The Indo-China strategic game continues CENJOWS 23 Jun 2020
https://cenjows.gov.in/article-detail?id=314
The Indo-China strategic game continues 23 Jun 2020
The Chinese intrusion which began in May was not an isolated offensive action by China. It was almost simultaneous to military pressures against its adversaries in the South China Sea, wolf warrior diplomacy in Europe, a looming trade war with the US and economic actions against Australia. Internally, there have been disagreements within the CCP on the handling of the pandemic, its post economic revival and anger against the Xi launched ‘wolf warrior diplomacy,’ which led to distancing of Europe. Hence, the intrusion in Ladakh was not so much for changing domestic perceptions due to economic fallout but more for Xi proving his power within the CCP and avenging the humiliation of Doklam.
Xi Jinping cannot be seen to be moving into and withdrawing from Ladakh without some gains. He cannot afford another Doklam. There is no doubt that China initiated the intrusion in Ladakh with carefully planned actions. It was prepared for fighting below the level of opening fire, twisting within multiple agreements which exist between the countries.
The involvement of Xi in the entire incident is evident as he moved one of the rising stars of the PLA and his trusted General, Xu Qiling, to take over the Western Theatre Command in early Jun, a day prior to the Lt Gen talks. These talks have not been re-held since sanction has not flowed from Xu. The South China Morning Post quoting an insider from the PLA stated, ‘Xu’s new position in the Western Theatre Command is also a new test for him,’ adding, ‘if he can handle the China-India border dispute properly, he is very likely to be further promoted to grab a seat in the PLA’s ground force headquarters, or even more senior, in the future.’ Hence, Ladakh has implications for both, Xi and Xu.
China has NOT been highlighting current tensions with India in its local media networks and newspapers. It has NOT declared its casualties nor was the Galwan incident covered in most local Chinese newspapers. Modi’s comments post the All Party Meeting and the External Affairs Minister’s statement on Galwan were both deleted by China from the Indian Embassy’s Chinese internal Weibo Chat site, proving that China did not want its masses to know about its incursions in Ladakh.
Chinese comments are mainly in its English Global Times, which are meant for the global audience. Propaganda of its military prowess has also been projected solely for Indian consumption, not internal. Mixed signals in different articles of The Global Times were aimed at causing confusion in Indian strategic minds. Hence, China is seeking to apply pressure on India, while conveying a message to the international audience that China will threaten those who challenge its writ.
China has still not considered it suitable to inform its own public about the current standoff. This is possibly because it is uncertain on how its actions in Ladakh would progress. It may have expected India to immediately raise dialogue to the political level, as has been suggested by many political leaders, where it could demand its pound of flesh. India did not oblige. Ultimately it was China which initiated talks at the foreign minister level. It may have also expected India to display limited aggressiveness not one which mirrored its deployment.
It had experienced Doklam and did not desire a repeat. Hence, its soldiers were armed for physical not military combat. It chose Ladakh where the intrusion and resultant standoff could be at multiple places, all of them the choosing of China. Possibly, China may not have any intention of pushing the standoff beyond a point. China commenced its intrusions in May, the beginning of the patrolling season, providing it ample time to push through its agenda.
Till Galwan, the Indian Prime Minister, despite all domestic pressure maintained a steadied silence, not seeking to disrupt the diplomatic and military talks which could resolve the issue. The government remained tight lipped on its options. The rest of the nation was swayed by the events and threats flowing from the Chinese mouthpiece, The Global Times. Indian critics believed that Chinese were seeking to change status quo based on the propaganda game being played by China. This was the opposite of what was happening in China, where the situation was not even being mentioned in local newspapers.
The Indian armed forces would also have conducted its own analysis to determine if the Chinese would have the staying power in the region once winters set in, as most structures constructed are temporary and distances to main administrative bases large. This would have enabled the government to determine its options.
The Indian leadership would have had two broad options. The first was to call the Chinese bluff and mirror their deployment, while allowing talks to proceed at per laid down norms and the second was to display panic and open dialogue through political levels. It chose the first. Simultaneously, it avoided escalating tensions by making strong political comments, from which it may not be able to withdraw.
While talks to resolve the standoffs were progressing at multiple levels including diplomatic, the incident at Galwan occurred. The casualties and ferocity of the altercation was unexpected. Despite being ambushed, Indian troops fought back ferociously, resulting in large numbers of Chinese casualties. The incident possibly made the Chinese realise that the Indian soldier is battle hardened, unwilling to back down and would hold his ground against all odds. They had never expected the situation to deteriorate to this level.
Galwan also changed Indo-China relations in multiple ways. Military talks would no longer be held in an atmosphere of trust. The two forces would henceforth encounter one another in conditions of extreme physical violence. India, which as a rule always announces its casualties, is now in no position to accept any compromise. Its public would denounce any government which backs down. Political meandering options are limited.
Escalation into war, regularly professed by English language Chinese media, solely for Indian and international audience is to pressure India further. Neither side would desire such a scenario. However, another Galwan could lead to high escalation levels, which may not remain localised. While India hopes for a peaceful resolution, it should remain prepared for war.
In case of war, both nations would be pushed back economically. The Chinese economy is contracting, further damage would ensure that Chinese plans to compete with the US are at an end.
While any loss of territory in operations could impact the Indian government in local and future elections, in China the two main figures behind the standoff, Xi Jinping and his trusted general, Xu Qiling would be forced into retirement. This would be unacceptable to the Chinese leadership.
China, which timed the intrusion to match the commencement of the patrolling season, is now forced to continue holding on wherever it has deployed for a longer duration. Its positions would become vulnerable as the weather changes and supply lines are disrupted. It would continue with its psychological warfare, threatening India with war and other consequences. India could now procrastinate in moving forward with talks. Despite all its bravado, China would remain cautious to choose war as its primary option.
The most difficult phase of negotiations has yet to commence. This is determining a face-saving avenue for ending the stalemate. This solution must suit both sides. It can neither emerge from military or diplomatic talks, only political. Hence, the involvement of Russia and the future meeting of the RIC assumes importance.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army