Committee on defence that the budget allocation of 2018-19 has dashed the hopes of the army and the marginal increase is barely enough to meet inflation.
In his oral disposition, he stated that the allocation of 21,338 crore for modernization is way below the committed payments of 29,033 crores.
In any service, as per the vice chief, the ideal mix of equipment should be one-third each in obsolescence, current and state of art stages. In India it was 68% obsolescence, 24% current and only 8% state of art. Even the 25 ‘make in India’ projects identified by the army had to be shelved due to lack of budgetary support. Similar has been the case with projects identified as being part of the strategic partnership model.
The Indian sub-continent is amongst the most unstable regions of the world. India is possibly amongst the few countries which faces hostile nuclear powers on both its borders, both seeking to hamper its growth and enhance internal turmoil. While no nation, including India would ever desire a two-front war, but unless it remains prepared for the worst, it can never handle anything less. With different terrains, weather conditions on both fronts, the requirements for the army are at variance depending on the terrain.
With a poor R and D base and an ineffective DRDO, India is forced to import military hardware. No nation can ever become a world power by solely relying on imports, hence separate budgetary allocations are essential for proceeding forward with ‘make in India’ and strategic partnership model. The government has ignored this fact, which would push development of capabilities behind time
Development of capabilities is a slow process. Orders approved at this stage would only fructify after an extended period. A shortfall in capabilities opens doors to adventurism by adversaries, while additional allocation for defence comes at a cost of some other social welfare programs of the government, the constant ‘bread versus guns’ battle.
The fact remains that unless there are guns, bread would always be at stake. It has been Indian military power, which has ensured national security and protection of the nation’s institutions enabling development of its economy. Letting it slide would be detrimental to ensuring security in an ever-increasing threat scenario.
Between different branches of the armed forces, the most expensive to maintain are the air force and the Navy. The army on the other hand has the largest manpower, permanently deployed ensuring security of its hostile borders as also battling insurgencies in the North and North East. In fact, the situation for the army is such that troops rarely get enough breaks from active service.
Many strategists have claimed that the Indian army should cut down its manpower and seek to maintain its forces within budgetary constraints, without realizing that the army troop strength is just sufficient to cater for a two-front war. However, its lack of modern tanks, long range artillery and even basic infantry weapon system, places it at a disadvantage. The air force has depleting squadrons, while the navy has shortfalls in its capacities. All these would severely hamper the armed forces in case of a collusion from both major adversaries. Any setback would be detrimental to India’s standing in the international environment.
While the armed forces must maintain and modernize within budget allocations, there is a need to share their concerns to the nation, to raise awareness for the government to reconsider their decision. The top hierarchy responsible for the rank and file and aware of the impact of being under prepared and under equipped have voiced their concerns.
It is now for the government to decide whether it desires to enhance funds for guns or ignore guns for butter. Ultimately, while the armed forces would still perform to the best with all limitations, it is for the national leadership to determine whether it desires a strong military which can enhance Indian national power and be sought after by the world or one struggling to manage increasing threats.
Army and development of remote areas (English Version) Rakshak News 14 Mar 18
The army chief, General Bipin Rawat, stated in a seminar recently that the army plays a significant role in nation building. He added that a reasonable part of the defence budget is employed for development and providing facilities in remote areas. In most border regions, it is the army alone, which is closer to the locals living there, hence provides employment, facilities and security. The army’s contribution to national development cannot be glossed over.
A nation only develops once its security including that of its institutions are ensured. Late president Abdul Kalam had stated while addressing graduating cadets from the Indian Military Academy, ‘National security and development go hand in hand.’ The strong deployment of the armed forces ensuring that threats from abroad are minimized and they remain apolitical enables internal development. This is the reason, why only India in the subcontinent has attracted maximum investment and has developed far more rapidly than any of its neighbours.
Internally, the army is deployed in the remotest corners of the nation. For the army to be sustained, there must be multiple communication means developed, which simultaneously assists the population residing in the region. The army also needs to ensure that local population are not influenced by enemies of the state, therefore provides them with additional facilities including establishing schools, local development and medical care. It organizes ‘Sadbhavna’ tours for residents of remote localities, exposing them to development in the rest of the country, making them proud citizens who can always hope for a brighter future.
It was only the army run ‘goodwill schools’ which functioned without a break throughout the period of agitations in Kashmir. Most of the assistance and facilities which the army provides in remote areas come from its own internal resources, with contribution from states being bare minimum. Most of the local produce of the region is purchased by the army, thus providing a regular source of revenue to the locals.
It remains in many cases the sole employer of the local population for multifarious roles. Many are employed as porters for maintaining posts not linked by surface transport, maintenance of the cantonments and other tasks. In most regions of the North East, troops move out regularly on long patrols, porters for which are from the local population. Thus, the binding which the army has with residents is closer than that of the state government.
In areas where the borders are tense, mainly in J and K, it is the army which provides shelter to the local populace as also medical aid when any of them are injured. There have been reports of army helicopters being pressed to shift injured villagers to hospitals. Medical camps are also a regular feature in the region. During natural calamities, including the earthquake in J and K or the floods and mudslides in the North East, the army is always the first responder, providing succour to the local population and subsequently assisting in reconstruction.
In J and K, army launched programs in remote regions have immense participation. These include inter-village sporting, musical and other knowledge sharing and advisory events. Even the youth, which in cities may resort to stone pelting, attend in large numbers and participate with vigour. In none army conducted events are there ever anti-national slogans raised or the army criticized.
In the remote areas of the North East, the army remains more visible and supportive than any government agency, hence has earned the respect and goodwill of the local populace. Thus, there is a stellar role played by the army in binding the public residing in areas where across the border influence could be detrimental to national security. It has ensured that the residents of the region maintain strong national bonding.
The defence budget also caters for a revenue section, which involves large scale purchases to sustain the daily needs of the armed forces. These may not always be warlike stores or equipment. Such stores are procured from the domestic market, adding to the national economy. Therefore, in brief the armed forces return a large part of the budget back to nation.
The Indian army other than ensuring national security by its strong deployment along the borders is also involved in nation building and integrating remote parts of the country into the mainstream. It is this role which has helped it win hearts and minds of the local populace. With a large part of its budget being ploughed back into the economy, the armed forces are not ‘white elephants’ being maintained by the state, but active contributors to national development.
Merit in what the chief says The Statesman 06 Mar 18
It has been two weeks since the army chief named political parties in a seminar on the North East, yet the controversy over those remarks continues to simmer. Even earlier his comments on Kashmir and seeking Bharat Ratna for Field Marshall Cariappa have come in for criticism. He speaks as a true soldier would, direct and to the point, informing the nation of the problems borne from political errors. His naming two specific political parties or suggesting a Bharat Ratna has been considered by some as diverting from the apolitical stance of the army. This accusation is itself debateable.
In India, the armed forces have been kept away from government decision making for too long. Their advice is never sought, while they are involved in resolving situations created due to political blundering. Looking back at history, a few examples of major political errors has led to situations which the army continues to battle. Avoiding it in the future would benefit the nation.
Post the 1965 war, the government handed back Haji Pir Pass to Pakistan, the bane of which continues today. It was captured with a prohibitive cost of lives and has immense strategic value. It is the amongst the main routes through which infiltration attempts are launched. Post 1971, despite holding all aces, India lost the moment when Kashmir and Siachen could have been settled permanently. Army advice was never sought, and the result is well known. Siachen and Kashmir remain a combat zone.
The government permitted and justified illegal immigration into the North East even passing the Illegal Migrants Determination by Tribunal (IMDT) act in 1983, authorizing change of demography in Assam. Though the act was struck down by the Supreme Court in 1983 as illegal but the damage had already been done. The state has over 6 million illegal immigrants, which has led to regular clashes and violence. It has benefitted the AIUDF, whom the army chief referred to in his speech.
In Kashmir, when it was initially on the boil, army requisitioning the army was delayed, resulting in massacres and mass migration of Kashmiri Pundits, changing demography forever. Even at present, stone pelters are being pardoned, while those that fire in self-defence are being questioned. Appeasement of the population continues, while the army bears the brunt. Appeasement actions never involve army advice, though it remains the only organization with contact upto the grass roots level and doing more for the welfare of the population that even the local government.
Despite the army raising the issue of the presence of Rohingyas around Jammu as also the security and demographic risk they project, in multiple forums, little has been done, solely because state governments are concerned with vote banks. Their increased presence would enhance security problems, which the army would be compelled to battle in the days ahead.
Internally, political blunders have resulted in large scale riots, with the army being called in to restore peace, Godhra, Panchkula and Haryana being examples. When agencies fail to produce results or complete their assigned tasks within a stipulated period the army is rushed in. Constructing stands for the Sri Sri event in Delhi, Foot Over Bridges in Mumbai or even laying mats for international Yoga day are some examples. When state governments fail to clear the muck dumped by tourists who visit their remote areas, it is the army which is tasked.
The army chief represents the force which is most in demand across the nation, always there to resolve problems created by governments, solely seeking to protect vote banks, unconcerned about masses in general. Hence, sharing the concerns of the force, is logical and should be accepted. Similarly, if political parties can criticize the army for every action which it does, there is no reason for the army not sharing its concerns on political blunders in an equivalent manner.
If soldiers are being martyred because of poor political decisions, then the chief is right when he comments on such issues. His words should be accepted in the right spirit, after all, the army is resolving what politics either created or failed to resolve. Naming political parties is no crime. He has neither suggested that the party be banned, nor voters ignore them. He has stated facts and as an Indian citizen he has his rights. His wearing the uniform does not take away the rights granted by the constitution, neither does his holding the office of COAS debar him from speaking his mind. His comments were neither political nor was he conveying that the army is saffronized.
Critics should realize that it is no longer the period covered by the historic poem, ‘charge of the light brigade,’ written by Lord Tennyson. Its famous lines, ‘There’s not to make reply, there’s not to reason why, there’s to do and die’ wherein soldiers charged to their death, despite knowing that the order to charge was wrong and death imminent, is no longer valid. The soldier is educated and equally aware, hence would question wrong decisions.
Criticism of the chief flowed from those political parties, whose follies either created the present situation or they gained politically from it. Other arm chair critics are being either myopic or have yet to overgrow the Tennyson era, which is long past.
The army is presently being more on the lines of what General Patton stated during the second world war in his address to graduating cadets, ‘You don’t win a war by dying for your country, but by making the other soldier die for his’. The army has thinking generals who are responsible for their troops. Hence speaking against what is harmful for their soldiers is legally and morally right. Soldiers can no longer be sent to the slaughter due to political bungling. They also have a right to life. The chief’s comments should be understood, his advice seriously considered knowing his inputs would always be from the grassroots and contain greater depth than those who criticize him.
The army chief speaks the truth (English Version) Rakshak News 28 Feb 18
At a seminar in Delhi last week, on the North East, the army chief, General Rawat spoke about the impact illegal immigration has had in the region. He commented on the phenomenal growth of a predominantly Moslem party, AIUDF (All India United Democratic Front). He even went on to compare this party with the Jan Sangh of the eighties. This came in for severe criticism from political parties, mainly from the opposition. The chief only compared the phenomenal growth of two political parties, both with a religious agenda, one growing rapidly presently while the other was stagnating in the eighties. It was done to basically draw lessons.
Illegal immigration, which was the reason for enhanced political support to the AIDUF, has been an ongoing process into Assam from mainly East Pakistan, presently Bangladesh, for a very long time. Scarcity of land and burgeoning population forced residents from Bangladesh to emigrate. Assam has faced the brunt of this move, which has resulted in over nine districts having been demographically affected.
Criticism flowed from the Congress and AIMIM basically because both parties had personal interests in supporting emigrants. It was the Congress which throughout its rule of Assam backed emigrants, mainly considering them as vote banks. It even implemented the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunal) act in 1983, placing restrictions on any government in Assam from deporting illegal immigrants. Thus, it remained in power for decades. AIMIM and AIUDF are both politico-religious hence in nexus as also changing demography benefits them.
These political parties have ignored the damage that illegal immigration has caused. Insurgent groups initially arose in the state due to this demographic change, where an Assamese is presently finding himself as a minority in his own state. These have claimed thousands of lives and immense economic loss, but state governments still refused to act, protecting vote banks. It continues, and the state remains under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) even today. It was in this context that the chief spoke.
As the General Officer Commanding (GOC) 3 Corps, he was aware of the impact of this demographic change. He also knew that such emigration requires support from nations inimical to Indian interests. For decades India knew that the Assam insurgency was being supported from Bangladesh by the Pak ISI. The leaders of the movement were camping in the Chittagong hills and obtaining weapons through the ISI conduits. Insurgency in the rest of the North East had Chinese backing. Logically, China and Pak would benefit if the North East, akin to J and K, would be on the boil. Hence, when the chief stated Chinese and Pak support to the illegal immigration, he was very correct.
Indian politicians have only witnessed army chiefs who have remained silent when political parties have ignored national security for vote banks and power. Soldiers have been dying daily mainly because governments have not handled rising unrest in time. J and K is clearly an example of this inept handling. Stone throwers are pardoned, while those who fire in self-defence are booked. Soldiers are booked for human rights violations, while those who attack them have these rights.
Now that there is an army chief who is willing to share the concerns of the million-strong army, remind the nation of political blunders, seeks no political office and would quietly fade into retirement, politicians are worried. They pick sentences and criticize. They fear that he would gain national respect and skeletons which they have carefully hidden over the years would tumble out.
The army chief has spoken what they would fear to speak. His words, ‘‘We have to live with the people of the region, irrespective of their caste, creed, religion or sex. If we understand that, we will be able to live together happily’ are words which politicians should be enunciating but hesitate. He has sought to bind the populace, not divide it, yet he is being criticized.
It is after a long time that we have a chief who is willing to share the concerns of the army with the nation. Let us support him, not suppress the voice representing the army, the only institution which rushes in whenever the nation needs it, is apolitical and highly respected.
Army chief should be heard, not gagged The Statesman 27 Feb 18
Speaking at a national seminar in Delhi on the North East, entitled ‘bridging gaps and securing borders’ on 21st Feb, the army chief, General Bipin Rawat, raised a few relevant issues. Some issues he raised were amalgamation of the residents of the region into our society, illegal immigration from Bangladesh and development of the area. His statement, “There is a political party, AIUDF (All India United Democratic Front), which has grown at a much faster time frame than even the ‘Jan Sangh’ in India”, came in for severe political criticism.
The criticism flowed mainly from opposition parties, Congress, AIUDF, Asaduddin Owaisi of the AIMIM and CPI. All claimed he was treading on political issues, which he should avoid. They felt that the army is losing its apolitical stature due the General Rawat’s comments. The critics chose only specific statements and not the entire address. These critics have either been responsible for the present state in Assam or gained by the illegal immigration.
The army chief heads the force which is at the forefront battling insurgency resulting from erroneous and cheap political games. Soldiers die daily while politicians continue playing vote bank politics, J and K being a prime example. Stone pelters have been forgiven but pelting continues. Firing in self-defence is a crime, as also is not firing by adopting innovative methods as Gogoi did, while stone pelting to injure or kill is forgiven legally.
Someone must have the guts to tell the truth without fearing criticism. A soldier who seeks no political favour, who has been witness to the impact of faulty politics and would fade away post retirement, has conveyed what many would desire, but hesitate. Politicians have over the decades been used to army chiefs who have accepted political blunders and remained silent while soldiers died. When truth begins to flow, politicians feel the army chief is crossing bounds. A search through history would prove every word he has uttered is correct.
What the chief implied was that within the same time span, AIUDF grew faster than the Jan Sangh of the 1980’s, which was then viewed as a pro-Hindutva party. It was simply a comparison of two ‘supposedly’ religious political parties in different time frames, not a criticism of any specific party. This sudden rise of AIUDF implies an enhanced Moslem population in the state due to increased illegal immigration.
Mr SC Mullan, ICS, Census superintendent of Assam stated as far back as 1931, ‘The most important event in the province……has been the invasion of a vast horde of land hungry Bengali immigrants, mostly Moslems, from the districts of East Bengal’. On 10th Apr 1982, Mr Hiteshwar Saikia, the Congress Chief Minister of Assam, stated that there were three million Bangladeshi illegal immigrants in Assam, only to commit a volte face two days later and declare there were no illegal immigrants, possibly due to pressure from the centre. The present estimate stands at six million illegal immigrants.
The Congress government at the centre in 1983 to secure its vote banks, passed the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunal) act, specific to Assam. The act implied that proving the illegal status of an individual, was the responsibility of the state, the opposite to any other part of the country. Further all who were residents of the state prior to Mar 71 were legal residents, as compared to 1948 for the rest of India. Thus, it became difficult to deport illegal immigrants and led to demographic change. The act was struck down by the Supreme Court as illegal in 2005.
On 8th Nov 1988, General SK Sinha, the then Governor of Assam wrote a letter to the President of India where he highlighted the impact of large scale illegal immigration into Assam from Bangladesh. He wrote, ‘It (large scale immigration) poses a grave threat both to the identity of the Assamese people and to national security. Successive governments at the centre and state have not adequately met this challenge’. From five districts initially affected by demographic change, the figure has risen to nine, a worrisome fact.
No one backed or supported the army chief when he stated, ‘We have to live with the people of the region, irrespective of their caste, creed, religion or sex. If we understand that, we will be able to live together happily’. Has a politician ever stated it? Most have sought votes on these grounds itself. Were they scared to praise this comment solely because it went against their vote securing strategy.
Having commanded 3 Corps, whose responsibilities are spread across majority of the region, he is aware of the dynamics of the area and its problems. He has seen the impact of changing demography first hand as also been witness to the violence which it has caused.
He was also conveying a message, that unless the government takes note, other states would be affected similarly. The latest to feel this pressure is J and K, wherein large numbers of Rohingya’s have settled around Jammu, almost encircling the town. Their presence has two major threats, akin to Assam, change of demography and national security.
The chief spoke as a soldier should, straight and to the point, after all he represents the force which has lost countless lives battling insurgencies caused by political blunders. The present criticism came only from those parties which backed illegal immigration or benefitted from it.
Rawat is neither a politician, who would beat around the bush nor throw the blame on previous governments nor opposition parties. He placed before the nation, facts which could always be verified. His critics scared of skeletons tumbling out of their cupboards, seek to deflect public attention. The army for once has a fearless leader, willing to call a spade a spade, whom we should be proud of, rather than seek to gag. The army is and will always be apolitical, but in a democracy has a voice which should be heard, not supressed, solely because it bares political misdeeds. Finally, if politicians can insult the army at will, why can’t it bare their skeletons?
Religion and the army (English Version) Rakshak News 21 Feb 18
Post the Sanjuwan attack, the religion card has again been employed to seek and divide the only secular and apolitical force within the country, the Indian army. Asaduddin Owaisi, President of the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen stated that five of the seven martyred in the attack were Moslems. He was seeking to question those who regularly ask Moslems to prove their loyalty. His comment, ‘Muslims are dying for the country but are called Pakistanis. Terrorists are not differentiating, but Muslims are still asked to prove their loyalty’.
Discussions on TV also moved in the same direction, with religion dominating loss of valuable lives. A day later, in the valley, there was mass turnout of locals during the last rites of martyred soldiers. This was a change from the past, where crowds only gathered for funerals of militants, while a sprinkling gathered for security personnel.
Those seeking to divide the army on religious grounds need to be aware of facts. While most Infantry regiments date back to British era and possess a chequered history, no new regiments have been raised based on caste, creed or religion. In fact, in these old regiments too, recruitment is by region, thus removing the aspect of religion. Most non-infantry units presently comprise of all religions, caste and creed. There is no entry of caste or creed in an individuals document. Religion is entered, mainly to cater for last rites as per religious customs. Hence, when an RTI was sent seeking details of Muslims in the army, the reply was a simple sentence, ‘there are no Hindu’s or Muslims in the army, only soldiers’.
Within a unit, irrespective of the mixture of troops, there is only one common religious institute. It is termed as the ‘Sarv Dharam Sthal’, implying an abode for all religions. It is a unique institution unifying different religions under one roof. It is in this one place where Id, Easter, Gurpurab and Janmashtami are celebrated. It therefore symbolizes the essence of tolerance, brotherhood and unity in diversity.
The areligious stance of the army has made it the most respected force within the country. During religious riots while other police forces hesitate, or their motives are questioned, the army is happily received, its very presence ushering confidence and restoring order. It has never failed the nation. During natural calamities when it deploys to help, religion of those it assists never comes to the fore. In Kashmir, during the floods of 2014, the army moved in to assist those who were pelting it with stones a day before and would so again the next day. Yet they were Indians, not Hindu’s or Muslims whom it assisted. It rushed in, ignoring the fact that its own camps were inundated, and own families struggling to survive.
Most of us, who have worn the uniform have celebrated every religious event with the men in the single ‘Sarv Dharam Sthal’. Religion is important for the soldier as it gives him the courage and belief to fulfil his mission and task, under most trying conditions. However, it is bonding with his comrades, trust, faith and belief in his battalion and its leadership which drives him to make the ultimate sacrifice. Religion has never been the main factor.
The areligious stance and character of the army is what has made it to be the most respected institution of the nation. It respects all religions and soldiers support one another, irrespective of religious beliefs. Thus, politicians seeking to bring religion to divide the army or gain a few brownie points, would never be able to break its fibre, but would enhance the divide within the nation. Such politicians are true anti-nationals and their ranting should be ignored. Their desire to gain a few minutes of limelight on television debates should be resisted by the channels.
Securing military camps needs more than funds The Statesman 20 Feb 18
Post the Pathankot air force base attack in early Jan 2016, the government ordered a review of all military bases under the Philip Campose Committee. The committee felt that there were gaping holes in security arrangements in military bases and recommended measures to strengthen them. The recommendations of the committee remained with the MoD, while the PM played musical chairs with the defence minister’s appointment. Then came the Uri attack, yet there was no response from the MoD.
