Can we change Pakistan’s J and K narrative Scholar Warrior, CLAWS Mar 2020

Can we change Pakistan’s J and K narrative Scholar Warrior, CLAWS Mar 2020

https://www.claws.in/publication/can-we-change-pakistans-jk-narrative/

Can we change Pakistan’s J and K narrative? Scholar Warrior, CLAWS Mar 2020

Introduction

As part of discussions in Parliament during the abrogation of Article 370, Home Minister Amit Shah made two profound statements. He stated, “Over 41,500 people lost their lives in J&K due to militancy since 1989,” and, “Article 370 is creating doubts over J&K’s relations with India.” These two statements summed up the current environment and status of Kashmir.

Firstly, there have been high casualties in the region due to Pak backed militancy and secondly, the existence of the Article, exploited by local politicians and Pak sponsored Hurriyat, proved that J and K (as held by India) remains disputed between India and Pak. Mehbooba Mufti had stated earlier on Article 35 A, “We want to tell the central government that tinkering with Article 35-A will be akin to setting a powder keg on fire.” The Hurriyat even claimed to be a party to the dispute. Earlier governments were even willing to engage in dialogue with the Hurriyat. The reality was vastly different.

While J and K had merged with India, it was Pak which attempted to capture Kashmir on multiple occasions, 1947, 65 and 99, but failed each time. Realising that there was no military solution, Pak attempted to seed internal uprising and anger within the local population of Kashmir, hoping to push India to respond with force, leading the international community compelling India to accept the UN resolution. India approaching the UN in 1948 had nothing to do with the inclusion of Article 370, which was introduced much later in 1954. Yet, the article was considered to provide the state with a disputed status by those with vested interests including Pakistan.

The Pak viewpoint

          As per the Pakistan website, HistoryPak.com, J and K should have acceded to Pakistan because of its, “Muslim majority population and location.” It also defines Pak’s strategic reason for demanding Kashmir, stating that it borders China and Afghanistan as also all rivers which feed Pakistan emanate from it. Pakistan’s Herald Magazine in an article titled, ‘The pursuit of Kashmir’ of 02 Feb 19, states, “these two factors (bordering Afghanistan and China as also rivers flowing from the region) make it a strategically crucial region. In other words, it is a prized territory.” In a press interview recently the Pakistan foreign affairs spokesperson stated that Pakistan had ‘exclusive rights’ over three Indian Western rivers, adding that any attempt by India to divert flow of these rivers would be considered an ‘act of aggression’.

          Officially Pak has changed its Kashmir narrative for its domestic audience. It has been spreading the word that Kashmir being a Muslim majority region could not be ruled by Hindu’s, thereby converting a land dispute into a religious issue. This aspect has support on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC).

          The Pak army jumped into Kashmir post the 1987 rigged elections, which brought Farooq Abdullah to power. Exploiting the discontent brewing in the valley, the ISI raised and pushed in terrorists, local and from POK, into the valley. It led to the creation of Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hizbul Mujahideen and Harkat-ul-Ansar. Within Pak too, after almost 11 years, democracy returned to the country and Benazir Bhutto became the PM.

          The Pak army refused to permit the civilian government from handling Kashmir and continued supporting Jihadist outfits. The Pak political stand was forcibly changed by the deep state from a diplomatic solution to one of India accepting the holding of a plebiscite. All attempts for talks for peace ran parallel to talks of war and support to Jihadi networks. In this period both nations became nuclear powered states in 1998.

          With passage of time, it became evident that Pakistan’s suggestion for talks would only bear fruit if their deep state agreed to dismantle their terrorist infrastructure as their civilian government and army were never on the same page. This has never happened, and the stalemate has continued.

          Another angle generally ignored is that for an army to remain of importance in a country, it must have a defined enemy. It is to counter this defined enemy that an army needs strength, capability, finances and power. Pakistan and India having separated on religious grounds and the splitting of Kashmir, gave Pak army the agenda to declare India as its eternal enemy. This was aggravated by the insult imposed on Pak in the 1971 war, where it lost half its country and surrendered 93,000 prisoners.       

Changing Pak ideology

          Over the years, Pak has changed its history and begun teaching its students the invincibility of the Pak army, thereby ensuring that it remains the only force to counter an enemy, India, which seeks to break the country. Some examples listed by the Dawn in an article of 15 Aug 2014 highlight this.

