South Asia affairs

South Asia affairs

Look at neighbours before looking East The Statesman 26 Jun 18

The Seychelles President, Danny Faure, has commenced his five-day state visit to India. The visit comes as India has slowly begun losing its grip on the country and seeks re-establishing its image. India had signed an agreement in 2015 to develop a naval facility on Assumption Island on a twenty-year lease. The agreement was subsequently modified early this year. It also included positioning military personnel on the island. The facility was to be jointly managed by both nations.

This base would have given India an immense advantage in the Indian Ocean region, would enable it to ensure safe shipping in the region, monitor the Mozambique channel, thwart piracy and counter Chinese presence. Opposition politicians in Seychelles opposed the deal, which was leaked to the media, preventing the President from approaching the parliament for approving it. The view of the opposition was surrender of territory to India as also undermining its sovereignty.

Seychelles would now be developing the facility on its own as a coast guard base. As Danny Faure stated, ‘It is important for us to ensure we have a military post in the area.’ There are reports that China is behind the decision of opposition parties to reject the Indian proposal.

India is now looking at regaining lost ground in the country. Presently India supplies weapons and equipment (India already supplies 60% of their equipment), trains senior members of their defence forces and has military advisors in the country. Indian equipment supplied include naval ships, Dornier aircraft and coastal radars. It would seek to enhance its cooperation with the country, during this visit.

In the Maldives, India has been pushed back, with China taking the front seat. The Maldives government has gone to the extent of asking India to withdraw its gifted Dhruv helicopters. It has given India till the end of the month to withdraw them. To insist on its decision, if had initially refused to extend the visas of the pilots who operate these helicopters, which expired in end May. It was only post the direct intervention of the MEA that it was extended till 30th Jun.

The latest row between the two countries is Maldives denial in granting work permits to about 30,000 Indians who work in different fields in the country. Clearly, India is being pushed away, while China is being drawn in. The continuous criticism of the country’s policies by India have ensured it.

In Sri Lanka, Hambantota port has already been handed over to China on a 99 years lease. While the present government in Sri Lanka led by Sirisena is pro-India, his predecessor, Mahinda Rajapaksa, was pro-China and invited them in. How long would Indian hold remain in Sri Lanka is a question, as shifting alliances could soon bring Rajapaksa back into the driver’s seat. In Myanmar, China is to obtain controlling stake in the strategic Kyauk Pyu port, which will impact Indian security concerns.

India is slowly losing the diplomatic battle for domination in nations in its near periphery. Whether the loss is either due to its strong stand against political wrongdoings as in the case of Maldives, lack of influence over multiple political parties as in Seychelles or a big brother approach as in the case of Sri Lanka. The fact is that Indian diplomacy is proving to be a failure in areas where it should matter most. It could also be because India took the support of these nations for granted or because we failed to read the writing on the wall?

In all these nations, security forces have remained the power behind the throne. Engaging them should have been the task of the concerned Indian military service which has had the maximum interaction with their counterparts, after all they train in Indian military academies. Diplomatic and military diplomacy should have been moving hand in hand in these nations, where India traditionally had multiple military engagements including provision of equipment, training and joint operations. Ignoring military aspects of diplomacy has reduced the levels of influence of the MEA.

In either case, the fact remains that once we began losing in Maldives, we should have immediately changed track, but we ignored it, expecting the nation to fall in line on its own. Chinese support ensured that it could ignore Indian influence and power. Chinese forays have now become so deep in the country that India will not be able to regain any foothold back, despite any government coming to power in the island nation. Chinese investments have eaten the Maldivian economy, which no government would be able to reverse. The same has been the case with Sri Lanka and would also be the case in Myanmar.

In Seychelles India still has an opportunity to regain its hold. It cannot let this nation too slip into Chinese control. Though Indian linkages are deeper with Seychelles and it is not a member of the Belt Road Initiative (BRI), but Chinese influence and pressures are on the rise. Hence this visit assumes importance. Every nation which pushes India away for China adds to own security concerns.

China establishing bases in these countries would in the long-term impact Indian security and add to costs of countering increasing threats. Possessing bases in Indian Ocean nations enhances our outreach and permits monitoring shipping in crucial areas.

India needs to move fast, possibly even climb down from its high pedestal and seek to rebuild relations with nations with whom they have gone awry, at a fast pace. It must seek to engage with all sections of politicians and political parties and be the power these nations must look upto for assistance, rather than China. It cannot afford to let its own backyard be dominated by China. Close coordination between the service HQs and MEA would push forth a more successful foreign policy.

