Removing myths of an insufficient budget Fauji India Mar 2019 Issue
Removing myths of an insufficient budget Fauji India Mar 2019 Issue
Historically, Indian concerns on national security only come out of the closet post a crises. The last was Kargil, which was twenty years ago. As time passes, national security recedes into the background, only to be pulled out of the bag, when the enemy is at the gates. The reason for this is that India lacks strategic culture, has never had a vision and has never produced a national security doctrine. Hence, there has never been an assessment of the emerging challenges, due to which no roadmap for creating requisite capabilities have been drawn up.
While the Indian armed forces have been crying hoarse about its state of equipment and lack of modernization, the politicians have been looking elsewhere. There is a perception existing within the polity that there would no major war in the foreseeable future, hence defence expenditure can be reduced. The only action which they visualize India to be continuously engaged in is the proxy war in Kashmir.
Development of a nation, including flow of foreign direct investment and technology, depends on internal and external security as also the protection of a nation’s institutions. This only happens if the country invests in national security on a regular basis. As President Abdul Kalam had stated, ‘Development and national security go together.’ The difference in growth amongst the countries of the subcontinent, all of whom obtained independence near simultaneously, is proof enough. As nations become secure, they develop faster, Bangladesh being an example in development and a receding Pak on the other extreme.
Political leaders fail to understand that developing military capabilities is a long- drawn process. As witnessed in recent cases, action from processing capability needs to its complete merger takes over a decade. Procurement orders placed at present would only fructify post a long gestation period, leaving vast capability gaps. They are also unwilling to understand that India’s adversaries will continue to grow and enhance their capabilities while the Indian armed forces would flounder. This has led to reduction in the share of the defence budget, year after year.
The finance ministry talks of the budget in monetary terms, while the armed forces strategist considers the budget in percentage of the national GDP. Monetary announcement does not in anyway cater for inflation, committed liabilities due to earlier procurements or breakdown of the defence budget between the armed forces and other civil establishments under the MoD.
The percentage figures have been receding every year, while the overall amounts have been marginally increasing, displaying two sides of the same coin. The monetary figures appeal to the politician and makes it an easy tool to influence the national public on the governments concern.
This percentage, if analysed, implies around 1.4% of the GDP has been granted as the defence budget this year. The world average of defence expenditure varies between 2 to 2.5% of the GDP. The Chinese share is 2.1% (its economy is 5 times more than India’s) and Pak’s share is 2.36%. The Pak government even announced that security being most important, it would not cut the defence budget in anyway. Is India more secure in the current environment, that it gets a meagre 1.4%?
Understanding that this being an election year, the emphasis would shift to social and welfare measures to secure votes. However, it does not reduce threats nor does such an action deter adversaries. Continuous and steady investment in security is essential.
Critics of the armed forces blame the Indian armed forces, specifically the army, of its size and demand its reduction to change the revenue versus capital ratio. They also claim that a high share of the budget on pensions and salaries impacts developing defence capabilities. These comments flow from lack of understanding the Indian security context.
The strength of a nation’s military flows from its envisaged threats. Military strength cannot be increased or decreased at the drop of a hat but done gradually. India has nuclear powered adversaries on both its borders, who claim Indian territory, while India has no external claims. Every time India has lowered its guard there has been an incident on the border. Kargil is a clear example on the Pak side.
On the northern front, Chinese incursions are a regular feature. Hence, India needs to maintain a strong army posture in its prepared defences along the watershed to deny its adversaries an opportunity from grabbing Indian territory. This posture must be manpower heavy and cannot alone be based solely on technology.
Those who profess the Chinese model, lack the understanding that China fears no threat on its territory as no nation has claims on it. China also has no prepared defences like India. Hence, it would be China launching offensives. Further, Chinese threat perceptions have changed. India is no longer a major threat, it is the US. Thus, it is restructuring accordingly.
Salaries are based on the strength of the standing armed forces. Reductions in the chain, where feasible are being carried out and only be done upto a limit, as Indian threats are unique as compared to its neighbours, mainly China, which did a mass restructuring. Being a government service, its salaries are fixed by the government as all other central forces.
The pension share does not pertain to the armed forces alone but also to civilians paid from the defence fund. Though they comprise approximately 30% of the pensioners, their share is over 50%, since all serve to almost 60 years and hence obtain a higher pension. Thus, blaming the armed forces is clearly lack of knowledge and understanding.
The major problem impacting lack of funds is the expenditure on maintaining wasteful ordnance factories and PSUs, which should have now been closed or sold to the private sector. The tail of the armed forces does not end with the uniformed alone but extends to civilians paid from the defence budget. This tail of the armed forces has never been considered for reduction as it remains a vote bank controlled by strong unions. Their maintenance has also cut the availability of funds.
The splitting of the defence budget and pensions bill between the uniformed and non-uniformed has rarely been made public, thus enabling the government to shift from one entity to the other. Releasing the same would open doors to where cuts must be made.
Some narrow-minded defence critics have also recommended disposing military cantonments in large cities to generate funds for modernization. In their view, cantonments in large cities are priced lands which could be sold at a premium and the money be transferred to the capital share of the budget. This view is anything but logical. All proceeds from such sales would be transferred to the Consolidated Fund of India, from which it could be diverted to any head, not necessarily defence.
To move the armed forces away from cantonments implies obtaining land away from cities and constructing cantonments there. Thus, funds are first necessary for procuring land and then for development of habitat and training areas. The time factor involved in this exercise would also be decades, making it worthless. If such funds were readily available, then the armed forces would have had no reason to complain of shortfalls. The critics have not considered that present cantonments have already had investments of thousands of crores since independence for developing infrastructure. Dumping them to restart from scratch would only be a foolhardy exercise.
If the armed forces must utilize the budget effectively and enhance joint capabilities, then the apex management of defence of the nation must be reorganized. The forces need a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). Fear existing within the government on handing over power of the armed forces to one individual refusing to die down, the service chiefs had proposed the appointment of a Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in lieu of the CDS.
This appointment would head the HQ Integrated Defence Staff and be responsible for enhancing joint capabilities and joint operations. He would be responsible for producing a common procurement plan and be the single point advisor. However, he would not head the armed forces akin to a CDS. The government has yet to respond to this suggestion.
The creation of the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) under the National Security Advisor (NSA) to evaluate a national security doctrine and coordinate defence procurements also appears to have been an exercise in futility. The NSA should have been the authority, on behalf of the Prime Minister, to interact with the finance minister and ensure that the defence share of the budget is reasonable and caters for emerging threats, after all the assessment of threats has been done under him.
A low defence budget implies not only a slowing down in enhancing capabilities and replacing obsolete equipment but also impacts maintenance of infrastructure. The gap continues to widen in every sphere only adding to pressures on funds over the coming years. The delay in constructing hangars for the incoming Rafale due to lack of funds is a case in point.
Ideally, the government should earmark a fair share of the GDP as the minimum defence budget. Observing the growth in economy, the armed forces would be aware of the likely availability and be able to plan. Expecting them to cut manpower, even if not possible, is not an answer, nor is the sale of defence assets and cantonment lands. The DPC should be the apex body to interact with the finance minister on defence needs, since it already has on board the expenditure secretary from the finance ministry.
The nation must reasonably invest in its security apparatus if it seeks to remain a power in the region and be respected by the international community as a military power. It cannot ward of threats, if its military capabilities continue to recede. Not having fought a war since 1999 does not imply that it is no longer possible. Kargil was fought under the nuclear threat and so could the next. Hopefully, the main defence budget post elections would be more realistic and meet the needs of the armed forces.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army