The Philip Campose committee in its assessment had categorically stated that paucity of funds was the major reason why camps could not be secured. Most camps lacked perimeter walls, electrified fences and CCTVs, which are basics even with private establishments which expect nothing more than small time thefts. Military camps have been targets of militants yet lacked them.
For years, demands for security fencing was never accepted by the government, always claiming shortage of funds. Lack of security fencing was also one of the reasons for encroachments in unoccupied areas. Many camps, even in high security zones have nothing more than simple cattle fencing, making them vulnerable to attack by militants. The Uri camp, attacked in Sep 2016, is an example.
Military camps are located based on operational requirement and hence are concentrated very heavily in the Jammu-Pathankot belt, in most cases closer than 30 Kms from the border. The size of a camp varies depending on the establishment located within and if they also cater for families. Hence, without basic security arrangements, most camps are easy targets especially for the fedayeen, who are launched to kill and prepared to die. Any casualties they get is a bonus.
Targeting camps has multiple impacts. Firstly, it boosts morale of the militants who have otherwise remained under intense pressure, suffering casualties almost daily. Secondly, it boosts morale of their handlers in Pak and the Pak army. Thirdly, it has an adverse impact on Indian forces, especially if they lose family members in such strikes. Finally, it impacts the morale of the nation because a small team of militants cause disproportionate casualties. Even for the government it becomes an embarrassment as it is targeted by the opposition. Yet the government slept all these years.
It was post the Sanjuwan strike that the government finally woke up and announced a release of Rs 1,487 Crore for improving security of army camps and gave a ten-month deadline for completion of the same. The announcement has been made, but would it be completed on time, especially as procedures laid down remain cumbersome and responsibilities for implementation are manifold.
Construction of security walls is not the responsibility of army engineers, who in no time constructed the Foot Over Bridges in Mumbai, a task which the state and railways were unable to even commence. The resources employed were the army’s training stores and not procured from the market, which would have led to immense delays. The entire border fence along the LoC was constructed by military engineers in a year, a feat unmatched by any other agency.
In this case, funds may have been allotted, but the supervision and coordination would remain to be that of the Military Engineering Service (MES), a quasi-military organization with almost no military ethos under the MoD, which is known to move at its own pace, without responsibility or accountability, in areas where it operates. MES projects, even miniscule in costing, as compared to the border fence, take years to complete. In this specific case its laid down procedures would imply over a year and a half before construction even commences. Such is their pace of functioning, that funds allocated for normal projects in a current year are only booked that year and the work may commence in the next, only if the military is lucky. Delays are common and so is lack of quality.
In addition are approvals by the Integrated Financial Advisors (IFAs), again representatives of the MoD at every level. The MES would need their concurrence pre and post tenders and even pre- issuing the final contracts. There are totally nine steps in any MES work process, of which two may have been eliminated by the release of funds. Thus, all included, construction of walls may only begin in end 2019 or 2020.
Speeding up may be possible, if works are undertaken under Para 38 of the Works Procedure. Here again there are limitations, implying that the work should be under 1000-man days and for 15 days overall. Thus, there is no way, except in a few remote areas, where there is no MES cover and works are undertaken by military personnel, that the project would see the light of day before 2021-22.
Thus, for the nation, the government has announced release of almost 1500 crores and given the organization ten months, however who would move the elephants within the MoD. These archaic procedures, meant to be a means of establishing checks and balances have been the bane of the military for seven decades and would remain so.
There have been instances, when a few trees essential to be felled for constructing buildings worth tens of crores, led to escalation of the project by over twenty percent. The Defence Estates Officer, responsible for them, refused to have them felled, unless they were pre-auctioned, which could not happen. Push and pressures by local army authorities including approaching the MoD failed. With such multiple organizations, all under the MoD, controlling construction, releasing land and funds, expecting the defence minister’s deadlines to be met appears nigh impossible.
The only alternative to ensure timely construction would be for the MoD to issue an ordinance, approved by the government, for urgent execution of a one-time work considering national security. This issued under wartime requirements may result in speeding up the work. The MoD should realize that only releasing funds is not the answer, it needs to think through the project and bypass archaic rules which could delay the process. Ignoring this would only result in more losses.
AFSPA and the army chief The Statesman 06 Feb 18
The recent comments of the army chief stating that ‘the time has not come for any rethink on the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA)’, at a press conference last week, has drawn criticism from many quarters, including editorials in leading newspapers. He was accused of crossing his limits as the head of the organization and commenting on topics beyond his domain.
In the immediate aftermath of his statement was the incident at Shopian, where the army had to fire in self—defence resulting in two deaths. An FIR was registered on the same with the army giving its own justification. Despite which direction the probe takes and its ultimate outcome, the fact that even with AFSPA, all incidents would be probed.
AFSPA is back into the limelight after reports that the Home and Defence Ministries were re-examining demands for a milder version of the act. The government is seeking to remove or dilute some aspects of the act, basically sections 4 and 7. Demands on this have flowed from the states who have themselves desired its imposition, as it is the state which recommends it, not the army. The army only advises.
The comments made by the army chief was, ‘AFSPA is an enabling provision which allows the army to operate in such difficult areas and the army has maintained a good human rights record.’ The reality is that the army has never applied the force which has been granted to it under this act, solely considering collateral damage and concern for human rights. It has fought terrorists with its hands tied.
Every other nation battling terrorists including Pakistan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka in our neighbourhood, Russia in Chechnya and those in South America and Africa have employed full military power including air and artillery. These have been done without concern to collateral damage. The US and Afghan forces in Afghanistan have followed the same pattern. India on the other hand has only used small arms.
The army is the ultimate source of power of the nation. It is only inducted when other elements of force including the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) have been unable to regain control over the situation. It cannot be allowed to fail, as after it there is no other source of power available to the nation to regain control. The army is inducted on the orders of the government. Once directions have been given, the deployment and employment remain that of the army.
In such environments, the army operates alone, employing its own tactics and methodology. AFSPA does not make the forces immune under law. Mistakes committed can lead to legal actions, however the power to sanction is with the central government, which takes decisions based on relevant proof provided. The Supreme Court had also ruled in Apr 17, post hearing cases on extra judicial killings of Manipur that every incident of death must be probed by an FIR.
The army on induction is always treated as an occupier and specifically targeted. Despite all its positives, it remains so in parts of J and K even today. Anti-national elements will always find trapping the army in fake legal cases an option to impact morale and reduce its efficiency.
In the Naxal belt, while the UPA did consider the army’s deployment, the army itself recommended that the situation can still be brought under control by CAPFs, hence was never deployed. However, to maintain presence and be ready in case it was needed, it has been allotted a training area in the region, which it continues to occupy.
Once deployed, it is for the government to decide if the situation is normal and can be maintained by normal law and order agencies. Once this decision is taken, the army reverts to barracks. This has happened in Tripura and Punjab. In North Eastern states, though the situation is much better, militancy within control, the state governments are unwilling to lift AFSPA, solely for enhanced security. However, till it remains, the forces operating need to be secured. If the government feels that the situation is normal it should withdraw the army, however diluting its powers of operating under such situations should not be reduced.
The recent incident in Shopian has indicated how delicate the situation continues to remain in the valley. A hasty decision on AFSPA, including diluting its provisions would place the army operating in the region under severe duress, restricting its ability to ensure success. Mehbooba, despite her registering an FIR also stated that the time is not right for lifting AFSPA. She is aware that if army presence is reduced, militancy would rebound.
When Major Gogoi, surrounded by a mob of stone pelters, saved his men and prevented casualties, during the last Lok Sabha elections, by tying one individual to his jeep, he was accused of violating human rights. This time, when the men surrounded by a mob, opened fire in self-defence, they were accused, and an FIR registered. Therefore, it is evident that the army is clearly a scape goat in such areas.
It is to the credit of the army that it has evolved methodologies aimed at battling militancy in both rural and urban areas, specific for nature of terrain and region. The men are trained in operations, respecting human rights and local customs. However, it is not trained to fire in the air, as the police does, nor use pellet guns or batons, as desired by Mehbooba. The day it does so, it would be as effective as those whom it has been brought in to replace.
The army chief should express his concerns to the nation, through the media on issues impacting the efficiency of his force. He is responsible for their actions, safety and security. Personally, he is neither a politician seeking votes nor is he criticizing the government on its decisions but conveying the thoughts of the organization. They should be respected, because behind all his views, it is the ‘nation first’.
Growing India and US military relationship The Excelsior 24 Jan 18
The US ambassador to India, Kenneth I Juster, proposed during his first public speech in Delhi that scaling up of strategic relations with India can also involve posting of liaison officers in each other’s combatant commands. He claimed that this was aimed at taking the relationship from ‘the strategic to the durable’. This was a gesture to India that the US is serious when it implies India is a valued partner in the region and the relations between the two are much more than just words. It also highlighted the acceptance of the US on the professionalism and capability of the Indian armed forces.
He did not put any timeframe on the subject, but placed on the table, an issue which has so far been ‘discussed behind closed doors’. He also proposed conduct of multi-service military exercises, as against the present concept of single service exercises. Such combat exercises would enhance understanding of each other’s concepts, methodology and employment of resources for generating optimum combat power.
The US presently has arrangements for military liaison officers with some of its NATO allies and close defence partners including Australia, Canada, Republic of Korea, Philippines, New Zealand and Great Britain. These liaison officers are attached with the US Pacific Command in Hawaii, where the US also proposes for India. Canada also has liaison officers with the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) as that caters for the defence of the North American continent.
All commands in the US are joint commands comprising of resources from all arms of the military. This is essential as they operate away from the mainland and hence require a joint force structure to enable maximum utilization of combat power. The advantage of having liaison officers enables better coordination in joint operations and exercises with defence partners. India, does not operate operationally with the US, however exercises with it and has also signed the LEMOA (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement), which implies access to designated military facilities for refuelling and replenishment. This enhances the reach of the military in the international arena.
The US has never fought any battle on its soil and has always aimed to deter threats as far away from the US mainland as possible. Its present operations in Afghanistan and Syria are examples. Further, the US is part of multilateral defence agreements and is a guarantor for many nations, including Japan and South Korea. Thus, a large part of its force is always deployed overseas. Therefore, it requires coordination with its allies.
India on the other hand is more involved in ensuring its own national security. Both its borders are tense and require monitoring. Its internal security environment is threatened by terrorist strikes from across the border. Its naval power is deployed to dominate the Indian Ocean for ensuring national security. Hence its armed forces operate largely on service specific commands. Since they are perpetually in operations, their professionalism and capability as a fighting force is well recognized.
Other than a few joint commands, the Indian military has service specific commands, responsible for operations of their own service. These commands are area specific and cater to immediate security requirements and threat. India is part of multilateral defence agreements, however mainly for training and joint exercises, as it has no territorial ambitions beyond its borders. It does not form part of joint operations with any country, despite the US seeking it.
Of its few joint commands, the only command ideal for coordination with multinational powers is the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC). ANC, based in Port Blair, is a theatre command, comprising of troops of the three services. Its strategic location enables it to dominate the main shipping routes of the Indian Ocean which pass through the Malacca Straits. However, inter-service rivalry and desire to directly control service assets have left the ANC under-equipped and hence under-utilized.
Ideally this should have been the command where liaison officers from the US could be based, provided India is serious on upgrading its working relationship with them. However, its limited equipment holdings and resultant poor operational capabilities have made it unsuitable for joint operations. Thus, in the present context establishing liaison officers between the nations would not serve any purpose.
The other aspect raised by the US Ambassador was the conduct of joint exercises. India has recently conducted joint exercises with Russia. With most other nations, the exercises are service specific. However, conducting joint exercises with the US is always feasible and should be explored as it would benefit both nations and be a stepping stone for the future as India becomes a dominant power in the region.
However, there is an option of posting instructors in major schools of instructions of both nations. The two institutes which officers from multiple nations attend are the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) and the National Defence College (NDC). While the NDC curriculum is more based on interactions with a vast variety of experts, including the academia, governance and industry, the DSSC is more structured and has emphasis on classroom teachings and discussions. It therefore is an ideal institute for a qualified instructor from the US. An Indian instructor could similarly be placed in a US institute.
This would enable understanding differences in outlook, when it comes to operational concepts, employment of resources and analysis of threats, especially at junior levels. It could become a precursor to establishing liaison officers between the two nations. The US has a similar exchange arrangement with many nations, where it has its staff with major training institutes.
This should be the approach which India should adopt initially, if it seeks to expand its operational and working relations with the US. Joint exercises should become the order of the day, as we seek to enhance joint operations internally. Enhancing to the next level of placing of liaison officers should only come about once the nature of our participation in international operations has been clearly enunciated. Completely ignoring the offer of the US Ambassador would be letting an ideal opportunity pass.
The army chief has spoken (English version) Amar Ujala 22 Jan 18
A candid, clear headed army chief shared his views in his press conference preceding army day. The conference covered a wide range of views from handling the Doklam crises to creating an army for the future, handling Pak’s misadventures, impact of education influencing the minds of the youth in Kashmir to the governments decision to cut the funding of education allowance for those killed in action or disabled.
Some of his comments have come in for criticism. The veteran community is aghast at the chief’s defence of the government’s decision to cut education funding, while the J and K government reacted sternly to the chief’s comments on their education system changing mindsets of youth. The Pak army through a comment by their Public Relations department (DG ISPR) challenged his comments on ‘calling the Pak nuclear bluff’, if the army is ordered to enter Pak.
However, simplistically put, the chief has spoken his mind and would adhere to whatever he has spoken. He would have had strong reasons for making his comments, knowing they convey to the nation the views of the army as an institution.
He was correct when he stated that, ‘while China may be strong India is not weak’. India has stood upto China during Doklam and borne all the pressures while China attempted, in a quiet and dignified manner, ignoring their adverse and threatening comments. The government’s decision to let the foreign ministry be the coordinating agency was an excellent decision and enabled diplomacy to lead in resolving the crisis, which it did. It has defended the nation from increasing Chinese incursions, despite poor communication means, wherein the Chinese drive upto the border, while Indian troops walk.
His worry on nations of the region moving into the Chinese lap is worrisome in matters of national security as it enhances threat perceptions. It also brings forth the need for the government to review its strategy of neighbour’s first, which appears to be faltering.
Handling the Pak nuclear bluff did convey the right message. The Indian army has been reacting strongly to Pak’s provocations along the LoC, while enhancing its counter terror operations in the valley. Its strikes across the border have imposed limited caution on Pak, as it neither admitted nor announced its casualties. The comments by the Pak DG ISPR were also only linked to the nuclear issue, while he ignored any mention of Pak casualties. Recent reports have stated that Pak has suffered three to four times more of Indian figures and this has worried their ISI.
He was categorically clear that we cannot expect any other country to battle on our behalf. We must be capable of handling our own threats. He was referring to recent US threats to Pakistan, thereby clarifying that despite US pressures on Pak, there would be no change on its anti-India policy. Thus, we need to induct weapons with modern technology and enhance our firepower and sources of observation.
At every level there is a requirement for troops to monitor and influence the terrain ahead. They cannot remain blind and depend on flow of information, when there is technology available. This must be provided to enable the ‘man behind the gun’ to produce results. If information can be obtained by multiple means, then the forces need firepower and ability to engage, thus better guns with longer ranges. Movement of reserves can tip the scales during war, therefore better means of transportation. The soldier also needs to be better protected from enemy fire, requiring better bullet proof equipment. He was candid when he stated that this is essential as we grow in strength.
Kashmir has the greatest involvement of the army over the decades. Teaching students from adolescence that they are not a part of India but an independent state, impacts young minds and is detrimental in the long term. Hence, he gave his suggestion, which had flowed from army formations in Kashmir as they interact at the grassroot level which even the state government does not. The suggestion should be considered as the state slowly returns to near normalcy. He announced the plans of shifting focus to North Kashmir this year to rid the state of militancy, which has presently been brought down. The recent successes of the army enabled the government to appoint an interlocutor for the state and regain control.
However, the maximum controversy amongst the veteran community came on the army chief’s comment on supporting the government stand on capping financial assistance at Rs 10,000 for wards of martyrs or disabled. His justification on misuse being the reason cut no ice. Social media was agog with adverse remarks. Most failed to note the sentence which he made stating that the armed forces have gone back to the government on the issue. They are presently in the process of reviewing the policy to address the anomaly of misuse. Till that is addressed, the cap would remain. His announcement of the army opening schools especially for the wards of martyrs and disabled veterans is a welcome step, as it would provide quality education with the best facilities for all round development.
The army chief avoided raising the impact military soft power and military diplomacy has had in international relations. Nations are rushing in for joint exercises, with the US also suggesting cross-attachment of officers in operational commands. India’s growing military power and professionalism of its military is now being recognized the world over.
In summation, the chief has spoken the hearts and mind of the Indian soldiers’ views and requirements. It is for the authorities in power to heed his words and for the nation to respect his views.
Respect the silent soldier Free Press Journal 15 Jan 18
The defence minister recently withdrew the controversial order of 2016, which had degraded army ranks as compared to their civilian counterparts. It was a welcome new year’s gift to the forces. However, there are many other contentious issues which still await her attention. Many are irritants from the past, while a few are recent decisions. Further is the need to make the military capable of handling future challenges and providing it with cutting edge technology. If this is to be achieved, then she needs to be clear headed and willing to take the bull by the horns.
This government has seen four defence ministers occupy the chair in its present tenure, with Jaitley having officiated twice and Parrikar as a permanent appointee, who rushed back to Goa at the first opportunity. The present defence minister, Nirmala Sitharaman is possibly the only one in a long time, with no secondary responsibility, hence can devote complete attention to defence. Thus, there are plenty of hopes on her for delivering, the recent letter being a prime example.
A major pending irritant is her recent decision of capping the combined amount of tuition and hostel fees of wards of martyrs and disabled veterans to a maximum of Rupees 10,000. This decision has been taken based on the recommendations of the 7th pay commission, which the nation knows was anti the armed forces, whose recommendations even the service chiefs refused to accept, compelling the PMO to step in. Hence accepting this recommendation is a retrograde step.
As per defence ministry reports, there were about 193 students, who claimed more than the capped amount out of a total of approximately 2700. The present capping would affect possibly 250 students this year. This grant was announced post the 1971 war and hence is a promise by the nation to the armed forces. It gives the families of martyrs and disabled the hope that the nation would care for them, after they sacrifice their lives for the country.
It is an accepted fact that in cases of grants and allowances, there would be some who would misuse it. However, misuse by some does not imply that majority should be denied. This goes against the basic norms of decision making. A better system would be to impose greater checks into the clearance of bills or lay down rates based on current known expenditures depending on the nature and level of education.
Another issue needing her serious attention is equation of allowances between the army and other Central Services. If the soldier cannot be treated as special, then do not expect him to do the unthinkable and place his life on the mat daily. Do not make him feel that since he has no one to fight for his rights, he can be ignored.
Non-Functional Upgradation (NFU) has only been denied to the military, while being granted to others. The MoD is aware that the armed forces are neither Group A or B, as they remain the only commissioned service. However, the letter stating that NFU is akin to an allowance and not merged with salary, as also no change in the reporting chain, thus maintaining status quo, has yet not been issued. Simultaneously, the armed forces need their own NFU, which should be formally projected. There are 47 anomalies from the previous pay commissions pending, clearing which would be a major morale booster.
The defence minister also needs to be aware that reservations are never the answer, more so in defence technology. The DRDO should be capable of competing with other manufacturers, after all they have been in existence for over six decades. It was reservations which made them incapable. It is time they are told, improve your quality or lose your defunct laboratories.
The same should be the treatment meted out to the factories under the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB). The policy should clearly be, compete and win or perish. Unless a few assets of the OFB and DRDO are privatised they would never be galvanised to improve performance. The army has lost immense capabilities and lives due to poor technology and manufacturing. It is time to stop.
The army functions under the MoD. Hence it becomes her responsibility to care for its rights. Treating them as labour and ordering them to clear garbage dumped by others is setting a wrong precedence. The areas where the army was tasked to clear garbage also houses other central police forces, mainly the ITBP. The home ministry never tasked them to do a similar action, then why the army alone. It did hurt sentiments but as it was task given by the minister, it was implemented.
We need to change with the times, care for our soldier and never break promises once made. The silent soldier would continue to serve the nation, in return the nation should respect him. The armed forces have hope on the present defence minister, which she should not break.
The LoC and cross border strikes (English Version) Rakshak news 03 Jan 17
The Line of Control (LoC) between India and Pak is almost seven hundred and fifty Kms. Tensions between the opposing armies is permanent all along it and each action needs to be taken in a measured manner. There is absolutely no scope for error for troops deployed to ensure its sanctity. The region is mountainous, forests exist on both sides, which provide cover for soldiers seeking to cross and strike. Posts are held in strength and troops regularly patrol gaps between posts, mostly along known routes and tracks.
Defences have been strengthened over time, mines laid during previous operations have not yet been lifted in many areas, hence many drifted, with both sides unaware of their exact locations. Hence, there are regular reports of mine casualties, which makes crossing the LoC risky. Villages exist close to the LoC on both sides and are frequently targeted. In the plains and semi-mountainous regions, farmers till their fields almost upto the LoC.
Both nations seek to dominate the other, through fire and observation. In earlier days, while Pak had limited restrictions, India seeking to maintain a peaceful LoC had placed restrictions on employment of heavy weapons and artillery. This has presently been lifted and the local commander is at liberty to retaliate. India has more concerns along the LoC, as Pak attempts to infiltrate militants, hence regularly establishes ambushes at night. When specific information is available, multiple ambushes may be laid. Pak, aware that India does not have terrorist camps supporting anti-Pak terror groups, is more at ease and less alert.
India would prefer a peaceful LoC while Pak would desire an active one, as a peaceful LoC would make infiltration difficult. In such an environment, determining who violates the ceasefire is difficult. Both nations blame the other for ceasefire violations and regularly lodge diplomatic protests. Pakistan even cries to the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), which is deployed on either side. UNMOGIP has restrictions on movement on the Indian side. India considers its deployment as defunct and valueless, post the Shimla accord, while Pak wants to exploit it, whenever it suits them.
