Indo-China talks (English Version) Amar Ujala 15 Oct 2020
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Indo-China talks Amar Ujala 15 Oct 2020
The seventh round of talks between the corps commanders was held on Monday. The joint statement issued post the meeting stated, ‘The two sides had a sincere, in-depth and constructive exchange of views on disengagement along the Line of Actual Control in the western sector of India-China border areas.’ It added, ‘Both sides agreed to maintain dialogue and communication through military and diplomatic channels and arrive at a mutually acceptable solution for disengagement as early as possible.’
A near similar statement was issued post the last round of military talks and the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on Indo-China Border Affairs (WMCC), which is diplomatic engagement. Frankly, there has been no progress between the two countries on resolving the current standoffs despite multiple level of talks.
For anyone following the trend, the current level of talks was not meant to yield much as the two sides have vast differences in their views. The Chinese have been demanding disengagement to commence with Indian withdrawal from the heights on the Kailash Ridge which it occupied in end August. The Chinese perception is that the Indian occupation of the Kailash Ridge is crossing the LAC, whereas India perceives it to be within its LAC.
India perceives Chinese deployment on the North bank and Depsang to be in Indian territory, whereas China considers it within its claim lines. The Indians seek holistic de-escalation spread across Eastern Ladakh, including Depsang and Hot Springs, whereas China seeks to resolve only Pangong Tso first. India insists on the understanding which follows the principle that the country which entered first, withdraws first, whereas China seeks Indian withdrawal first. China seeks disengagement, implying creating distance between forces, whereas India seeks de-escalation and reversion to status quo ante. New objections continue rising from China
Every time the Chinese spokesperson in Beijing is asked to comment on the talks or an Indian announcement, he adds a new rider. The latest set of riders stated by Beijing, post the inauguration of 44 Border Road projects, include Chinese unwillingness to recognize Ladakh as a Union Territory (UT) and they consider Indian infrastructure development in the region to be against the spirit of past agreements. China is aware that these riders are meaningless as talks would continue with the Indian government, despite its unwillingness to recognize Ladakh as a UT and India will not stop its infrastructure development as these remain within Indian territory. Further, the infrastructure is also aimed at assisting the local population in the region, while China considers them solely to enhance Indian offensive manoeuvres in the region.
Military talks are only a means of projecting national viewpoints. In the latest talks, China gave a new set of proposals for disengagement, which would be studied by the China Study group and a response sent through the hot lines between the two countries at Leh. It is likely that this proposal would imply equal pullback by both sides, which may be rejected as it would lead to India withdrawing in its own territory. Similarly, Indian proposals would be studied at Beijing. These would form the basis for the next round of talks.
No progress was expected in the current talks and hence has come as no surprise. With a differing perception and both sides sticking to their stance, chances of an early resolution appear remote. The positive is that the two nations are engaging one another in talks, rather than in escalating the conflict. The other acceptance is that there is unlikely to be any pullback prior to the onset of winters, ensuring that both countries maintain high force levels in the region through the winters. Evidently, the trust deficit would ensure that neither nation is willing to be the first to withdraw, fearing occupation of its positions by the other.
China had attempted to subdue the Indian army and thus project itself as the supreme power in Asia. It wanted to warn India that acting against Chinese interests, diplomatically, economically or militarily, could invite a backlash from China on similar lines as 1962. It sought to convey a message to the US that India lacks the capability to even defend its borders against China and hence would not be a suitable partner to it in the region. This could impact Indo-US relations post US elections, where the new government is expected to review its alliances in the Indo-Pacific.
In case India had not responded to Chinese incursions, the capability of the Indian armed forces would have come under question. The quid pro quo action of occupying the Kailash Ridge and the Galwan clash altered the scenario. The Kailash Ridge enables domination of Chinese camps, current deployment and ingress routes into the Chushul valley. The fact that the Chinese currently have limited choices of either remaining deployed in the region or adopting an offensive option is an indicator that their plans have gone awry. China has currently decided to remain deployed in situ.
For the Chinese, it would be the first time that they would be deploying the PLA in Ladakh. For decades, the PLA pulls back into the mainland with the onset of winters and leaves the border defence regiment and its militia, both comprising of locals to manage the LAC. This forced deployment is a small victory for India. To cater for accommodation for its conscript soldiers, China has been forced to move all resources from the mainland, as Tibet remains undeveloped.
Through the winters, military level talks would continue, while the forces would battle the weather, keeping a wary eye on the adversary. It is probable that military and WMCC level of talks would narrow down differences between the countries and create conditions for talks at the political level for a final resolution. It is also equally likely that perceptions being vastly apart may lead to no closure of differences leading to the LAC becoming another LoC, with eyeball to eyeball deployment, where one incident could lead to a flareup. Currently all that can be done is wait and watch and support our soldiers deployed on these icy heights.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army