Kashmir: the missing healing touch Bharat Shakti 23 Apr 19
Kashmir has been witnessing ups and downs. Militancy rises, subsequently subsides, only to rise again. There is no doubt that at present there is a perceptible change in the attitude of the masses, as increased human intelligence inputs have begun leading to successful encounters with minimum civilian casualties. Inputs even contain information about local militants, who till recently felt secure in their own communities. There were reports that even local militants were being advised to stay away from population centres.
The only militants who have managed to avoid the security dragnet are those who stay hidden from local public and avoid direct attacks on security forces. They seek to gain notoriety by targeting security force personnel on leave and killing innocents claiming them to be informers. They remain poster boys, issuing regular messages and videos online. Stone pelting is also restricted to fewer areas.
A lot has changed post Balakote. Pak has realized that it can no longer continue to act the way it has, always fearful of an Indian retaliation. Its enhanced deployment along the LoC continues as India retaliates strongly against any violation of the ceasefire. Reports continue to flow of closed terrorist camps, close to the border, fearing an Indian riposte.
The government has cracked down on multiple separatist organizations in the valley, making funding militancy and stone throwing difficult, if not almost impossible. Separatists leaders are now facing increased scrutiny and pressure, as also imminent arrest. Un-Islamic actions of Pak militants attempting to marry local women and even taking a young child as a hostage in Hajin has added to public anger.
In most parts of the valley there is a change in attitude. Small pockets of strongly pro-militant localities remain and would continue to be so, despite all attempts. In these areas, militants would remain protected and operations to flush them out slow, protracted and fraught with risks of collateral damage as stone throwing would be expected. Hence, the only option would be to conduct cordon and search operations with large quantum of forces. These localities would be very few.
As the separatists are incarcerated and their influence wanes, calls for bandhs are ignored. The loss to the local public in each such incident has been heavy and hence most desire to avoid it. It is only in locations where goons of separatists hold sway that locals are forced to act.
In this largely changing environment local politicians are resorting to every means to enhance an anti-India sentiment rather than projecting a pro-national stance, only to garner votes. They remain quick to criticize security forces, claim the central government is anti-Kashmir as also propose talks with Pak, knowing it is not possible in the present environment, while are unwilling to question militants who kill innocent civilians and security personnel on leave. They support talks with the Hurriyat, despite knowing their anti-national stance. In the latest provocation political parties have promised to lift ban imposed on separatist and pro-Pak elements, if elected.
The impression the politicians appear to convey is that they would desire a valley continuing in turmoil and remaining anti-India, as it would benefit them politically. Both the main valley based political parties, NC and PDP, have done little to alienate problems faced by locals, whenever they have been in power. They are aware of their shortcomings, but also realize that if the valley remains in turmoil, accusations for the present condition contributed to Delhi and national political parties, they would have little political competition. This attitude only adds to existing confusion amongst locals.
Every national political party claims it has a solution for Kashmir, but when in power is clueless on how to push their agenda forward. Confusion remains between conducting round table conferences and appointing interlocutors, none of which has worked. Pushing money into the valley and subsidizing costs appears the easiest way out for the central government, but this is anything but the solution. Politically, Kashmir has been a disaster as no government has been able to move forward for some reason or the other.
The local administration has almost no role in the valley. The existing militancy adds to their insecurity and they remain ensconced in their secure areas, unwilling to venture into the open. Very few are daring and desire to ignore threats. It is for this reason that over the years, while innocents and security personnel on leave have been targeted, very few members of the state administration have been attacked. Hence, while the environment has witnessed ups and downs in militancy, there has been no follow up by any agency.
It ultimately boils down to security forces, mainly the army, to remain the only connect between locals and the government. It attempts to push the national agenda forward by adopting to Sadbhavana projects. It is the army which is spread across the region in small camps, conducting anti-terrorist operations, hence remains most visible. It is in these camps that locals receive medical care and on occasions even rations, when they are in dire need.
The security forces have, in remote areas, organized multiple events, whether sporting, educative, veterinary and medical. The level of participation has always been encouraging. Even recruitment rallies have indicated immense enthusiasm, despite calls for boycott by militant groups and separatists.
The army interacting with locals is always intimidating as the soldier would be in uniform, stiff and alert, accompanied by colleagues bearing guns. Despite all their humility they would always appear overbearing. Not the ideal method but there are limited opportunities as all other agencies which should have been involved are missing. In most regions of the valley, barring some villages and localities where Pak and Hurriyat influence are overbearing, the army is their only avenue for redressal.
This is not the solution for the long term. It requires an integrated approach for which the governments at the centre and state must put their heads together, work towards ensuring that the local administration is effective and visible, problems of residents handled, and visibility of political leaders enhanced. It is only by adopting this approach will the needed healing touch to the valley be visible. Banking on the army alone to represent them would ultimately never work.