Further, neither nation can guard and protect every inch of territory, there are always gaps which are exploited by infiltrators. The existence of rivulets and undulating terrain add to difficulties, despite a border fence existing. In this terrain, exploiting the weakness of Pak’s complacency, mainly because it does not expect terrorist infiltrators, India plans and launches cross border strikes. It has succeeded as these are done at infrequent intervals and at varying locations. Employment of snipers only adds to the tension of troops operating in the region. They may not be effective across the entire LoC, but are in select areas and claim regular casualties.
The Indian army, which operates in the region has multifarious responsibilities. They need to ensure sanctity of the LoC, dominate Pak posts, monitor gaps between posts checking for tell tale signs of infiltration and establish ambushes at night to target infiltrators. To ensure all this they need to possess high morale, immense motivation and dedication to the nation and its people. They are aware of the dangers which lurk around the corner and take all precautions, yet there are occasions when they are surprised, and casualties occur, as it happened recently, where it lost four soldiers, including an officer.
As a genuine army, it has never hidden its casualty figures. It accepts them as a part of its responsibility, reamends its operating procedures and continues fulfilling its tasks and missions. However, for any force, an adverse incident would always impact morale, hence it would seek to extract revenge from the adversary. In addition, by striking back and inflicting greater casualties, it imposes caution on them for the future. It also provides the force a moral ascendancy over the adversary. Within the battalion, unless revenge is extracted for any loss of lives, the battalion would not rest, after all its own family has been targeted. Battalions have been known to request an extension of tenure to ensure extraction of revenge.
Cross border strikes are only one option to extract revenge, while many more exist. Destruction of posts and defences can also be undertaken with artillery fire or even by employing direct firing weapons. Resorting to artillery fire would enhance levels of risk to local villagers, in case of retaliatory fire and hence is only resorted to as a form of retaliation. Employment of direct firing is undertaken at regular intervals. These actions also impose caution on the enemy.
In addition to border tensions, posts in higher reaches are also impacted by heavy snow and avalanches in winters. Some posts also need to be winter stocked, as access to them are likely to be blocked for prolonged durations in winters. Hence maintenance of the force assumes equal importance.
Planning and launching cross border strikes is always a risky proposition. A failure can be disastrous, hence surprise and maintaining adequate reserves are essential. Timing and selection of objectives must be perfect. Once launched, those responsible for launching it, remain tense, awaiting the return of each soldier. The assault team strikes its target, causes casualties and returns, prior to the enemy reacting, without seeking to count the casualties it has inflicted. Information would flow from the monitoring of signal communications and move of ambulances. Its safe return is always a relief.
The LoC is an area where each day brings forth a new challenge for the soldier. There are occasions when he forces Pak to react and at times it is the other way. It not an area where an individual can be lax even for a moment. The respect and gratitude of the nation gives the soldier the courage and strength to lumber on. This coming year, we need to dedicate to the soldier ensuring our security along the LoC.
Forces must communicate better The Statesman 26 Dec 17
In recent times, there have been numerous contentious issues, dominating social media, concerning armed forces personnel, both serving and retired, for which the top hierarchy is blamed for inaction. Some issues being discussed include non-granting of Non-Functional Upgradation (NFU), withdrawal of entitled rations, degrading military ranks as compared to civilian counterparts, denying them status of Group A services and non-implementation of OROP. These have also impacted morale of the serving soldier, who has felt that his hierarchy which is responsible for his welfare, since he has no union to project his grievance, has let him down.
The reality may be different, however actions undertaken by the top hierarchy on resolving contentious issues, based on their logic, fail to reach the soldier and the mass of veterans, who have taken it upon themselves to stand by the soldier. An example is the differing opinion on NFU. Most serving and veterans, including me, feel that non-implementation of NFU is a major factor in degrading the status of the armed forces. Simultaneously, there is a strong feeling that the armed forces must be considered a Group A service.
Historically after the commissioning of disciples of Jesus Christ, only officers of the armed forces are commissioned. They are therefore logically a step above Group A services and due to their nature of service, including willingness to sacrifice their lives for the nation, would remain a cut above. Thus, the perpetual battle seeking to evolve a means of comparison to establish working relationships with civilian counterparts. If they were equal to any group service, this issue would never have arisen. The battle is perpetuated more by the present Group A services, as they feel hemmed by the presence of the military in any common gathering.
Group A services comprise of two parts, All India Services and Allied Services. The all India services comprise of the IAS, IPS and the IFS (Indian Forest Service). All other central services are termed as allied services and are considered below the all India services in status. The difference is on the logic that the IAS, IPS and the forest service (IFS) are allocated to states and serve both the states and centre.
The allied services, comprising the Indian Foreign Service, multiple revenue and railway services and a host of others (almost forty-four) are employed only by the centre and can be posted based on vacancies across India. There is always friction between the allied and all India services as the latter dominates in status. In case the armed forces seek equation to Group A service, they would be considered at par with Group A allied services, based on the nature of their serving all India, as against an all India service.
The top hierarchy having understood the likely game which would be played by the bureaucracy, if it demands equation with Group A has taken up a case for a separate NFU, based on similar parameters, specifically for the armed forces, as it is a commissioned service, above Group A. This battle is progressing slow, as in all government cases.
It has also insisted on the government to issue a direction that NFU allocated to civilian employees will not be considered towards enhanced status and grade and there would be no change in the reporting chain, thus maintaining status quo in working relations. This letter would resolve the pending status degradation to some extent. It has been reported that such a letter has been issued, however, official verification on the same is not available. If issued, the service HQs should make it public.
The hierarchy refused to accept degrading circulars and directions of the ministry on equating armed forces officers with their civilian counterparts. While more panels may continue being established, anything which degrades the rank structure would never be accepted. After all, individuals who head the armed forces today, have come to that level after battling their way up the ladder and are aware of its consequences. Similarly, it was the refusal of service chiefs to sign the 7th pay commission notification which led to intervention by the PMO.
A similar action has been adopted on another painful issue, withdrawal of entitled rations for officers. The hierarchy has taken a decision to re-implement the same as it existed, within the financial constraints laid down by the government, as its supply chain purchases in bulk and is feasible. It would commence shortly. Hence issues are being addressed, however fail to circulate down in the correct perspective.
Similar actions would be on hand on multiple other cases which affect the soldier and his working conditions. Recent inputs on lack of equality between the Siachen allowance for the army and allowances of other central agencies has also begun being highlighted. As these inputs flow, the hierarchy would be involved in taking it up. Whether every case is taken up by the armed forces HQs or the MoD acts on its own is a mute question.
Based on lack of inputs, the rank and file and the mass of veterans, including me, had begun feeling that rights of the soldier are being ignored for personal gains of the top hierarchy. This is simply because the hierarchy has failed to connect with the mass they represent and project the correct perspective. This needs urgent correction. Actions being undertaken should be conveyed employing channels of social media in an unobtrusive manner, thus setting aside rumours and correcting perceptions.
In the present environment unable to convey welfare actions in progress causes more harm than good. Even a soldier deployed in remote areas has communication networks available. To ensure his morale is always high he needs to be regularly assured that issues which affect him are being addressed.
While for service chiefs, blowing own trumpets is not the normal norm, however positive actions impacting morale, leading to spread of rumours, should be disseminated. Whether the Public Information Directorate of the three services release such inputs through social media or they are clarified in the addresses by senior serving members, the choice is that of the military. Ignoring conveying positive messages is detrimental to military morale and leads to spread of malicious rumours.
Respecting the soldier is important – English version from Rakshak news 19 Dec 17
The soldier who places his life and limb at risk to ensure that the nation is safe and secure, has no demands, but respect and status. ‘God and soldiers are only remembered in times of trouble’ as an adage, had always been true for India. However, in recent times, there has been a slow but positive change towards respecting the soldier, possibly following trends from across the globe and impact of social media.
A video circulating on social media showed passengers at the international terminal of Delhi airport, standing and applauding soldiers transiting in uniform for a UN assignment. Airlines have also begun announcing the presence of mortal remains of martyrs on board. On an Indigo flight, in which I was present, an announcement indicating the presence of veteran officers on board, moving for their reunion, after thirty-seven years of service to the nation was made. The applause by the passengers was a welcome change.
Similarly announcing the presence of military award winners on board domestic flights is gaining ground. The latest in the list has been a circular issued by the NHAI asking its staff at toll plazas to salute or applaud serving military personnel, when they transit through, the practicality of which is not the issue, the gesture is. Airlines provide special boarding to defence personnel in uniform, though due to security instructions, none travel in uniform, unless moving onboard special military flights.
Such actions are an indicator of display of gratitude to the soldier. It may be small, but makes him feel proud and respected. It enhances his morale. Simple gestures such as special boarding privileges from airports like Srinagar, Leh, Jammu, and in the North East, where soldiers board after a troubled stint, heading home for short breaks, even if not in uniform, should become a norm as it gives a feeling of his service to the country being recognized.
A nation which respects its soldiers and veterans would always be a proud nation. In a democracy, the military is kept away from the corridors of power, rarely involved in decision making, but always at the forefront of action, implementing tough decisions made at the national level for ensuring national pride, Doklam and the surgical strike being recent examples. Hence, soldiers need positive gestures from society, indicating to them that they are special and the nation thanks them for their sacrifice.
Simultaneously every government action, seeking to degrade their status, ignoring rightful demands of widows and aged veterans has a negative impact. The government must pass directions to all ministries that issues concerning soldiers and veterans need to be viewed sympathetically. The defence minister has a significant role to play, as it is mainly her ministry, which by its recent actions has been criticized for being insensitive to the needs and problems being faced by veterans and widows.
Every soldier of today is a veteran of tomorrow. Veterans and the serving have a close bond, most being on the same page on social media. When a soldier receives news about maltreatment to widows and veterans, he begins to wonder, if the nation would care for his family, if he were to become a martyr on the line of duty. After all, each soldier loves his family and is worried for their welfare. If this thought ever comes into a soldier’s mind, it would be a sad day for India and the national leadership would be responsible.
The armed forces are the only organization in the nation without a union, lacking means to project their demands to those who matter. They have always worked silently and tirelessly battling those who seek to harm the nation. They have rushed in to aid those impacted by calamities, even ignoring their own difficulties.
It is this approach of the military which has resulted in respect and recognition flowing from the common Indian, despite some politicians and human rights activists, sitting in arm chair comfort, finding fault with their every action, including well- meaning ones. There would always be a lobby, who would seek to earn a living by criticizing the armed forces, knowing it would never respond or retaliate to their comments.
Governments in India have also never given the military its due recognition. 1965, 1971 and Kargil were wars when the armed forces proved their mettle and changed history. The world still studies these operations for their remarkable planning and perfect execution. Within the nation, they are celebrated quietly and without much fanfare. It is only within the military community that the event has relevance and is an occasion to honour widows of martyrs of these operations. Ignoring these occasions at the national level denies the public an opportunity from identifying with their own armed forces. It is only by ensuring that these victorious events are celebrated across all spectrums of society can the government enhance recognition of the military.
Instead of giving the military respect and recognition, governments over the years, fuelled by a fear of a coup, raised by a dominating bureaucracy, have lowered the status and standing of the armed forces. This has only increased heartburns and enhanced distance between the bureaucracy and the military.
It is only in India that political parties seek votes based on operations conducted by the armed forces, while simultaneously failing to grant them their rightful dues. They prefer moving rightful demands of veterans and serving to court to delay and deny, rather than granting them, thus denying recognition and respect for a service well rendered.
However, as recent incidents have proved, the common Indians’ respect for the soldier increases, even if the government ignores. This could be a warning to the government that disrespecting the soldier will lower their own standing in the eyes of the public.
Cancelling Spike order a mistake The Statesman 28 Nov 17
The defence ministry has cancelled a negotiated USD $500 million deal with Israel for the Spike Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) and has tasked the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) to indigenously develop a man-portable version of a similar system. The Spike missile is a third generation, fire and forget, top attack ATGM. This implies, that once locked on, it tracks its target and strikes enemy armour from the top, where it is the weakest. The army had planned to equip all infantry and mechanized infantry battalions, operating in plains and deserts, with it.
As per the report, the deal was to be inked soon and in anticipation, the Israeli company, Rafael Advanced Defence Systems, had even set up a missile sub-systems manufacturing unit near Hyderabad in partnership with the Kalyani group. Rumours are that the deal was cancelled to push indigenous development.
The DRDO claims, that since it has developed the Nag missile system, it could also produce this in the next three to four years. The fact is even if it delays development or fails, there would be no action taken, nor would the original deal be revived; hence the only losers would be the army and its operational preparedness. It would lose a capability, which is essential for operations, solely to fulfil a development attempt by the DRDO.
The Nag had undergone two test firings this year, the last being in Oct, which the DRDO claimed were a success. A DRDO statement released after the trials stated, ‘With these two successful flight trials and the flight test conducted earlier in Jun in the peak of summer, the complete functionality of the Nag ATGM along with launcher system NAMICA (Nag Missile Carrier) has been established and marked the successful completion of development trials of the Nag Missile’.
The army on the other hand commented, ‘The developmental trials of the Nag ATGM carried out earlier this month have only proven partial success and many more user trials would be needed. The entire exercise of hot-and-cold region trials of the Nag missile will take more than a year to complete, after which the missile could be ready for production.’ Thus, it appears that the army still has doubts on the functioning of the missile. It is essential that soldiers operating it in battle must have complete faith on the functionality of the equipment.
The army’s main objection to the missile remains its prohibitive cost and multiple technical shortcomings, including thermal sensors. Though the army’s overall demand is 8000 Nag missiles, with an immediate requirement of 2000, however it is only willing to place an initial order for 500 pieces.
The cancelling of the Spike deal has invited adverse comments from strategic experts. Operations in plains and desert sectors would involve mechanized formations. Thus, anti-tank weapons will be an essential equipment with forces operating in the region. The cancelling of the deal puts Pak in an advantageous position. Pak employs a locally manufactured variant of the Chinese designed HJ-8 missile alongside US manufactured TOW missiles which can strike tanks and bunkers at a range of 3-4 Kms, while missiles in service with India presently have a maximum range of two Kms.
This decision by the MoD may have been prompted by two major reasons, though no official announcement has been made. The first is hesitation on the part of the army to enhance orders for the Nag missile system in its present form, unless it clears trials planned in the future. Secondly has been a visualization, that by cancelling the contract, yet to be inked, the army would be compelled to accept future indigenous systems despite shortcomings, as against its desire to import battle hardened and tested equipment, as options would be closed.
However, this decision by the defence minister is wrong. The reliability of the DRDO to produce a similar product, within the desired time as also capability remains unconfirmed. Whether the Nag system itself would undergo the balance tests successfully and be suitable for introduction into service, only time would tell.
The army has a reputation of not accepting low quality equipment, as once inducted, it would remain in service for decades, preventing any purchase of technically advanced systems. Further, as history has proved, dependence on DRDO has rarely payed off. Ideally, purchase with technology transfer would have been ideal as the DRDO could have a better base technology for further development of systems.
Giving the DRDO an opportunity with a time factor, may imply giving undue support to home production, however warfare is not a game, since national prestige and lives are involved. The DRDO receives government funding and has immense laxity in research and development, hence must be able to stand its ground on proven capabilities with comparable products from the world market. Only by facing open competition and securing contracts, will it be able to enhance its development capabilities. Protectionism in any industry has led to its collapse, as has clearly been the case with DRDO, through the decades.
India has maintained reservations in every field and academic institutes of the government, less the army. To commence reservations even in defence manufacturing, by blocking imports, is setting a wrong precedence, which must be avoided. If maintaining a white elephant like the DRDO is beyond the governments capabilities, then its assets should be sold to large business houses now venturing into the defence field.
While rumours are resurfacing that the government may consider limited procurement of the Spike ATGM. It is again a haphazard decision as the army will be saddled with multiple equipment for the same task. The defence minister, needs to realize that she cannot push reservations into defence production. A wrong decision forced down the military’s throat can cause loss of lives; hence she needs to rethink before accepting advice from her non-military staff. The government must understand that it is responsible to ensure that the army always remains prepared for war and possesses requisite equipment.
Rising military power of India The Excelsior 22 Nov 17
India is a growing military power, which is evident with the number of nations seeking to enhance military ties with it. The recent comment by President Trump that the world’s two greatest democracies should have the two strongest militaries and terming Asia-Pacific as Indo-Pacific, indicates the growing proximity and dependence of the US on Indian military power in the region. For the US, presently the worlds sole super power, India remains a key element to its Asian strategy. The signing of the LEMOA (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement) has only brought the two militaries closer.
India has enhanced its naval presence in the Indian Ocean and is the only Asian nation capable of challenging a belligerent China in the region. Its forays into the troubled waters of the South China Sea, visiting ports of friendly nations including Vietnam has made the nations of the region, facing Chinese pressures, look upto India as a balancing power. The development of Port Blair into a major naval base would enhance the reach of the Indian military into the Indian Ocean and enable it to monitor all shipping activities. The navy has also successfully operated against sea piracy, rescuing ships of all nationalities. It remains the sole blue water navy of the continent, other than China, despite delays in its growth and acquisitions.
The Doklam standoff conveyed to the world that India is confident of its prowess and would support its smaller neighbours while simultaneously ensuring that its security interests are protected. Its policy of not claiming others territory, unwillingness to deploy forces in trouble spots, except under the UN banner has enhanced its reputation. India has indicated that while it remains a military power, it is solely for its own security, without any international claims.
India’s relations with all its neighbours (less Pakistan) are cordial with no major disputes. Further, Indian military experiences in many fields including counter insurgency, jungle warfare and operating in high altitudes have given its armed forces a unique character. Thus, nations have begun seeking to enhance military ties with India.
The Malabar exercise involving India, Japan and the US is now moving into a ‘Quad’ also including Australia. It was a ‘Quad’ earlier, but a pro-China Australian government pulled out. Having realized that it alone cannot counter a belligerent China, Australia has now re-joined the group. In fact, this exercise is very closely monitored by China. The formation of the ‘Quad’ has drawn adverse comments from China, which feels threatened by this grouping.
Simultaneous has been the desire of the French government to enhance its naval ties with India. France has two bases in the Indian Ocean, Djibouti and Reunion Islands, close to Mauritius and is aware that collaboration with India would enhance its military reach. It also desires involving Australia in the grouping making it into a trilateral event. This interaction would be separate from the ‘Quad’ thereby enhancing the navy’s role. India has increased its existing naval outreach with ASEAN nations, providing a sense of security to countries facing Chinese domination.
The army has been conducting joint exercises with a vast variety of nations spread across the globe. It has exercises with the US, Russia, China, all its neighbours and a host of others. The most recent seeking to join the bandwagon is Egypt, whose army chief visited India last week. The army’ expertise in handling insurgencies is well established. Nations seek to gain from Indian experience. The recent combined exercise with the Russian armed forces had elements of all three services participating. The air force has also been operating in joint exercises across the globe, from Alaska to Israel.
This international desire stems from the fact that the world has realized the professionalism and capability of the Indian armed forces. Despite lack of latest technology and limitations in some fields, the armed forces have displayed their determination and professionalism. In addition, this is the only armed force in the region, which has remained apolitical.
The desire of the international community to engage with the Indian military should make the nation and its leadership proud as the only service respected by the common Indian is the envy of the world. It has earned this reputation due to its determination to succeed and gain victory at any cost.
Yet, they continue to lack requisite capabilities essential for ensuring dominance in the region. The navy, whose role is enhancing at a rapid pace, is way behind in its capacity of ships and submarines. Most of its fleet is aging, hence requires considerable maintenance. All internal developmental projects for the three services are behind schedule, some by decades. With a poor defence research and development base within the nation, the military is compelled to seek weapons from the international market. Its recent action of refusing to induct Arjun tanks and Tejas fighters, solely because of shortcomings in technology, has come in for some criticism.
However, the armed forces have sound reason for rejecting domestically developed technologies. Equipment once inducted would remain in service for decades. Inducting an equipment which is unreliable would reduce efficiency and operational preparedness rather than enhancing it. With nations and companies willing to build in India as also transfer latest technology it makes better sense to induct battle tested and hardened equipment, which can be employed for a prolonged period.
While it remains a fact that no nation can become an international military power on imported equipment, yet India has been compelled to follow this path. The push for ‘make in India’ is moving at a snail’s pace and unless given due impetus, the Indian military would remain dependent on imported equipment. A military respected and in demand from across the globe desperately needs capabilities, which the government should address at a rapid pace.
Congress has no moral right to complain about Rafale The Statesman 21 Nov 17
A war of words has broken out between the Congress and the BJP on the Rafale aircraft deal, even sucking in the air force chief, who felt it essential to clear the air. It has led to press conferences from both sides, with each blaming the other for dragging their feet on defence procurements and kickbacks, including favouring Reliance Defence.
The Indian armed forces, presently amongst the most powerful in the world, are largely dependent on imported equipment. Realistically, no nation can become a superpower, without its own strong military technological base. India had remained dependent on the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO).
The DRDO was founded in 1958 by merging three existing departments and comprises of fifty-two laboratories. It has held sway over Indian defence procurements. In many cases it has opted to develop technology, rather than permitting imports. The latest is the cancellation of the $500 Million Spike ATGM deal with Israel, to enable developing inhouse by the DRDO. Other than rocket and missile development, it has failed in almost all sectors. The recent decisions by the army and air force in rejecting the Arjun tanks and advanced Tejas due to shortfalls in capabilities bears testimony.
Indian defence imports have always been under a scanner, despite efforts by any government in power. In recent times, every defence deal has been questioned. The Bofors and the Augusta Westland helicopter purchases continue to be under investigation. Rafale joins the group. The UPA government remained haunted by the Bofors ghost all through its tenure. Even a leak in the papers about kickbacks had Anthony scrapping the deal.
Anthony fearful of being blamed in any kickback scandal, took the effortless way out and scrapped almost all procurements, while delaying decision making in even the Rafale purchase. His cancelling and blacklisting actions had adverse impacts on defence preparedness.
