India needs to look beyond land borders CENJOWS 02 Jun 2020

India needs to look beyond land borders CENJOWS 02 Jun 2020

INDIA NEEDS TO LOOK BEYOND LAND BORDERS

By

Maj Gen Harsha Kakar (Retd)

 

The recent standoff with China along northern borders and Indian determination to continue with the construction of infrastructure network in the region, which was the main objection by China, will ensure that tensions remain. With improved surveillance, better communication arteries, weapons and transport, Indian forces will challenge any transgressions as soon as they commence, denying China the ability to surprise. It was surprise which gave China an advantage this time, lessons from which would have been well grasped and remedial actions taken.

With infrastructure development also taking place along the Eastern Borders, monitoring Chinese movements will be a regular feature. Therefore, standoffs, as occurring in Galwan and Pangong Tso and earlier in Naku La, should be considered a new normal along the LAC. Ladakh will continue to remain a flashpoint due to its strategic location. Some standoffs would end early, some may prolong.

There is also no doubt that with two disputed land borders, Pakistan and China, land security will remain a major concern. For Pakistan, Kashmir has been an obsession, which has always remained a distant dream and would continue to be so. Their only option would be attempting to ferment internal uprisings, along with employment of terror groups, hoping that the law and order situation rises to a level which could play into their hands. Such a possibility is unlikely to occur. Their other hope is to exploit an Indo-China conflict to secure some territory.

China, on the other hand continues to enhance pressure on the LAC, hoping to discover some chinks in Indian defence, which could enable it to resort tochanging the current perceived alignment of the LAC. The moment India displays equal aggressiveness and resolute, China does not push further. It then accepts a diplomatic solution, siting the agreement between President Xi Jinping and PM Modi. Thus, it will continue to test waters, hoping for a weakness to be exploited.

Determination of success in future conflicts, with both Pakistan and China, will depend on land territory claimed and occupied, as these remain bones of contention.

It is considering this scenario that the CDS, General Bipin Rawat, stated, ‘the immediate requirement is to have a strong Army duly supported by a capable Air Force. The Navy will require to project power in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and locate and degrade enemy ships.’

The planning for theatre commands includes a peninsular command, which is likely to be an amalgamation of the Western and Eastern Naval Commands alongside some air and army elements. The intention, as stated by the CDS, is to have security of the complete peninsular under one commander. This, as per the CDS, would enable shifting of forces from one naval sector to the other.

General Rawat has turned down the naval demand for a third aircraft carrier stating, ‘Anything on the surface can be picked up by satellites and knocked off by missiles. I think theNavy needs more submarines rather than aircraft carriers, which themselves require their own individual armadas for protection.’Thus, based on its current and immediate future holdings, the Indian naval responsibility appears to remain close to own shores, rather than projecting power beyond the region seeking to apply pressure on adversaries and shift focus from land frontiers.

On the other hand, addressing a seminar organized by the Manohar Parrikar Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, the defence secretary, Ajay Kumar stated, ‘We are still not even looking at going beyond our own territorial waters. Our fishermen are not trained, they do not have the craft. And, we don’t have the security umbrella for our fishermen to be going deeper and for tapping resources even in our EEZ.’ He added, that after the South China Sea, the IOR has become ‘an important theatre for activity’ and national security plans need to cater for this. ‘Maybe it will require naval resources, or some air capabilities need to be created to deal with the Indian Ocean. The fact is that security of the IOR must be addressed.’Therefore, two differing views from the same MoD emerge.

India is an important member of the QUAD which relies on naval power to challenge Chinese forays in the South China Sea and the IOR. Hence, naval power is an important element of national security and cannot be ignored.

Is China, with increasing land-based actions, seeking to compel India to concentrate on land borders, ignoring the Indian Ocean?Increasing standoffs with China and tensions along borders with Pak, Indian concentration remains on deterring incursions on land while seeking matching air power. Developing naval power recedes into the background.

It is also possible that China and Pak are operating in tandem to compel Indian thinking away from the sea, opening doors for China to enhance its forays and presence in the Indian Ocean. This will also benefit Pak whose naval power is the weakest amongst its forces.

With a navy, growing stronger by the day, Chinese forays into the IOR are bound to increase. Chinese bases around India are on the rise, adding to security concerns. Simultaneously, China is shifting concentration from land power to sea power. While, China considers the US as its main rival and hence needs a powerful and matching navy, the impact would spill into Indian waters in case of any future conflict.

There are already reports of over 600 Chinese fishing vessels operating in the IOR beyond Indian EEZ every year from 2015 onwards. In addition, are regular movements of Chinese research vessels in the region, some even within Indian EEZ.

Can India bank on its affiliations with the QUAD to ensure security of its assets in the IOR? While the QUAD has the power, the question which needs consideration is what would be their involvement in an Indo-China standoff in the IOR? ShouldIndia re-visit its priorities? Is India falling into the Chinese strategic trap? Do we need to reconsider the structuring of the peninsula command?

These are questions which need analysis at senior level of defence planners. Budgets would not change, simultaneously, developing naval power is a slow process, given the capability of our shipyards. It cannot be ignored nor placed low on the priority list.It is time to reconsider Chinese long-term intentions.