Reassessing national security post Chinese incursions CENJOWS 06 Jul 2020
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Reassessing national security post Chinese incursions 06 Jul 2020
The armed forces maintained by any nation are not showpieces or a means of displaying its economic power, but a necessity to face challenges to its ideology, culture and way of life. Economic growth is dependent on national security and vice versa. For India, with two nuclear powered adversaries along its major frontiers, ensuring a capable armed force is a necessity, not a luxury. History of animosity towards a rising India has driven these two nations, China and Pakistan, to join hands.
Nothing is more evident from the fact that with rising tensions with China in Ladakh, Pakistan pushes in additional forces into Gilgit Baltistan and seeks to exploit the situation by attempting to enhance terrorism in the valley. Pakistan may deny these moves however satellite imagery proves this. Indian intentions in the current standoff were evident from the PMs words in Ladakh, ‘Those who are weak can never initiate peace, bravery is a pre-requisite for peace.’ India will not relent.
While inputs on Chinese build up were available from multiple monitoring agencies, its translation into determining intentions were missed. As evidence of Chinese forces moving beyond their annual exercise area emerged, India reacted. Having failed to push India militarily, China dug in. It will now be compelled to expand the region of conflict by increasing its deployment opposite Arunachal and Sikkim. India is prepared and troops alert to such attempts. Negotiations would be slow and hard. Would China move back only based on military and diplomatic talks is unlikely.
How would the current crisis terminate remains a mute question. Would it require political dialogue to end? Would it lead to a war on one or both fronts, alternatively end with status quo ante being restored, post political or diplomatic level talks, is unknown. In case of no progress, would India, at some stage, be compelled to act militarily to regain areas it considers to be within its perception of the LAC is unknown. How would the Chinese react to Indian moves is a mute question. In any case, the end of the standoff is unlikely soon. The fact remains that while India prepares for the worst, it is hoping for the best.
Trust between the two nations has deteriorated to their lowest level in decades. This alone would make any progress slow. India was the first to expand the conflict beyond the military level when it employed its economic tools. It gave further hints of moving into the diplomatic arena when it raised Hong Kong at the UN Human Rights Commission.
China initiated the standoff but sought to project India as the aggressor and responsible for the violence at Galwan. Chinese unilateral actions, premeditated violence and refusal to adhere to agreements displayed that it cannot be trusted, and Indian armed forces need to remain permanently prepared for similar such attempts. Another lesson which emerges is that defence preparedness for the future assumes greater importance as neither neighbour would adhere to previously inked agreements.
The nation cannot afford to replicate instances of allocating additional funds for defence procurement once a crisis commences. Funds allocated post the commencement of crisis would only bear fruit well after it concludes. In the present case, current orders being placed for aircraft and ammunition would fructify after 2-3 years. This situation regularly arises because neither the polity nor the bureaucracy understand ramifications of allocating suitable funds for national security, assuming there is no threat.
In the last few years, the perception within the national leadership has been that war is not on the horizon, hence defence allocations can be reduced. This has flowed from the belief that economic and diplomatic cooperation with China alongside a policy of silence in its internal matters as also not joining any grouping which will challenge it militarily, will ensure peace on our northern borders. This complacency and misled belief placed the armed forces, which face their most major challenge in recent times, at a disadvantage.
Capabilities take time to develop while intentions of belligerent neighbours can change overnight, especially when there are disputed borders. There is a need to look beyond the current crisis and reassess the Indian concept of national security and modernizing its armed forces.
There is no national security strategy in place, from which the armed forces can draw their own military strategy resulting in development of requisite capabilities based on emerging threats. The NSA had taken it upon himself to handle military modernization by creating the Defence Planning Committee, which is also responsible for producing the national security strategy. Without this document in place, there are no compulsions on the finance ministry to cater for a planned allocation for defence.
India has always reacted post a crisis. Defence budgets have traditionally been high during or just after a major incident, which has shaken the government. Subsequently, it has been business as usual. Historically, defence has never been given its due importance. Even top military commanders have accepted the fact that funds would always be at a premium as there are multiple demands for the same financial pie.
The most important component of the Indian defence budget, which is allocation under the capital head, has been reducing over the years, while the revenue component has been rising. This is skewed and should have been a priority for the government to address. It is not that the government does not have solutions, but inter-ministry rivalry and fuel to fire added by the bureaucracy and the IPS, which control the CAPFs, has ensured that there is no centralised approach to resolving this skewed trend in defence budgeting.
This leads to service chiefs seeking to find ways to reverse the trend. Solutions flowing from within the system will always be adhoc and short term as has been seen in recent times. Some adhoc solutions include increasing age of retirement, temporarily moving soldiers from the CAPFs to the army and considering introduction of Tour of Duty. Permitting PSUs and OFBs to hold the armed forces at ransom by poor quality and slow rate of production has only aggravated the problem of shortfalls in critical ammunition and stores. This is not the desired solution.
Pausing the raising of the mountain strike corps by reducing the budget has impacted Indian response to the Chinese. This was another short-sighted decision based on the premise of no-war in the foreseeable future by the political hierarchy. This must be reversed on priority.
The nation would emerge from the current scenario, possibly unscathed and unrelenting. However, the national leadership needs to re-evaluate its policies and processes. The armed forces must possess the power to counter threats flowing from belligerent neighbours. Thus, they need to be equipped suitably. PM Netanyahu of Israel brought forth the reality of geopolitics when he stated at the Raisina Dialogue in Delhi in 2018, ‘The weak don’t survive, the strong survive. You make peace, alliances with the strong. You are able to maintain peace by being strong.’ This should be the Indian government’s mantra.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army