Cancellations were done at the final stages of trials or even after they were completed. The artillery, desperate for modern guns found its ‘request for proposal’ cancelled umpteen times. The scuttling of deals at the last moment and blacklisting of firms implied denying a capability, not halting a company from further contracts.
Being the defence minister, he was aware that trials of an equipment involve immense time, effort and expenditure. Once cancelled, the entire process is set back by years. Hence all the three services were way behind in desired capabilities essential for warfare. It even led to a frustrated Air Vice Marshall Kapil Kak commenting, ‘We need a person who is not pro-self but pro-India and can utilize the resources to the best, rather than sitting on files for personal intangible gains’.
Ageing equipment, becoming the main inventory, enhanced accidents. Spares, essential for maintenance were lacking, as contracts were not being cleared. The situation became such that the navy chief resigned, claiming moral responsibility for a series of naval accidents, which claimed unnecessary lives. Yet, the UPA and Anthony refused to budge. Never in history have the armed forces been denied equipment, the way they were under the UPA.
Military capabilities take time to develop. Contracts inked today would commence induction a few years hence and would be completely inducted after almost a decade. The equipment would remain in service for decades thereafter. Delay in concluding contracts, especially for a country with a poor internal military technology base, would compel it to forcibly continue exploiting outdated technological equipment.
Non-commencement of negotiations for the Rafale aircraft had the air force worried. Its ageing fleet, facing increased accidents, led to losing professional pilots. While the issue is being contested politically, what neither party wishes to divulge is the variation in price depends on addons and modifications in the equipment profile that the air force seeks. For a layman to understand that what the UPA had was just a base price, not the additions, training and maintenance essentials that the air force desired.
Bringing defence deals, which were delayed for a decade to their conclusion, required a government willing to take a step forward. It had to be proactive, meet the requirements of the armed forces and ensure desired capabilities are procured, to ensure that the armed forces are capable of meeting future challenges.
The offsets going to the private sector has advantages as dependence on DRDO and ordnance factories must reduce. The involvement of the DRDO and its affiliate the Ordnance Factories into defence production was an ancient practice. Neither of the two organizations have either the commitment nor the responsibility to ensure quality checks. It took decades before the ordnance factory realized that it had the technology transfer for the Bofors guns and has now finally produced its Indian version of the same, undergoing trials.
Inferior quality of artillery and tank ammunition from ordnance factories have resulted in multiple accidents. The fire which claimed sixteen lives at Phulgaon was the result of faulty tank mines manufactured by ordnance factories, which they subsequently refused to recollect. The overhauling of armoured vehicles is perpetually years behind schedule, solely due to lack of spares. This because it neither has responsibility nor accountability being a government department under the same ministry of defence.
The private sector, seeking profit would meet deadlines and quality. Further, they would ensure employment of technology and not be manpower intensive. Future production lines should be given to the private sector. They would remain accountable, since finances are involved.
Those presently in service and veterans who had served during the ten years of UPA regime are aware of the limitations in ammunition even for training, lack of spares and desperate shortfalls in capabilities, which now appear to be ending. A political party which showed no concern for the armed forces while in power, is suddenly finding its voice. For the Congress, which had placed the armed forces on a down slide throughout its tenure, to now seek to question those completing projects which they failed to implement, is akin to living in a glass house and throwing stones at others.
Growing Indian military soft power English Version from Amar Ujala 18 Nov 17
The Indian army is known across the globe for its professionalism, determination and conduct. It is respected for being the only apolitical military in a subcontinent, where the military is known to dominate governments. It has retained its responsible place in a democratic environment, despite all efforts of the government to degrade it. While the world respects it, its own bureaucrats and political commentators seem to target it.
Historically it has participated in both world wars under the British flag and post-independence in UN missions. Wherever it has operated, it has received glorious tribute. Recent release of a stamp in honour of the Indian soldier by Israel, for the battle of Haifa, is a case in point. Internationally, its performance in the liberation of Bangladesh remains a military history study. Thus, in reputation and standing, it is a professional force which has performed its tasks with aplomb.
Recent years has seen the Indian armed forces conducting joint exercises with a multitude of nations. The Malabar naval exercise involving India, Japan and the US, now likely to also involve Australia is aimed at conveying a strong message to China. This exercise has always been closely monitored by China as it sees Indian naval power as a threat. The air force conducts exercises with the US and presently with Israel amongst others. Both the services have been applauded for their capabilities and performance despite shortfalls in equipment profile.
The army has the largest number of international interactions. It conducts exercises not only with its neighbours but with many countries across the globe, spreading across continents. Almost every developed and militarily powerful nation seeks joint military exercises with India. Nations presently battling internal insurgencies have adopted the Indian model and experience, with success. They have participated in exercises in our variety of training institutes to enhance knowledge and gain from our experience. The latest seeking to join the Indian training bandwagon is Egypt, whose army chief is in India seeking the same.
India also provides training opportunities to many countries in its numerous training establishments. Those who attend courses develop close bonds with their Indian counterparts, which remain lifelong. This bonding, hospitality, Indian culture and cuisine builds within them respect for the Indian armed forces in specific and the nation in general. There has rarely been a case when they have not highlighted the professionalism of the forces and its members. The maximum international participation is at the Defence Services Staff College in Wellington, with lesser in other institutes. Simultaneously, Indian officers attending courses abroad have been recognized for their professionalism.
This international exposure at every level is aimed at enhancing the military’s soft power. To understand the impact of military soft power is to take the example of Afghan forces being trained in Indian army institutes. Their experience, knowledge gained, exposure to the variety of Indian equipment and proximity to their Indian counterparts would steer them clear of any influence which Pak may attempt. It is with this intention that the Afghan president requested for Indian military equipment and desired similar training for their police forces. Thus, the visit of the Pak army chief to Afghanistan, seeking to provide training to the Afghan forces, was met with cold response.
Despite tensions with China, Indian and Chinese soldiers have participated in joint exercises, on each other’s soil. This enables both nations to understand the other’s capability and professionalism. While standoffs may remain a regular feature in the years ahead, until the border issue is resolved, the two nations would be careful to go beyond it to a stage of war, as they are aware that the other is no pushover. Hence, exercises are also an opportunity to project the capability of the military.
Indian military soft power is on the rise. While it is a fact that no nation can ever become a superpower on imported equipment alone, yet the Indian army has repeatedly proved its mettle in every engagement it has been involved with. Military soft power can play a significant role in international diplomacy, which the Indian government hesitates to employ.
Nations, whose survival is at threat either due to internal disturbances or external threats, have a powerful military to support a democratically elected government. It is this military with which our military leadership can interact and enhance diplomatic ties. Close to home examples are Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand and the Philippines. At slight distance away would be African states battling the Boko Haram.
Simultaneously, for military soft power to be effectively built and exploited there is a need for timely planning joint exercises and allotment of courses to different nations. Both these actions involve close coordination between the armed forces and Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). Since the armed forces are not part of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), but subservient to it, there is invariably a delay in passing of information and subsequent actions. It has led to innumerable embarrassments.
On many occasions courses have been allocated late to nations, compelling them to send students unprepared and unfamiliar with the language. The reimbursement of their stay is from the funds of the MEA, which is years behind schedule, compelling the host institute to bear the cost. Approaching the MoD has no impact, as it has almost no role except being a post office to convey military requirements to the MEA.
As threats grow across the globe, international military cooperation and coordination would become more important. India has no desire to project its armed forces in any international trouble spot, unless it is under UN flag or to safeguard Indian investments and interests. However, experiences gained by nations, while battling multitude of threats need to be shared and exploited. For this, India needs to exploit its military soft power and expand its international cooperation. Thus, the present shackles of communication and interaction within the government needs to change and the armed forces provided more freedom for engagement and action, after all, every major Indian embassy has a military attaché.
FOB job for army: beginning of a new trend ORF 06 Nov 17
Since the announcement of employing the army to construct three Foot Over Bridges (FOBs) in Mumbai, a discussion has been launched on whether the government decision was right or wrong. Opposition politicians including Captain Amarinder Singh and Omar Abdullah amongst others warned the government against employing the army meaninglessly in roles earmarked for others. The army chief in an interview with the press stated that he accepted this task as it would be image building for the forces, beyond the normal, ‘know your army mela’s’, conducted regularly. If the decision was a political one, taken at an appropriate level, the chief would have to comply.
Veterans, who possess knowledge of a similar incident pre- 1962, when the army was employed for constructing accommodation in Ambala, ignoring their primary task of training and preparing for war, against the wishes of the army chief, paid with immense loss of lives when suddenly moved for operations against the Chinese, have also criticized the government’s decisions. This argument may not hold much water as the Indian army of 1962 and 2017 are vastly apart. It is presently well prepared and equipped to repel any misadventures.
The major comment of veterans on social media has been that the state is abdicating its responsibilities of tagging to task the agencies which have inordinately failed to complete their projects in time. It is seeking an easier way out and this action may set a precedence which would be difficult to reverse in the years ahead. It is an established fact that the army has done more for nation building and national unity than any other organization, but its employment has always been within bounds. Crossing it once, would set the cat amongst the pigeons.
There are some major questions which the government needs to answer, for the satisfaction of the nation. Firstly, if a new and permanent FOB was sanctioned two years, why is it that the railways have still not finalized the tender? Who is responsible and why has no action been initiated? Is it that the railway minister has lost trust on his own organization, despite it being packed with engineers, having its own engineering institutes and possessing expertise.
Secondly, while such tasks are within the purview of the army, however as a rule, the army is always the instrument of last resort. A counter argument could be that the army is a national resource and hence can be tasked, if necessary. In recent times, the golden rule of employing the army as an instrument of last resort is being ignored to the extent that other agencies have begun taking for granted that the army will be there. Incidents of Haryana, Yoga day (when the army laid the mats) and cleaning garbage dumped by tourists in remote areas bear testimony to this. This is the beginning of a new trend.
Thirdly, army engineers are trained for constructing temporary structures during war, which as the battle progresses can be dismantled and resources re-employed elsewhere, not permanent ones. While this FOB is claimed to be a temporary structure, it would like all such cases remain permanently, hence would require additional resources and expertise, which the army can muster. As a norm it tasked in emergencies, such as bridges being washed away or the area likely to be flooded, when other agencies are either unable to muster resources or would take immense time. The temporary bailey bridge constructed in Enathu, Kerala while the main bridge would take time to repair in Feb this year, overbridge constructed during the Commonwealth Games in 2010 post the collapse of the main structure or the Pontoon bridge during the Sri Sri event being prime examples. It also has over decades been constructing temporary Pontoon bridges for the ardh and khumb mela’s in Allahabad.
Fourthly, the army would be employing its stores meant for operations. History is testament to the fact that once constructed and deployed, the FOBs would remain in place for eternity. A permanent FOB may come up in the years ahead, but these would never be dismantled. The FOBs would be handed over to the railways, cost having been borne by the army, with the material never returned. More than the cost are the raw materials employed on the site, which would add to the army’s already existing shortfalls of bridging equipment. The army would also continue battling CAG objections on the expenditure and payment for employment of the army in tasks beyond its normal duties.
Fifthly, for such a construction, troops would need to be redeployed from multiple locations, compelling them to sacrifice their normal tasks and training. Administrative bases would need to be established for dumping of stores and living of the personnel involved in construction, for which land would always be in short supply, adding to the woes of those involved. Knowing the government and its policies, the entire labour would be army personnel with no contribution in manpower from either the state or railways.
Finally, a major doubt is whether this entire exercise is being done to benefit the local population or for regaining lost political ground in the state. Logically, if it was aimed at providing succour to the local population which faces the brunt daily while travelling on suburban trains, then the railway minister and the state chief minister should have first pulled up the railways and the local municipal corporation for the delay in tender and commencing construction, prior to tasking the army.
If the action is to seek political mileage from the employment of the army, then it would cause more damage than good. It would definitely enhance the army’s image, as it would deliver the FOBs, in time and with quality, but would set a new precedence. It is also probable that the railways would desire its maintenance by the army, since constructed by them, thus ensuring a permanent detachment remains in place, while they are absolved of any future responsibility, which would be an added task.
A major negative message which is being conveyed is that government’s both at the state and centre are incapable of pushing their own organizations to function at the desired pace. Hence, go slow and delay projects and the government could seek other options. The opposition across the nation would exploit this incident to place the government and its agencies in poor light, while praising the army.
Hence, despite all measures, politicization of the army is unavoidable. Simultaneously, it would open doors for other governments in the future, to employ the army’s scarce and specific war stores for tasks, which remain the responsibility of other agencies. If that becomes the norm, then the nation would only witness failures from every department of the government and a shrinking in the army’s resources.
Inimical forces will attempt to jeopardize military modernization Bharat Shakti 31 Oct 17
India has over the decades only modernized its military by importing hardware. It has been the largest importer of military hardware, as its Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) maintained monopoly, preventing the private sector from entering the market and itself being a failure in almost all military technologies, less missiles and space. Thus, with dependency on imports, the military’s modernization moved forward with hiccups.
The international armament market is a competitive one, which is dependent on increasing distrust between nations and enhanced possibilities of war. The competitiveness and desire for profit makes manufacturers unscrupulous in their dealings. They would adopt any means, legal or illegal to ensure their products are accepted. Employing middle men, whose sole task is to interact with concerned officials, spread positive inputs on their product by inviting those who possess power to determine final choices, either to the manufacturing plant on holidays or to costly social events, has become a norm. Kickbacks as a policy is well established.
A single mass order of a product could make or break a company. India, along with the induction of the Bofors, also ordered ninety-nine Position Azimuth Determining Systems (PADS). PADS were necessary to accurately fix the location of the guns when deployed, thus enhancing lethality of fire power. The order saved the company, which was heading for closure. Similarly, in the present environment, the battle for the ‘make in India’ fighter aircraft has top diplomatic personalities from manufacturing nations, visiting India, seeking to influence decision making in India on its choice of aircraft.
The Indian armed forces have a system of an indepth analysis of any product they seek to procure. Trials are conducted in every nature of terrain and weather condition. Each equipment is put through rugged trials. In one case, a manufacturer representative even remarked that the Indian trial report is a document in demand, even if the equipment is rejected. The document alone can enhance sales in various parts of the globe after rectifying the suggestions made during trials.
The duration between trials, evaluation, negotiations, final orders and delivery can on occasions spread over a couple of years, in cases almost close to a decade. This duration is ideal for rival equipment manufacturers to scuttle the deal by any means, hoping for fresh tenders and a repeat of the trial process.
Further, dependence on imports binds the nation to the supplier. In the case of the US, there are laws that if the nation possessing US manufactured equipment employs it in areas against US interest, it could stop supply of the equipment or spare parts. In the case of Russia, dependence is mainly on spare parts. There have been instances, even presently, when shortage of Russian spares has adversely affected serviceability of the equipment. This issue gained prominence when the erstwhile Soviet Union split and the arms manufacturing industries were relocated in other countries.
There are also inimical powers, who do not desire Indian armed forces enhance their capabilities. Hence adversaries would seek to employ multiple avenues to impact development of capacity and capability. In the case of imported products, spread of rumours on kickbacks or illegal means adopted by the manufacturer is the easiest. Home developed products could be impacted either by deliberate tampering or by rumours.
Scuttling of deals was largely prevalent during the UPA regime. Tender after tender was cancelled solely on claims of payment of kickbacks and the like. The government continued to be haunted by the Bofors ghost. In many cases this was being done in the advanced stage of trials or even post the selection of the equipment. Methodology adopted included leaking kickback details to the press and on occasions to elected representatives from the state or centre, who suddenly became knowledgeable. Were the claims genuine or were they the result of disgruntled competitors whose equipment had been rejected, was never announced, but the entire process and effort went into cold storage. A fact missed by the defence ministry was scuttling implied not blacklisting a company, but the equipment, pushing capability development years behind.
Amongst the major deals scuttled during Anthony’s time as the defence minister were the Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) involving the Rafale, whose price negotiation he was unwilling to complete, Light Utility Helicopters (LUH) and the all-terrain army transport vehicle. The tenders for the 155mm Guns were issued and then cancelled, solely on fears of kickbacks. Air Vice Marshal Kapil Kak (Retired) also commented, ‘We need a person who is not pro-self but pro-India and can thus utilize the resources to the best, rather than sitting on files for personal intangible gains’.
The impact was on every service, which were compelled to remain ready for war holding decades old equipment with poor serviceability. It fought Kargil with aplomb, however would not have been suited for large scale operations. The air force was way below its essential holdings, the navy drastically below its minimum required submarine fleet. Even the serviceability rate of the equipment held by both services, was below satisfactory levels. The navy suffered a collection of operational accidents due to low serviceability and lack of spares, compelling its chief to resign, to send the right message to the government. The biggest sufferer in the army was the artillery, which remained locked in the eighties, desperately needing modernization.
The present government, adopted the ‘government to government’ approach, ignoring complaints or suggestions of favouritism or misdemeanours. Thus, a slew of orders for capacity development have been inked in the past three years for all the three services. The lesson which should be accepted from our mistakes over the decades is the importance of developing a sound military research, development and manufacturing base, within the nation involving both, the private sector and the DRDO.
Another important lesson is the need to support this base by every means. A clear example in the present era is the development of two major artillery systems, one each by the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) and a combined effort of the DRDO and private sector. These are presently undergoing extensive trials, which like all equipment, continue to face some shortcomings. Similar has been the effort of the DRDO in developing the Arjun tank for the armoured and the Tejas for the air force. Shortcomings would always exist in every weapon system, irrespective of the country of origin.
The concerned service should adopt a methodology of interacting with the developer and manufacturer and assist in identifying shortcomings and rectifying the same before final production. Developing inhouse would remove shortcomings of import, including saving vital foreign exchange and supporting the ‘made in India model’ as against the ‘make in India’ model.
Like the missile success story, once a breakthrough has been achieved, the sky is the limit. It would be the same in weapon technology, future models would always be more modern and trouble free. We should only look outwards for technologies which we have yet to master and breakthrough, while supporting inhouse developments in others.
Army veterans must act responsibly The Statesman 17 Oct 17
As compared to any other organization in the country, the armed forces are the only ones without a voice. They have no means of venting their unhappiness on government decisions to those that matter, no union to support their demands, nor any right to protest, while wearing the uniform. Their top hierarchy can only raise its voice and request the government through interactions and notes, but do little if the government is unrelenting. These silent warriors only have their veterans, who having shared the pains and difficulties of service, understand their constraints and have become their public voice.
The culture of silence and discipline ingrained while in service tends to remain within an individual even post his retirement. Hence open protests by veterans are rare. In most cases he continues to behave responsibly and disciplined. Even in the OROP protests, there was a large community, which felt that agitating is incorrect by veterans and legal action is the option. Hence, the long-drawn agitation took time before it gained momentum, solely because a cultural change was essential amongst the veteran community.
Once it gained momentum, then there was nothing stopping the enthusiasm, till the initial release of OROP. Most participants quit after the initial release because they felt the government had acted, despite its remaining half-baked.
Even at the peak of the agitation, there was no violence, no insults to the government, solely cries of demanding rights and ‘Bharat Mata ki Jai’, in complete contrast to the behaviour visible in assemblies, parliament or in other protests. The visuals in the media of aged veterans being manhandled by police or of surrendering their medals, which every soldier considers most dear, hurt sentiments across the nation and compelled the government to act.
The agitation was aimed at resolving pension issues of not only present veterans but also of generations of serving and future soldiers, as every soldier of today is a potential veteran of tomorrow. Hence, the agitators, protested not solely for themselves, but for the tomorrow of those now in service. The military was never criticized, despite claims of non-involvement of its hierarchy.
However, in recent times, there has been a marked change in the commenting by veterans on social media. Critical comments against the service, at times even based on fake content, have been on the rise. A recent case where social media became a battle ground was the Gogoi incident, where there were clearly two opposing veteran groups, one for and the other critical of the service. The other was the helicopter crash in Arunachal, post which the remains of the deceased, were initially lifted and brought to the base in cardboard boxes.
While the army termed it as an aberration and the few who have served in the area understood the difficulties in rescuing in such terrain, some veterans ignoring sane voices, were extremely critical and accused the army of insensitivity, ignoring the fact that the armed forces respect’s its martyrs and treats each one with dignity and honour. The honour provided once the remains were in the base and beyond was ignored.
This increased unwanted criticism has become a norm. Many, when questioned, state that it is a means of advising the armed forces to improve, while enhancing awareness amongst the public. There are some who are permanently critical because they bear a personal grudge against the organization. The media is only too happy when such differences crop up and seek to play one group against the other on national channels. The critiques may gain media glare, but their negative comments have impacts.
Social media being open, is regularly injected with comments from forces inimical to the nation, seeking to impact morale. These when circulated with added adverse comments, spread faster even within the serving community, causing greater harm than good. On many occasions there have even been comments stating that the service chiefs should resign, in case the armed forces are not granted their due, without understanding that such an action is tantamount to mutiny, unheard of in independent India, an action which would damage its reputation forever.
The veterans are always a respected community within the armed forces family. Their experience and contribution has been respected by the organization, if not the government. The present young generation look upto them as mentors. They must realize that it is the service which has made them what they are today, respected members of the community and would continue to care for them, solely because they sacrificed their youth for the service of the nation.
If they profess a negative outlook, continue criticizing the service, rather than supporting it, they project a poor image of the military and its hierarchy amongst the public and within the serving community. It also impacts those seeking to join it as a career. The serving community is also on social media, though not as active participants, but observe and are influenced. Spreading malicious content enhances internal cohesion.
Hence veterans as a community need to understand their role in impacting the minds of the serving. Positive approach builds confidence and trust into the system, negative outlook erodes the same. The more senior the veteran, the more positive and advisory should be his role, after all he may be a role model for many. Wrong or negative actions should be gently criticized, as the incident may not have been intentional, but accidental. A positive veteran community would enhance service prestige, while a negative one would degrade it, in the public eye.