India may be adopting a ‘move East’ policy to challenge China, but ‘neighbours first’ is more important to enhance our security concerns.

India’s SAARC dilemma The Statesman 15 May 18

The Indian government’s refusal to attend the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit in Pak in 2016 had pushed the organization almost into a state of oblivion. With India leading the charge, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Bhutan had turned down a desire to attend the summit in Pak. As per rules of SAARC, even if one nation turns down the invitation, it is deemed cancelled. Thus, the others had to accept the Indian decision.

Though humiliated, Pak had no choice but to maintain silence. The BRICS summit last year had almost all SAARC members present as members of BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation). India has over time created alternate organizations with same SAARC nations, keeping Pak out. Recently Pak has begun displayinh a desire to reignite the SAARC flame.

Realistically, SAARC is only a forum for leaders to meet. It should have led to enhanced economic cooperation, free movement of population and simultaneous growth, however it has been dominated by Indo-Pak rivalry. Hence, as an organization, its utility remains questionable and growth limited. However, conduct of the summit is an issue which impacts the reputation and local standing of the host country.

While nothing would move in Pak till the elections and formation of the new government, however their present leadership has slowly begun seeking support of countries for a summit in Islamabad later this year. Prime Minister Abbasi visited Kathmandu soon after Oli was designated as the Prime Minister and the joint statement mentioned re-commencing the stalled SAARC summit. Recently, the visit of the Sri Lankan President to Islamabad also had early convening of the SAARC summit mentioned in the joint statement.

The visit by the Pak army chief to Maldives enhanced military cooperation between the two nations. Though SAARC was not mentioned in any statement issued during the visit, however the growing bonhomie would indicate it would be willing to support the conduct of the meet. The growing distance between India and Maldives would ensure that it would join Nepal and Sri Lanka in supporting the hosting of the summit.

India had always in the past hesitated on imposing its will and intentions on SAARC, as it did not wish to project being labelled the big brother, who seeks to dominate smaller nations. The size and location of the nation, along with its economic growth and military power had smaller neighbours concerned about its attitude. India has in recent times, enhanced its relations with almost all neighbours, thus expelling this big brother attitude. Its economic support and provision of aid has expelled this fear.

Hence, when it took the decision to skip the Pak summit, it received support from multiple members of the group. Therefore, it was Pak which was isolated on this occasion. Presently, with some members seeking to restart the process, India needs to carefully consider its options.

Pak’s reluctance to accept most proposals projected by India in the SAARC summits compelled India to move on its own to enhance direct cooperation with members of the group, bypassing SAARC. Hence, the utility of SAARC is reduced. With Pak seeking support for conducting the meet and India reluctant, it has become a diplomatic game of who would win.

In case most nations, including those which backed the Indian decision to boycott the summit change their minds, India would be compelled to agree, or it would be termed as being responsible for the demise of an institution of which it was a founder member. In such a scenario, it would be Pak which would emerge the winner. If the summit remains cancelled, then India would emerge on top. Therefore, it is Pak which is rushing ahead, seeking to draw countries to support the initiative, rather than India.

With elections of 2019 looming large, India must be careful on the option which it would take. The Indian stance on Pak stopping support to terror groups was the reason, it remains the same now. There has been no change in the ground situation as at present. Hence, a change in Indian stance, despite pressure from neighbours, would open doors for the opposition to enhance criticism of the government.

The chances of Afghanistan agreeing to attend the summit, as increased attacks by the Pak supported Taliban are on the rise, is low. Therefore, India is bound to have their support. Bangladesh remains unhappy with Pak, however elections around the corner could always throw in a surprise. If the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) headed by Khalida Zia comes to power, it may tow the Pak line. Further, with Bangladesh joining the BRI and Chinese investments increasing, there could be pressure from China to attend. In this scenario, India may come under increasing pressure.

For Pak, which has visualized the present Indian government as being strong and willing to up the ante, removal of it would be a benefit. Hence, if India accepts to attend the summit and there is a strike, it would assist in impacting vote banks, reducing support to the ruling alliance. Thus, the policy dilemma in Delhi.

Since the window of conducting any SAARC summit is small, post the formation of a new government in Pak and elections within a few months in India, the government needs to calibrate its decision carefully. It must stick to its stance, yet not be projected as a hinderance to development of the region. It must continue claiming that unless Pak changes its spots, there can be no cooperation, hence SAARC would bear no fruit. Simultaneously, it must avoid bringing SAARC into statements when interacting with its immediate neighbours, thus enhancing one-to-one cooperation, which bears more fruit than SAARC.

