India’s two front conundrum The Statesman 04 Sep 18
India is possibly the only nation in the world which has two nuclear powered adversaries on its borders, seeking Indian territory. The close relationship between Pak and China, dubbed as ‘higher than mountains and deeper than oceans’, always creates a threat of a two-front war, which would be the worst-case scenario for the military.
While China has not supported Pak in earlier conflicts, there is always a possibility of Pak attempting to grab Indian territory in a limited offensive, in case of an Indo-China conflict. Border issues with both nations are far from being resolved, while India faces a proxy war imposed by Pak in Kashmir.
The emboldening of Pak to challenge Indian military might has only been possible by the staunch backing of China. Thus, in the long term, it does appear that it is China, which despite claiming on multiple forums that it is keen to be a facilitator for Indo-Pak talks, would prefer that the enmity continues.
Indo-China rivalry has existed for decades. For China, Indian sanctuary to the Dalai Lama has always been an enigma, for it still fears the power he wields. It has continuously applied pressure on India to restrict his movement and activities, but to limited avail. In fact, post the nuclear test in 1998, Vajpayee stated that the test was essential because, ‘an overt nuclear state exists on our borders, with whom an atmosphere of distrust exists.’
Increased Indian engagement with the US and its participation in the QUAD (including Japan, US and Australia) are a matter of concern for it. Further, India’s increased military collaboration with Vietnam, Indonesia and the ASEAN indicates India’s intention to step on its toes, which adds to its unhappiness with India.
China has always considered itself as the rightful pre-eminent power in Asia and India would always be a challenger. The Chinese opine that ‘India possesses an ambitious belligerent and expansionist strategic culture.’ Hence it has always propped Pak as a counter balance to India ensuring that India cannot focus only on China.
The Chinese military, now reorganized, is focussing on two major aspects, its navy and strategic missile forces, while reducing its army strength. Its western theatre command is solely directed against India and has the capability to challenge India. This restructuring is a new challenge for India, as it could be a signal that the next conflict may be dominated by naval engagements and missile strikes, aimed at the heartland of the country, rather than simply an operation along the disputed border.
Zhou Bo, from the PLA academy of military science wrote last month, ‘China has built more warships since 2000, than India, Japan and South Korea combined’. However, post Doklam, Anthony Wong Dong, a Macau based Chinese Strategist stated, ‘China should realize that even if it defeated India in a land war, it would be impossible for the PLAN to break India’s maritime containment’. He implied the Malacca straits, through which a large part of Chinese trade transits.
Chinese actions in recent times, which directly impact India include their military and diplomatic support to Pak. Pak’s nuclear and missile technology is China’s gift. In addition, has been an enhancement in incursions and standoffs, its growing naval power, leading to an increased movement of ships and submarines in the Indian Ocean as also its string of naval bases around India. Financial support at high rates of interest to nations in South Asia, threatens the stability of the sub-continent and could limit Indian influence as India cannot match Chinese contributions.
The overall Chinese strategy towards India has been to marginalize India’s influence in regional and international organizations, thus containing its rise as a global power. Therefore, it has neither accepted India into the NSG, nor would it support Indian entry into the UNSC. It would continue to keep the border issue festering by regular incursions and standoffs as also support Pak as a counter-balance to India. Therefore, the recent visit of the Chinese defence minister to India has been billed as ‘much ado about nothing’. It ended with multiple options for moving forward, but no concrete decisions.
By supporting Pak, it would achieve multiple benefits. Firstly, India would always be concerned about a two-front war, thus being forced to dissipate its resources on both fronts. Financially, India would need to maintain a modern force capable of handling both frontiers, which would be an economic burden. This involves elements which are specific to the Pak frontier, mainly mechanized formations.
India, aware that it first needs to grow economically to meet the demands of its growing population, has kept defence spending to the bare minimum. It has never projected itself as a counter to China in any forum but has relied on international organizations and institutions, SCO, ASEAN and BRICS, to keep China at bay. Its military alignments with the US and Japan are only to enhance its security. It has sought to engage China diplomatically to reduce tensions.
Indian emphasis had always been its western borders with Pak. To deny China any advantage in operations, India had ignored development of roads close to the Chinese front. With a growing military power and the availability of rapid switching of forces employing aerial means, India has begun developing roads close to the Chinese front.
The difference between the two countries is that while China reorganizes itself to counter growing US threat, as it desires to replace the US as a military and economic power, India modernizes to meet challenges emanating from China and Pak. The two forms of warfare for which India still needs to be adequately prepared to counter the Chinese are its growing missile and naval power.
Despite all Indian attempts to improve ties with China, the two nations would always consider the other a threat. While peace reigns on the border and talks to enhance confidence building measures progresses, India needs to reassess the new threats emanating from China and prepare to counter them.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army