Also missing is the media cells of the services. Once malicious content is identified on social media, they need to step in and clarify if it is false. Silence on their part adds to the damage. They are aware, however have not been granted freedom to act by the hierarchy. Unless this is done, malicious posts on social media would continue spreading, harming the reputation of the military, both outside and within.
Cluttering the air space Salute India magazine Aug-Sep 17
Employment of air power for close air support missions in operations necessitated planning and coordination in air space management between various agencies. Air defence, artillery guns and rockets, attack and reconnaissance helicopters as also close air support aircraft operated simultaneously in the same limited air space, possibly with different height zones, however a risk of being shot by friendly fire always existed. With the proliferation of UAVs and drones the same restricted space will only get more cluttered and enhance possibilities of accidents as they gain importance by the day.
Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) are best resorted to from the air. In the past, there was employment of helicopters and aerial missions in addition to satellites which provided inputs to ground forces, close to real time, as photographs took time to be developed and delivered. The development of UAVs of all sizes, varying flight durations and height levels, packed with technological advancements has changed this concept.
Given a choice, every unit, irrespective of nature of task, and every commander would seek real time information. None would be willing to wait for it to flow from the top. Hence the ideal methodology is to employ UAVs and drones, range, duration of endurance and height of operation depending on the formation or unit’s area of influence and interest. This is the future cluttered battlefield.
The availability of longer range artillery implies detection and correct identification of targets well in depth for timely engagement. The accuracy of location of targets would determine the effectiveness of destruction and degradation. Similarly, is the requirement to monitor the engagement for Post-Strike Damage Assessment (PSDA).
Offensive ops were time consuming as ground reconnaissance was essential and necessitated moving troops to occupy vantage points in hostile territory for physical reconnaissance. With the availability of UAVs, this has been to a large extent offset, as upto-date information on enemy deployment, movement and location of reactionary forces is readily available.
Armed drones have begun changing the nature of warfare, especially counter insurgency and cross border strikes. This has been amply demonstrated by the US in war torn Syria, Iraq and closer home in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Controlled from mainland US, thousands of miles away, the drones have been able to strike precision targets including moving vehicles, hideouts and training camps. The detection, identification and engagement of targets is done real time with deadly accuracy. They could be similarly employed in operations to engage targets behind crests, naturally protected from artillery fire assaults.
The benefit of UAVs and drones is immense, with each service demanding them in mass quantities justifying it as essential to enhancing operational capabilities. The army requirements include ISR, target acquisition and monitoring, target engagement and PSDA as also guiding artillery fire. In the ‘no war no peace’ scenario as is existing along the LoC with Pak, it is ideal for monitoring infiltration along the LoC and monitoring and engaging Pak terror training camps. Whether it would replace the Air Observation Post (Air OP) in its primary task of aerial reconnaissance and directing artillery fire in operations, has yet not been seriously considered.
The air force and navy would require them for surveillance, boosting air defence capabilities to add to existing radar configurations and engagement of targets. While the requirements of the army may involve UAVs with lesser flying time with varying altitude, depending on terrain configurations, the air force and navy requirements would involve longer flight durations and greater altitudes.
For the armed forces, these would augment inputs presently flowing from satellites, building data bases and enhancing strategic intelligence. Commanders at all levels would be able to monitor inputs on real time basis and be prepared for developing situations. Thus, with passage of time UAVs and drones would become an integral part of the armed forces at every level. On ground, while availability of UAVs and drones has yet to reach such levels, it soon would, as the equipment is internationally available while also being developed by the DRDO in India.
In the present concept, its employment is expected to be delegated to varying levels of command, based on task and requirement. Amongst the contentious issues, yet to be discussed and cleared would be the responsibility to employ and launch armed drones. The army would desire to control deployment and employment, as it would seek to engage enemy terror training camps and infiltration attempts as far forward as possible, after all the LoC is active and Counter Insurgency (CI) is the order of the day. The air force concept would be to employ them as strategic assets for engaging enemy air defence systems as part of its deep strike strategy in operations. Operating them is likely to remain with the air force.
A major benefit of employing UAVs and drones is even if destroyed, it is loss of equipment with financial implications, however without corresponding loss of human lives. A nation, in peace time, can afford to lose an equipment not a life, which could become an embarrassment in international circles. Further is the availability of real time inputs, permitting forces to be redeployed based on emerging threats. Hence, its benefits are immense, however, so are its shortcoming in the limited battle space.
Its employment in CI and along the LoC in the present context is ideal, as operations are restricted in time and space. Air power is not employed and artillery duels are controlled. Further, induction of the 155 mm gun systems with longer ranges has yet to commence, hence the air space is free for their random and uncontrolled employment.
A glance at the development plans of DRDO would indicate that it covers a wide range of UAVs meeting the requirements of the armed forces. It varies from long range armed and unarmed UAVs to Slybird with a range of ten Kms and the Netra for counter insurgency operations. India has acquired a variety of UAVs from Israel and is also in the process of acquiring more from Israel and the US. The larger the variety, the better the flow of IRS, the more the free flow of aerial objects in the Tactical Battle Area (TBA).
Since the commencement of across the board employment of UAVs and drones, there has never been a war where both adversaries have employed UAVs and drones to maximum effect. In recent times, these have been employed by one superior power against a weaker adversary, whether it be Israel against the Palestinians or the US in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan or Pakistan. Hence, there is lack of knowledge on how it impacts air operations.
In the Indo-Pak context both nations possess almost similar nature of equipment and are seeking to continue developing and employing them. While India either develops inhouse or imports, Pak obtains from China or manufactures based on Chinese technology. Thus, it needs to be considered as to the impact their mass employment would have in the TBA, mainly in J and K, where possibility of limited operations is much higher.
Free flying UAVs and drones would impact helicopters and low flying fighters, either supporting ground forces or evading enemy radar, to strike at targets in depth. In mountains, low altitude flying would be restricted to valleys hence limiting areas and enhancing possibilities of accidents. Since employment of UAVs and drones is likely to be delegated within the army without centralized command and control, passing instructions to reduce or restrict their employment, during times when other aviation resources would be using the same air space would be difficult to implement.
The impact on the aviation industry by the witnessing of a single drone over a commercial airport is such that it offsets flight schedules for hours. This clutter by own forces is likely to be far higher and may impact the effectiveness of own air power, which while on a mission compels the pilot to also concentrate on free flying objects in near vicinity. Simultaneously, the enemy would also be employing UAVs and drones in almost a similar manner, which is equally threatening to own air force as it crosses the border to destroy hostile targets.
While it would operationally benefit commanders at all levels in maintaining latest ISR, it would remain a threat to air power and helicopters. Restrictions could possibly only be placed on high flying UAVs, whose control on employment would be at the strategic level. Thus, the air force and army aviation would need to consider the presence of increased free flying objects in the TBA and their impact on air operations. It may entail a change in air tactics as also necessitate creation of means of controlling UAV flying at crucial times. Further, tasking of army aviation may have to be revisited, as part of their role could be better done by UAVs and drones. This subject has generally been brushed aside, but would soon need to be discussed as their deployment and employment increases.
More power to fire Force India Oct 17
With the arrival from the US of the first two M777 Ultra-Light Howitzers, the Bofors ghost has finally been laid to rest. The Indian Artillery had been crying hoarse for modernization over the decades, but the ghost kept raising its ugly head, the UPA government continued reacting and Anthony, as the defence minister, was compelled to turn down all proposals. The Indian artillery firepower remained weak and limited in range, equipment outdated and choice of projectiles restricted. It was very evident during the Kargil conflict, when the army was compelled to induct Bofors from other sectors, solely to support the operation.
In the mountains, there are few Bofors regiments and the balance are the indigenous 105mm guns with a limited range of 17 to 18 kms with restrictions of firing at higher angles of elevations. There were similar problems in the plains as the 130 mm Russian guns had outlived their life, but had to be retained or modified on an adhoc basis with Israeli support as SOLTAMS, as options never existed. Self-propelled (SP) guns to provide support to armoured formations were outdated and almost non-existent.
Artillery has always been termed as the ‘Queen of the battle field’ and is a battle winning factor. Its employment philosophy has been changing over the decades. Initially it was providing fire support for operations by infantry and armour but is presently destruction of the enemy’s combat potential and degradation of his defences. The concept involves employing preponderance of artillery firepower to ensure success. Thus, there is a requirement of long ranges, higher calibre weapons delivering greater TNT content with deadly accuracy and the availability of a multitude of ammunition choices to engage a variety of targets.
Further, to reduce logistical nightmares of a large variety of ammunition, due to multitude of gun systems, a single calibre gun, using commonality of ammunition is essential. Hence the Indian artillery desperately wanted to upgrade to the 155-gun systems but their demands remained ignored. To some extent, the initial causes of delay in modernization was within the service itself. For a few years, there was an internal battle as to which calibre would be best suited. This debate and the Bofors ghost ensured that no guns were even considered for induction. The UPA did issue tenders for a host of artillery equipment in 2012, but claims of bribery resulted in tenders being cancelled, with the wheeled SP gun contract being terminated, post the trials.
In the present environment, where the Line of Control (LoC) is active in J and K, the ability to fire accurately at long ranges can turn tables, in case of increased ceasefire violations. The quantum of damage impacted by heavy shells destroying their terrorist camps, defences and logistic bases can impact morale. With precision means available for acquiring targets, delivery of accurate fire assaults would change the scenario. On the Chinese front, with strong Indian defensive deployment on the watershed, long range guns alongside missiles can be a major deterrent to any misadventures.
The present concept of converting the Indian artillery to a common 155 group of guns, varying in weight, manoeuvrability and capability of the equipment based on specific terrain requirements, nature of operation, indigenization of ammunition and local manufacture has major advantages. Thus, all guns now in the process of induction are being test fired with the Indian manufactured 155 ammunition systems.
While guns were being ignored for induction, other systems began seeing the light of day. Pinaca and Smerch missile systems were added, giving some respite to the artillery in terms of engaging at longer ranges and SWATI, the indigenous weapon locating radar was introduced. SWATI has proved its mettle already along the LoC. UAVs were also inducted enhancing surveillance capabilities.
The artillery is now witnessing a spurt of inductions with the arrival of M777, trials of the Dhanush, the home developed 155mm version of the Bofors, the ATAGS (Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System) and orders for hundred K 9 Vajra tracked SP Gun systems. These have changed the artillery landscape for the future. The other major missile systems including the Brahmos and Prithvi, remain strategic weapons, employment of whose would be cleared at different levels.
All the guns now being trial tested would be part of ‘make in India or made in India’. The induction of new technology would give a boost to the Indian defence industry. The ATAGS, the gun which has set a world record in its trials, by reaching a range of 48 kms with specialized Base Bleed Unit (BBU) ammunition, is being developed completely inhouse by the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) in collaboration with private sector units including Bharat Forge, Tata Power Strategic Engineering Division and Mahindra Defence Naval Systems.
The Dhanush, the Indian version of the Bofors, based on the original designs given by the company, is being developed by the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB). Twenty-five pieces of the M777 Howitzer would be delivered by the company in ready to use condition and the rest would be manufactured in India by Mahindra Defence. L and T would manufacture and supply hundred units of the K9 SP guns. Thus, India would also become a hub for export of spares and in the years ahead of artillery equipment.
India always conducts detailed trials on all equipment which it inducts into service. Artillery guns are tested in extreme weather conditions and in each nature of terrain where it is expected to operate. Post each trial, if the profile of the equipment is found suitable, then recommendations are made to the supplier for minor modifications to suit Indian conditions. The reason for detailed trials are few. The gun once inducted would remain in service for decades, the Bofors were inducted in 1987 and are still the mainstay of the artillery, post thirty years. In addition, the cost of each equipment is immense, hence selecting the wrong piece would lead to loss of limited defence budget. Thus, artillery trials are serious business and conducted by a combined team of scientists and artillery personnel.
There are always adverse incidents during any trials, for a variety of reasons. These incidents make headlines in the media and there are calls for discarding the system. Most of these demands are by so-called experts or rival business houses. Accidents should not be considered as a failure of the equipment, but investigated and actions adopted to rectify fault lines for the future, if the equipment meets other parameters.
Two recent incidents would bear testimony to the issue. Firstly, during the last phase of the trials of Dhanush, a round hit the muzzle break, resulting in a damaged gun. Secondly, a barrel burst during the technical firing of the M777 howitzer. These are not setbacks, as is being projected in the press, but incidents which need to be probed and actions taken to rectify. Accidents always occur during training or firing during operations. While operational incidents may be ignored, each training incident is investigated and action adopted to prevent recurrence.
The barrel incident in the Dhanush as claimed by the DRDO was due to poor quality muzzle brakes, wrongly imported from China, by a contractor, whom they have taken to task. It can be rectified, fresh correct quality muzzle brakes imported or locally designed and the gun re-sent for limited trials. It should not be a reason to reject the gun in totality, after all it is designed in India and can be regularly modified to suit user requirements.
The M777, is a gun which has seen action in almost all theatres where the US has participated in operations, including Iraq. The causes of the barrel incident are being investigated. It could be due to faulty metallurgy (highly improbable as it is made of titanium and has been firing for years), residue in the bore (possibly less changes) or faulty ammunition (most probable). The ammunition being fired was manufactured by Indian ordnance factories. Again, investigation would determine the cause and actions could be initiated for rectifying the defect.
Most accidents are the result of faulty ammunition. The fuse of the shell has multiple minute parts, any of which can malfunction in the bore of the gun. The priority for the government is to establish modern factories with fool proof manufacturing and quality control facilities. Ammunition failures can be minimized only if quality control is correctly implemented.
The Indian artillery has come a long way since the first unit was raised in 1827. Complete induction of the 155-gun systems would take a few years, but the artillery is well on its way to becoming a source of firepower to deter misadventures. There are always hiccups when modern war fighting equipment is put through rigorous trials. These hiccups should never be considered as a failure of the equipment, but a stepping stone to better improvement. To simply reject an equipment due to an odd failure is to set back the system by decades, especially if it is indigenous, but to encourage it, will ensure better quality in the years ahead.
An ode to the Gunners The Excelsior 27 Sep 17
The Regiment of Artillery, also termed as the ‘Gunners’ would celebrate their 190th Raising day on 28th Sept. It was on this day in 1827, when the first Indian Artillery unit, 5 Bombay (mountain battery) was raised, though Babur was the first to employ artillery in India, in the first battle of Panipat. It has come a long way since its initial raising in 1827. It is termed as the ‘Queen of the battlefield’ and has always been a battle winning arm, in every war that India has fought.
It proved its mettle in recent times, when it was instrumental in destruction of Pak army positions during the Kargil war. Its firepower, mainly by additional inducted Bofors was such that it created panic in enemy ranks. It adapted to its shortcomings in firepower by firing directly onto the targets, destroying bunkers and making the task of infantry easier. As per data available, the artillery fired a total of over 2,50,000 shells, bombs and rockets during the Kargil conflict, implying over 5000 rounds being fired daily, with 9000 solely on the day Tiger hill was recaptured. It lost three officers and thirty-two soldiers in the conflict.
Despite being under continuous enemy shelling, the artillery responded to the call of duty. Gun barrels were made unserviceable with the quantum of ammunition fired, soldiers barely got rest nor meals, but ensured that the guns never stopped firing, till victory was achieved. The artillery has always lived upto its motto of ‘Sarvatra Izzat-o-Iqbal’ (everywhere with honour and glory) and the expectations of those it supports, irrespective of its own equipment shortcomings.
Its initial philosophy was provision of fire support to Infantry and Armour when they launched their assaults. With passage of time and development of gun systems, this philosophy changed to ‘destruction and degradation’ of enemy’s combat potential. This implied modernization and upgradation. The artillery required higher calibre guns, delivering greater quantum of TNT with a high degree of precision and at rapid rate, on targets.
However, post the induction of the Bofors, the rise of the scandal over kickbacks, it was ignored. The fear within the UPA on the simple mention of guns was so palpable that artillery modernization was taboo. It did issue a tender for fresh guns in 2012, but soon cancelled them, as rumours of kickbacks again arose.
The outstanding performance of the Bofors during the Kargil war should have set at rest any controversy of its induction, as it remained the mainstay in the battle, being inducted from other theatres, solely to increase firepower and enhance destruction. But it did not. Even after thirty years Bofors remain the mainstay of the artillery. While induction of fresh guns was ignored for decades, other weapon systems began seeing the light of day.
The Pinaka and Smerch missile systems were introduced to enhance artillery firepower, as also the SWATI weapon locating radars. These missiles have longer ranges and would be effective in future conflicts, while SWATI has already begun proving its mettle along the Line of Control (LoC), accurately locating enemy guns and mortars, which are subsequently engaged with accuracy. UAVs for better observation from the air are also now part and parcel of the artillery.
Its lack of modernization over the years worried defence planners. The artillery had limitations in the mountains, where indigenous 105 mm guns whose ranges were limited were deployed. There were no Self-Propelled (SP) guns to support mechanized formations in the plains and the 130 mm guns, some modified with Israeli assistance as SOLTAMS, had outlived their utility. Artillery modernization was behind schedule by over a decade.
The last three years has witnessed the beginning of a change in artillery profile. A number of contracts have been inked in recent times. A contract for supply of one hundred and forty-five M 777 US manufactured Ultra-Light Howitzers has been signed, of which two have already arrived for technical data firing. These guns are light and can be transported by helicopters, hence ideal for the mountains. Seven artillery regiments would be equipped with these guns. Of these twenty-five would be delivered in ready to fire configuration and the balance would be manufactured in India by Mahindra Defence. One of the gun’s barrel burst when it was firing Indian manufactured ammunition. Initial reports indicate faulty ammunition.
The government has also inked a contract for supply of one hundred K9 SP guns, being manufactured in collaboration between L and T and a South Korean company Hanwha Techwin, in the L and T plant near Pune. Trials of this equipment have been successfully concluded. While ten would be imported, the rest would be Indian manufactured. These two guns would be ‘make in India’.
Trials are in progress of the Dhanush, a gun based on the original Bofors drawings, being developed by the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB). It had an incident of a round hitting the muzzle in its final test firing. It was discovered that the gun had a Chinese manufactured muzzle, which was of poor quality. This would be rectified and the gun would undergo more tests before final induction. The artillery is planning to initially induct one hundred and fourteen, with a larger order of three hundred later, all being manufactured by the OFB.
The Advanced Towed Artillery Gun Systems (ATAG) is under development by the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) in collaboration with a variety of local private sector units. This gun is presently undergoing trials. In its trial firing, it has already set a world record of firing a shell to a range of forty-eight Kms. Both Dhanush and ATAG are ‘Made in India’.
All gun systems being inducted are of the 155 calibre, hence would fire similar nature of ammunition. The government now needs to invest in modern technology driven ammunition manufacturing units, to avoid accidents as have been happening with poor quality ordnance factory produced ammunition. These should preferably be given to the private sector with insistence on quality control and time bound delivery. The government should no longer face criticism of the CAG on not ensuring adequate ammunition quantities.
Complete induction of the equipment would take a few years, but the artillery is moving towards becoming a formidable firepower provider. Its additional firepower resources include the Agni and Prithvi class of missiles alongside the Brahmos missile system, thus being a major deterrent for any nation with an evil intent on Indian territory. It has also begun contributing in every measure to the ‘make in India and made in India’ concept of the government.
A nations voice in the international arena is dependent of the strength of its economy and its military power. Military power flows from the barrel of the gun and Indian guns are finally moving towards the twenty first century. The artillery must encourage the ‘made in India’ guns and support their endeavour. On Gunners day, we wish the artillery, “Good shooting and may you always have the firepower to drill fear into our adversaries”.
The army must revisit skewed policies The Statesman 19 Sep 17
Recent press reports stated that a group of hundred serving officers of the ranks of Major and Lt Cols of the Army Service Corps (ASC) have approached the Supreme Court for rectification of an act of discrimination. They claim they are deployed on combatant tasks when the army needs them, but are denied benefits on promotion prospects, which come with operational deployment, as their service is categorized as non-combatant.
While ignoring the legal jargon in the case, there is merit in their claim, as the army continues to follow outdated policies solely to protect a select lot. When considered for operational deployment or counter insurgency tasks, there is no term as a non-combatant. All who wear the uniform are combatants and function accordingly, irrespective of their arm or service. However, to differentiate when promotions and appointments are considered, is gross injustice.
For decades, the army has followed the policy of differentiating between different arms and services, generally biased towards the infantry. Officers belonging to the infantry and armoured are automatically considered for command of formations, while those from other arms including engineers, artillery, air defence and signals need to be selected based on their performance, despite being equally. Very few are approved.
Officers from services (ASC, Army Ordnance Corps (AOC) and Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (EME)) are not even entitled to be considered for such appointments, only because they belong to the services. The logic conveyed is that the fighting arms, implying the armoured and infantry are at the forefront of battle, hence are only capable of commanding formations.
This logic may not be valid any longer for a variety of reasons. Firstly, all officers, irrespective of arm or service are trained in common institutions and establishments, in operations of war, in addition to specialized courses of their specific arm or service. During this period, there is no bias towards arm or service. Secondly, all major courses, which determine higher appointments including the Higher Command course, Higher Defence Management course and the National Defence Course, are attended by the crème de la crème of the batch from all arms and services. The imparting of training and exposure is common, however to subsequently differentiate officers is incorrect.
Thirdly, there are claims that officers from the services are not exposed to operations. This is incorrect. Officers from the services have also been at the forefront of operations in the last few decades. They presently undergo two years of infantry attachment soon after commission. They are the front runners in operations in Infantry battalions. In fact, the services presently claim more Ashoka and Param Vir Chakra awardees amongst the officer category than Infantry regiments.
The nation has fought no war since Kargil and even in Kargil, many young officers who fought, laid down their lives and were decorated for bravery were from the services, mainly the AOC and ASC. In the valley, services officers continue to operate and produce results as an integral part of the RR and infantry battalions and have been decorated for their bravery and performance on numerous occasions.
