Reducing destabilization while establishing theatre commands CENJOWS 06 May 2020

Reducing destabilization while establishing theatre commands CENJOWS 06 May 2020

https://cenjows.gov.in/article-detail?id=274

Reducing destabilization while establishing theatre commands 06 May 2020

          The armed forces are well on the way to establishing theatre commands. While there are many critics debating on its requirement in the Indian context as also the approach adopted, there is no doubt that it is the need of the hour. Some studies for establishing integrated commands have been ordered, while others would be announced with time. The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Bipin Rawat, has stated on multiple occasions that these will be completed in three years as per the mandate given to him by the government. However, with internal emphasis on battling the Coronavirus, there could be a delay.

          Presently the Air Defence Command study is in progress. The study on the Peninsula Command, to be conducted under the Naval Chief, was to be announced by the end of March, is possibly delayed with the armed forces attention diverted towards the Coronavirus. Land-based theatre commands are only expected to roll out by 2022-23. Where official studies are yet to be ordered, individual services are conducting their own analysis to determine which option would be best suitable for them.

Theatre commands can either be created on threat or geographical considerations. Both options have their advantages and disadvantages. No matter which option is ultimately selected, the government intention is to establish integrated commands with a larger span of control, thereby removing single service commands and intermediate HQs, leading to reduced manpower and maintenance costs.

Most nations which have established integrated commands had to overcome individual service objections and push their decision adopting a top-down approach, as being done by India. In every case the intentions were the same, cut down defence expenditure, adopt an integrated approach to handling threats, synergize operations, procurements and development of military capabilities.

With transformation there is always a period of destabilization. In the Indian case, despite being aware that integration will be adopted in the long term, the armed forces never seriously prepared themselves for this transformation. They were snug in their belief that integration is only a buzzword and even if it does occur, it would be at service HQ levels. Now with the ball rolling, destabilization during transition needs consideration.

          India has its own internal and external challenges, with two unsettled borders and proxy wars, which will continue unabated even as it undergoes the most extensive transformation of its armed forces in 70 years, within a relatively short time. Its vulnerability in the transformation process could, on the contrary, be exploited.

With the globe battling the Coronavirus, Chinese offensive forays have increased in its immediate vicinity and would soon expand into the Indian Ocean Region. Pakistan’s actions along the Line of Control have witnessed a spurt, which could never happen without tacit approval of China.  

To cater for such adverse scenarios, General Rawat had stated that service chiefs would remain in command of theatre commands till the transformation is complete and the proposed new chain of command would only be implemented once the system stabilizes. This would imply that service chiefs would command bi/tri service integrated commands, which would not be effective.

Integrated commands should be implemented keeping internal destabilization to the minimum. Any new structure requires time and patience before it settles into its operational and administrative roles, especially if it involves integrating two or more services, with varying cultures and work ethos. Hence, India needs to adopt a sequential system while it transforms its forces.

          Amongst the major aspects which need consideration for establishing integrated commands with minimum destabilization are span of control, location of new integrated HQs, closing of HQs rendered surplus as also identifying and establishing functional commands. Simultaneous should be transfer of responsibility, both operational and administrative, from current controlling HQs to integrated commands as also from service chiefs to CDS.

Each new integrated HQ would have its own unique requirement. The air defence command could be built on an existing air command HQ, preferably in central India as its span of control is pan-India.

The case of the Peninsula Command is vastly different, provided the navy accepts its necessity. With increasing threats, it appears unlikely that the navy would willingly shed both operational commands to one HQ responsible for operations close to Indian shores, especially as it considers a regional role for itself currently and possibly a global role in the years ahead. It may on the contrary be willing to amalgamate the Andaman and Nicobar Command into one of the existing commands.

However, in case the Peninsula command is to be created, then it would initially be in addition to the existing Commands, hence may need a new location for its establishment. Until the Peninsula command is established and operational, the Western and Eastern Naval Commands would need to remain operational. Their subsequent status would be determined by the study. This may require consideration and planning.    

          In the case of land-based commands, it may be more complicated as the two or three integrated HQs that may be considered (depending on the option adopted) could only build on an existing HQs as space and facilities for creating a new HQs remain limited. Building on an existing HQs implies destabilizing the functioning current HQs as also providing additional manpower and staffing, leading to enhanced commitments.

Establishing new HQs, enabling them to comprehend their operational, administrative roles and tasks is time consuming. Once fully functional, only them would they commence taking over responsibilities of present HQs, which could then be considered for being closed. Even closing existing establishments is an arduous process. Their subsequent space utilization also needs to be considered.

The first decision which the army in specific and the armed forces in general need to consider is which level of HQs for land-based commands should be closed. In the Russian model, divisions were removed, and brigades placed directly under Theatre Commands (termed districts in Russia). In other models, individual service command HQs were closed. 

In our case, the options are just two. These are removing existing Command or Corps HQs. This is because a division currently or in the long-term, Integrated Task Forces (ITF) based on operational tasks, would become the standard norm. In case the existing command HQs are closed, then Corps would function directly under integrated HQs, alternatively ITFs would operate under Command HQs and corps HQs disbanded.

The army has the experience of establishing the South-Western Command in 2005 by splitting the current Western Command. However, in this instance the nominated formations only shifted from Western Command to South-Western. There was some destabilization, however it was kept to the minimum as there was no impact on fighting formations and it only involved the army.

Whichever models are adopted, destabilization would remain limited to HQs. Units and brigades would function as earlier. Hence operational destabilization may be less, administrative more likely.

Management of change would also be a major concern. Indian armed forces have for decades only given lip service to enhancing jointness from the grassroots level, despite talking about this approach in every forum. Other than the College of Combat, which conducts an elaborate Joint Capsule for senior officers, other establishments have ignored this aspect.  

Bi-service/ tri-service integrated commands would logically take longer to become fully functional as it would involve integrating resources of all three services. With lack of joint training and understanding other service functioning, it would initially be service specific officers handling their own service under a common superior. It may take upto a decade for the system to be fully integrated, depending on how joint training is implemented in training institutes. Hence, a joint training command must be considered on priority.

To add to confusion, there is still no mention of establishing a logistics command. This implies that for a reasonable period there would be multiple logistic chains operating in a theatre adding to the staff posted from different services only for monitoring the same.

Evidently, changing a system implies management of change. The better this is managed, the lesser would be the cost and period of destabilization. This must be factored in at the planning stage itself to ensure that operational stability is managed, and inimical forces do not exploit this vulnerability. Creation of functional commands alongside operational commands needs simultaneous consideration. In such a scenario, time should not be a major constraint as being regularly mentioned by the CDS.