India and US differences in involving military leadership at national level CENJOWS 18 Jun 19
https://cenjows.gov.in/article-detail?id=178
India and US: differences in involving military leadership at national level CENJOWS 18 Jun 19
When Trump assumed office and nominated a host of retired Generals as his advisors, Indian thinktanks and media went on an overdrive comparing the two nations. His initial nominations included General James Mattis as Secretary of Defence, General John Kelly as Secretary of Homeland Security and initially General Michael Flynn followed by General HR Macmaster as the National Security Advisor (NSA). The fact that most never lasted long, due to Trump’s temperamental behaviour, is immaterial. In earlier US administrations too retired military personnel have found important advisory positions to the President.
On the contrary in India, the NSA is from the IPS, all advisors to the PM from the IAS and the present external affairs minister from the Indian Foreign Service. A retired army officer only finds a place as an advisor to the NSA, rather than even being part of the organization. None is even an advisor to the Governor of J and K, despite many having served at the grassroots to senior levels in the state. Of the two ministers with an army background in the last government, one has been retained as a MoS and the other has been given a miss in the present one.
Senior armed forces officers are on occasions considered suitable as governors or ambassadors. The reason is simple. While both these appointments may appear lucrative and important but are always under the control of the central government. There is little leeway available for those in these two appointments to act independently.
Historically, the Indian armed forces have always been inward looking, with rare exposure to handling issues at the international level. This is because we have always considered security of the homeland as a priority, never looking outwards. Even service chiefs have not been involved in diplomacy at the international level, despite visits to friendly nations during their service. Military diplomacy, which could play a major role in enhancing ties, especially in nations where the military controls the government from the backseat, has also been ignored.
Compare this with US integrated command commanders, whose span of operations covers multiple countries. They possess a greater understanding of international relations and power dynamics. During their visits to nations in their sphere of operations, apart from interacting with the military hierarchy they also meet concerned senior functionaries and ministers, hence remain diplomatically aware. Their inputs and understanding are considered positively by multiple senate committees, where they are frequently called for their assessments. Their freedom in interactions and decision making is much higher.
The other aspect which impacts is the current national system of governance. With a bureaucratic run Ministry of Defence (MoD) controlling the armed forces, service chiefs have been kept away from national decision making even on matters of national security, in which they are expected to play a major part. They are not a part of any national security decision making committee.
Their interactions remain at best with the defence minister and their meetings and advice at the PM level is rarely sought. Possibly, in recent times, they were in direct contact only when surgical strikes were to be launched. Even then in every interaction the NSA was omnipresent. He was also present in the operations room when these strikes were launched, thus indicating that he was more trusted than service chiefs by the PM.
Suppressing of the armed forces has been done over the years as every government has sought to keep them at bay fearing a notional coup. Despite the armed forces and strategic thinkers stating at every forum that the government must reorganize apex management of defence and appoint a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) as a single point advisor to the government, who could then be a member of major committees, there remains a hesitation.
There is no study also which has not recommended the CDS as essential for a coordinated approach to emerging threats, but every government, considering models of the neighbourhood, where the armed forces control the nation from the backseat, fear doing so. This stems from the feeling that this appointment could grant immense power to one individual. Governments either ignore reorganizing apex management of defence or claim lack of political consensus. The Defence Planning Committee under the NSA has service chiefs, but this committee can only make recommendations, not decisions.
The armed forces are expected to be apolitical. This also implies that military personnel will not interact with politicians and political parties while in service. The lack of interaction between the uniformed and the polity prevents the political leadership from knowing the true capability of senior military commanders. Politicians proximity to the bureaucracy and other central services, which do their bidding without question, makes working with them more comfortable. Hence, they rely on their advice even on subjects on which they lack expertise.
There are areas where the domain expertise is that of the armed forces, insurgency and winning hearts and minds of the population in trouble spots, being examples. Even in these fields, advisors are either from the IPS or civil services, who have never operated at multiple levels in these regions nor are aware of the true feelings of the local populace. Hence, government policies in these regions have rarely succeeded, yet they refuse to change their approach and bring in senior military personnel as advisors.
There is also the belief within the bureaucracy that opening doors to retired senior military personnel at national advisory levels would be detrimental to their own interests. This is egged on by the fact that within the armed forces, there is a strict hierarchical order and hence their personnel may not be suitable. There is also a belief that advisors at the national level must interact with a vast spectrum involving bureaucracy, politicians and their own personnel in uniform, which is not considered the military’s cup of cake.
Till recently, all armed forces chiefs and other senior promotions were only on seniority. Governments over the years appointed the senior most as either a service chief or theatre commander as was the case. The Modi government began a process of deep selection, implying choosing the service head whom the government would be comfortable working with. Hence, they should have had the ear of the Prime Minister, which has still to happen. Whether this amendment in the selection format would change the government’s approach in appointing military veterans as advisors, in the future, is yet to be seen?
It is surprising that in an era of increased threats and security challenges, armed forces members continue being ignored as advisors in national security to the government on flimsy grounds, while others with lack of professional military knowledge are considered more capable. While most of these appointments are the prerogative of the political leadership, unless they step forward and interact with military personnel, they would never realize their ability and knowledge. This would impact obtaining right advice, on national security, which is essential at the national level.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army