Creating theatre command to meet our specific conditions USI Journal Apr to Jun 2020
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Creating theatre command to meet our specific conditions USI Journal Apr to Jun 2020
Introduction
The mention of theatre commands conjures the US image of large forces moving across oceans capable of launching operations far from their home bases. It also intermingles two major terms, ‘theatres of war’ and theatres of operations’. A theatre of war is an area where ‘important military events occur or are progressing.’ A theatre of operations is a ‘sub-sector of a theatre of war’. In the Indian context, during operations, the nation becomes a theatre of war and within it would be theatres of operations.
Indian higher defence management and its armed forces structures initially defined by the British, modified over time, remained outdated to meet future challenges. No one considered tampering them as everyone had settled into the system, despite being aware that it was unfit to handle any crises of the modern era. Service chiefs kept referring to a Bottom’s Up approach in integration. This remained a farce and status quo continued, with service chiefs functioning as both, force-providers and force- employers.
It was finally on 15th Aug 2019, that the Prime Minister took the momentous decision and announced sweeping reforms on management of defence. He stated, ‘Our forces are India’s pride. To further sharpen coordination between the forces, I want to announce a major decision from the Red Fort: India will have a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).’ Reforms which overdue for decades became a reality.
In end December 2019, General Bipin Rawat, who was retiring as the army chief was appointed as the first CDS. He was given a period of three years to create integrated commands. Thus, reforms were finally on the way to completion.
Scope
This paper seeks to analyse India’s options for creating integrated commands based on its specific national security needs. It takes into consideration recent studies announced by the CDS on the subject. The paper will be covered under the following heads: –
Emerging national security threats
Shortcomings within our current force structuring
An analysis of Chinese integrated commands
Establishing theatre commands
Recommended stages for establishing integrated commands
Emerging National Security Threats
A nation’s environment is influenced not by its immediate neighbours alone but also by changes in global dynamics. The world is transiting into an information age, with power flowing from economic and military alliances where bases are shared to maintain control over strategic routes and points. There is greater reliance on technology with shifting emphasis to non-contact and non-kinetic warfare. Range of threats including cyber, space and info-space are growing more relevant. The use of proxy’s and enhancing internal strife to tie down adversarial states would continue as a global trend as nations seek to avoid moving into direct contact and kinetic warfare.
The environment on either side of India is distinct and different. On India’s East there exist regional rivalries, military asymmetries, a communist government and border disputes. The region is marked with insecure democracies. The West is dominated by wealth polarisation, insurgencies and terrorism. There is a threat of failed states, radicalism, Jihad and possession of weapons of mass destruction with non-state actors. Within Asia, West and South Asia have become global epicentres for a future conflict.
In the immediate neighbourhood, China will continue to assert itself, seeking to establish dominance in states surrounding India and in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan would remain a failing and highly radicalized state. There will always be a possibility of a collusive hybrid threat emanating from Pak and China, which could in the worst scenario emerge as a one and a half to two-front conflict.
Military operations initiated by China would initially be non-contact, non-kinetic. It would be marked by intense Cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure and stand-off attacks on strategic targets, aimed at pushing India onto the defensive. Due to existing topography, Chinese forces possess the advantage of interior lines of communication, while Indian forces are largely dependent on exterior lines.
Operations with China would also spill into other domains including outer space and info-space. It could subsequently lead to contact and kinetic operations with China seeking to capture some part of their claimed regions. In such a scenario, China would seek to enhance internal strife by influencing militant groups operating in the North East.
Pakistan may attempt to take advantage of this scenario. Post the announcement of the ‘Cold Start Doctrine,’ Pak conducted a series of wargames and exercises and announced a counter concept termed as ‘New Concept of War Fighting.’ This envisages induction of tactical nuclear weapons and faster mobilization to beat Indian schedules of Cold Start. Simultaneously, it seeks closer cooperation between their army and air force to counter Indian offensive plans.
Operations if launched by Pakistan, would initially be non-linear and hybrid, while seeking to influence internal strife and employing proxy forces in depth areas operating in conjunction military forces, all under a nuclear umbrella. The availability of nuclear weapons is aimed at restricting the employment of strong conventional Indian military forces operating in depth for a prolonged period.
In such a scenario India may seek destruction of enemy’s military combat potential, rather than capture of territory. Hence, it is essential to plan employment of maximum combat potential at the point of decision. Pakistan remains the only global nuclear- powered nation, which considers nuclear weapons as ‘weapons of war’ rather than ‘weapons of war deterrence.’
