China must realise India can hit back The Statesman 10 Jan 2023
China must realise India can hit back The Statesman 10 Jan 2023
Claiming that the tense situation along India’s northern borders is because China had not adhered to earlier border agreements, Jaishankar stated in an interaction with Austrian public broadcaster ORF, ‘There’s a larger concern, which is based on our experiences. The concern is that we had agreements with China not to mass forces in our border areas and they have not observed those agreements, which is why we have the currently tense situation that we do.’ Ram Madhav, writing for the Indian Express in mid-December stated, ‘For China, continuous attempts to nibble away at Indian territory have been normal ever since (China began disputing the McMahon Line (1964) and Sikkim joining India (1975)).’
While the PLA attempts salami slicing at Indian territory, blaming India for the incidents, Chinese diplomats talk of improved relations by bifurcating border disputes from diplomatic ties. The Chinese spokesperson Zhao Lijian stated in a press interaction, ‘Galwan Valley incident took place because India violated all the signed agreements and treaties and encroached upon Chinese territory, illegally crossing the line (LAC).’ On the Yangtse incident, Colonel Long Shaohua, a spokesperson for the Western Theatre Command of the PLA, mentioned that ‘a routine (Chinese) patrol was blocked by the Indian army illegally crossing the LAC.’
The erstwhile Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi, mentioned in Delhi, during his last visit in Mar 2022, ‘the two sides should put the differences on the boundary issue in an appropriate position in bilateral relations and adhere to the correct development direction of bilateral relations.’ The new foreign minister, Qin Gang, writes in an article, ‘As to the border issues between China and India, the status quo is that both sides are willing to ease the situation and jointly protect peace along their borders.’ Border incidents have increased with development of infrastructure on Indian side, which China perceives as a threat.
In reality the new normal between China and India is that while China suggests improvement in bilateral cooperation and enhanced economic ties on one hand, it will attempt salami slicing with the other. Salami slicing is not so much aimed at grabbing territory than it is at displaying India as a weaker nation which China can intrude at will as also embarrassing the nation and government.
Another fact is that China is unwilling to escalate beyond a level which is why they continue the use of handheld medieval weapons. Its intention is to keep tensions at manageable levels, thereby preventing an escalation, which could be damaging to them at the tactical level. As recoveries of sleeping bags post Yangtse displayed, the Chinese intent was to occupy territory, engage in prolonged dialogue, place unacceptable terms, build infrastructure and ultimately change the alignment of the LAC. After all 17 rounds of corps commander level talks have not ended the standoff in Ladakh.
Added is Chinese strategy of ensuring India faces neighbourhood challenges. With Bangladesh and Maldives coming into elections this year, a pro-China Oli backed government in Nepal, an economically struggling Sri Lanka, India has its hands full in its neighbourhood. The closer India moves towards the US and Europe the more will be attempts to embarrass India along the LAC. Further, as India’s infrastructure develops, Chinese objections and attempts to disrupt and grab Indian territory seeking to force stop it will continue.
A failed salami slicing incident is equally embarrassing for China. It maintained silence over Yangtse, licking its wounds, till it was broken in India media, compelling it to respond, to which it did by issuing a meek statement. Its attempts to employ drones to capture its success and embarrass India backfired, forcing it into a pregnant silence. It released doctored videos, post Galwan to embarrass India, but hoped India does not do the same post Yangtse.
For India, the Chinese threat is ongoing. Will the future signal continuation of its policy of sticks and barbed spikes or is there a bigger gameplan. Should India respond in a similar manner as China or with weapons as border agreements no longer hold ground is a continuous debate. Post Galwan, the army permitted its troops to use firearms under ‘extraordinary’ circumstances, though it has not defined ‘extraordinary’. The government even announced that the Chinese were informed on the changed ‘Rules of Engagement.’ Carrying weapons but not being permitted to use them is a failure of senior leadership. Questions remain on why this was not implemented at Yangtse. There are reports that the Chinese fired in the air to stop Indian troops from overrunning their post opposite Yangtse.
There is no doubt that the Chinese army suffered a loss of prestige at Yangtse and as a nation was dubbed as one which does not adhere to agreements and rules post Galwan. Raising the subject in every global interaction, Jaishankar is only rubbing salt on Chinese wounds, by conveying that China, as a nation, cannot be trusted.
Currently India has no enunciated policy towards China. All that is stated is that India has no territorial ambitions but will defend every inch of its territory. Hence, China acts and India reacts. If this continues, India is bound to be surprised at some point as it happened in Ladakh. Either India lays down its red lines or decides to occupy its perceived locations along the LAC, within the Chinese perception, China will not feel the pinch. Unless China is given a lesson like the Kailash Ridge, it will continue to feel emboldened.
For this, the Chinese threat must be discussed in parliament and a national message sent. Blocking discussion under the garb of national security and the role of the army is not a solution. Alternatively, India must publish its National Security Strategy enunciating its offensive intent. India is not a nation which China can overrun or even embarrass at will. It is doing so because India is unwilling to confront it as part of its national policy. The national leadership must get its act together to send forth a strong message.
Simultaneously, Indian military power to deter Chinese threat must continue being developed. China must realize that militarily, on air, land and sea, India has the capability to hit back.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army