Armed forces need structural reforms The Statesman 03 Jun 2025
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Armed forces need structural reforms The Statesman 03 Jun 2025
The devastation to Pakistan’s air defence systems and strategic assets, including air bases, in the short four-day Operation Sindoor, was such that Islamabad and Rawalpindi were compelled to release their troll army to convert their DGMOs call for ceasefire amidst imminent defeat to false victory.
Such was the desperation that even their Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharief, on Azerbaijanian soil, in front of global media, falsely claimed downing six Indian aircraft, including four Rafale, while praising their army chief Asim Munir, whom they were compelled to promote to Field Marshal, as a display of victory. The Indian CDS rebuked his claim.
Operation Sindoor was a perfect example of coordinated and synergized action amongst India’s three services and multiple other agencies including external intelligence, technical monitoring organizations etc. It was done under the aegis of the CDS.
Despite shortcomings in structures and capabilities, the armed forces stood tall and displayed what they can achieve when working in unison. In a span of four days, they brought Pakistan to its knees, forcing it to request for a ceasefire. Had Operation Sindoor extended, the devastation to Pak’s military assets would have been greater. The operation may have been a setback for Pakistan and China, which armed it, but they have picked the pieces.
Post Uri, was the cross-border strike on terrorist camps, which was again expected to be repeated after Pulwama. Hence Pakistan strengthened the LoC. Pakistan was certain India would not employ airpower as it could signal declaration of war, which it would not risk due to their nuclear bogey. It had also considered the Kargil scenario where orders were given by the Vajpayee government not to cross the LoC.
However, Indian aircraft entered Pak airspace to strike Balakote. It was a total surprise compelling their then defence minister, Pervez Khatak, to mention, ‘Our air force was ready but since it was night they could not assess the damage so they waited.’ Pakistan was thrilled when it downed an Indian MIG 21, ignoring its own casualties and losses. For them this was victory.
This time Pakistan expected a strike akin to Balakote and hence beefed up their air defences, ready to target any aircraft crossing the LoC. Meanwhile, India, aware that terrorism would again be exploited to highlight the disputed status of Kashmir, had prepared differently for a similar eventuality.
When Operation Sindoor happened, Pakistan was again surprised. They attempted to retaliate the next night, hoping to cause some damage as a face-saver, but failed. Retaliatory Indian strikes tore apart their strategic assets, after negating their air defences, forcing them to request for a ceasefire.
This is not the end. The Pakistan military and civil leadership, while licking their wounds, are aware of differences in military power, failure of Chinese and Turkish military hardware and their planning and implementation. It can never admit failure as it could lead to loss of control of the army over national politics, resulting in the collapse of the current government.
It could also end in another coup solely intended at preventing the emergence of Imran Khan as the new leader, aka Bhutto after 1971. Hence, their narratives have been packed with lies, backed by their hierarchy, convincing their public, while sowing seeds of distrust on gullible Indian and global media and populace.
India has to now look ahead. Terrorism, despite talks, if ever held, will not end. Pak is known to make promises and never keep them. At some stage in the future, prodded by China, and pumped with its new weaponry, Pakistan will attempt another terrorist incident which will be beyond India’s tolerance levels, compelling it to react. China and Pakistan have drawn their lessons from Operation Sindoor. Indian armed forces are doing the same.
It is time for India to push for creation of theatre commands, where coordination, force synergy and decisions are taken under one roof, implemented in one operations room, post clearance by the political authority as against it being coordinated by the CDS, monitored in three different service operation rooms, overseen by service chiefs. Training and exercises in theatre commands would anyway strengthen joint operations.
Theatre commands being way beyond single service commands of current, would be structured accordingly. Their role would include coordinating operations against one or more adversaries and hence would be suitably organized. It should have representatives of all major external intelligence agencies, technical monitoring establishments, MEA, real-time links to satellites etc. As technology increases so would inputs to these commands.
This implies that all resources necessary for launching operations would exist under one roof. If there is need for additional resources, these would be allocated accordingly. Operations, so controlled, would offset the need for three different service HQs being involved in planning, coordination and execution.
Theatre commands would have multiple options for military offensives as also limited strikes in their region of responsibility. There are many who mention that the close coordination achieved this time does not warrant amending the existing system.
The difference is that all would happen under one roof, with one commander, responsible for that theatre, employing joint forces under a synergized plan. This will also enable activation of multiple contingencies depending on how operations progress.
Simultaneously, service HQs as also HQ IDS (Integrated Defence Staff) would continue pushing for force development and capability enhancement. This is a major role as shortcomings in capabilities to handle a two-front conflict exist. It necessitates an enhancement in defence budget as also speeding up procurements. Multi-domain operations involving space, cyber, information and cognitive (including building and pushing the right narrative) are part and parcel of future conflicts. These imply greater civil-military fusion which would be the role of HQ IDS.
The difference between the current and the next level is that service HQs would be force providers while theatre commands would employ them. HQ IDS would coordinate provision of additional resources as the situation demands. All organs of the state would need to function in synergy, displaying a ‘whole of nation’ approach.
The future will be vastly different. As has been seen from Uri onwards, no two conflicts are the same. As days go by, the role of technology in modern warfare will only increase for which we need to prepare and change. We can no longer fight tomorrow’s war with today’s structures. We need to change and change fast. Will the government take heed?
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army