India’s conflict-avoidance strategy is its best bet Fauji India magazine Dec 18 issue
India’s conflict-avoidance strategy is its best bet Fauji India magazine Dec 18 issue
The US is leading the charge by placing unilateral sanctions or enhanced tariffs against those nations it considers as its challengers. It has imposed sanctions against Russia and Iran and additional tariffs on almost all Chinese imports. It took these actions on Russia for its interference in the last US polls, China though as a part of trade war, however realistically for pushing back ‘China 2025 Made in China’ plan. In the case of Iran, the US unilaterally walked out of the Iran nuclear deal.
It resorts to these measures when it is aware that it cannot threaten these countries militarily. China and Russia are also nuclear powers with a strong military. They have also joined hands together to counter US military might. Any unilateral military action against Iran may not succeed and could engulf the entire West Asian region into turmoil.
Simultaneously, the US has delinked its security relations with economic ties, an aspect never done before by any US administration. Thus, while on one hand it considers India as a strategic partner and seeks to enhance military ties, on the other it seeks to impose tariffs on Indian products and place restrictions on H1B visas. It is still considering sanctions on India for purchase of the S 400 anti-aircraft missile systems.
By imposing sanctions and enhancing tariffs on nations it considers as its future challengers (Russia, China and Iran), either to itself or to its influence in a region, the present US government has shown an independent streak in foreign policy, missing earlier.
While India is considered a major non-NATO ally, the relations between the two are not on the same level as NATO. Article 5 of the NATO treaty states ‘collective defence’ which implies an attack on one is considered as an act on all. This was implemented post 9/11 when all NATO nations joined operations against the Taliban. The imposing of sanctions against Russia by NATO nations on the poisoning of Sergei Skripal, an ex-Russian spy in the UK, is another example. The same would not happen in case India is attacked by China. India would have to battle alone, albeit with US diplomatic support and maybe some posturing to tie down Chinese forces.
Actions by the present government raises question of whether the present foreign policy initiatives undertaken by the US government would be continued by future governments or would it be a one-off action. For a nation like India to ignore its existing ties and relations and blindly support US actions, as it so desires, is a difficult proposition. It is quite likely that the next government or even the present could suddenly change stance and leave India exposed and vulnerable. In the same vein, it also cannot only bank on US produced weapons, as these could be stalled in case Indo-US relations hit low key on any issue.
The US’s unilateral withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and its re-imposing sanctions placed India in an awkward position. India had investments in Chabahar, which it could not lose, as Chabahar was India’s counter to Gwadar as also the opening of doors for its increased engagement with Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics. Its stopping import of oil could also have impacted its investments in Chabahar. Therefore, it had to continue, maybe reduce its imports, not cease them.
India has maintained ties with both camps, US and Russia. Its relations with Russia have been strong in multiple ways. Russia has always stood by India in international forums, when India has needed support. Simultaneously, it has for decades been the main provider of military hardware to the country. Almost 60% of Indian military hardware is of Russian origin. Thus, India must continue its dependence on Russia for spares to ensure serviceability of its military hardware.
It therefore had to proceed forward with the procurement of the S400 missile system, despite any threats of CAATSA by the US. Delaying or cancelling the same would convey a wrong message and mar relations. Further, maintaining military ties with Russia would reduce the sale of its products to Pakistan, though not stop it completely.
It was Russia which brought India into the SCO as also has begun involving it in its own interactions with the Taliban. Russia needs India in the SCO to prevent the movement from being hijacked by China. There have been reports that during the Sochi summit, Russia assured India that it would contain Chinese aggressiveness against India.
Indo-Chinese relations have been wavering for a prolonged duration. There have been areas of dispute, even beyond territorial. China objects when India seeks to develop Arunachal or even permits visits to the state on the grounds of it being disputed, while it develops CPEC through POK, ignoring its disputed status. It simply claims that economic development does not change its stand on Kashmir.
