What has China gained from the standoff The Excelsior 18 Jun 2020
What has China gained from the standoff? 18 Jun 2020
The army chief’s statement at the passing out parade in IMA over the weekend was aimed at conveying to the nation that the situation at the LAC was stable. He stated, ‘I would like to assure everyone that the entire situation along our borders with China is under control.’ He added, ‘Both sides are disengaging in a phased manner. We have started from the north, from the area of the Galwan river where a lot of disengagement has taken place. It has been a very fruitful dialogue that we have had. And as I said it will go on and the situation will improve as we go on.’
The ongoing standoff in Ladakh has entered its second month. It commenced on 05 May with fisticuffs involving both sides. Talks have been held between the two armies at the senior most level of Corps Commanders and equivalent, apart from lower levels alongside diplomatic discussions. Since the talks, both forces have disengaged in some regions, while they remain stalemated in the Finger region alongside Pangong Tso. The patrolling season in Ladakh extends till Nov and hence there is no hurry on the Chinese to pull back. India has already announced that it is prepared for the long haul and would continue with development of its strategic communication arteries in the region.
Action by China was well planned and correctly timed. Normally both forces conduct exercises at the same time with additional forces to prevent such intrusions. This time, due to spread of COVID 19, India delayed its exercise, an act which China exploited. Chinese soldiers came armed with equipment suitable for fisticuffs, not for war.
Subsequent build- up of weapons and equipment on both sides was posturing and projecting firmness in resolve. Evidently, China did not seek an escalation, indicated by its willingness to talk and pull back in some regions. China has planned and kept its actions below levels of Indian tolerance avoiding any counter retaliation and employment of force by India. Move back, though symbolic, implies that grabbing territory across the region was never its primary objective.
There are possibly few diplomatic or economic concessions which China would possibly be seeking or may even be attempting to convey a warning to Delhi. Simultaneously is the confusion on whether the initial decision of intruding all along the front was made by the CCP or the PLA itself. Instances of the PLA leadership independently charting some aspects of foreign policy exist.
For the Indian government, the major concern is not the current standoff, which will be resolved with time, but determining the reason why China chose to intrude. Correctly assessing Chinese intentions would give the government options in ending the stalemate while enabling them to lay down army policies (defensive or offensive) for the future. Mixed signals continue to flow from China, either through their government mouthpieces, The Global Times, China Daily or through few of their spokespersons.
The possible messages being conveyed range from India making Ladakh into a Union Territory, claiming territory presently under Chinese control in Aksai Chin thus bringing China into the Kashmir dispute to construction of bridges on the Darbuk-Shyokh-Daulat Beg Oldie all-weather road, implying changing status quo. Other reasons mentioned include enhanced Indo-US ties to possible impact of agreements signed during the recently concluded Indo-Australia virtual summit.
Editorials in Chinese mouthpieces, which convey Beijing’s intent have also cautioned India against exploiting the US-China trade war and working to welcome manufacturing companies leaving China, thus changing the economic difference between the two nations. Multiple other minor reasons have been quoted by Chinese analysts.
A few independent analysts have stated that this could also be Chinese revenge against India blocking their road construction at Doklam. Others have suggested that Chinese are concerned about security of the investments in Gilgit Baltistan amid Indian rhetoric for reclaiming POK as also China is securing its Karakoram Highway. These are unlikely as unless China initiates hostility, India would not. There has also been a viewpoint that by pushing India at the LAC, China compels the Indian government to concentrate on land and air, opening doors for China to enhance its presence in the Indian Ocean region.
Nothing clear has emerged till date. Indians remain speculating causes behind Chinese actions. Neither has China conveyed any official topics for discussion. They continue beating around the bush, aware that time is not of essence, while displaying positivity by adopting partial and cosmetic pullbacks. Simultaneously, their mouthpieces continue their propaganda of projecting Chinese military prowess and conveying multiple messages. Counter propaganda is launched from the Indian side. Indian political leaders and national spokespersons issue mundane and muted statements seeking to avoid escalation by provocative comments.
Chinese actions are also a stark warning to the Indian government and the armed forces. The warning is that being defensive and seeking a peaceful resolution always is not the answer as it is the Elephant which will dance to the Dragon’s tune at the time and place of its choosing. The Elephant needs to stare down the dragon, not rush for a resolution and plan to be equally aggressive in the future. It cannot always react to Chinese provocations but must on occasions make the Dragon react.
Finally, what has China achieved thus far? Without sharing its intentions, China has conveyed a clear message. The message is that China considers itself as the power in the region since it was the originator of the intrusion, at a time and place of its choosing. It would also be the nation which will determine when and under which conditions would it conclude the standoff. Talks are only a means to prolong the stalemate, till it decides to pull back. With time of no essence, the ultimate decision to end the current stalemate is still some distance away.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army