Privatizing defence production The Excelsior 28 Aug 19
Privatizing defence production 28 Aug 19
The firing accident at the School of Artillery, last week, where an artillery shell exploded in the barrel of a gun and caused injuries to soldiers undergoing training, is the latest in such accidents as a result of ammunition produced by ordnance factories. In 2009, post a near similar accident, which took the life of a young officer, the institution obtained a specific X-ray machine to examine fuses manufactured by ordnance factories prior to firing. The percentage of defects were astounding.
In one of the enquiries post a firing accident, the statement of the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) which controls all ammunition factories was, ‘the important reasons (for failures) can be manufacturing deficiencies, improper handling and storage in ammunition depots, improper maintenance of weapon systems and improper handling of ammunition and weapons during firing. The OFB is not aware of the storage/handling/maintenance conditions at the army’s end, which are equally responsible for defects/ accidents.’
Ammunition accidents have occurred with tanks, mortars and air defence equipment involving different depots, different units and different ranges, however all manufactured by the OFB. In every case, there has been an investigation, post which ordnance factories have washed their hands off. They may be an error in one depot or one unit, not across the country. Clearly a result of manufacturing defects.
In 2016, 19,325 faulty mines, manufactured by ordnance factory Chanda, exploded at Central Ordnance Depot of the army at Pulgaon, resulting in 19 dead, including an officer. These were not being collected back by the ordnance factory despite multiple requests. The army has repeatedly requested the MoD to punish those responsible for the production lapse. A case has also been filed against those responsible by the family of one of the deceased.
There are 41 ordnance factories, which presently hold monopoly on production of equipment including ammunition for the armed forces. These operate under the OFB located in Kolkata. In the MoD they come under the department of defence production. Since the MoD is controlled by the bureaucracy, there is no military say over them. Thus, all service HQs can do is approach the MoD and hope it acts in their favour and firmly.
The lackadaisical approach is common to most ordnance factories solely because they face no competition, are never accountable to the user and function directly under the MoD, thereby remaining protected. Such accidents would continue to occur, unless the government acts and reconsiders its approach to ordnance factories.
In addition, has been the issue of supply of requisite quantity of ammunition. The CAG had pulled up the MoD for poor ammunition holdings. The CAG report stated, ‘OFB, which had a limited production capacity vis-a-vis the requirement of Army, accepted targets for supply of ammunition covered under the roll-on indent in mutual consultation with AHQ. It however, failed to supply the accepted quantities, and there was shortfall in 54 to 73 per cent types of ammunition.’ The intention was to prevent privatisation, despite being aware of low production capacity.
Even recently a report submitted to the MoD stated, that the value of production up to July 31, 2019 was 20% which is 39% less than the target, while the value of issue (supply) to the army was only 15%, which is 55% less than the estimated target. The report states that there was a shortfall in 24 different types of ammunition and explosives and in 21 types of major principal items, including like Dhanush guns and T-90 battle tanks. Despite this, the MoD has announced that it has set a defence production target of Rs 90,000 crore for the coming year. Everyone who has dealt with ordnance factories know that this target is a pipedream.
Instead of working to make up their shortfall, the staff of ordnance factories went on strike against being corporatized or orders placed on private domestic manufacturers, while unwilling to expand their own capacities. Even the basic support which they had received over the years from the MoD appears to be lacking. Last week, in a statement the MoD stated, ‘its products are of high cost, have poor quality issues and there is lack of or minimal innovation in the factories.’
Ordnance factories were essential post-Independence when the nation lacked an industrial base. These have over time outlived their utility and are presently white elephants sucking the defence budget only because the armed forces have no option but to place orders on them. They are no longer the second line of defence as they claim to be.
The true reason for the strike was a desire to stop corporatization and let them continue with their present concept of only working in overtime conditions and producing poor quality products leading to accidents. They desire to remain unaccountable while drawing all benefits of being under the MoD. Their calling of the strike is only because the MoD convinced them that ‘no final decision on corporatisation has been taken.’
The army is being forced to shed manpower by reducing its teeth to tail ratio, to enable generation of funds for modernization. The tail of the armed forces does not end with the uniform category but extends to ordnance factories, whose production capacities are now being cut, while no action is being taken to close those which have outlived their purpose. Corporatizing them would compel them to work harder to generate profit to sustain themselves while removing them from the defence budget.
Governments have not had the courage to initially corporatize and finally privatise these factories fearing union pressures. Instead they adopted a safe approach, refusing to invest in technology leaving the armed forces to procure poor quality products manufactured by them. They continue being pampered at the cost of lives of trained soldiers. Though some orders are now being placed on private manufacturers, this is insufficient.
An interesting line in the website of the OFB states, ‘undoubtedly, we are the force behind the armed forces.’ The reality is that they remain the stumbling block to defence preparedness.
The government must not bend down to their continued protests and threats. It must act. These white elephants should be corporatized at the earliest and the private sector encouraged. It would reduce the revenue budget and enhance funds for capital acquisition of the forces.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army