Midway to a CDS ORF 11 Dec 18
https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/midway-cds-46134/
Midway to a CDS ORF 11 Dec 18
In his pre-Navy Day interview, the Chief of Naval Staff and Chairman Chief’s of Staff Committee (COSC), Admiral Sunil Lanba stated that while the three services have differences on the establishment of theatre commands, they have agreed in principle on the appointment of a Permanent Chairman of the COSC (PCCOSC). In the present context the chairman COSC is appointed on seniority. The senior most service chief is the Chairman. On his retirement the next in seniority takes over the mantle.
The HQ Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) provides the secretarial support to the COSC. It was created post the acceptance of the Kargil Committee report which had recommended the establishment of HQ IDS and the creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). The CDS would be the single point military advisor to the government and would have overall command of the armed forces.
Logical was the next stage, which was to create integrated theatre commands under the CDS which would employ all resources of a theatre against the adversary. This has been placed on hold as it has been objected to by the air force. As per Air Marshall KK Nohwar (Retired), the air force would lose its flexibility if it was part of a theatre command.
Rejecting the concept of theatre commands, Nohwar stated, ‘The IAF can operate from anywhere. Fighters could take off from a base in the East, ‘strike targets’ in the Arabian Sea and land in bases in the South’. By allocating them to theatres, this flexibility would be lost as their movement outside the theatre would only be on approval of the theatre commanders. The air force perceives India as one theatre of war, while the army and navy have a different perception.
While the air force logic is partially acceptable, air power can always be reallocated and redeployed on an as required basis, depending on the nature of threat. Further, the concept propagated by the air force implies that its own employment in war is paramount, while the requirements of other services are secondary. Hence, the army and the navy have begun enhancing their own air power.
The world over, most nations have moved into the theatre command concept. Earlier the reasons being provided for India was that other western powers which have adopted this concept have done so as they do not visualize fighting a war on their soil, but overseas, hence need the combined firepower of all the three services. With China also having adopted this concept and creating one integrated command against India, this logic has lost its value. India on the other hand has seven different commands facing China, which remains illogical.
Admiral Lanba in the interaction stated, ‘There’s a need for an operational commander to look after the theatres… The three service chiefs cannot be theatre commanders. We need one operational commander. You can call him PPCOSC or the CDS. We first need a Higher Defence Organization before we can think of theatre commands.’ However, realistically there is a vast difference between a PPCOSC and a CDS.
The PPCOSC, is not likely to ever be the overall commander of the armed forces as a CDS would be. It will be a staff appointment coordinating the functioning of the IDS and handling matters common to the three services, less operations. The terminology itself is an indicator of the same. The service chiefs would continue handling their services and remain force providers and force employers, an aspect which remains the bane of the Indian armed forces today.
The service chiefs are aware that the government would not sanction a CDS as it has always feared placing all powers and command of the armed forces under one individual. This is because of a false sense of insecurity fearing a coup. The fact that no single individual would ever be able to push forth a coup as there are multiple layers in the chain of command is ignored. Further, with the creation of the Defence Planning Committee under the NSA, he has presently become a de-facto CDS.
The PCCOSC, though just a staff appointment would be the first amongst equals between the service chiefs. The individual to hold this appointment would be appointed by the government in a similar manner as service chiefs. He would formally be the head of the HQ IDS, which till date remained toothless. However, there are still major tasks which this appointment must handle.
The first is presenting a coordinated modernization and procurement plan to the government. It would replace the present system when each service projects its own needs and the defence secretary acts as the arbitrator. The joint procurement plan would also cater for enhanced jointness. It would be more effective with the newly established Defence Planning Committee.
The second is that the increasing joint service commands would now be responsible to a single entity. In the present context they were responsible to the COSC through the IDS. The head of the IDS and joint service commanders were of similar seniority which was a drawback. With the PCCOSC being equal to service chiefs they would now have a formal chain of command. Finally, and most importantly, he would form an important link in the nuclear chain of command as the Strategic Forces Command would be directly under him.
Being the first amongst equals would not make him a single point advisor as is being envisaged, as each service chief would desire to project aspects pertaining to his own service. However, he could be the armed forces representative in multiple committees where service chiefs now attend, whether it be the Defence Planning Committee or the Strategic Policy Group, both of which function under the NSA.
The PCCOSC, for whose appointment the service chiefs have written to the defence minister, may not be the equivalent of a CDS, nor would he ever control the armed forces, but he would have a role and task cut out for him. He would be midway between the present and the CDS. The present shortcomings in the system, inter-service rivalry and control of joint commands, all of which need immediate attention would now be resolved. The question remains is that while the armed forces have accepted this change, will the government follow or ignore this logical advice.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army