An election crucial for India The Statesman 08 May 18

Bangladesh goes to the polls later this year. In Asia, this election will be closely watched. It will be of special interest to India and China. Politics in Bangladesh is run by two major political parties, both led by dynastic rulers. The present ruling party, the Awami League is headed by Sheikh Hasina, the daughter of the founding father of the nation, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman. The other major party in the fray is The Bangladesh National Party (BNP), led by Khalida Zia, the wife of the former Bangladesh army chief and ex-president Zia-ur Rehman.

In the last elections in 2014, the BNP boycotted elections claiming the government led by Sheik Hasina refused to follow the laid constitutional provision and appoint an interim government. The state nonetheless went through the elections and the Awami League stormed to power. This time the BNP would participate, however there have been internal developments which make observing the elections important.

Economically Bangladesh has been making progress. The GDP has been rising steadily, however unemployment remains a major concern. Its GDP would cross that of Pakistan by 2020. Bangladesh has been taking loans from China, which could add to its financial burdens, if it is unable to repay. Being India’s neighbour, China would demand its pound of flesh, in terms of a strategic base which could enhance India’s security concerns.

Fundamentalism has been growing within the nation, with terror groups like the Jamatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B) gaining ground. Between Jan 2005 and Dec 2017, over 700 people lost their lives to terror strikes, with 90% incidents being post 2013. These militant groups have some presence in Indian districts bordering Bangladesh. The IS and the al Qaeda Indian sub-continent claim their presence in the country.

Minorities have been regularly targeted, adding to alienation. IS has taken responsibility for multiple attacks on foreigners, homosexuals, Sufis, Shia’s, Ahmadis and Hindus. Islamic militants have targeted secular writers and bloggers. Dozens of Bangladeshis have gone and fought alongside the ISIS in Syria.

The arrival of Rohingya refugees were an added burden on the most densely populated nation in the world. It enhanced tensions with Myanmar. Rohingya’s are known to have even been involved with Bangladesh militant groups. While many nations including India supported Bangladesh by providing aid to fund the management of Rohingya refuges, however, the issue needs to be resolved as these remain a financial burden.

Politically the nation is in a turmoil. Khalida Zia has been handed a five-year sentence for graft and is banned from participating in elections. Her son was also convicted in a similar case earlier and remains in self-imposed exile. Thus, the party lacks credible leadership. Whether she gets a reprieve is to be seen.

The tough stance adopted by Hasina by establishing the International Crimes Tribunals (ICT) and trying those responsible for supporting the Pak army during the freedom struggle has broken the back of the third political party, the radical Jamaat-e-Islami. The court has convicted and hanged six for war crimes till date. Most tried were either from this party or the BNP.

The Jamaat-e-Islami is banned from participating in elections on the directions of the court. Therefore, the current elections would remain between the two major political parties only.

The outlook of both political parties remains vastly different. Sheikh Hasina is strongly pro-Indian and during her watch, no Indian anti-national group was able to establish any foothold in Bangladesh. The activities of the Pak ISI were curbed. The actions of the ICT, in convicting pro-Pak supporters only worsened relations between Bangladesh and Pak. Hasina stood by India in condemning Pak in the UN General Assembly as also in refusing to attend the SAARC summit in Islamabad in 2016.

Anup Chetia a top leader of ULFA was handed over by Bangladesh in 2015 after being in the country for eighteen years and in Nov 2017, five militants belonging to Manipur and Nagaland militant groups were handed over. Thus, there has been close cooperation between the two countries on terror issues. Most key problem areas including the handling of enclaves have been resolved. However, an unresolved issue remains the sharing of the Teesta and Feni river waters, mainly due to resistance of Mamta Banerjee.

Khalida on the other hand has always been an Indian baiter. During her term in office, India was blamed for all ills in the country. She moved closer to China, opened doors to the ISI and sheltered anti-India group leaders in the country, including from ULFA. Thus, her party’s emergence to power would be disadvantageous to India.

Internally, the nation had had multiple spells of military coups from the time of assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman in 1975 till 2007-08. Thereafter the army has remained in the background and supported the government in power. The army controls the Bangladesh Rifles, equivalent to the BSF, thus remains the most powerful institution in the country. It is the power behind the throne. It has watched the side lining of Khalida Zia by the courts and has supported the actions of the ICJ.

For India, continuation of the present government is ideal as relations between the two nations are on an even key.

