India has prepared for Ladakh winters The Excelsior 25 Sep 2020
India has prepared for Ladakh winters 25 Sep 2020
Winters are fast approaching in Ladakh where the current standoff continues. India has dug in deep and is unwilling to shed an inch. Its current deployment has placed China at a disadvantage, regaining these locations would imply launching an offensive, which neither its soldiers nor the CCP is willing to risk. Withdrawal would imply a loss of face, which the PLA cannot afford. It faced the experience in Doklam and cannot repeat it again.
China has realised that there are limited options in Ladakh. These include accusing India of transgressing the LAC and demanding its withdrawal, which is unlikely to be accepted, continuing with false propaganda, hoping pressure would mount on the government to seek a solution beneficial to China or continue holding ground through the winters, hoping to tire the Indians. Of all these options, the only one which can lead to Chinese face-saving in Ladakh is continuing its deployment and hoping India seeks a pro-China solution.
India has learnt from previous Chinese standoffs, which have been prolonged. Thus, when China proposed talks as a solution, it was understood that it was playing the prolonging game and the standoff would extend into the winters.
Xi Jinping’s dreams of getting a victory salute over Ladakh during the centenary celebrations of the CCP, next year, and sealing his place in Chinese history has ended. If an offensive is launched, the flow of body bags into China may well mean the end of the communist regime, as its one child policy could ignite the masses to rise in anger.
Further, Chinese conscript soldiers, who form a large chunk of their army, are poorly trained, lack motivation and hence most likely to vacate the battlefield in panic when they witness strong retaliation of trained Indian forces. Thus, Chinese emphasis remains on disengagement, propaganda warfare and talks. De-escalation is not a priority and China seeks to avoid confrontation leading to loss of lives. The few firing incidents displayed panic of Chinese soldiers.
As an alternative, there is a possibility that as the winters set in Ladakh, the Chinese focus may shift to other sectors including the North East, where the weather is more conducive. The enhancement of force levels across other areas of the LAC, including Arunachal, proves that China is desperate for some victory against India. Its other option, apart from India, is amalgamating Taiwan where tensions continue to build.
China had presumed, once India enhanced force levels and blocked Chinese game plans, that it could face, apart from financial implications, problems of maintaining its forces in the winters in Ladakh. It was aware that there are limited road axes for stocking, and these would be choked with traffic. In addition, procurement of winter equipment and clothing may not be possible in a short time frame, compelling India to reduce troop levels, as the weather changes. Further, with an economy on the downswing and increasing cases of COVID, India would not be financially stable to manage additional expenditure.
The Indian army evaluated Chinese options as soon as the crisis began, and talks proved futile. It expected the standoff to prolong and hence began preparing to maintain additional forces through the winters. It invested in opening multiple avenues for movement of stores and began their procurement. Reserves were tapped into and fresh procurement initiated to replenish the reserves. Financially, nothing is more important than national security and staring down a bully.
Within months, India organized and completed its preparations for long term deployment. Not only has it inducted additional forces but also catered for their requirements, all in record time. The Chinese misjudged not only Indian capabilities but also the fact that Indian force HQs are aware of needs and requirements of the region and have decades of experience of movement of equipment, manpower and stores into Ladakh. It always maintained suitable reserves as China was never a trusted neighbour.
Currently, India has stocked all that is needed for the coming winters and has begun procuring for the future, which could extend well beyond this period. The equipping of troops with clothing, arctic tentage, heating appliances and food supplements has been completed. Alongside has been stocking of ammunition, repair facilities, constructing underground medical facilities including operation theatres and facilities for treatment of COVID patients. Water points have been created. India has an added advantage of the local Ladakh population which are more than willing to help transport stores and supplies to deployed troops in winters by foot.
Thus, as the two forces move forward for talks, progress on which may be slow, India is set to continue with its forward deployment through the winters. Stocking levels are sufficient for any offensive actions which may be necessitated by Chinese misadventures. Alongside this Indian forces have initiated measures to ensure that road connectivity into Ladakh is maintained through a greater part of the winters. With a modern air transport fleet, India can also now provide fresh fruits and vegetables throughout the winters.
The Indian preparation will impact the Chinese in multiple ways. The PLA, which for decades vacated Ladakh in winters, leaving maintaining the sanctity of the LAC to their Border Defence Regiments (BDR) and militia, both of which comprise locals, would now be compelled to stay deployed. China would also need to enhance its stores and equipment in a similar manner as adverse weather impacts both sides. With an underdeveloped Tibet, these would need to be moved from mainland China at a far greater cost.
This is an exercise which the PLA has never done for such force levels and would need to plan and implement from scratch. Further, pushing its conscripted soldiers to spend their winters in harsh climate is an added problem. It may possess suitable infrastructure, however troops need to be prepared to move into the open, facing vagaries of weather, for which they are unprepared.
As weather changes, the advantage would shift to India. China will struggle to hold onto its positions. The only option open to China, to prevent India from exploiting the harsh conditions is to enhance pressure in Arunachal, for which it is currently deploying. India is expecting this and has hence prepared itself for such an action.
Ultimately, the game plan of Xi Jinping, of securing Chinese claim lines in Ladakh, without firing a bullet, has backfired. It would now be compelled to remain deployed in harsh conditions for a prolonged period.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army