Defining normalcy within Kashmir CENJOWS 21 Oct 19
https://cenjows.gov.in/article-detail?id=218
Defining normalcy within Kashmir CENJOWS 21 Oct 19
Social media is abuzz about questions being raised on Kashmir. They include, how is normalcy defined in Kashmir and with continued terror strikes and ongoing radicalization, can Kashmir ever turn peaceful? To understand the overall scenario, the comment by the Chinese President, Xi Jinping, should be read.
He stated in Kathmandu post his visit to India, ‘Anyone who attempts to split any region from China will perish, with their bodies smashed and bones ground to powder.’ He was hinting at the violence in Hong Kong. None in India have ever needed to come close to this level of threat, despite decades of violence in Kashmir. The reasons are not difficult to guess, it is because the situation has never been so worrisome and India as a democracy is willing to accept dissent.
Coming to the debate on normalcy. Post 1990, when was Kashmir genuinely normal, like other parts of India? An anti-India sentiment had been in play in the region for decades. It cannot be removed with just the abrogation of article 370. This action is neither a magic wand nor would it be the end of all troubles in the valley. However, it would provide citizens of the state with benefits to which they were till date denied.
Within the erstwhile state of J and K, now a Union Territory, there were always some regions, which were worst hit by violence and whose populace, mainly youth, influenced to support terrorism and back a pro-Pak approach, more on religious grounds than for any other logical reason. These affected parts were claimed to define the character of the entire valley. In many cases, the violence was blamed on the action of security forces in the region.
Security forces have been a part and parcel of the state since its accession to India, mainly to guard the LoC with Pakistan. The internal deployment of the army increased post the commencement of insurgency in the nineties and the subsequent raising of the Rashtriya Rifles. The present generation was born seeing the army in its vicinity, regular cordons and searches as also road checks and questioning.
It was also only the army to which locals turned for any help in handling administrative, medical and other problems. The civil administration was largely invisible, and corruption existed even in providing basic requirements to the common public, for resolving which, nearest army camps were approached. During natural calamities the first responder was always the army. With such a vast presence and almost a daily interaction with soldiers, either on the move or deployed in vicinity, the fear of the force was bound to reduce. In many cases, the local public respected the army, as it was their sole contact for assistance. There was always a line in the relationship between the public and the army, which could never be breached.
Linking the present scenario with that of 2010 and 2016 may possibly provide a further understanding of the term ‘normalcy’. In both these periods the valley was rocked by violence leading to loss of lives. Simultaneously, the state curtailed communication means and enhanced deployment of security forces. None of these actions stopped violence and loss of lives. The situation in 2016 was so tense that counter insurgency operations were suspended for some time. Additional troops were brought into the valley and even some deployed along the LoC turned inwards, enabling higher levels of infiltration.
In comparison, the present actions by the government may have curtailed freedom and imposed some restrictions, however, are by no means different from what existed in 2010 and 2016. The major strategic difference is that on earlier occasions’ the initiative was with anti-national elements and security forces reacted to their actions. All who instigated violence, led the mobs and paid stone throwers were free and operated as per the plan of their handlers in Pak.
In the present case, the government aware of the steps it was planning to undertake, moved in security forces prior to its decision, detained those who could instigate violence, blocked flow of funds and curtailed the spreading of rumours. Clearly, the government grabbed the initiative and those who desired to rebel were reacting to the government’s actions. This foresight and planning by the government led to controlled reaction and violence. This is the difference between earlier periods and the present.
The impact of security forces deployment along the LoC and in the hinterland has resulted in pushing terrorists onto the backfoot, hence they have resorted to selective targeting of civilians, enforcing closure of businesses and restricting the move of vehicles. They are seeking to terrorize local population, intending to convey that normalcy does not exist. Yet, if normalcy is compared to earlier periods of unrest, then it does exist, as those who have attempted to instigate violence are unable to do so. This is what has frustrated Pak and those who continue to harp that violence will flow once curbs are lifted.
Radicalization is not restricted to Kashmir alone. It is an international phenomena. In Kashmir, Sufism, which was the mainstay of the region, has over a period been replaced by Salafism, mainly impacting the youth. One of the major causes of infusion of Salafism was disillusionment of the younger generation. It has spread rapidly due to the mushrooming of Madrassas espousing Wahabi ideology, funded by the Petro-dollar.
Over the years, state governments led by valley dominated political parties, seeking to secure their vote banks, turned a blind eye towards the growth of radicalisation. Militant outfits like the LET and JEM were able to convince the youth to move away from Sufism to the more radical Salafism, while governments looked the other way.
While there are differing views on how alarming is the level of radicalisation, there is no doubt that unless the free flowing Petro-Dollar is stopped, Pak’s actions to radicalise the youth countered by presenting the dire conditions of a radicalized Pak and addressing the socio-political and economic condition of the youth, the situation could become difficult. This is what is possibly hoped could be the fallout of the abrogation of Article 370. It is the battle of convincing the benefits of the current decision.
Radicalisation will stay, unless urgent steps are taken by the state. However, linking radicalisation and terror actions with normalcy may not be in the right perspective. If the youth are convinced that in the medium and long term they may benefit, the majority would move from violence. There would always be pockets where violence would continue, as it occurs in some regions across the country, but that should not be taken as the situation being abnormal. In fact, deaths due to violence in complete Kashmir in weeks are well below even daily murders in any Indian metro.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army