Disputed and unsettled borders on both fronts would imply that forces holding ground in advantageous positions can never be reduced as loss or gain of territory would be the deciding factor.
Maritime requirements include ensuring protection of Sea Lines of Communications, supporting Indian Ocean Region states, controlling crime and maintaining a friendly littoral. This implies ensuring supremacy in surface and sub-surface marine operations. Emphasis will need to shift to sea denial. Our island territories and offshore assets would need monitoring and protection.
In the aerospace domain, while existing threats would increase with growing capabilities of our adversaries, especially with enhanced concentration on employment of long-range missiles with greater accuracy and larger standoff ranges of weapons, the mass availability of drones including swarms of drones to break through even the most modern air defence systems, and remotely piloted vehicles have added a new dimension. Demands on airpower would be intense as would be the requirement of ensuring air defence security to the nation and its strategic assets.
Demographic challenges including radicalization of minorities leading to violence or sabotage benefiting the adversary can be expected during periods of operations. These would be fuelled by employing social media as part of psychological and information warfare. There have already been attempts to break the secular fabric of the nation and these would continue with time.
Hence, there is a requirement to reassess our current armed forces structures to meet emerging threats.
Shortcomings within our current force structuring
While nature and range of threats have changed, the structure of the forces to counter these threats have remained constant. In India the service chiefs have remained force providers and force employers. Decisions on armed forces matters are taken by a bureaucracy which is neither knowledgeable on military affairs nor responsible for their actions. There exists no single point military advisor, nor an authority to coordinate integrated operations, procurements and long-term planning.
Each service views its strategic and operational role in isolation. Jointness and integration in operations come secondary to individual service assumed roles and goals. Trust between services has hence reduced at the macro and micro levels. This has led to lack of synergy in operations. Apart from being a manpower intensive armed force, there is lack of interoperability between the forces, no commonality of equipment nor economies of scale.
Planning, procurement and processing of capabilities is only a compilation of individual service requirements not based on a common threat profile. Even added structures adopted by a service is kept away from the others till the final announcement. Joint service coordination for cyber, space, Information Warfare, Psychological Operations, training and logistics is non-existent. Individual service logistics chains imply duplicity in demanding, repairing, warehousing and transportation.
Shortcoming in the current structure also impact force application. Inter-service coordination is only possible at service HQ level. Current sectoral area of responsibility and existing allocation of forces make force application predictable. The air force representatives at army command and corps level are responsible to their own service chain of command, rather than the army. This implies availability of force would depend on air force priorities, instead of army operational requirements.
The armed forces within themselves have seventeen individual service commands, most of which are neither co-located nor co-purposed. There are 7 single service commands facing China as compared to a single Chinese Western Command deployed across.
The existing shortcomings mandate that the system be rehauled to bring about better synergy in every aspect spread from training, capability development to operations.
Analysis of Chinese integrated commands
Introduction
The US was the first to contemplate creating theatre commands. Its commands are based on a mix of the geographical and functional models. It presently possesses six geographical and four functional commands. Each has requisite force levels and integral C4ISR capabilities. Geographical Commands are under a single commander and can seek assistance from functional commands when needed.
Russia began its restructuring in 2008. It always terms its regions as districts. It has now created four theatre commands, removed divisions, keeping brigades as the basic fighting formation. Its concentration has been on non-contact warfare as it continues to rely on the Gerismov Doctrine, which advocates 70% non-military means versus 30% military means, as was evident in its successful occupation of Crimea and the subsequent civil war in Ukraine.
Chinese Theatre Commands
The Chinese theatre command model largely copies the US (Fig 1). They have created five peacetime geographical commands. The reason for China adopting the theatre command model is to develop an integrated joint operations capability, promotes joint training and enhance familiarity between services while providing for a rapid transition from peace to war.
The Chinese Western Theatre Command is responsible for operations against India. Apart from operations against India its additional responsibilities include maintaining ‘internal stability’ in Tibet and Xinjiang. Externally it could also be deployed in case of instability in Central Asian nations. It has integral to it adequate force levels including special and airborne forces needed for operations against India. However naval operations against India do not fall within the responsibility of this command and would need coordination with its Southern Naval Command.
The Chinese Southern Theatre Command was raised specifically for, ‘safeguarding sovereignty and interests in the South China Sea.’ It is in this region that China would deploy its SSBNs. It is also responsible for the borders with Myanmar and Vietnam. This command is also responsible for naval operations in the Indian Ocean and has the largest naval fleet of China.