Multiple rounds of talks, visits by delegations and senior leaders have not resulted in any progress on the existing border dispute. Doklam enhanced tensions, which despite all talks was ultimately resolved in Wuhan. It does appear that the two nations reached an understanding in Wuhan, details would of which are unlikely to appear in public domain. It was authenticated by a sudden change in the Indian approach to China, post Wuhan.
PM Modi in his address at the Shangri-La dialogue in Jun this year, his first after Wuhan, did not raise the role of QUAD nor Chinese developments in the South China Sea (SCS). He stated, ‘I firmly believe that Asia and the world would have a better future when India and China work together in trust and confidence, sensitive to each other’s interests.’ Subsequently at the second Maritime dialogue with China, India briefed Beijing on its Indo-Pacific policy.
India also refused to accept US demands to raise the level of the QUAD dialogue from the present joint secretary level to that of foreign secretary or minister level, as it was not keen to antagonise China. It similarly rejected the inclusion of Australia in the Malabar exercise. The rejection came just after the return of PM Modi from Wuhan, hence raises more questions, than answers.
India therefore is seeking to contain China by relying on regional and international institutions (QUAD, BRICS, SCO and ASEAN). Simultaneously it is enhancing its participation in exercises with friendly countries opposed to Chinese expansionism (Malabar exercises and increased interaction with ASEAN nations).
India is moving closer to ASEAN nations which have disputes with China on its expansion in the SCS. It has berthing rights for its naval vessels in Singapore as also is establishing a base at the Indonesian port of Sabang. Its growing relations with Vietnam whose SU 30 pilots are being trained in India and which has indicated a desire to procure BrahMos missiles, being objected to by China. Thus, India is slowly but steadily treading on Chinese toes.
With the US targeting both, Russia and China, it is natural that the two nations, though competing for power in the region, become allies. When the SCO was formed, it was Russia which was the leader and China seeking alliances. With growth of the Chinese economy and military power, it is China which has begun to dominate the SCO. Most nations forming part of the SCO are also participants in the Chinese BRI. However, militarily the two nations would be willing to jointly challenge the US, in case of any misadventures.
While India is a member of the QUAD and an active participant with the US in the Malabar exercises, it is unwilling to challenge China by joining the US in its ‘freedom of navigation operations’ (FONOP) in the SCS. The movement of US ships close to Chinese claimed islands, displaying its right to freedom of navigation and showcasing its superior military prowess indicates it is willing to challenge Chinese claims on the SCS. These actions have the possibility of escalation, of which India is unwilling to be a part.
The most recent incident of a near collision between a US destroyer, USS Decatur, and a Chinese warship, Lanzhou, occurred in end Sept during FONOPS. The Chinese navy in this incident displayed an aggressive approach not resorted to earlier. The US warship diverted course to avoid a collision. A collision during FONOPS could trigger a clash between the two, especially if there is loss of lives involved.
The manner in which events would unfold, post an incident in the SCS, remains to be seen. While the US would be compelled to hold ground and challenge Chinese actions, military support from India may not forthcoming. India would not desire letting a US-China conflict become an Indo-China conflict, as it is aware of its present vulnerabilities and shortcomings. Similarly, the US may not openly participate in an Indo-China conflict.
India remains aware that conflict avoidance is the best policy for the present. Unless war is thrust upon it, India is keen to maintain neutrality. It may support the US by adhering to its terms of LEMOA, but not by active participation or a hostile deployment.
India is presently walking a tight rope. It is a close ally of the US yet seeks strong relations with Russia. It avoids challenging China openly yet enhances relations with nations opposing Chinese hegemony in the SCS. It engages China bilaterally but has been unable to convince China on issues concerning Pak and on its membership to the NSG.
India is seeking to contain China through multiple forums and alliances while adopting a conflict-avoidance strategy, unless one is forced on it. It is concentrating on economic and military development, rather than challenging adversaries. Whether these actions would pay off in the future remains to be seen, but presently conflict-avoidance appears to be the best approach for India.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army