          The fifth-grade history textbook of NWFP states on the 1965 war, “The Pakistan Army conquered several areas of India, and when India was at the verge of being defeated, she ran to the United Nations to beg for a cease-fire. Magnanimously, thereafter, Pakistan returned all the conquered territories to India.” On the 1971 war, Pak history books state, “after 1965 war India conspired with the Hindus of Bengal and succeeded in spreading hate among the Bengalis about West Pakistan and finally attacked on East Pakistan in December 71, thus causing the breakup of East and West Pakistan.”

          Pak history books also present a different picture on the history of Kashmir. They state that Maharaja Hari Singh started a brutal campaign to drive out Muslims from Kashmir. Over 200,000 people in the princely State, supported by the tribesmen of the Northwest Frontier Province, were successful in liberating a large area of Kashmir from the Maharaja’s control. Hari Singh was forced to turn to India for help and in return acceded to India.

          A class five social studies book states, “India is our traditional enemy and we should always keep ourselves ready to defend our beloved country from Indian aggression”.  

Post 1979, Jihad began being introduced in the Pak school curriculum. In an article in the Express Tribune of Pak on 08 May 2011, Raza Rumi writes, “The National Curriculum guidelines for primary schools cite a key ‘learning outcome’ as recognising ‘the importance of Jehad in every sphere of life’.” Another macabre gem is to train children in making ‘speeches on Jehad’ and assessing ‘their spirits while making speeches on Jehad, Muslim History and Culture’. 

          The present and future generations of Pakistan have been taught that the Pak army is supreme, Kashmir is a part of Pakistan, India is an eternal enemy and Jihad is justified.

The question arising is that if this is the current narrative, can it be changed?

Information warfare

          Adding to the above has been the application of a successful information warfare strategy being employed by the Pak deep state. General Ata Hasnain, speaking at the Institute of Strategic Studies, UK, in Mar this year, stated, “I give full marks to Pakistan for the way it has played out the information strategy. The ISPR (Inter Services Public Relations) has done an outstanding work for Pakistan.”

          Pak has successfully thwarted all Indian successful operations by projecting a different narrative, maintaining that their army regained the upper hand. Post the Balakote strike, Pak projected Indian loss of aircraft and capture of Wing Commander Abhinandan and hid the success of the strike. Post the abrogation of Article 370, their information warfare campaign compelled India to launch diplomatic offensives to regain the narrative.

In Kashmir, India continues to block internet services fearing a Pak media onslaught. India Solicitor General, Tushar Mehta, stated in the Supreme Court on 26 Nov 19, during the hearing on J and K restrictions, that anti-India propaganda was being pushed through the internet in a large way and hashtags used to multiply the message by thousands of times and incite violence. He stated, “it’s a cyber war, (a) psychological war emanating from across the border.”

Pakistan’s financial crises and global standing

          Despite all claims by the Pak and Chinese governments, the CPEC will bleed the Pak economy. The guarantors to the CPEC is the Pak army, with the civilian government facing public anger and hence, behind the economic downfall the cause is their army. The appointment of Lt Gen Asim Bajwa as the head of the CPEC authority and China praising the extension of their army chief bear merit.

          The economic impact of the CPEC in one case of power generation itself, is heavy. As stated by Pak author Imtiaz Gul in the Matrix on 27 Nov 19, Pak’s peak requirement of electricity is 20,000 MW and the production capacity being created with Chinese help already caters for 35,521 MW. It would grow to 45,000 MW. The distribution capacity is only 22,000 MW. Thus, the loss from this one project alone is Rs 200 billion a year.

When the CPEC is not being utilized by any other nation, Pak earns no revenues to repay loans, which would start accruing a few years from now.

Pak is in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Grey List for failing to stop terrorist funding. They would continue in the list as the deep state employs terrorism as a tool for statecraft. No action by any elected government can have Pak removed unless the army changes its approach, which presently remains unlikely. Thus, the ills facing Pakistan are because their army refuses to change its stance on employing terrorism as an instrument of state policy and backs a failing CPEC.

Deductions

          From the above there are few deductions which can be drawn when considering if the Pak narrative on J and K can be changed. The first, no civilian government in Pak can push forward any talks, unless it is acceptable to their army. Secondly, the Pak army has just one enemy for the moment, unless Afghanistan and terrorism on its eastern borders becomes a major threat, and hence would never let peace reign.  