Unlike the US, China had not prepared its cadre for this change. Since the Chinese forces have not been involved in any conflict since the creation of these commands, their jointness remains questionable. Armed forces and civilian agencies are integrated to ensure that logistics support is localised and not central.
The fact remains that the concept of theatre commands has been successful to the level that every nation, despite varying nature of threats has adopted this model with subtle variations based on their threat perceptions. India should not be an exception.
Establishing theatre commands
Introduction
Considering the existing scenario, growing variety of threats and existing shortcomings, India needs to reconsider its current organization structures. In addition, India needs to evolve a ‘whole of government’ approach to managing threats. As threats flow from beyond our immediate neighbourhood, India must look beyond its immediate regional sphere and seek a continental role for the current, with a global role in the future.
Status at present
The study for establishing an Air Defence (AD) Command is underway and that for establishing a Peninsula Command likely to be ordered shortly. The AD command envisages amalgamating all air defence resources of the three services except those of the army’s strike corps and navy’s ship-based AD resources under the air force.
The Peninsula command involves placing all resources of Western and Eastern Naval Command, few air force resources currently based in South India and some army formations/units into a single integrated command under the navy. It may meet resistance as all naval resources under one command could limit the role, tasking and employment of the navy. This service is seeking to enhance its current holding, hence would not be willing to limit its role and capabilities from the outset.
Study to establish land-based theatre commands are only likely to commence by the end of the year. For other functional commands including an integrated logistics command, Information Warfare and Psychological Operations Command and integrated training command no firm schedule has yet been announced.
Joint organizations or commands which would continue
The Andaman and Nicobar Command, Strategic Forces Command, Cyber Agency, Defence Space Agency and Armed Forces Special Operations Division, all of which have been established would remain in their present form.
Options for creating land-based theatre commands
Integrated land-based commands could either be threat oriented or geographical or a mix of both. When considering them from the geographical option, then there would be just two commands, Northern catering to China and Western catering towards Pakistan and beyond. In the threat- based option, J and K, which remains a major threat from both Pakistan and China, could remain a separate command, while the other two could be re-termed as Eastern, looking towards China and Western towards Pakistan. An analysis of each is given below: –
Geographical Commands (Fig 2).
The Western Theatre Command (Bi-service) would stretch from Siachen to the Rann of Kutch. It would also be responsible for counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir. The Northern Theatre Command (Bi-service) would be responsible for the border from Ladakh to Arunachal. It would also be responsible for insurgency in the North East. Thus, India could be divided into two integrated theatre commands.
Advantages/ disadvantages of this option. The option implies, one threat, one nation and for which one command is responsible. It would lead to coordinated operations, depending on the nature of threat. Would make planning, deployment and synchronisation of operations easy. Each command has multiple roles including insurgency. In J and K, where a collusive threat from both Pakistan and China exists, coordinated operations and sharing of resources may prove difficult.
Threat-based Theatre Commands (Fig 3).
In this case the broad sanctity of existing Northern and Eastern Commands would be maintained. The major change would be that the Northern Command would be responsible for complete J and K upto its border with Punjab as also Uttarakhand and Sugar Sector of the current Western Command. The balance border with China would be with Eastern Command. The Western Command would handle the plains, semi-desert and desert sectors, implying regions currently under the Western, South Western and Southern Commands.
There is an option of creating an additional integrated command (Integrated central command) to handle the Indo-Tibet border extending from Himachal, Uttarakhand to Sikkim including the responsibility of Chicken’s Neck. It implies handling disjointed sectors on both sides of Nepal. However, considering that the current responsibility of Eastern Command includes Sikkim, creating an additional command for two disjointed sectors is impractical. It would also lead to three commands facing China, implying lack of coordination in operations.
Advantages/Disadvantages of this option. Sanctity of two crucial commands is maintained. Importance of J and K as a flashpoint is catered for and the region is considered as a separate theatre of war. All strike and pivot corps are under one commander, providing him multiple options for an offensive. Airpower in J and K can be effectively employed. The major disadvantage is that there would be no synchronization of operations against China as the Ladakh and North East sectors are under different commands.
Theatre Command Structures
Ideally, existing operational commands should remain under the theatre commands. Similar should be structures below. However, in the Indian context, the intention is to reduce HQs, hence either Command or Corps HQs would remain. Considering the need for maintaining stability in operations, it is opined that once theatre commands are established and take over their responsibility, current command HQs could be closed and Corps HQs function directly under them. This will also result in minimum destabilization. Hence, the following is recommended considering both above options.