Every officer in the present environment, irrespective of arm or service, undergoes a minimum of one tenure in the valley or the North-East battling militancy. In addition, even when posted to any establishment or unit in insurgency affected areas, which is almost as frequent as the infantry, irrespective of appointment, they are given additional tasks, including road opening or patrolling. Thus, operational experience at the junior level is the same. Claiming they lack similar experience at staff levels, again a reason for denying rightful appointments, is because of the army’s faulty policies, which prohibits giving them desired exposures.
This bias implies a reduction of vacancies in senior ranks which translates into making them lose out on promotional avenues. Such a narrow-minded approach of the top army brass leads to capable officers losing out only simply because they were commissioned into a service. Simultaneously, this faulty policy has the army bypassing qualified and capable officers.
At the stage of commissioning, a cadet is asked to list the arm or service of his choice. The final allotment is made on vacancies and his seniority in the training institute. Many never get their desired choice. To deny an officer a rightful future, solely because he was commissioned into a service is wrong, after all he wears the same uniform, is trained in the same institutes and fights alongside his colleagues from other arms when he is so tasked. There has been no report of any service failing in its role in operations or counter insurgency.
This narrow-minded outlook of the army, protecting a select few, while denying equal rights to others, has affected morale and cohesion between officers of different arms and services. Officers from the services have begun questioning army headquarters on their discrimination. Earlier, over three hundred officers from the services had approached the courts to offset a skewed promotion policy put in place post the Kargil war, when the army decided to reduce the ages of command. They finally won the battle in the supreme court and have now been compelled to take up the next.
The third largest army in the world and the most respected institution of the nation is being sued by its own for discrimination and favouritism. The hierarchy is aware of its shortcomings, but is unwilling to change. It is too steeped in trying to protect a select few, while ignoring others, only because they are serving in arms and services, other than the infantry.
It may again be the courts, which would compel the army to change and become just and fair to all who wear the uniform and swear allegiance to the nation. After all, they too have done their bit in protecting the nation. The army headquarters must revisit its skewed policies and amend its biases internally, before it is embarrassed by the courts and publicly questioned.
Restructuring the armed forces for the future The Excelsior 06 Sep 17
The previous defence minister, Manohar Parrikar, had formed a committee under Lt General DB Shekatkar (retired), to recommend measures to enhance combat potential of the armed forces. The committee submitted its finding in December 2016. It concerned itself with internal restructuring of the armed forces and establishments under the Ministry of Defence (MoD). It had no role in considering working conditions, pay and allowances and parity with other government services. Hence, it was tasked to enhance the capability of the armed forces of the nation in application of military power.
It submitted a total of one hundred and eighty-eight recommendations, of which the government recently announced acceptance of ninety-nine, from which directions to implement sixty-five have been issued. The committee had strongly stated that accepting only a part of its suggestions would be more damaging than beneficial, as most are linked for changing the armed forces from its present status to one prepared for meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century.
Most recommendations, implementation of whose directions have been issued, concern the army. The army in any case requires to be right sized based on changed realities. Over the years it has continued to grow in strength, adding manpower even in those services, where it should be cutting down. There is a requirement to restructure and reorganize the army, releasing manpower from establishments which can be closed or outsourced for more combat effective tasks. Restructuring of signals, ordnance, animal transport units, supplies and the education Corps have been specifically mentioned. Directions to close military farms have already been issued.
The recommendations, which the government appears to have glossed over, concern organizations other than the armed forces, solely because of political compulsions, though economically and considering government policies of ‘make in India’ and ‘made in India’ these need to be shut down or severely downsized. Recommendations for the navy and air force are also likely to be issued subsequently.
The defence budget allocated to the ministry, is in addition to the armed forces, also utilized to finance many deadwood organizations, who have far outlived their utility in the present era, but continue to exist for solely political reasons, as the unions hold sway. These include defence finance, Military Engineering Services (MES), Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) laboratories, ordnance factories and many quality control organizations, all functioning directly under the MoD, as also the MoD itself.
The army has a fighting strength of nine lakhs, a support base of four and a half lakhs, with another six lakh civilians, in organizations under the MoD and as part of it. Thus, the teeth, or the fighting element, to the tail, the supporting element, is 1:1 or even 1:1.5, when all the above unnecessary organizations and an overstaffed civilian run MoD are taken into consideration. This is a very awkward ratio for any modern army and severely impacts application of combat power. To comprehend why the army has such a mammoth structure is to understand its origins.
The army takes its roots from the British, which had created the Indian army as an expeditionary force as also the fact that the army fought in Burma in the second world war, just prior to independence, hence needed a collection of depots and bases, to support its war efforts. The British visualized that the army should be organized to fight a war on its own, without any support or help from the national population as its terrain for employment was difficult and communications poor. Hence it had to be self-sustaining.
In the initial years post-independence, when the army was employed in operations, till the 1971 war, development of industry, infrastructure and communication, remained fairly poor. Thus, most equipment used by the army was not locally available and imported or assembled under licence. India therefore had to create ordnance factories and DRDO laboratories. It also required its own specialists for their maintenance and repair. The army inherited from the British a collection of logistic bases and repair facilities to enable different levels of stocking, repair and maintenance, based on the Burma campaign, which it continued to run, albeit with some modifications. Thus, till 1971, wherever the army was at war, it was self-contained and possessed all support facilities to enable it to fight a sustained battle.
Over the years, with a strong industrial base, better production facilities and improved road communications, civil support to the army increased manifold. Most of the road transport fleet is now market driven, civil repair facilities are available almost everywhere and the Indian industry is being geared up to meet the demands of the military. During Operation Vijay and Parakaram, it was observed that most male border residents were unwilling to move from their villages close to the border, hence support and repair facilities are available all the way upto the border. Thus, restructuring was essential.
Surprisingly, the government only selected those areas, which are politically suitable and easy to implement. It has avoided touching organizations, which desperately need to be pruned, basically because of union issues and vote bank politics. It has not accepted recommendations to close down ordnance factories manufacturing uniforms, boots and many other personnel clothing items, readily available in the market. It has similarly refused to touch unwanted DRDO laboratories and establishments, which are defunct and presently, white elephants. There is no mention of downgrading the MES, defence finance and a collection of quality assurance establishments. Most companies providing products to the armed forces presently are self-certifying, hence quality assurance requirements are far lessor.
Most importantly, integrating of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has been completely ignored. This civilian manned organization controls the nation’s ultimate source of power, with staff who have little to nil understanding of matters military, as the armed forces are the only organization with no lateral absorption. Hence, every CAG and parliamentary committee on defence reports, lambast the MoD for its failures in maintaining defence preparedness and adequate reserves. It has had little impact. Unless the MoD is integrated with serving and civilians working together, India will always be affected by poor management of defence at the apex level.
The government even refused to consider extending the service of jawans who retire at an early age by two years, strongly recommended by the committee, thus cutting training costs and saving funds. The government has similarly made no mention on recommendations concerning restructuring of higher defence management, a very essential requirement of the present era. Future operations would require the armed forces to fight in an integrated manner, whereas they are geared for a war of a few decades ago.
There is no National Security Strategy (NSS) nor a National Military Strategy (NMS), nor any joint long-term plans. This is because the authority to create them, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), a single point military advisor, has still to be even considered. The major shortfall facing the Indian armed forces of the future continues to be lack of coordination in conducting joint operations and employment of complete national combat potential. Unless the CDS is appointed, with requisite powers, the armed forces will remain under-utilized and under-coordinated.
The present restructuring ordered by the government, with much fanfare, actually presents a bleak picture of government decision making. It has implemented only the easiest of points raised by the committee, ignoring major decisions, which would turn the defence budget, enhance combat potential and reduce dead weight. If it is serious on reforms, ignoring political compulsions, then it needs to close or downsize most Ordnance factories, DRDO laboratories, MES, defence finance organizations and DGQA amongst others. Appointing a CDS and restructuring the MoD would be a major step to preparing the armed forces for the future.
The Prime Minister had stated in his address to the Combined Commanders in December 15, that there is a need to restructure higher defence organization, defence planning and joint warfare, amongst others. It is these specific issues which have been ignored by the government when it made its last announcement. Statements on reforms resulting in releasing fifty-seven thousand soldiers for active combat duties may make headlines, but in reality, it is misleading the nation.
The new defence minister, Nirmala Sitharaman, has assumed her appointment. She should, with time, take the bull by the horns and push down major restructuring within the MoD and organizations under it, creating funds and manpower for modernization of the armed forces.
Remembering Kargil The Excelsior 26 Jul 17
May to Jul 1999, the Indian army fought its last major conflict with Pakistan, thrust down by Parvez Musharraf as its army chief. There is no doubt that we had let our guard down enabling Pak to infiltrate and establish positions at heights which most armies would think twice about recapturing. That was exactly Pak’s thoughts too and they were convinced that India would neither attempt and even if they did, not succeed. However, India showed to the world the grit and determination of its soldiers, as one by one, they recaptured the heights, irrespective of cost.
A nation which cares for its soldiers never hides its casualty details and respects its fallen comrades, which India never hesitated to do. The Pak army on the other hand, never informed the nation about its casualties, nor accepted its fallen comrades. Most were buried with military honours by the Indian army. It continues to hide details of casualties along the LoC even today, this time officially refusing to share, claiming it would benefit India.
The Kargil war opened Indian eyes on what could happen if there is any laxity in matters concerning national security. This wake-up call has changed Indian response for ever. The standoffs in Ladakh and now in the Doklam plateau are the result of an ever-alert army. Indian deployment at the heights of Kargil, earlier vacated in winters, is now all year round. What was once considered as logistically unsustainable is now being managed, albeit with some difficulty.
Indian shortfall in equipment came to the fore. Not much had changed till a change in government. The UPA, with Anthony as the defence minister, refused to sign new contracts for weapons, fearing kickbacks behind every deal. It took a change of government at the centre to push through enhancement of capabilities, which would prevent any future misadventures by Pakistan. For a nation to be secure, it requires deterrence, which in a conventional sense would flow when the nation creates capabilities to punish its adversary for misadventures, an action India is resorting to across the LoC.
For the battalions which participated in the Kargil war and succeeded, this week would be a period of reliving the operations and remembering the sacrifices of its personnel. The participating units have been recognized with the battle honour Kargil, which they display with immense pride. For the families of those who sacrificed their lives in Kargil, this is a period of recollecting fond memories.
The nation would celebrate Kargil Diwas as it has done over the years, with serenity and military honour. Wreaths would be laid in memorials across the country to honour its martyrs, candles lit in war memorials and family members of those who sacrificed their lives, honoured in military stations. This is also the occasion when the participants of the war would share their experiences and interact with their colleagues, who have now retired. It would always be a day of remembrance and joy.
While India celebrates, Pakistan stays quiet. Its public is largely unaware of true casualty figures and their history is twisted to hide the reality of the war. It is possibly the only country, where an army chief whose forces were defeated and compelled to withdraw, solely to save face, became president of the country. Logically, he should have been forced to tender in his resignation as he led his army into defeat, but such is the power of the deep state. The Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, neither had the power nor the guts to demand his resignation. Had he demanded it, the nation would have known the truth and the army shamed. It was an opportunity for re-establishing political control over the army, which was lost forever.
For Indians, it was a war brought into dining rooms as newscasters broadcast it live, interviewing those returning from successful operations, while covering the last rites of those who sacrificed their lives. Some TV commentators became household names, covering the war. The nation stood together and large crowds attended final rites of valiant soldiers who sacrificed their lives. Quotes such as ‘Yeh Dil maange more’, ‘Either I will come back after hoisting the tiranga or wrapped in it, but I will be back for sure’ and ‘If death strikes before I prove my blood, I will kill death itself’ are today well-known.
The Indian army showed its mettle once again. Irrespective of odds and difficulties, it had to succeed. Shortfall of equipment was never a stumbling block. The officer-men casualty figures proved once again, that the young officer lot will always produce results, despite odds. The nation realized that it can always bank on its army to succeed, irrespective of cost.
The Kargil war was fought by an organization created for the fifties and sixties. It succeeded solely because of the grit and determination of the soldier on the ground and the fact that it was limited in content. The organization at the apex lacked cohesion, coordination and integration. There were disagreements between the army and the air force on the manner of engaging targets. It led to the government forming a Kargil review committee to recommend sweeping changes at the apex level to resolve problems and enhance integration.
It has been eighteen years since the conflict and the submission of the report, yet the government hesitates to implement major reforms, while clearing the minor ones. It has still to integrate the military into a cohesive whole, capable of fighting a war in the twenty first century. A Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) has still to be appointed, the armed forces integrated and theatre commands, unifying all resources under one commander, created.
This is solely because of unfounded fears and lack of trust by the government machinery, on a military, known to be apolitical and trusted by the nation. Unless the government acts swiftly, the next war would again be fought with an outdated organization, employing resources piecemeal and enhancing casualties. We need to create structures for the twenty first century and make the military into a cohesive force, fighting together, rather than bickering over power and control. Lessons of Kargil need to be implemented before another localized war is thrust upon us.
Is there a leadership failure in the Indian Army? Daily O 24 Jul 17
The recent fratricide incident in the valley, where a jawan reprimanded by his superior officer for using a cell phone on duty, shot him fatally in anger, has been quoted in sections of the media as an example of junior leadership and man-management failure. This has been linked to reports that the army has over one hundred stress related suicides per year, again due to junior leadership failures. While the loss of even one life of a trained soldier is unacceptable, however suicides may still occur and be accepted. Fratricide is and would always remain unacceptable.
The army has a strength of over one million. With such a large force, there would always be a miniscule who would have problems which could impact mental health. To reduce such incidents, remedial measures including counselling has been incorporated at grassroot levels. Yet incidents do occur. Most cases, when investigated, are a result of family tensions which at times are beyond the mental ability of the soldier to bear.
Most soldiers come from rural or semi-rural areas. They join at a fairly young age, when the family at home is secure under the patronage of the patriarch of the family. Most join with a dream of rising to the uppermost levels in their cadre. With passage of time, either the patriarch becomes old or passes away, resulting in division of property, mainly land. The share of the serving jawan is impacted as he is unable to look after it, due to exigencies of service thus facing enhanced pressures from his immediate family. It is for this reason that many seek to retire once they have completed their basic colour service.
The process of selection of soldiers at their time of joining is vastly different from the officer cadre. The potential officer undergoes a four-day Services Selection Board (SSB) where he is minutely observed and judged for his suitability. His positive approach, physical courage, leadership qualities and mental robustness must be of a high order. Only those meeting desired standards are selected. His background has no impact. Psychologists would confirm that most of the desired qualities are engrained in an individual at a very early age. They are further honed during his training cycle. Hence untoward incidents amongst officers are miniscule.
Such a process is never conducted for those joining as jawans, solely because of vast numbers being recruited. Hence mental robustness and ability to bear stress are never judged. Some aspects are engrained during training, physical courage, camaraderie and leadership qualities being major ones. Thus, every individual has different levels of stress which he can bear.
For most serving personnel, maximum stress flows from the home front. The individual has the same affection and regard for his family as any of us. He has similar responsibilities towards them, though he is disadvantaged by being away for prolonged periods. Hence problems at home always have immense impact. To cater for this, all personnel in every unit have a ‘buddy’, implying a colleague, who is always along, preferably from his near vicinity. Both live, eat, operate and even proceed on leave together. The intention is that every soldier has someone he can trust and share his problems with, thus reducing stress levels. This has succeeded and helped control potential suicide cases.
The last fratricide incident took place in a Rashtriya Rifles (RR) battalion deployed in Kashmir. RR battalions are not homogeneous troops belonging to one regiment, though the basic structure remains from one regiment. Most would have not served together earlier, nor would they after their RR tenure. Thus, the level of bonding is lower as compared to a regular battalion. Officers in RR units are mostly on deputation coming from all arms and services. The officer who lost his life in the recent fratricide incident was on deputation from the armoured corps. Officer-man relations in RR battalions is close, since they live and operate together, always as a team. However, stress levels due to multiple reasons can bring about a sudden change in behaviour of an individual, as was the recent incident.
Troops deployed in Kashmir face increased stresses. Family issues continue to dominate their minds, while each day, each operation, only adds to stress levels. Restrictions imposed seeking to avoid accidental casualties to locals, places them in greater danger, enhancing pressures. The present period is more stressful as militancy has risen and encounters are frequent.
Troops deployed on guard duty are responsible for the safety and security of their comrades who are resting. Laxity on guard duty can lead to casualties, hence there were clear instructions on avoiding use of mobiles, which could be a distraction. When the officer checked the individual for using a mobile, it was with the intention of conveying that a distraction may result in a fatal incident. The manner it was conveyed or accepted by the soldier is unknown.
To blame junior leadership is making an accusation with minimum knowledge. The Indian army junior leadership is its hallmark. Its junior leaders, implying its young officers, have always led from the front, proved their mettle in every operation the army has been involved in, whether it be a war or counter insurgency. The officer-soldier casualty ratio has been high, indicating officers lead from the front. The trust between the officer and his command has been the backbone behind its success. Thus, officer-men relations are best at the junior level, increasing in distance at higher echelons.
Suicides due to stress are high in every army, which is employed in operations. The US army has over two hundred cases per year and is almost double its national average. In recent times, since its involvement in Afghanistan, its suicide cases have risen. Britain figures are one army suicide every fortnight and its army size is much smaller.
The Indian army loses about a hundred soldiers per year to suicides, mostly related to pressures emanating from unresolved family disputes. This is still well below the national average. Measures are in place to reduce suicides and fratricide incidents, including increased counselling and liberal policies. However, a large standing army, with soldiers being inducted without psychological testing, there would always be some with low stress levels, hence untoward incidents can never be completely eradicated, though reduced.
Tough working conditions, better connectivity implying real time communication of family squabbles, enhanced operational stress and despite liberal leave policies, prolonged periods of absence, all affect an individual. It is not leadership which alone can be held accountable, societal changes and individual behaviour have an equal impact. However, the army needs to conduct studies to determine workable solutions at grassroot levels to reduce untoward incidents. For those unaware of the working environment of the army, there is a need to comprehend its realities, before blaming junior leadership and its man-management policies.
Politicization of the Indian army The Excelsior 22 Jun 17
Newspapers and online news portals are packed with articles condemning the army and its chief for its recent actions in Kashmir. The common Indian may disagree with the criticism, as an unofficial online poll on the Gogoi incident proved, yet there seems to be no end to army bashing. The chief’s unstinted support of the officer resulted in him being compared to General Dyer, criticized by opposition politicians including Prakash Karat who termed the army as being politicized and toeing the government line. The limit was when Congress leader Sandeep Dikshit called the army chief, ‘sadak ka goonda’.
To bring an end to the Gogoi controversy, the army permitted the officer being maligned to explain his side of the story. This was the first time in India’s history that such an action was resorted to. Politicians, critics and media claimed this was unwarranted and undertaken at the behest of a government seeking political mileage increasing politicization of the army.
Recent counter strikes undertaken by the army, including the surgical strike and destruction of Pak posts, were projected in public domain. This was the first time that the army openly announced its offensive actions to the nation, including sharing videos. it was resorted to, because the government was being criticized for inaction post the terror attack on Uri and the beheading of two soldiers. The army released details in the public domain basically because it was responsible and the government felt that an army statement would carry more authenticity and be better accepted by the public. It led to a hue and cry by the opposition, wherein some politicians and doubting Thomas’s went to the extent of claiming proof of the strike. Most termed it as increasing politicization of the army by the present government.
Before discussing politicization of the army, its role and task at the national level must be clear. The President is the supreme commander of the armed forces, not the head of any political party or alliance in power, including the Prime Minister. The forces serve the nation, in other words its constitution, implying it is subservient to the government in power, irrespective of the government’s ideology or leaning. It has no role in government decision making nor interferes with its functioning. It only advices on military matters, for which it is the sole authority. Hence, it functions under the governments directions and guidelines, its strategy being derived from the government’s. The service chiefs are appointed by the government and continue serving even with a change in government, since they are not political appointees, as is the case with governors of state or heads of other regulatory bodies. This aspect gives it an apolitical stature.
On the other hand, politicization of the army would imply its hierarchy making political statements supporting or questioning the governments political decisions. Pakistan is a clear case of a politicized army. Its head of Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) openly tweets the army’s objections to a direction issued by their PMO. In India, it is the government which tasks the military, at times in political tasks, which the military performs, examples being the Yoga day or laying structures for the art of living mega show in Delhi. Some would term it as politicization, the army would term it as a task given, carried out and forgotten. Rejecting or commenting on the same by military hierarchy could be termed as politicization, an action it clearly avoids. Serving individuals can and do project their views on politics and political parties on social media, however these are individual views and not of the service or its hierarchy.
Articles are galore as are statements in television discussions, that the army is increasingly being brought into media glare, which would be detrimental to democracy. The fact remains that the army stems from the same Indian society. Its officers and men are from across the nation and every walk of life. They and their families read the same newspapers, watch the same channels and hence morale is affected by false criticism and accusations, especially when their leadership is questioned. They are neither gods nor angels descended from heaven. They are humans, who love and care for their families, have come to do a task and not become cannon fodder, like the militants they battle.
The present Chief is more straight forward than his predecessors, hence would be open and direct. He has stated and rightly so, that the army operates in conjunction with and is responsible to the government and majority Indians, who are not air conditioned and armchair based critics.
The army is changing its methodology of conveying its actions and reactions to the nation which some may term as being at the behest of the government. Further, such actions also have a strategic aim. Successful operations against Pak announced in public domain impact the morale and internal standing of their army.
In the present context, especially facing trying times in Kashmir, the army is compelled to react to accusations. It cannot sit quietly and lump all that is thrown in its direction by arm chair critics and self-serving political non-entities, who resort to army bashing, solely to seek a few minutes of limelight, in the terminal phase of their fading career. Their negative comments are exploited in militancy affected areas to induce innocents to take up arms. It must support its personnel who risk life and limb daily, while seeking to fulfil its constitutional responsibilities of working in conjunction with the governments strategic objectives.