However, whichever government wins, the army would remain the power behind the throne. The Indian and Bangladesh armed forces have traditionally been in close touch. The Bangladesh army chief visits India regularly. The two nations also have regular military exchanges, joint exercises and training. A major event jointly celebrated is Vijay Diwas, when freedom fighters from Bangladesh’s erstwhile Mukti Bahini visit India and veterans of the 1971 war from India visit Bangladesh.

Hence military diplomacy is the right approach for India to convey its security concerns. It is their army which, if convinced, would ensure that national policies remain unchanged, proximity with India continues while Pak and China are kept at bay. There are some limits to what foreign offices can do and there are occasions where military diplomacy may produce better results. Bangladesh is a clear example.

Has CPEC failed for both Pak and China? The Excelsior 25 Apr 18

The much-touted China Pak Economic Corridor (CPEC) is unlikely to either be a part of the Belt Road Initiative (BRI), nor benefit either nation to the extent it was supposed to. It would only add to financial difficulties of Pak in the long term.

The CPEC moves through the Karakoram Pass, which remains closed for six months in a year, thus reducing its viability. Chinese efforts are opening an axis available throughout the year has not met with success and is unlikely too in the future. Therefore, CPEC would only remain operational for limited durations.

With India and Afghanistan refusing to join the BRI, despite China claiming it is linking Afghanistan, the CPEC remains only an axis to move Chinese oil and gas to Xinjiang. Pak would never gain from it in any way. It would only provide land for Chinese geo-political requirements. Further, refusal of India and Afghanistan to participate in the BRI ensures that the CPEC can never be linked to it but would always remain a standoff project. Pak remains the ultimate loser.

China has desperately tried to involve India, which has till date refused. Its latest attempt is asking Nepal to be the via media to link China and India, hoping to galvanize the CPEC, which will again be against Indian interests. India remains doubtful on this proposal too.

Complete control of the CPEC remains with China. No Pak investment is being permitted in Gwadar or anywhere on the project. The land route linking Gwadar is through Punjab as China fears that the fuelling of unrest in Baluchistan could be an impediment. This has enhanced internal divide within the nation and added to tensions, as all CPEC benefits would only accrue to Punjab, others being ignored.

All contracts for construction remain with Chinese concerns and the labour is also Chinese, despite China claiming global tenders for each project. Thus, CPEC has not enhanced any employment opportunities in Pak. The restrictions placed by China ensures no Pak concern can ever bid. Restrictions imposed in the contract include a security deposit of USD 5 Billion or five years’ experience in similar construction, which is beyond the capability of Pak companies. Internationally, with instability in Pak, no global concerns would participate.

Reports emanating from Pak indicate that Chinese labour employed are mostly convicts, who remain unruly and undisciplined, leading to regular clashes with Pak police personnel. There have been reports of Chinese even involved in ATM thefts. A report over the weekend indicated the arrest of two Chinese who had launched drones to monitor the new Islamabad airport, adding to security issues.

Pak attempted to charge toll tax for move of Chinese vehicles, but the same was blocked by China, reducing the income it expected to earn. It would also earn nothing from the use of Gwadar as it has only 10% control, with 90% earning going to China.

With phase 1 of the free trade agreement in place, Chinese goods have begun flooding Pak markets, pushing their economy deeper into doldrums. Its traders have begun rising up in arms as they realise that the government’s decisions have impacted them.

The realization that China has exploited them has now begun to dawn and it is too late. Pak, in Nov 17, cancelled the construction of the Daimer-Bhasha dam, slated to be a USD 14 Billion agreement, stating China’s hyper strict conditions for funding the project were ‘not doable and against our interests’. The dam was part of the BRI.

Recently there were reports of Pak backing down from signing the revised free trade agreement with China at the last juncture. As per their minister for state and finance the worries shared by the business community of Faisalabad over the China offer list forced the government to back down. There was opposition from the federal board of revenue and industry after the government announced its plans to offer zero duties to seventy five percent of tariff lines. The Chairman of the standing committee of finance stated that Pak was already running a huge trade deficit with China and these concessions would destroy all industry in the country.

China on the other hand is aware of the deep economic crises Pak is facing. Pak had recently approached China for a USD 5 Billion loan, but the same was turned down. Pak prefers approaching China as against the world bank, despite higher rates of interest, as international monetary institutions are controlled by the US, which can always tighten the screws, if Pak refuses or delays acting against US interests in Afghanistan.

Post being turned down by China, it is resorting to a desperate measure to raise as much as USD 1 Billion from its diaspora by launching an overseas certificate in Dollars and Rupees. Economically Pak’s foreign exchange reserves are at their lowest in three years. Pak’s repayment of loans to China, which would be approximately USD 5 Billion a year has yet to start. Their claims of development rising to plus 5% this year is solely due to Chinese investments and infra development.

