Looking beyond the LAC standoffs CENJOWS 08 Jun 2020

Looking beyond the LAC standoffs CENJOWS 08 Jun 2020

Looking beyond the LAC standoffs CENJOWS 08 Jun 2020

          The standoff between Indian and Chinese forces in multiple locations along the LAC continues, although there appears to be cooling in tensions. For multiple standoffs to have occurred across the LAC, spreading from Eastern Ladakh to Sikkim, though the entire region being the responsibility of the same Chinese Western Theatre Command, directions would have flowed from Beijing. They had planned their intrusion to the extent that Chinese soldiers came armed with handheld weapons suitable for physical assault. They had contemplated Indian reactions and prepared accordingly. Their digging in and constructing camps at fast pace displays they were prepared for a prolonged standoff.

          Varying levels of military to military talks, including at the highest level of Lt Gens has been held, which have led to reduced tensions. Forces remain deployed, maintaining distance. Both nations have accused the other of crossing their perceived LAC and violating existing agreements including developing infrastructure. The ultimate resolution would flow from diplomatic channels, with some give or take by both on diplomatic or economic grounds, not on territory or infrastructure development. This will ensure that both nations end the stalemate with no loss of face.

          China has regularly sought to apply pressure on adversaries for multiple reasons, most of which come under diplomatic or economic domains. With nations with whom it has land or sea borders, the pressure is by application of military force and with others economic. When the adversary does not relent and displays similar aggressiveness, China seeks a diplomatic resolution, though never rushing for a solution. 

With India ramping up infrastructure, there is no doubt that standoffs would be a natural occurrence along the LAC in the years ahead. Under normal conditions, Indian forces seek to contain own patrolling activities and movement within their own perceived LAC. Their intention has always been to ensure sanctity of the LAC as visualized by us and prevent ingress. Most standoffs would be resolved immediately, except those planned for conveying a message.

On the other hand, major Chinese actions are predetermined and aimed at sending relevant messages to India. The duration of standoffs and time taken to resolve would dictate Chinese intentions. The current standoff, where the Chinese came prepared for fisticuffs is an example.

China is equally vulnerable in multiple places along the LAC. It neither has the force nor the logistic capability to hold onto the entire region, all through the year. India exploiting its vulnerability is a factor which China fears. Its mouthpiece the Global Times stated on 05 Jun, ‘China does not want to fall foul of India,’ adding, ‘Once India makes a strategic mis-judgment and nibbles away at China’s territory, China will never condone it. China is bound to make strong countermeasures.’ These are Chinese bluffs indicating its vulnerability.

Hence, India needs to reconsider its strategy on whether it would let China lead in transgressions or display equal aggressiveness and resort to similar actions in areas which impact them at a time of own choosing. The decision that the Indian leadership needs to make is whether it would switch from defensive to offensive actions?

Further, China has always feared an Indo-US combination. In this context the op-ed stated, ‘As China has made clear its friendly policy toward India, India should return the favour instead of being fooled by Washington.’ This is possibly one of the messages which it sought to convey by the current standoff. India needs to consider whether it would stick to principles as Australia did and back the US and Quad or fall to Chinese pressures? Logically, India must stick to its principles, ignoring Chinese threats.

Standoffs are the future. If India adopts an offensive approach and contemplates to challenge China in regions where it is weak, then it needs to develop infrastructure as identified by the China Study Group. On this issue, India must not relent, as all our developments are within own territory.

Intelligence is the key to quick counter actions. In the current standoff, Indian reactions were guided by poor inputs on Chinese intentions. India delayed its seasonal exercise due to COVID 19, while China did not. This gave China the upper hand. This is not the first time that intelligence has failed in the region. It happened during Kargil. Intelligence gathering, analysis and dissemination need a review and remedial measures adopted.

          The final factor is resolving management of active borders, whether it is the LAC, LoC or IB with Pakistan. The national policy should be ‘one border, one force, under one commander’. India cannot have multiple forces, operating under different ministries, following different chains of command deployed together. Nothing could be more absurd than the current system adopted, where effective coordination depends on management skills of commanders at different levels, not operational necessities.  

          Our neighbours have changed their system, but unresponsive Indian bureaucracy always places stumbling blocks. In 2018, China placed its border guards deployed along the LAC under PLA. The Chinese announced through their Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) ‘WeChat’ public account, ‘a complete withdrawal of frontier defence troops of the Peoples Armed Police (PAP) to enhance CPC’s (Communist Party of China) management of armed forces.’ This implied placing the PAP under the army. It was reported by the Global Times. PAP is the Chinese counterpart of the Indo Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) raised specifically for the northern frontier. Pakistan already has all its CAPFs and paramilitary forces under the army.

Presently in the Indian context, orders need multiple chains of approval, causing delays and at times remaining unimplemented. Information inputs flow up through different chains, leading to time penalties. Ministries, mainly the MHA, which controls the ITBP and BSF need to hand over command of forces deployed on borders to the MoD which would place them under respective command and lower formations.

Currently, the LAC in Ladakh is held by a mix of two forces, the army and the ITBP. Officially the ITBP is expected to be under operational command of the army, realistically, the scenario is vastly different. The DIG of the ITBP battalions deployed in the current area of standoffs is located at Leh. The IG HQs, earlier located at Chandigarh, had been staged forward to Leh in Apr 2019 and both ITBP HQs are co-located. In addition, an approval has been granted to create an ITBP Command level HQ located at Chandigarh to handle the Chinese border.

          Most interactions between the army and ITBP would remain with their HQs at Leh. Presently, the two forces report to two different ministries, possess their own regions of deployment and maintain their own logistic supply chains.

          The creation of new HQs cannot be stopped as these give additional vacancies to a force which has been under the thumb of the IPS. However, what can be considered is amalgamating the current DIG and IG HQs in Leh into HQ 14 Corps or formations responsible for operations in the region, implying making them part and parcel of army formations, while the newly created HQ in Chandigarh is designated only as a technical HQ with no operational role.

          The intention should be to place deployed forces for border management, under the formation responsible for the region, without impacting vacancies of CAPFs. Force HQ in Chandigarh and the MHA in Delhi should exercise technical control. The national leadership needs to be realistic in its approach, rather than continue with outdated systems only to retain ownership over CAPFs.

          Historically, India has only learnt from mistakes, Kargil being an earlier example and this the latest. Lessons flowing from the standoff must be studied, considered and implemented at the earliest to ensure that such incidents are never repeated, while India takes a stronger approach.