In fact, politicization flows from criticism and adverse comments by politicians and media houses, compelling the army to lear the air, ultimately leading to unnecessary debates. Politicians, ignorant of army functioning, question its actions, condemn its sincerity, doubt its integrity and insult its leadership forcing the government to react, bringing the army into focus, an avoidable action. Veterans, who support the service, openly clash in debates and comments with critics and opposing politicians, only increasing media glare on the forces. This is politicization.
Despite all criticism, the army continues its task of restoring order in troubled areas, ensuring national security, creating conducive environment for peace, without any political intention or aim. It is an organ of the government, hence functions under the government. It neither seeks publicity nor political mileage as it has no role in national decision making or governance. However, continued criticism would bring forth reactions.
If the army is left alone, it stays away from the media, except when it has an announcement to make. When insulted, questioned or criticized, it comes into limelight and response flows from the government, veterans and the chief. Hence those claiming politicization and increased media glare need to look inwards and analyse their own actions. They would then realize that they who speak of politicization are the ones who are politicizing.
Understanding what the army chief meant The Statesman 06 Jun 17
The army chief, General Bipin Rawat, gave an interview to a national news agency last week. Opposition parties and media have accused him of making intemperate comments during his interaction. The statements, some partially misquoted, include phrases ‘dirty war in Kashmir’, ‘firing weapons instead of throwing stones’, ‘adversaries and your people should be afraid of you’ and his continued support to Major Gogoi including commending him for his service in counter insurgency operations.
The fact that some of his statements were misquoted and some twisted needs to be clarified. A fact which must never be forgotten is that the Indian army is from the nation, by the nation and with the nation, hence irrelevant comments against its own people would never flow. This article is based on the original press release issued.
The chief had stated that the army is involved in a ‘proxy war in Kashmir’ and a ‘proxy war is a dirty war’. He never stated that it is fighting a dirty war against its people. This is true, because from Pakistan’s side, all gloves are off and there are no rules of engagement. It employs its agents in India to instigate the population, mainly the youth, to hinder army operations against militants, by resorting to stone pelting. For Pakistan, civilian casualties due to collateral damage, which is feasible when firing occurs from all directions, only benefits their cause and enables their propaganda machine to go on an overdrive. Hence the army chief stated that ‘to fight a dirty war, innovative methods must be adopted’.
Major Gogoi had adopted an innovative method, wherein, by placing one individual in jeopardy, he saved possibly dozens of lives. It also does not imply that such an action would become a doctrine nor would it continue being repeated. Other innovative methods may be employed, depending on the situation, basically to prevent firing and related casualties. At the same time, the army has given a message to its forces deployed in the valley that similar incidents should preferably be avoided.
The other statement, misinterpreted by critics was of the ‘population throwing stones and petrol bombs and not firing weapons’. When fired upon, the army is free to retaliate as it comes in the realms of self-defence, but with stone throwers it cannot and would not retaliate, unless the situation is life threatening. This situation could get out of control when mobs resort to throwing petrol bombs on vehicles, as was the case in the Gogoi incident. Under normal conditions, retaliation against stone throwers is the responsibility of police forces, however when resorted to during anti-militant operations, can interfere and result in army casualties, inviting army retaliation.
The army has been compelled at times to walk away from anti-militant operations due to presence of large number of stone throwing locals, an action against its charter. Since terrorists’ fire weapons, the army is free to respond and does so with force. He was seeking to clarify that throwing stones is more harmful to operations than firing as the army is compelled to show restraint.
The mention of ‘fear and respect’ is logical. The army is the instrument of last resort for the nation. In every instance of disorder including operations against anti-national elements, it is inducted when all other options have failed. Haryana, Gujrat, Mizoram, Nagaland, Assam, Punjab and now J and K are examples. It brought relief, confidence and succour to affected communities in Gujrat and Haryana, as also restored peace with almost no firing and heavy-handed actions. It created a positive environment in NE states and Punjab, enabling the government to find a solution and establish order, from a position of strength.
This happens because the army is considered apolitical, fair and just. It is known that once the army is inducted, it will fulfil its missions. This is the implication of fear and respect. By criticizing it, terming it becoming politicized and forcibly lowering its standing, harms this image, which would be detrimental to the nation, rather than the army. On the other hand, across the border, the army must be feared, failing which, domination of the Line of Control (LoC) and the International Border (IB), would not be feasible. Fear implies the enemy knowing it would retaliate and do so with full vigour in case of any misadventures. Actions, which it has always been taking.
The support to Major Gogoi has also been severely commented upon. The chief’s statement was open and clear. Firstly, as the army chief, he was aware of the progress of the enquiry and its findings. If he desires to know the progress of an important enquiry, it would be informed to him, which is logical. Secondly, the incident was a one- off incident, resorted to, as other options would have only resulted in casualties. Decisions in such scenarios are split second ones, delays could result in loss of lives.
Soldiers deployed in Kashmir work under immense pressure. Each time when they venture out of their camp, they are unaware of a safe return. Supporting them in their actions, even at times if partially at fault, is the responsibility of the senior hierarchy. By commending Gogoi, not solely for this incident, but for his performance all through his tenure, was a message sent to all serving, that the hierarchy is behind you, since each day, you put your lives on a limb.
The present army chief, General Bipin Rawat, is a soldier who is open, frank and to the point. He never hesitates to call a spade a spade, irrespective of criticism. His priority is the men he commands, whose welfare and security is paramount. His experience enables him to understand the pressures his men face and the fact that unless he stands by them, they would lose confidence, in the face of unwarranted criticism. He knows that the country respects the army, irrespective of a few critics, who would twist words to suit their requirements. For the public, who have been reading distorted versions, this is aimed at clearing minds and removing misconceptions, if any.
Enlarging the role of Army’s public information directorate Bharat Shakti 02 Jun 17
Militancy in J and K assisted by stone throwing, increased militant encounters, Chinese intrusions, regular firing incidents on the Pak border and aid to civil authorities ensure that the army remains in the limelight throughout. The nation witnesses’ discussions on TV concerning actions of the army, where veterans join a multitude of politicians spread across party lines, security analysts from Pakistan and supporters of pro-Pak separatists all screaming at each other, seeking to drown opponents’ voices on issues of national interest. Rarely do senior serving officers give interviews on prevailing situations, army reactions and involvement or answer media queries. These interviews even when held, never give a true picture of the army’s involvement in every spectrum of local lives, just dealing with current issues at hand. Thus, the nation receives only limited version of facts.
In contrast, the Director General (DG), Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) of Pakistan is the one point contact and source of information on all matters concerning their military. While for India, his tweets and press releases are a biased version, but for the world he is the source of all information pertaining to military operations or information. Till Parrikar was in the chair, he was the individual who regularly interacted with the press and presented the military’s viewpoint. However, most of his interactions only concerned operational issues and the government viewpoint.
I agree India is not akin to Pakistan where recently their PEMRA (Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority), passed a directive banning all television media houses from airing unverified news or analysis themed around the Pak army or its relationship with the civilian government. The statement went on to state that the content can prove to be problematic if it accuses the military of something or tarnishes its image. This opens doors to their army to resort to any level of brutality, when handling militancy, which could never be adversely commented upon as also is an open threat to media to toe its line. The Indian army, on the other hand, comes in for criticism from various quarters frequently. This is expected in a true democracy and should be welcomed.
Kashmir, the present hotbed of operations has deep military involvement, basically due to its terrain and lack of development. The army provides succour to the local population in times of need, medical aid and facilities at regular intervals, computer and skill training to enhance knowledge of youth and also has established army goodwill schools in remote areas. There have been instances when Kashmiri sportspersons have been trained at army cost and facilities, having gone ahead and performed creditably at national and international events. The young Tajamul Islam, who won the world kickboxing sub junior title, being an example. Further, it has been the army and the air force which have been the first to react whenever there has been any calamity including floods and earthquakes. Information on all this remains suppressed and is hardly ever projected.
The government philosophy in Kashmir is employing an iron fist in a velvet glove and Winning Hearts and Minds (WHAM). This is only possible when the efforts being adopted by the army for the betterment of the local population is broadcasted across all spectrums of media and highlighted in local channels at frequent intervals, including interviews of those that participated or were assisted. It should also be aimed at targeting the common Indian, who would realize that the army’s involvement in Kashmir, goes way beyond battling militants and restoring order.
The army department responsible for interacting with the press is the Additional Director General, Public Relations (ADGPI). It issues information of military supported local activities conducted in the valley or the North East, areas where we need to win hearts and minds, either on its Facebook page or twitter account. It does not openly interact with the press or give regular briefings. Hence its information is hardly visible. Most residents of the state impacted, leave aside the nation, are even aware that the army undertakes such activities. It has only recently been broadcasting figures of attendance of locals in recruiting rallies.
Amongst events recently conducted in the valley, by the army, available on the ADGPI Facebook or twitter page include kisan mela’s, local T-20 cricket leagues, inter village sports competitions and youth festivals. Each event had immense participation and were roaring successes, visible when perused. Medical camps conducted by the army have had over a thousand attendees. No event was interrupted with cries for azadi nor affected by stone throwing, despite most being held in militancy affected areas.
These events project a true picture of rural Kashmir, where locals are in support of the army, rather than militants. It also projects that those pelting stones or interrupting operations are doing so, solely under pressure or to earn a few hundred rupees. While cities may be influenced by anti-Pak elements, rural areas are not. While schools and colleges across the state were shut during the violent summer of 2016, army goodwill schools in the interiors remained open and had full attendance. It was in frustration of being unable to gain control over rural areas that Geelani stated that Kashmiri’s should give up attending army goodwill schools.
The army is missing an ideal opportunity of winning hearts and minds, not only in the valley, but also across the nation. It needs to spread the message of its efforts by every means, including fixed slots in all government owned or pro-government channels, radio shows and newspapers. In local areas, the spread of its message should be via every possible media including social. The more it spreads, the better the impact. It should also devise a methodology, where spokespersons from the ADGPI states its position on issues concerning the army to the press, to avoid fake complaints and criticism. In summary, the army should become more press friendly and more interactive, by permitting the ADGPI to be a true army spokesperson, rather than displaying army efforts on Facebook or twitter and restricting media interactions to only a select few.
New military doctrine and joint operations The Statesman 03 May 17
The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), Admiral Sunil Lanba, recently released the new military doctrine in the presence of the other two service chiefs. This doctrine proposes joint training, a unified command and control structure and a tri-service approach for modernization. It also mentions a framework for joint operations across all domains, land, air, sea, space and cyber space. The doctrine would remain a piece of paper, unless the government implements major changes in ‘management of defence’, pending since the Kargil conflict. Implementing joint warfare in its true sense would imply total integration of the three services HQs and the Ministry of Defence (MoD), which has been held up mainly due to regional and historical reasons.
Pakistan has had regular coups and the deep state maintains its strangle hold over the political leadership, proved again when the army spokesperson rejected the PMO’s formal orders in a tweet on the Dawn’s news leak story. In Myanmar, the military junta continues to be in total control while the army plays a dominant role in Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lankan politics. Hence doubts remain in the eyes of the Indian polity. It has been compounded by the bureaucracy and some ill-informed strategic thinkers claiming that the Indian military cannot be trusted, as thoughts of coup always exist in minds of their apex leadership. Most politicians find military leadership daunting due to its uniform and continuing disdain in attitude and behaviour. The mere presence of five unarmed army personnel, at a toll tax plaza, near the state secretariat in Kolkata, had the chief minister screaming about a coup in the state.
This distrust is also historical as pre-independence, the military was an instrument in British hands for supressing the freedom struggle. Hence, immediately on attaining independence, the government scrapped the office of the Commander in Chief, an equivalent to the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), and made the services independent. Distrust only built further on both sides with the military take-over in Pakistan. The political leadership which had participated in the freedom struggle considered the military a legacy of the British era and the military maintained a disdain for politicians.
This mindset has resulted in immense delays in bringing about essential reforms in management of defence as also involving the military as part of any apex body tasked with national security strategy, planning and implementation. Post the recent Sukma ambush of the CRPF, all meetings of the Home Ministry should have had representatives from the army, due to their experience in handling such adverse environments. Further, the military should have been part of any committee tasked to investigate causes for the lapse and suggesting remedial actions. However, attendees were bureaucrats or IPS, with almost no experience of either the environment nor remedial measures which could be adopted.
The fact that the army has been ignored at this crucial juncture, especially when an incident has occurred to a security force in an insurgency affected area, indicates the gap which still exists in the minds of the polity and bureaucracy. There are reports that the CRPF would finally induct army officers, possibly those who have finished their terms of engagement to lead their battalions in counter insurgency operations.
Despite numerous promises and statements made by the Prime Minister and Manohar Parrikar, the CDS has still to be appointed, the MoD and the service headquarters have yet to be amalgamated and hence the military has miles to go before it becomes joint in operations, planning and procurement, despite claims made in the new doctrine. This is one government, which does not need to seek political consensus, as it has the requisite majority, yet, it hesitates. The perception in the polity and top bureaucracy, that a divided military ensures safety to democracy and enables easier control has still to change. This lop-sided view harms national security and pushes the military back in enhancing joint capabilities. The polity fails to realize that all future wars would only succeed if they are jointly planned and conducted. This myopic view must change, if the full potential of the military has to be exploited.
With no incident since independence even remotely hinting towards such thoughts, the latent fear refuses to die down. Most writings against the appointment of a CDS and integration of the services has been by retired bureaucrats or arm-chair strategists. The major reason for regular raising of the issue is possibly not solely the fear of a coup, but the aspect of control over the military, civil or political. Realistically, the national leadership irrespective of the party or coalition in power has been unable to garner either the courage nor support from its allies in bringing about this essential change. The UPA government throughout its ten year tenure continued to maintain that it was seeking a consensus on the issue.
By ensuring that the MoD remains divorced from the three-service headquarters, the government reduces the military’s involvement in decision making. Most governments have failed to realize, that the military is the only service, where everyone commences from the bottoms up with no lateral intake. Hence anyone not having served in it, would only possess knowledge partaken from literature or discussions.
This does not imply that the nation adopts the model or avenue chosen by Donald Trump, where most of his senior advisors are retired or serving military officers. While wrong in many ways, however, Trump had easily won approval of the senate and the nation in making these appointments. It also does not imply that serving and retired military personnel in India are the only experts in strategic security planning, but would always make capable advisors. At the same time, changes in ‘management of defence’ must be ushered in, as early as of yesterday, ensuring better integration of the full combat potential of the three services, as it faces increasing security challenges and seeks the bang for the buck in days of rising financial curtailments.
Heed the chief’s warning The Excelsior 01 Mar 17
The recent comments by the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Bipin Rawat, on stern action against those interrupting anti-militancy operations, led to debates in every form of media, with most liberals, activists and politicians from opposition parties, decrying his comments. Articles in magazines and newspapers adversely commented on his statement, suggesting that this attitude would alienate locals and re-incite violence in the valley. The same critics and politicians had maintained silence when Kashmiri Pundits were hounded out of their homes and Sikhs massacred, changing the demography of the valley, leading to the situation which the region presently faces. In reality, the ground situation as prevailing today, has amply proved the chief’s critics wrong. We fail to realize that increased militancy impacts development and tourism, affecting the general population.
The army released a press statement recently stating that actions by flash mobs, including stone throwing and forcibly moving towards encounter sites, permitted over twenty-five militants, including hardcore members of various groups, to escape their dragnet. This was the result of extra precautions adopted to prevent collateral casualties. Another visible change, compelling security forces to alter tact, is that most encounters now take place in villages, indicating increased support to militants at local levels. Post the violent summer of 2016, the number of locals joining militancy is also on the rise. Present assessment by intelligence agencies estimate that J and K has over 450 active militants, of which over 350 are operating North of the Pir Panjal. Interference during operations is more pronounced in South Kashmir, than in any other part of the state.
A combination of the above factors has increased casualties to security forces, which is detrimental to morale and can induce additional caution, which is undesirable. Conversely, it emboldens militants and enhances their support base. The ambush on security forces a few days ago, resulting in three deaths and five injured is an example of emboldened militants taking advantage of an opportunity. This situation is detrimental for the nation as it enables Pak to gloat on the success of its policy, while permitting it to project J and K as a case of a home-grown terror. Another cause for worry is that the present level of militancy is solely based on militants inducted pre-winter, before passes closed. With summer around the corner and passes opening, increased infiltration may occur, irrespective of border sealing actions, only adding to pressures on security forces. As the level of militancy rises, it threatens the writ of the state, especially where it garners local support.
As inputs of increased infiltration of militants’ flow in, the forces deployed to deal with it also increases. Enhanced tempo of operations conducted over prolonged periods increases chances of collateral damage and civilian casualties. Security forces had discarded the use of rocket launchers in their conduct of operations for almost a decade. These were initially employed for destruction of structures where militants had taken refuge, thus eliminating them along with the structure, while reducing casualties to own forces. This approach did cause hardships to the local population as it destroyed their meagre households. In the present context, a prolonged operation, with the aim of flushing militants out without damaging dwellings is likely to be impacted by mob interference, which could enable their escape or increase casualties to security forces. Thus, security forces may be compelled to once again resort to the earlier tactic of destruction rather than prevention of damage. Similar changes could become the order of the day in most other nature of encounters.
Inducted militants have no concern for collateral casualties or damage. They mostly battle to safeguard their own lives and escape any dragnet established by security forces. They have no remorse or feelings towards locals and exploit them to further the aim of Pakistan. For security forces, the present period is important as it aims at reducing the number of active militants to acceptable levels, prior to the onset of summers, when possibilities of enhanced infiltration could raise the tempo of operations.
The critics of the COAS need to realize that the words chosen and the timing, apart from being announced at a poignant moment, are a warning to the national and state leadership that unless we work together to control the situation now, the coming months would only make it more difficult. Losing valuable lives of soldiers and civilians due to inciting of locals for political advantage belies a mature nation. The comments last week by Farooq Abdullah at a NC party event in Srinagar and Congress Veteran P Chidambaram are cases in point. Most others criticizing the army chief are doing so fearing a return of the summer of 2016. However, for security forces, the options remain limited, they must battle on, ensuring destruction of anti-national elements, irrespective of comments or discussions in the media.
It is therefore more prudent to adopt a firm stance now and seek to restore the situation before it becomes grave in the ensuing summer. The government needs to ignore the likes of NC leaders, opposition parties and so-called liberals and critics, granting security forces more laxity to bring the rising levels of insurgency under control. Media commentaries and discussions have no relevance in matters concerning national security. The state writ must run unhindered throughout the valley. The government may need to also adopt a strong stance against separatists and be willing to risk the situation temporarily worsening but accepting the fact that it will return to normal in due course.
Mollycoddling should cease as desperate times call for desperate measures. We as Indians should remember, that national security and national interest are paramount and forces deployed to ensure the same must be given the authority and power to enforce it. The nation must remain united, if the designs of Pak have to be foiled and the writ of the nation restored across the length and breadth of the country.
A US-style unified command would sharpen India’s military edge The Quint 19 Jan 17
The Prime Minister would be addressing the combined commanders conference in Dehra Doon on the 21st of this month. As per reports the army is scheduled to give a presentation on the establishment of ‘unified commands’ during the conference. This has immense significance for management of defence and national security, as it changes the very nature of the manner in which future wars would be fought. For the uninformed, unified commands signifies that all resources in a sector, irrespective of the service, would be under the command of one single entity, who would be called the theatre commander. This system has been in vogue for a long time in the US and has recently been adopted by China, amongst other western nations.
The US has adopted it for a specific reason. Their military has always been an expeditionary force, since they have never fought a battle on their soil. Since the first world war, the US has fought wars on other continents, hence needed a pattern of command which could integrate different branches of the military and marines into one cohesive fighting force. China has realized that one commander coordinating operations would maximize combat potential, rather than each service conducting operations. This change in concept came about in their recent military restructuring. Further, in the long term, it visualizes itself as playing a larger role in the international arena, mainly to protect its investments and interests spread across the globe.
India at present has four army, two air force and one naval command solely dedicated for operations against Pakistan. Hence seven commands are deployed against one enemy. Simultaneously, against China, there is one command each from the army and the air force. The service commands are located at different places, with the air force providing an advance HQs co-located with army commands. Each service plans operations primarily from their service viewpoint. The air force, for example, considers counter air operations as its priority, rather than providing support to ground troops. Coordination between commands of the same service as also inter-service are lacking, hence resources are never optimally employed.
Wars of the future would be short and intense, therefore demanding simultaneous employment of maximum combat potential. In this scenario, operations would never be single service specific. The ideal organization would be a theatre command, wherein, all resources deployed in a theatre of operations would function under one commander, irrespective of the service to which he belongs. Further, the number of HQs could reduce, saving manpower for better employment.
The system was being considered post Kargil, but faced maximum resistance within the services itself. In our existing scenario, the service chiefs are the almighty. They command and control their respective service, including allocation of resources as also coordination between different services, hence simultaneously function as force providers and force employers. In the case of the unified system, the operational commanders would be the theatre commanders, who would have a mix of resources specific to the area of operations and would therefore become force employers. The service chief’s role, would then only remain as force providers. This would dilute their power.
The present leadership of the military is now in the hands of mature leaders, who have participated in the Kargil war, in different appointments and have realized the importance of joint operations and maximum employment of combat potential, hence support this concept. They have accepted the necessity of joint operations, against individual service power. In the Indian context, there could be as few as four to five theatre commands, mainly due to terrain restrictions, apart from the already existing Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) and the Strategic Forces Command, which would continue as hither to fore. Amongst them could be two against Pakistan, with the northern one only comprising of the air force and army and the southern with all three services. China could have one with elements of the army and air force. Ideally the nation could create an ‘overseas operational command’ with all services integrated. Its role could involve conduct of operations overseas to protect Indian assets and in support of friendly nations. UN operations could also come under its purview. Resources of the navy from the eastern command could be reallocated to the ANC.
The command and control of theatre commanders would also undergo a change. Unlike the present system, where the senior commanders function under the service HQs, these would need to be directly under the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and his HQs, the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS). The CDS, if correctly planned and implemented by the government, would be a part of the Ministry of Defence, hence the theatre commanders would function under the ministry and defence minister.
