https://cenjows.in/article-detail?id=371
Talks with no tangible solution 11 Aug 2020
As per reports, the fifth round of talks between Indian and Chinese military commanders held on 02 Aug, at Moldo, failed to make any headway in easing the over 100 days long standoff in Ladakh. India did not make any official statement post the talks, though sources stated, ‘the focus of the latest round of talks was on the Pangong lake area but the Chinese side refused to undertake any further disengagement unless Indian soldiers also step back by an equal distance. That is untenable. It was conveyed to the Chinese that status quo ante remains our aim and their proposal was not acceptable.’
India had demanded complete pull back from Pangong Tso, though, post the comments of the Chinese Ambassador, Sun Weidong last week, it appeared unlikely, within the gambit of the current level of talks. He had stated a few days earlier, ‘On the northern bank of Pangong Lake, China’s customary boundary line is in accordance with the LAC. China has not expanded its territorial claim.’ The Chinese are seeking to extract concessions, which India is unwilling to provide.
Despite acceptance, China has not completed the disengagement agreements of the 14 Jul military talks. Simultaneously, force levels remain evenly matched. Backing army talks are discussions of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) on Indo-China border affairs. These are headed by joint secretary level officers on both sides and have been effective since 2012. They were created to assist special representative level talks. Even these have made no headway.
There are also reports of Chinese troops movement in other sectors of the LAC. India is aware and has enhanced its presence in these regions. Chinese intent appears to be to continue exerting pressure along the entire LAC. India remains prepared for any escalation.
Apart from the above, diplomatic and economic actions are underway. India has added additional apps to those already banned, is planning to stop functioning of Chinese Confucius Institutes including cancelling tie ups with Indian universities while banning Chinese products moving through ASEAN nations. These have impacted China which has responded stating these decisions are biased and detrimental. The US is backing Indian actions with similar restrictions enhancing economic pressures on China. The banning of Tik Tok by Trump had a reference to the Indian comment on security of data.
China also commented on the abrogation of Article 370, stating, ‘any unilateral change to the status quo in the Kashmir region is illegal and invalid.’ This was countered by the Indian foreign office statement, ‘China has no locus standi whatsoever on this matter and is advised not to comment on internal affairs of other countries.’
All stated, the relationship appears to be moving downhill. Can it be restored by military talks?
Military talks are only a means of conveying views from relevant authorities, replies to which are subsequently assessed at multiple levels in both nations and acceptance/negation decisions conveyed back. In the current case, the Chinese offer of equal level of withdrawal was discussed by the China Study Group and a negative decision conveyed through the army hot line functioning at Ladakh. Hence, military talks are not the level where decisions would be arrived at, as those involved have limited authority to accept beyond a point. Further, the hype created by these talks would impede any diplomatic settlement, which could contain a face-saving withdrawal for China.
Army talks were effective when lowering temperatures post Galwan was essential. With the level of conflict rising beyond just disengagement and Chinese demands increasing, there is a need to reconsider the level of dialogue. It is a similar case with the WMCC level. Even if China proposes further military talks, acceptance should be considered once disengagements agreed on 14 Jul are implemented.
Simultaneously, India must accept that it will remain deployed for the winters and maintain level of forces essential to thwart any Chinese offensive plans. Build-up by China should be monitored and matched in every manner. Any tactical benefit which could be gained by deploying forward, negating any advantage which the Chinese possess, should be implemented. India should ensure that Chinese remain locked in their current deployed areas, till they unilaterally withdraw under pressure.
Future discussion between the nations, if any, should be via diplomatic channels. Both nations have ambassadors with fully staffed embassies, whose role is managing the environment. They should be the means of communicating between the two governments. Ambassadors, akin to military commanders involved in talks, have limited authority to take decisions. Like military commanders, they would convey the host nation’s views to their respective countries for acceptance/ rejection. Talks at this level would not provide media hype which military talks create, enabling determining a resolution.
Since ambassadors are based in capital cities, have direct access to the host nation’s foreign office and foreign secretary as also their own country’s top leadership, decisions and counterviews would flow faster. The army authorities should be kept in the loop to monitor any agreements, which are arrived at.
Final solutions would only flow from political discussions, whether they involve foreign ministers or special representatives. India is in no hurry to rush to this level as it remains confident of handling the Chinese threat, without enhancing levels of dialogue. In case, China desires to raise levels, the offer must flow from them.
India took time to compel the Chinese to withdraw in Sumdorong Chu in the eighties, Depsang in 2013 and Doklam in 2017. It achieved these through firm standoffs and talks. Hence, it is currently willing to let the confrontation continue while it enhances pressure on China employing its diplomatic clout and market power. The Chinese also appear to be having the same intention of being in no hurry as early resolution in India’s favour would impact Chinese standing. With India, unwilling to bend, the only option left would be either to continue maintaining current deployment or expand the military option.
With passage of time, public attention on the standoff would reduce, permitting diplomacy to succeed with a face-saving resolution. Therefore, continuing with the farce of military talks needs reconsideration. Diplomatic channels involving embassies must become the main mode. It will also reduce media hype.