Thirdly, despite all efforts, unless the mindset within Pak begins to change, the local Pak youth will consider India as an eternal enemy and be unwilling for any talks or compromise. Fourthly, all Pak ills are because no government has been able to change the army’s approach to international relations, mainly with India and Afghanistan. Finally, India needs to have a national communication strategy to counter Pak’s information warfare.

Changing the Pak narrative

          The strategy which India needs to evolve is to remove the stranglehold that the Pak army has over the nation and ensure that its political leadership regains control. The political leadership in Pak is aware that hostilities with India are detrimental and need resolution. They have no say till their army holds all the cards. Talks have been unsuccessful throughout history because their army has opposed it, either officially or by an action which has pushed relations back. Nawaz was the first PM in a long time to attempt gaining control from their army. His overthrow was to send a strong counter message across. The selection of Imran conveys that whom the army desires would be the PM.

A change can only be possible if the Pak army is discredited in the eyes of its people. For this to happen, the myth that the Pak army is invincible needs to be steadily broken. This could have been done by the two strikes that India launched, the cross-border strike in 2016 and Balakote this year, but in both it was Pak’s information warfare which thwarted Indian success.

There are still options for India to change the Pak narrative without an all-out war. A start point is that in all operations involving Indian retaliation, Pak’s true losses are projected with evidence. This may not be easy but should be attempted. Similarly, while being prepared for an escalation, the next retaliation should be in a region, which cannot be hidden from their public eye.

India must continue to project Pak’s regular losses to the Baluch freedom fighters in their struggle for independence. In addition, is to highlight employing multiple media channels Pak army’s atrocities against its own non-Punjabi population and create fissures within the organization and nation.

While Pak has faced tensions along its Western borders with Afghanistan, it has never been of the level to cause it worry, as the Afghan army remains ill equipped. Afghanistan has rejected the Durand Line and objected to the fencing. Despite any government being in power in the country, this issue would not die down. Strengthening the Afghan army’s capabilities could add to Pak’s tensions as the region is also the territory of the Baluch freedom fighters and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Finally, is creating a strong counter information warfare strategy. India has only been reacting to Pak’s actions, but failed to counter them. Counter information warfare should be employed at discrediting the Pak army as being responsible for the current ills facing Pak. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) losses in the long term and the continuing of Pak in the FATF Grey List is only because of the Pak army. Thus, while it fills its coffers, the nation suffers.

There remains a drawback. Like every nation, within Pak too, its army is revered, hence, to break this stranglehold, the campaign must be prolonged and well thought through.

Winning hearts within Kashmir

          Despite any external action by India, including discrediting the deep state, the change in the Pak narrative can only be successful if India wins the hearts of its own Kashmiri residents. If the present generation of Kashmiris turn to India and reduce support to Pak sponsored terrorists and propaganda, then Pak pushed terrorists would find themselves left out in the cold. This is again a difficult task.

          Years of strong-arm tactics against terrorists, impact of which has been felt by the local population, as also the spread of Wahabism from the mosques makes such an action difficult but not impossible. The abrogation of article 370 and the subdued reaction of the population (despite claims by many that India is sitting on a powder keg), indicates that the region has hope for the future.

Positive indicators are that numbers of youth joining militancy have reduced, as also crowds attending funerals of locally eliminated militants. However, this could also be because of blockade of social media, which was the main source of instigation and the large presence of security forces. Will this remain the future or is it only a temporary phase is unknown.

Government actions to push through benefits of merging the region with the nation remain slow and tardy. Soon this positive hope of the local population may turn to despair and anger as internet restrictions continue and there is no bright light in sight. The government would have a strategy in place which must be realistic and visible in a short time span. Unless the local population is won over, there is unlikely to be any success in countering Pak’s narrative.

Conclusion

          If India is to succeed, change the Pak narrative on Kashmir, bring in peace, stability and development, it needs to look at the stumbling blocks in the current environment and evolve options to overcome them. Success is unlikely to be either immediate or assured. However, without a long-term strategy and options to pursue it, India will keep stumbling from one day to the other. It may not be possible for India to handle these options alone and it may need the support of its close allies, however unless it is itself clear, chances of success are dim. The question at the end of the day is, are we up to it?