Surgical strike 2.0 had to be done to convey the right message Kathmandu’s Khabarhub.com 01 Mar 19
Surgical strike 2.0 had to be done to convey the right message
Surgical strike 2.0 had to be done to convey the right message Kathmandu’s Khabarhub.com 01 Mar 19
India had been facing terror attacks sponsored by Pak for decades. Thousands of Indian lives have been lost battling this multi-faceted monster being launched from across the border. Pak was sure that its threat of nuclear weapons would keep India at bay. It was also certain that the backing from the US initially (when it’s deployment in Afghanistan was high), and now from China would keep international pressure away from it. This is the reason why Masood Azar has never been declared a global terrorist.
Since 2016, India indicated a change in approach. Pathankot was the turning point, post which a message was sent to Pak when its team visited India to join in the investigations. The message was this should be the last, one more and India would retaliate. Pak took this to be another bluff and Uri followed. The surgical strike was a tactical operation from which the government sought strategic gains.
The strike was close to the LoC and targets were expendable terrorists, whose deaths Pak could ignore as also there were no civilian and only a handful of army casualties. This gave Pak the leeway. It declared Indian claims on the strike be fake and false. The target audience which India wanted to send a message to, the Pak army and government, got it, however, since they hid facts from their population and fed it a bunch of lies, there was no long-term impact and no retaliation from Pak.
Post the Pulwama attack, Indians screamed for retribution. Prime Minister Modi and his government spoke of the same. Internally, opposition parties launched an offensive against the government, questioning the timing of the strike (it being close to elections), response of the government and the failure of its policies. The government had to act.
Diplomatically India launched its offensive seeking to isolate Pak, but with limited impact. The nations which stood by India also had an interest in Pak for their own selfish reasons. They would support India, call onto Pak to act, but stop short of forcing or threatening Pak. Hence, neither would Pak be diplomatically isolated, nor would it be pushed into acting against terror groups.
Economically India’s action did resonate in Pak. It shook the Pak economy as tensions began to grow. India had many more options to hit back at Pak in the economic sphere, including putting pressure on multinationals doing business with both countries. Simultaneously was India’s decision to employ all water resources allocated to it under the Indus water treaty.
However, India was aware that unless a military option was exercised, retribution would never be complete for its masses. It would also convey the message that India would act against terrorist strikes, escalating its response each time. The message to be given to Pak and its population is that actions against India would be responded back with vigour. It was with this thought that Prime Minister Modi announced that he has left the decision of time and manner of response to the armed forces.
The ground conditions, with snow still existing were not conducive to ground operations. Further, experience showed that shallow operations may not have the desired impact, as the Pak public would be in the dark. In addition, Pak was aware that India may attempt the same, as it did not desire to escalate the situation and hence had its forces deployed accordingly.
In any scenario, employment of air power is an indicator of escalation, especially if the targets chosen involves civilian or military casualties. Further, employing air power implies targets in depth can be engaged, while adding risk factors of loss of aircraft and capture or death of pilots. In addition, escalation by one country would surely invite a response from the other.
If there are errors and innocents are targeted during the strike, then the nation would also have to bear international scrutiny. Considering all options, the government took the risk and sanctioned approval of the strike.
Target selection was imperative. This was done after detailed intelligence reports were analysed. The target was a terrorist training camp, which housed a few hundred terrorists, located in a remote area, away from civilization and military camps. This would ensure that collateral damage would be limited and restricted. The next stage was preparation for the strike, which was done meticulously by the air force. Dry runs were conducted, and Pak defensive systems studied.
The attack launched was a success. The camp was hit without any collateral damage and the aircraft returned without any losses. The execution was perfect. The message India had desired to send was done. The messages were its willingness to escalate and call the Pak nuclear bluff.
Its striking a terrorist training camp, without collateral damage gave Pak an opportunity to officially hide Indian success. However, since the objective was deep within Pak, this may not stay subdued as the surgical strike targets were. Pak immediately admitted to Indian attempts, however restricted the same to only crossing the LoC. Since it admitted Indian aircraft crossing the LoC, it had to respond in kind.
Within two days Pak attempted a similar action, launching its aircraft across the LoC. There are conflicting reports of Pak’s attempts. The Pak DGISPR stated that the aircraft dropped their payload in an uninhabited area, similar as India had done, while the Indian government claims it intended to hit military targets but were foiled. While Pak aircraft were intercepted and being chased back, a dogfight occurred, in which a Pak F16 and an Indian MIG 21 BISON were hit. The Indian pilot bailed into Pak and has been arrested. He is shortly scheduled to be released.
With both nations displaying their intent albeit for different purposes and audiences, tensions would commence to reduce. Rhetoric may continue, however offensive actions may not. For Pak, the most important message sent is the Indian willingness to escalate and ignore nuclear blackmail. India escalated from surgical strikes close to the border to strikes in depth. It also conveys that India can and will go to war, if it is pushed. While the Indian economy will sustain it, the Pak economy would crumble, hence Pak should reign in its terrorist networks.
Pak has conveyed the message that it can also retaliate. Both nations also conveyed their intent to their domestic audiences.
Will Pak now stop or control its terror groups, or will it again permit a terrorist strike of a similar nature remains a mute question. If it does control, there could be a change in relationship, if it does not, the escalation the next time may be at a much higher level, which could impact the entire subcontinent.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army