Rightsizing, restructuring or transformation Fauji India magazine Oct issue

Rightsizing, restructuring or transformation Fauji India magazine Oct issue

The army chief had stated recently that like all other government organizations, the army is also expected to conduct an internal review every five years but has not undertaken one for 35 years. He had therefore ordered multiple studies to be conducted simultaneously on the future of the army. Studies included restructuring of army units and formations, directorates and branches of its every growing HQs in Delhi as also of improving the civil-military rank interface, while meeting the aspirations of the officer cadre.

The questions which have arisen in the public mind are whether this is rightsizing, restructuring or transformation? When information flowed that the army proposes to shed 1.5 lakh men over the next few years, questions arose on whether in the present context of increasing threats, is it the right approach to shed manpower?

Transformation as defined by the US Department of Defence is ‘changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, peoples and organizations.’ Realistically, the three services together need to transform the way they would counter futuristic challenges, implying making jointness as a mantra.

This involves the need to develop joint strategic and operational plans as also capacities and capabilities for handling future threats. The start point is to accept a common threat scenario, from which would flow joint strategic and operational plans, leading to creation of joint capabilities. If this is to happen, then there must be a controlling organization, HQ IDS with a CDS.

With the government still hesitating to appoint one and the three services having varying perceptions on the future nature of warfare and their roles in it, leading to non-agreement on creation of theatre commands, transformation in the true sense is nowhere on the horizon. Thus, the only option left with each service is to restructure and reorganize within itself, in a manner it considers the best for itself. This is what the army is aiming for.

Such actions are not new across the globe. They have been done by most nations, possibly even at a more regular rate. Some of the restructuring now under review may be a copy from what other nations have done, it is but expected as a mature commander learns from other’s mistakes. However modifying it for the Indian army is the key.

Restructuring being undertaken by the army is based on certain factors, which have been determined over time. Operationally, immense has changed. There is an increase in firepower and manoeuvrability, change in operational concepts based on the nature of threats and reactions by the adversary.

In the plains, semi-deserts and deserts, the days of huge armoured formations moving into enemy territory is past. It would be small self-contained battlegroups moving with speed to capture limited objectives. In the mountains, bulky formations holding defences spread over large areas with reserves located at multiple places may no longer be required. Central reserves to be moved by helicopters to change the force ratio, while smaller formations holding defences with adequate and effective firepower may be more prudent. This would imply modifying existing structures from Corps downwards as also redesigning the organization of units from battalion upwards.

Administratively too, having multiple formation HQs may not be the need of the hour. The world today is moving towards flatter structures, while the army continues with its pyramidical organizations. Improvement in communications and mobility even in remote areas, alongside faster and near real-time flow of information could result in reducing layers. In many cases, the existing division HQs are more administrative than an operational necessity.

Reorganizing its Delhi HQs is easily said than done. An example is that the Director General of Military Training. It is the core agency, apart from duplicating the role of the Army Training Command, for interacting with the MoD for coordinating of career courses abroad. This task cannot be done from Shimla, where it is proposed to be merged. Therefore, either such tasks are given to another branch or a small component remains. There would be many more such issues which would require to be micro-studied.

There has also been discussion on moving of the Rashtriya Rifles HQs from Delhi to Udhampur. Details on its future role and tasks have yet to be spelt out, however the same exercise was undertaken during Kargil Operations in 1999, aimed at relieving the Corps HQs at Srinagar for handling Kargil. This was reversed as it was not found suitable. Would General Rawat and his team repeat a mistake or modify its task, remains to be seen.

With time, directorates have been created with roles of some overlapping. Military intelligence and Public Information are two examples. Monitoring social media, perception and media management alongside information warfare need to be under one roof for extracting the best from existing resources. This is also being considered.

Civil-military equations need to change, while the aspirations of the officer cadre also must be met. Enhancing pay or granting NFU alone may not amend equations. Inter-se seniority is determined not be grades of pay, but by badges of rank. Most army officers retire as Cols, while even those from the Group B service, AFHQ Cadre, retire at the SAG level, whereas most from the IAS retire in the HAG grade, which not even 1% of army officers reach. Thus, ensuring that army officers retire at a higher rank is essential, even if it means reducing some ranks.

Post Kargil, seeking younger Commanding Officers (COs) enabling them to climb the peaks with troops, led to the army implementing the AV Singh committee report. This brought down the ages of COs while at the same time reduced maturity levels in dealing with troops. Thus, arises the dichotomy of faster promotions, reduced ranks, but mature COs, who have the experience to understand troops.

Experience has shown that decisions to cut manpower would be readily accepted, while restructuring to meet the aspirations of the officer cadre would face resistance. Post Kargil, considering the impact of the war, the other services were forced to accept the AV Singh committee report, even if they were unwilling. This may not be the scenario this time. Similarly, the MoD may be unwilling to accept senior ranks for all serving as it could impact the existing civil-military equation in which only a limited number obtain that rank.

Overall, there is immense scope for restructuring, reorganizing and readjustment. Transforming war fighting is not one of the options as the actions are army specific. Hence, expecting the army action to enhance chances of the creation theatre commands or the appointment of a CDS is possibly farfetched.

Even what the army presently proposes to do comes with immense pitfalls and question marks. Most important is that the collegium comprising the army commanders and senior staff officers, many firm in their views, are all on board. While they have had one meeting, there would be many more as views from across the spectrum would be taken and the same re-discussed. The final decision would flow much later after all views are absorbed and sanction of the government taken.

With the final status is still miles away, it is better to hold horses, rather than comment on vague information, which flows through multiple channels. What is more important to discuss is whether this decision would in any way impact the overall aim which the army chief has kept in mind while planning this mammoth exercise.

Financially, the budget is never a fixed percentage for the three services, especially as modernization is concerned. Thus, reduction in manpower as also removing some organizations in the pyramid would in no way enhance the modernization share of the army. Thus, expecting that cutting down manpower would enable faster modernization may not be a correct presumption. Modernization of all three services must move in step, priorities being determined by the newly created Defence Planning Committee headed by the National Security Advisor. Its impact on the revenue budget for the armed forces as an entity may be correct.

The other factor is that while the army may cut its own manpower and the navy and air force are comfortable with their existing strength, it is the MoD which also needs to open its eyes. The MoD has 6.5 Lakh civilians to support the armed forces. Many are employed in organizations where drastic cuts can be imposed. With the army showing the lead, will the MoD follow suit. It appears unlikely as recent actions show that it is more than willing to enhance vacancies for its own support cadre, rather than reducing them.

In the overall perspective, the current exercise is an ‘only army’ exercise. It is aimed at changing its structures to meet future administrative and operational requirements. Those presently jumping the gun and announcing the final state of restructuring may be in for a surprise as ultimate decisions are still far in the horizon.

Similarly, those criticizing the army for undertaking an exercise to reduce manpower in an environment of increasing threats need to realize that the current collegium tasked to take the final decision is possibly the best that the army has at present. They would never jeopardize their main task of national security to score a few brownie points. They need to be trusted to deliver and they would.