Geographical Command structures. The Western theatre command could be built up on the existing Western command. Current operational commands at Udhampur, Jaipur and Pune continue as hither to fore. No change in functioning of Corps HQs and below. Existing Northern Command to be less 14 Corps which would sidestep to the newly created Northern theatre command, which could be located on the premises of the current Central Command at Lucknow. 14 Corps would also be responsible for Sugar Sector, while UB area could be upgraded and made an independent Division or Corps to handle the Uttarakhand sector. Eastern Command would continue in its present location. Once theatre commands are raised and functional, existing operational commands could wind up and Corps operate directly under theatre commands.
Threat based theatre commands. In this case, Northern and Eastern Commands continue as at present, with added responsibility of Sugar Sector to Northern and Uttarakhand with UB Area (converted to Division) under Eastern Command. The newly raised Western theatre command is located at Lucknow, while existing operational commands at Chandimandir, Jaipur and Pune remain in place till the theatre command stabilizes. These are subsequently disbanded.
Recommended Option
Considering minimum turbulence, it is recommended that the threat-based option is adopted. This would imply that while the Northern and Eastern Command remain as at current, the others close when theatre commands are operational. Corps HQs and below should remain in place. In addition, two functional commands, not yet under consideration need to be created. These are Integrated Logistics Command and Integrated Training Command.
Integration within tri-service and bi-service commands
There has been lip service on jointness, integrated operations and handling other services. For India to achieve the level of proficiency would take at least a decade, provided an integrated training command is created and commences altering scope of training, enhancing jointness and integrated operations. Till then service specific officers would be required in every branch of tri-service commands for handling service matters, whether they be operational, logistics or administration. Their working together would bring about jointness and integration. The senior service officer in the HQ would remain his service advisor.
Land-based bi-service commands involve the army and air force. Air force representatives already exist at operational command and corps levels. However, they follow their own chain of command and allocate resources as desired by their air command HQs. In the context of integrated theatre commands, they would continue, however function through the integrated theatre commander and not the air force chain of command. Resources already allocated to the theatre command would be their responsibility as also coordinating additional resources from any functional air force command which may be created. The strength of air force staff in integrated HQs would be enhanced, and rank structure upgraded as they would form part of every branch of the HQ as also command resources allocated to the theatre.
The above would remain the norm, despite whichever service officer would command the theatre.
Restructuring chain of command
Vulnerability increases during periods of transition. Hence, service chiefs would remain in command of their specific integrated commands during this phase. Once integrated theatre commands stabilize then their chain of command flowing through the CDS to the defence minister should be implemented.
Recommend stages for establishing theatre commands
Theatre commands cannot be created in a rushed manner. Nor can there be any error in its structuring. Further, apart from force restructuring there is a need to consider the hygiene factors involved in the process. Ideally theatre commands should be raised in a sequential manner. A recommended option is given below: –
Phase 1. Appointment of a CDS with a mandate including tasks and role. He would, alongside his staff evolve a long-term plan for ultimate integration. This phase would also involve nomination of study groups for assessing different aspects of creating integrated theatre commands. (This is currently in progress).
Phase 2. Finalization of study group reports. The reports would be studied at relevant levels and finally approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). Timelines are essential to be followed.
Phase 3. The CCS on approval would push through laws for providing legitimacy to theatre commands including assigning roles, tasks and chain of command.
Phase 4. The concept should be put through a test bed including wargames at relevant level and one adhoc structure through exercises to confirm validity and determine shortfalls, if any.
Phase 5. The theatre command tested should be raised and its operational control assigned by the CCS.
Phase 6. The raising of the integrated training command and logistics command including amending the training curricula.
Phase 7. Raising of balance theatre commands and assigning their chain of command.
Phase 8. Promulgating integrated personal policies, common military laws, rules and instructions.
Conclusion
There is no escaping the fact that integrated theatre commands will be established. Simultaneously, Indian conditions and requirements for theatre commands are at variance from other countries and hence require a unique solution. Indian defence investments are also low, which must be factored in. Resources, especially airpower would always remain at a premium. Hence, India would need to move with caution and not make rushed judgements leading to subsequent changes. Sequential movement incorporating hygiene factors, joint logistics and joint training would make the transition smoother.
Fig 1
Fig 2
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About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army