Firm mindset needed in forthcoming Indo-China army talks CENJOWS 16 Sep 2020
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Firm mindset needed in forthcoming Indo-China army talks CENJOWS 16 Sep 2020
The two foreign ministers have discussed Indo-China tensions in Moscow and issued a joint statement. Jaishankar had stated prior to his Moscow visit that the ongoing standoff was serious and warranted a diplomatic solution. The joint statement mentioned, ‘The two Foreign Ministers also agreed that the current situation in the border areas is not in the interest of either nation and therefore, agreed that the border troops of both nations should continue their dialogue, quickly disengage, maintain proper distance and ease tensions.’
It added, ‘The two sides also agreed to abide by all existing agreements and protocol on China-India boundary affairs to ensure peace and tranquillity in the border areas and avoid any action that could escalate matters.’ The statement accepted that diplomatic and military talks must continue to resolve the current standoff.
The joint statement has termed the LAC as border areas, thus removing the sanctity maintained through decades. There is also no mention of restoration of status quo ante of Apr 2020, which was the basic Indian demand, nor is there any timeline for de-escalation and withdrawal of forces.
It is possible that timelines for de-escalation and restoration of status quo are to be decided in army level talks, most of which have failed to achieve any results. The joint statement left avenues open to both sides to determine where they would disengage and de-escalate and where they could delay, though Jaishankar mentioned that Indian forces would monitor Chinese move back prior to responding in kind. Further army commanders, involved with talks, only convey national viewpoints with main decisions being taken in Delhi and Beijing and subsequently conveyed back through army hot lines.
The joint statement also mentioned moving back all personal and equipment that are supposed to have crossed the LAC as also quick disengagement of frontier troops leading subsequently to de-escalation. The fact that there is a differing perception of the LAC makes resolution even more difficult. For China, disengagement is primary as it cannot risk another Galwan.
The Indian foreign ministry statement, post the talks, mentioned that India is prepared to work along with China to ease tensions through dialogue and negotiation to restore peace and tranquillity. The Chinese foreign minister interpreted this and stated that India and China have agreed to meet each other half-way, an aspect which conveys a different meaning.
The Chinese press placed the onus of restoring peace on India. The Global Times, in an editorial stated, ‘The successful implementation of the joint statement, however, depends on whether the Indian side can truly keep its word.’ It attempted to warn India by adding, ‘Only a strong military can wake up a sleepy India, words are not enough.’
The intrusions by China towards their claim lines initially took the army by surprise. The political leadership, though initially caught in a policy paralysis, recovered quickly. The army, after observing Chinese dillydallying, firmed its plans for a counter action. The political leadership gave a green signal. At the opportune moment, a planned offensive action to occupy heights, which had never been even patrolled post the 1962 war, was implemented. It turned tables, put the Chinese on the defensive and gave credence to Indian diplomacy, when the two foreign ministers met in Moscow.
The Indian positions occupied on both banks have eroded most gains made by China. It has the advantage to apply pressure on China in case it attempts to venture forward, apart from protecting approaches towards Chushul and Ladakh. Operationally, they can assist in targeting the main Chinese camp, in case it persists in offensive attempts. Hence, sacrificing these gains, unless reciprocated in full by China, is pointless.
There is no guarantee, in the current environment of trust deficit, that China would not occupy these locations, which could in the future, provide them with a major avenue of ingress. Simultaneously, establishing new posts, capable of withstanding attacks, maintaining them through the winters and keeping forces prepared for a Chinese counter stroke is no easy task for Indian forces.
China, which had proposed disengagement to be followed by de-escalation, implemented disengagement but refused to proceed with de-escalation as it believed it held the upper hand and could push the LAC westwards as per its claim lines. The disengagements currently being discussed imply both banks of Pangong Tso, with little reference to Depsang, where a similar situation exists and in the long term could be disadvantageous to India. China considers the Indian offensive action to be a violation of its perception of the LAC as also a major threat and would seek to employ every means to push India back.
A few questions arise from the joint statement, which need discussion. Under what conditions should India accept de-escalation and withdraw from heights it currently holds, or should it continue to remain there? Would China demolish its newly constructed structures in the Finger area as part of de-escalation? Should there be new Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), as proposed in the joint statement, to ensure China does not take control of heights which India currently occupies? Is Ladakh only a diversionary to draw in Indian reserves, which could be locked in for the winters, when pressure could build on Arunachal Pradesh?
Disengagement implies creating gaps between forces currently deployed in places within firing range on both banks of the Pangong Tso. De-escalation is moving forces behind the accepted LAC as in Apr 2020 and additional forces out of the sector. Indians should insist in talks between military commanders on a quid pro quo across the region. India vacating its current deployment along the Kailash Range should be in return for China demolishing its new structures in the Finger region and withdrawal from Depsang. In case of any Chinese hesitation India should continue maintaining its current deployment to maintain pressure on China.
Timelines for de-escalation should be clearly laid down. While winters would not adversely impact Indian forces deployed in the region, they would impact withdrawal of additional forces, in case China seeks to change direction and apply pressure in Arunachal Pradesh.
On CBMs, there is a requirement to lay down measures to prevent another incident like Galwan, where the Chinese used instruments which caused grievous injuries. Simultaneously India does not seek another active LoC as with Pakistan, where firing is a regular occurrence. Further, discussions should include an agreement that no additional features would be occupied nor would there be any construction in disputed regions. The existing structures in such regions must be demolished. The major issue which will always remain is whether China can be trusted to adhere to its promises.
A fact which need consideration is whether Ladakh remains the main concern of the Chinese or is it only till the onset of winters when a fresh push could be expected in Arunachal Pradesh, where the weather is more conducive. There is no doubt that Indian forces are deployed and prepared to thwart any similar moves. This cannot be discussed at current talks. In this scenario it would be just wait and watch, remain prepared to enhance pressure and thwart any Chinese attempts.
A clear-cut strategy and firm mindset at the national level are essential to push forth Indian concerns and restore normalcy in a trust deficit environment. India should exploit the gains which remain in its favour. In case of hesitation by China, it should prepare to hold onto its positions, against all odds, and push the Chinese to remain in the area through the winters.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army