While the presentation may be made, however, taking major decisions in restructuring management of defence implies determination and clarity in the eyes of the government. It would need to bring about changes in a sequential manner. Thus, the first step to be undertaken would be the appointing a CDS, after which it could consider creating theatre commands. Management of defence in India needs to evolve with the times, especially as the nature of war undergoes a change. We cannot aim to fight a war in present times, with outdated concepts.
Agni V launch alters dynamics of the region The Statesman 10 Jan 17
End December saw India do a successful launch of the nuclear capable Agni V missile, with an expected range of over five thousand kilometres. The missile achieved its objective and landed off the Australian waters. The present launch was from a canister, rather than a mobile launcher, for which it is being designed, implying more test launches are due, prior to its final induction into service. Almost simultaneous was the final test launch of the four thousand kilometre range Agni IV missile. This is set for induction into service. These launches have already become a sore issue in the immediate neighbourhood.
Adverse comments on the launch have flowed from China and Pakistan, which is but natural. Though the missile can reach as far as central Europe, there has been no criticism from western nations. The test has put India on a platform which few nations have been able to achieve and that too at a marginal cost. It has altered the dynamics of the region and has immense strategic implications, mainly in the Asian region. The DRDO should be complimented for having achieved this milestone.
China, other than claiming that such a test has impacted security of the region, also pulled out a leaf from an almost defunct UN resolution on limitation of missile ranges, which nations could develop. It went further and threatened that if the world community does not restrict India’s growing missile program, it would not sit idle, but support Pakistan to obtain parity. The mention of supporting Pakistan was indication enough of Chinese proximity and desperate desire to counter India’s growing military power, by bolstering Pakistan, thus compelling India to always consider a two-front war as a reality. The Chinese criticism was a result of losing an advantage which it always held over India.
For decades, China refused to resolve the border dispute, knowing it held all the aces. The offensive strike corps is still years away from being effective and even once raised would only threaten limited parts of Tibet. After all Indian economy is still one fifth of China and the defence budget is way below. India presently only has the potential to defend its borders against Chinese transgressions. Further, till the construction of strategic border roads, which are woefully behind schedule, there would always be avenues open for the Chinese to transgress. The Indian air force does possess a technical advantage over the Chinese in terms of employability due to terrain configuration, though not in numbers. To further enhance its capability, the air force has planned to induct the first Rafale squadron in the North East, as also is in the process of deploying a Hercules C 130 squadron there. The Indian Navy, presently holds an edge, however, may not for long, as China is rapidly developing its naval power. Yet confrontations with the Chinese would remain localized and be land based.
China possessed nuclear capability to target most Indian cities, while India in retaliation could not target the Chinese mainland. Hence, it was disadvantaged. The development of the Agni IV and V has upset this critical balance. All major cities of China are now within Indian missile range, eliminating Chinese superiority. Further, Agni V would be launcher based, implying it can be moved, deployed and then employed, maintaining surprise and avoiding detection. Chinese nuclear missiles, on the other hand, are silo based, hence immobile and can be engaged, prior to launch. The presence of a Chinese nuclear submarine in Karachi port last week, was an indicator of Chinese attempts to display its proximity to Pakistan and indicate opening of a new front in the Arabian sea against India. It would in time commence deployment of naval vessels in Gwadar. It has also leased the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka for ninety-nine years. Therefore, clearly India requires strategic deterrence.
India was quick to counter Chinese objections, stating that its strategic capabilities are not targeted against any specific nation. Both India and China have a ‘no first use’ declared nuclear policy, which implies that neither nation would be the first to launch nuclear weapons. Recent comments by the defence minister on the need to re-visit the nuclear doctrine and re-consider the ‘no first use’ policy would create a doubt in Chinese minds.
For Pakistan, it is simply a case of sour grapes. In strategic terms, this development means nothing to them. The complete country was already within India’s existing nuclear missile ranges. There is however a feeling of having fallen behind India in missile technology, which the nation is unwilling to accept. It would therefore seek equity with India, with Chinese assistance. Simultaneously, it would support Chinese claims and cry hoarse on this development impacting security and stability in the subcontinent. India, like always, would ignore Pak objections. Interestingly, no other nation in the subcontinent has commented on the Indian test.
The world order is changing. India’s proximity with the US and Japan would remain to counter Chinese hegemony. It was for this reason, that the Japanese press hailed India’s achievement. India always sought a closer interaction with China, especially since the present government came to power, however China openly indicated its preference by blocking India’s entry into the NSG and employing its veto in declaring Azar Masood as an international terrorist. It is unlikely to even accept India’s entry into the UN Security Council. Its proximity to Pakistan grows by the day, as the CPEC becomes a reality.
India already has the military capability to limit Chinese misadventures, but lacked nuclear deterrence. It is evident that irrespective of any military parity or near parity with China, the future would continue to have China and Pak colluding against India. Thus, to ensure security of the nation and ward away supposed Chinese threats, we must possess a viable strategic missile capability.
Let the new chief get on with his job The Statesman 27 Dec 16
Though it has been over a week since Lieutenant General Bipin Rawat was designated as the next army chief, superseding two seniors, however, the controversy surrounding his appointment refuses to die down. The serving and veteran military community, media and political parties remain divided in their views on the governments decision. While TV debates on the topic have ceased, columns in the media continue unabated. Such has been the impact that the chief designate has yet to give his traditional press interview on his proposed vision for the future.
Within the military community (serving and retired), those objecting to the appointment of Bipin Rawat are basing their arguments on two parameters. The first is increased government interference in senior military appointments, an action not been resorted to for decades. After all the military is very seniority conscious. Some opine that this action of the government would open doors for increased politicization, with those in line for future top appointments lobbying with those in power. This, in their perception, could affect professionalism. The second has been divisions within the army between the infantry, armoured corps and others. There are claims and counter claims on the existing hierarchy’s bias towards the infantry against the armoured corps. This is truly sad as it reflects a microscopic view of the army as against a macroscopic view, which is the requirement of the day. Those in favour of his appointment support the decision on the grounds of his experience, prerogative of the government to appoint as also that this action has offset those waiting in the line of succession and playing safe, thus enhancing professionalism.
The media was almost similar in its approach. Those supporting the government defended this decision, while from those possessing an anti-government approach, it was open criticism. For political parties in the opposition, it opened a new front to oppose the government’s decision, after all in a democracy, the opposition’s primary role is to find fault with every government decision. However, with passage of time, their voices slowly ebbed.
The fact that the announcement has been made and the two generals superseded would now take a call on their future, life in the army would move on. Down the rungs of the ladder, the decision has been accepted like any other, with just a shrug. While in every other government service, supersession for the top post is the order of the day, the military, except for a few rare cases, had generally been immune. It was bound to happen sometime and with a strong government at the centre, willing to take a major decision like demonetization, such an action should have been expected. The fact that announcing the appointment was delayed till the conclusion of the parliament session, was itself an indicator that something was amiss. Rumours were abound of the appointment of a CDS, with General Rawat expected to be chief.
In the army, the pyramidical structure results in supersession at every level. Competent, decorated and capable officers miss the cut at every rank. Vacancies are limited, contenders are many, hence supersession has become a norm, with over fifty percent being superseded at every level. Very few resign, majority go about their normal routine, accepting it as part of the system. Field Marshall Manekshaw had stated while reviewing the passing out parade at the Indian Military Academy ‘all of you would now commence climbing the ladder of success. Most of you would climb a few steps and then fall, very few would rise and possibly only one amongst you would reach where I am.’ In other government services, even post supersession, resignation is generally not resorted to. A new government in every state changes most top appointees of the previous regime, selecting even subordinates. Hardly anyone resigns.
Whatever the two senior army commanders decide, it would be their personal choice and the army would respect it. They would always be remembered for their contribution in making the service a better place, their professionalism and for their simplicity and clean image. New appointees would assume their place and life would continue as hitherto fore. Within the rank and file, it matters little as to who the chief is. Their daily routine and tasks keep them engaged. Jokes have flooded social media on the importance of either belonging to Uttarakhand or serving in the Gurkha’s for career progression. However, it is now time to move on.
For Bipin Rawat, the chief designate, challenges are numerous. He will lead the mighty Indian army in conditions of increasing hostility and uncertainty. Both borders are active, while militancy including in the North East, is on the rise. Simultaneously, the army battles shortfalls in equipment and lags in modernization. Morale is low due to government policies of downgrading the military in stature and delay in releasing the seventh pay commission and its connected allowances. The veteran community is dissatisfied with the OROP and would expect him to intercede on their behalf. He has immense on his hands as he assumes his appointment. His actions in the days ahead would prove whether the decision to appoint him is meritorious.
Having served as the Vice Chief, prior to assuming the chief’s mantle, he would be well prepared for handling the current problems. Further, his vast experience in serving in every theatre of operations would give him an added advantage. For us, serving and veterans, sitting on the side lines passing judgement, it is time we stopped commenting on his appointment as the decision of the government is irreversible and final. He is the next chief and would remain so for three years. Instead, we should do our two pennies worth and support him wholeheartedly. In simple terms, let us stop bitching and create the right environment for him to assume the mantle and implement his vision.
Don’t politicize Army Chiefs appointment, or run down the record of those superseded The Wire 19 Dec 16
The government announced the nomination of Lieutenant General Bipin Rawat as the new army chief on Saturday. He will assume his appointment on the evening of 31st December, when the present chief, General Dalbir Singh retires. Discussions have since dominated every form of media on the impact of this announcement. While there has been no word on the appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), however with this announcement two officers, senior to the new army chief would now resign, as has been the norm, if a CDS is not announced. They are not compelled to, but service customs dictate they retire prior to General Rawat assuming his appointment. As a courtesy, he would have spoken to them and requested them to continue. The opposition has been critical of the announcement, claiming the government must give its reasons for superseding two seniors.
There could be multiple reasons for the government to select Rawat ahead of his superiors, some of which have been raised in the media. His operational service profile and experience of serving and commanding in all operational sectors of the country has been stated as one of the major reasons. Another claim is his present appointment of Vice Chief and proximity to those in power. These reasons are only partially correct. Much more would have been at stake before the government took the decision.
The seniority principle is not followed in most countries around the globe for varying reasons. It is ignored in the US, France, Germany, China, Pakistan and many more. It remains the norm in Britain, where due to a small army, there are very few contenders for the top post. In India, officially the government is at liberty to choose an army chief from the collegium comprising of three senior most serving Lieutenant Generals. Rawat was third in seniority in the list. Bypassing seniors for the post of the chief already has a precedence. However, in earlier cases only one was bypassed, not two, as at present.
The government need not broadcast its reasons for its selection. The committee which finalizes the appointment does so, based on inputs and would have sound reasons for its decision. In the past, government’s played safe as also wanted to avoid unnecessary controversies. Further, there was minimum interaction between the political leaders and military brass, as against the present, when the PM himself meets all chief’s at least once a month. In previous supersession cases, especially where it concerned the army, there was a strong prime minister in the chair. Both earlier cases were under Indira Gandhi. The government was correctly expecting the opposition to jump onto the bandwagon, post its announcement, hence delayed it till the conclusion of the parliament session. Parliament was adjourned Sine Die on 16th, the announcement was made on the 17th.
Arm, service and operational experience matter little, in such selections. Post commanding a corps, the only aspect which enables an officer to become a member of the collegium to be considered for chief, is command of an army, for which date of birth or age is the only governing factor. There have been chiefs with even lesser operational experience than those superseded. In addition, all in contention are capable, qualified and equally competent. That is the reason they have risen to this level. Any weaknesses or flaws in their functioning would have seen them being superseded in earlier ranks. The statement that the other officers possessed lesser operational experience, as a major reason, is too far- fetched. The chief is responsible for coordination and allocation of resources. He directly does not direct operations. Operations are conducted and controlled at the level of army commanders and below. Hence service in every operational area is not essential. Inputs of each area would soon be available to him by his visits and briefing.
Service chiefs basically operate at the national strategic level of management of security. The overall responsibility is of the apex political body, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), with whom the chiefs closely interact. This body is directly involved with the selection of service chiefs. At this level selection based solely on seniority, which at the top level is impacted by ‘date of birth’ may not be completely justified. Decision is more likely to be based on ‘relative ease of working’ rather than just seniority. Relative ease implies certain qualities which are essential at that level, especially when the government is following a pro-active and a strong foreign policy, mainly against our immediate neighbours. The qualities include risk taking profile, decisiveness, tolerance of complexity, tolerance of ambiguity and synergy with other stake holders at that level. In simple terms, it is mutual understanding and commonality on thoughts and operational issues.
Solely following the seniority principle has at times caused damage to the system. From the time, General Dalbir assumed the mantle, his next to next successor was already being announced in the media. Such predictability leads to officers, solely on age criteria, assessing their chances and working towards the top post. It brings in a culture of playing safe and avoiding rocking the boat. This negatively impacts the army. Occasionally there should be a break from the standard.
While I do sympathise with those superseded, even knowing both well, however, the decision of the government must be accepted in a democracy. Arm chair strategists and politicians should avoid criticizing the government solely differentiating based on arm or service or even religious lines. There is no reason to politicize the appointment, as those who selected the present chief, would work closely with him, especially when the nation battles threats on both borders. It makes sense to strengthen the chief’s hands now that he is appointed, rather than criticizing a decision which is within the purview of the government.
Insurgency and the army The Statesman 02 Aug 16
J and K flared up, post the encounter, in which Burhan Wani was eliminated. The situation should have been expected and requisite security measures adopted. The centre was compelled to react and the only answer was to induct additional security forces into the area. The media and political circles debated the crisis with emphasis on the efficacy of pellet guns and the lifting of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). While employment of pellet guns is a police decision, AFSPA involves the army. News channels revelled in the AFSPA debate and also drew parallels to the situation in the North East. However, most failed to realize the true role of the army.
The military is the ultimate source of power of any nation. Once employed there is no other force available with the government to enforce its writ. Therefore, it cannot be allowed to fail. It is only inducted into the internal security environment once the situation deteriorates beyond control of other forces, hence warranting employment of desperate measures to regain control. AFSPA was initially enacted to enable the army to function (albeit with hands tied and severe limitations on use of equipment), but with more freedom than the state and central police forces, to reverse a situation, which led to the state losing its writ over a particular area. The decision to employ it is always political and so is the decision to withdraw it.
By hands tied, I imply that it only utilizes hand held weapons, irrespective of its own casualties and losses, which mount, while ensuring minimum collateral damage. The Pakistan army, on the other hand, employs air power and artillery in its anti-terrorist operations, without even considering the loss of innocent lives, however reducing its own casualties. Similar is the case with most other nations fighting militancy including US is Afghanistan, Myanmar, Russia in Chechnya, Israel and countries in West Asia and Africa.
The army is not employed for crowd control, hence weapons like pellet guns never exist in its armoury. The confusion created on pellets guns arises because of the common pattern uniform worn by other central forces. The army only disperses mobs which try and attack its bases or convoys and when it happens, responds with military force to ensure its protection. In J and K, it defends the border to prevent infiltration of militants and subsequently eliminate those that infiltrate.
When dealing with militants who have no morals nor hesitation in killing or raping locals in their desire to achieve the aims of their masters, especially when cornered in an encounter, there is always a likelihood of collateral damage. Even action by locals, resorting to stone throwing to distract security forces, is handled by the local police, while the army concentrates on its primary objective of eliminating militants. While precautions are taken, accidents occur. In insurgency areas it is difficult to differentiate between militants, supporters and locals, especially when people flee from check posts established to trap militants. Such incidents result in avoidable casualties.
This is the same army, which comes to rescue when the area is affected by natural disasters. It cares for the population first and then its own. Earthquakes and floods in Kashmir and Assam bear testimony. Similarly, its actions to win the hearts and minds of the local population have produced results. It has opened avenues and facilities which never existed and even taken local children on guided tours across the nation, thereby inculcating in them a feeling of being Indian. This will bear fruit with time. This action has never been paralleled by any other agency including state governments.
In Kashmir, in the current agitation, the valley continues to burn. This is mainly due to funding by anti- national and pro-Pak elements to stone throwers and agitators as also the guidance provided by infiltrated terrorists solely for this purpose. They instigate misguided youth to launch stone attacks while they remain in the back ground. The attackers place women and children ahead, who bear the brunt of the retaliation, adding fuel to fire. In reality, the agitation is a sign of frustration fuelled by pro-Pak elements.
AFSPA has been facing criticism from many quarters. While it does need to be discussed, however primarily it should be understood that it does not offer complete protection to the force. In the initial period of army involvement in controlling insurgencies, there could have been excessive force employed, however, with period of time, the army has matured, learnt its lessons and laid down strict codes of conduct. There are provisions within the act to punish those who break the law and do so intentionally. The last few years has seen over 104 army personnel including 35 officers punished for taking the law into their own hands, in J and K alone.
Every internal security problem has a political solution. Military power is not the ultimate answer. It is only a tool to regain state writ, while enabling the government to seek a political solution from a position of strength. The government should continue to strive for a solution while the army keeps the security environment under control. This coordination is an essential ingredient for success. However, as long as it operates it needs AFSPA to remain in force, thus enabling it to operate independently and judiciously, ensuring that majority of the public are protected. An aberration could always be dealt with summarily. The decision to determine that the situation has returned normal will always be of the political leadership.
While the army operates and suffers casualties in battling militants, it needs national support. The army represents the nation as it fights for national unity, security and re-establishing state writ in an area where it was lost due too political and bureaucratic bungling’s. Criticism, especially by arm chair pseudo intellectuals, who have never experienced a flurry of bullets from a militant’s gun or watching their own die, does affect morale. My earnest request is support the men in uniform, as they perform a task which is unenviable and difficult. The soldiers are sacrificing their lives each day, only to ensure a secure nation.
God and soldiers only when in trouble The Statesman 09 Mar 16
In the past few months, events and incidents brought the performance of the silent Indian soldier into the limelight. In each case he quietly proved to the nation, that he can be unflinchingly depended upon, irrespective of the nature of the crises. The event passed and the silent warrior was forgotten, to be remembered only when the next crisis arises. However, in return, he has been treated unfairly and brought down in stature. No one cares to speak up for him or his kin.
The Jat agitation so shocked the government that it requested for army deployment even before employing central police and paramilitary forces, as per the norm. The government, in panic, ignored the principle of systematic response which ensures that the instrument of last resort is employed only when other means have failed. It was during this deployment, that wide spread misuse of army fatigues became clear. The army had to deploy carrying placards and banners indicating that they are the army and not a paramilitary or police force, which wears a copycat dress. The soldier performed as was expected of him, without a whimper or protest.
The Pampore and the Pathankot attacks claimed the lives of soldiers who died protecting government assets, while ensuring minimum loss of civilian lives. The locals pelted stones and indulged in slogan shouting to enable the militants to escape, but failed. The battle was won by the silent soldier, who steadfastly continued with his task. The discovery of a tunnel in J and K over the weekend is a clear indicator that attacks would continue as hitherto fore. The moving forward of dialogue is again on the cards and would progress, till the next incident scuttles it again. The martyrs of Pampore and Pathankot were given their due respect by a grateful nation, but as public memory is short, will soon be forgotten.
An avalanche on the glacier claimed the lives of ten soldiers. Irrespective of terrain and weather difficulties, soldiers continue holding posts and defending unimaginable heights only to ensure that no other nation can even contemplate to occupy our territory. Many lose life and limb due to the vagaries of the weather and terrain each year, but silently go about their task.
The seventh pay commission lowered the standing and prestige of this very soldier. It not only ranked Siachen way below the risk level of bureaucrats serving in a secure part of India, the North East, but also ensured that the military in comparison comes below all other paramilitary and police forces. While the army loses soldiers in Siachen, due to its inhabitable terrain, there have never been reports of similar losses of bureaucrats in the North East. The bureaucracy does not fight militancy; it occupies safe offices and residences in protected zones. The ruling by the pay commission was so absurd and insulting to the military that it compelled the three service chiefs to approach the defence minister to register their protest. The final verdict is yet to be out.
The One Rank One Pension (OROP) agitation has been running for almost a year. The aged veterans, who have been spearheading the agitation, have been crying hoarse from the ramparts of Jantar Mantar, for a rightful cause, but to no avail. They have been protesting peacefully and have even returned their medals, but the government has stuck to what it deemed fit. The finance minister has only acceded to whatever his wise bureaucrats have recommended. One week of a violent agitation by the Jats and the government capitulated and acceded to their demands, while almost a year of a just and peaceful agitation has had no impact. Is the government conveying a message to the veterans, that only holding the capital to ransom would give immediate and positive results?
The protests at JNU and the arrest of those leading anti-national protests received the support of many political parties. The anti-India protests was a sad day for any true Indian, however a bonanza for politicians. Could the infamous ‘Azadi from or Azadi within’ even been debated if national security was not assured? Those in JNU debating this issue have the silent soldier to thank but even fail to honour their own JNU martyrs who died at Pampore. JNU dominated proceedings in parliament and some political parties even approached the President for intervention. Surprisingly, not one political party voiced similar support for the veterans during OROP or for the armed forces demands against the pay commission. Not a cry was raised, nor was the government asked to explain its stand. Was this because the soldier is silent or because he trusts the political leadership?
This simple and sincere soldier who has responsibly been ensuring national security and enhancing national integration has been ignored by the government and those in power. Since his rules and regulations do not permit him to agitate or strike, discuss politics or question government decisions, all he can do is bank on the nation for support. Therefore, governments have praised him in public, but when it comes to giving him his due, receded to the background. He is the cannon fodder to be employed earliest when the administration fails and natural calamities cause damage. However, he is the last, when the issue of giving him his due arises.
The nation looks to the military whenever there is a crises or a threat. Once that recedes, then national security is pushed to the background till the next event. Political leaders can spend days debating JNU, Rohith and the Jat agitation as also hold the government to ransom on these issues, but cannot spare even a moment to question the government on OROP and lowering of the status of the military in the pay commission.
Is this because ‘God and soldiers are only remembered in times of trouble’?
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army