Heart of Asia isolated Pakistan The Excelsior 14 Dec 16
The recently concluded ‘Heart of Asia’ conference witnessed theatrics and controversies as well as signalled a shift in regional dynamics. While a few common statements were expected, some came as a welcome surprise. The joint statement was clearly crafted, supported and pushed by India, with support from Afghanistan. In all common platforms, since Pathankot, India raised the Pakistan bogey of sponsoring terror, but in each one, Pakistan was not a member and India’s efforts were scuttled by China. This was the first platform, with Pakistan in presence, that the statement specifically mentioned Pak sponsored terror groups, operating against India. Promises continued to be made in the summit, some of which would be ignored with time while some would be fulfilled. However, all actions may be restricted by changing security scenarios.
The change in the schedule of the de-facto Pakistan foreign minister, to arrive a day before, led to a variety of speculations. Some suggested the intention was to avoid the early morning fog, which could delay flights, others claimed it was to enable him to attend the dinner hosted by the Prime Minister as also interact with key officials. Pakistan announced his schedule and claimed to have left it to India to plan or avoid meetings on the side-lines of the summit. India on the other hand, claimed that there was no formal request from Pakistan for talks, nor was India keen, as it was unwilling to change its stance that ‘talks and terror’ cannot go hand in hand. In a frosted relationship, as presently existing, no nation is willing to take the first step. Had Pakistan requested for talks and India denied, it would have soured relations even more. While Sartaj Aziz did attend the dinner, and walked some distance with the NSA, claims of talks varied. The Indian side claimed there were no talks, Pakistan claimed that discussions continued for about half an hour.
The Indian prime minister spoke as expected, blaming Pakistan for all the ills prevailing in the region, aiming to continue his attempts at isolating it. The highlight was the address by the Afghan President, Ashraf Ghani, where he praised India for its unilateral military and economic support, while simultaneously rebuking Pakistan for supporting terror groups operating in Afghanistan. His open comment to Aziz, that the money offered by Pakistan for its development, could be better utilized by them for battling terror groups, as unless those are eradicated, no development can occur in Afghanistan. Through all this ranting, Sartaj Aziz was compelled to sit with a straight face, even when Ghani addressed him directly by name. Aziz did attempt to regain the situation, stating the Pak’s attendance despite border tensions, indicated its serious desire for restoring peace in Afghanistan, cut no ice. Pak media downplayed the degradation in the conference, while all Aziz could state was, ‘it is easy to single one country’.
For Pakistan, it was a difficult situation. Had it avoided attending the conference as a tit for tat for SAARC, it would have been the loser, as the conference would have continued and ignored its absence. It would have also given Afghanistan an additional lever to accuse it even more, in addition indicating to the world Pakistan’s lack of interest in restoring peace in Afghanistan. There was an option with Pakistan to send a junior representative, however, if it did so, its position on the importance of resolving the Afghan issue would diminish. It was compelled to choose between the devil and the deep sea.
The conference cleared the air on many issues. Firstly, it indicated a change in regional dynamics. India has emerged as a key player in Afghanistan. Its support in both military and economic fields have made it Afghanistan’s most dominant partner. Pakistan has not only been relegated to the background, but also been directly accused of supporting and fermenting terror incidents there. An open comment that the Taliban cannot survive even for a month without its bases in Pakistan, highlights the distance which has emerged between the two states.
Secondly, by refusing to hold formal talks, India has stated that its policy of ‘talks and terror not going together’ is being adhered to. It conveys the message that India is willing to continue to up the ante, till Pak resorts to visible action in curbing known terror groups. Thirdly, the adoption of the joint statement by all members including staunch Pakistan supporters, Turkey and China, directly stating Pak sponsored terror groups including the LeT and HuM was indicative of Indian diplomatic success. Fourthly, the decision of India and Afghanistan to establish an air corridor, bypassing Pakistan was conveying the message that its importance can be diluted.
For Afghanistan, the year had been a difficult one. Increased Taliban offensives have resulted in higher casualties and greater loss of territory. For Ghani, the shift in his foreign policy from Pakistan to India and dealing with internal rumblings had compelled him to lash out against them, knowing that he would have Indian and US support. For Pakistan, bad ties with its western neighbour indicates that it would need to contend with handling two active fronts. It would also open doors for India to support anti-Pak groups in case it does not control the anti-India ones.
Realistically, Pak, India and Afghanistan do and in some cases, could support terror groups operating against each other. They can sit together and resolve their differences, permitting concentration on development. However, geo-strategic and ideological barriers prevent such a step. Therefore, in the near term, unless serious pressures are applied, there would be no change and the local population in both, Afghanistan and Pakistan would continue to suffer with groups operating from each other’s soil. Indian would remain affected by terror, though less than the other two. Finally, the conference only added to Pakistan’s isolation woes.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army