The Pak army is aware of the problems being faced by the country, hence have begun tightening internal screws. It has begun believing that it is the politicians who have sold the country. However, they have ignored the fact that senior military leaders, including their present and past army chief’s, praised the CPEC as the saviour of Pakistan, in every public forum. China provides approximately 60% of Pak military hardware only making it more indebted. The politico-military nexus knows it cannot broadcast its doubts on the viability of the CPEC to the public as it could add to the existing turmoil.

The impact is such in Pak, that Mandarin is being taught in every institution in the hope that CPEC would change the character of the nation. The true reality remains hidden. Simplistically put, the CPEC has been a disaster for both, China and Pak. While China would get its money back from Pak by yearly payments or take possession of critical assets, Pak would remain a loser. Its economic mess would only increase, pushing it deeper into financial doldrums.

Has Indian foreign policy failed in the Maldives? The Statesman 10 Apr 18

In recent times, especially since President Abdulla Yameen assumed power, there has been a stream of anti-India actions. It has moved closer to China, imposed emergency and jailed political leaders while turning down Indian requests for participation in the Indian naval exercise, Milan. It also refused to send any delegation to the Indian defence expo and asked India to retake back its Dhruv helicopter. It simultaneously welcomed the Pak army chief with open arms.

While most could have been ignored as the actions of a child seeking attention of both parents, India and China, as also playing one against the other, however the visit of the Pak army chief was possibly the cake. India would have ignored the visit, except that it comes at a time when Maldives is in a Chinese embrace and India was, as is the unwritten rule, previously uninformed of the visit. What irked India more was the announcement of joint patrolling of Maldives Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ), claims of which conflict with that of Sri Lanka.

Maldives had declared that no shipping vessel can enter its EEZ without prior permission of its government. It could never enforce it but involving the Pak navy is another issue. The Pak navy may not be able to deploy its ships on a permanent basis, as its navy presently lacks capacity, however the announcement irked India. Maldives turning down participation in Exercise Milan would never have been an issue, except that it also participates in Pak conducted Bi-annual exercise, Aman, on which it has made no mention.

Pak and Maldives even played out the religious card. The statement issued by the Maldivian President’s office post the visit of General Bajwa stated, ‘Noting that Pakistan and Maldives are two brotherly Muslim countries, the General emphasised on further cultivating ties of friendship’. Pak went ahead and even offered welcoming members of the Maldivian National Counter-Terrorism Centre and providing military doctors to Maldives.

When Yameen declared emergency and requested India to accept a delegate to hear out reasons for the same, India refused. India even went ahead and conducted naval exercises close to Maldives, which was being touted as possible Indian military intervention in the country. Nasheed, the ex-President, now in self-exile in Sri Lanka, requested Indian interference, which India refused. India however, along with the US and other western nations criticized the emergency, demanded its roll-back and sought the release of political prisoners, which Yameen refused. By moving closer to Pak, Yameen is now closing doors to India in multiple ways.

Indian decisions were also impacted by Chinese warnings. Chinese investments and Maldives active participation in the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) would ensure that China would never desire a regime change. For China, any dictator following any policy is acceptable, provided he tows the Chinese line. As China’s close ally Pak wades in, it ensures that Maldives moves further away from India.

Chinese investments in Maldives is a repeat story of Pak or Sri Lanka, where unable to repay loans they get deeper and deeper into debt. Thus, Maldives is deep into the Chinese camp. Its offering China an uninhabited island for developing into a tourist destination, in addition to other projects including construction of a bridge, linking Male to its nearest island and the airport would have Male permanently indebted. It may, like Pakistan, Sri Lanka and possibly Myanmar end up providing a naval base to China, supporting its ‘String of pearls’ policy.

The issue is, whether we have made an error in our foreign policy judgement or have we adopted a wait and watch policy which could prove beneficial with time or by sticking to our ideals opened doors for inimical nations to grab a foothold at our doorstep, enhancing threats.

Many analysts felt that India should have intervened militarily to restore democracy in Maldives, post the declaration of emergency, removing the dictator regime of Yameen, seeking to replace it with a government seen closer to India. Military intervention in an internal issue of Maldives would have damaged Indian reputation in the region. India may continue being accepted as a military power, but would be considered as an unreliable ally, which has waded in uninvited to remove a legally established government.

Indian intervention may have succeeded but would have pushed our other smaller neighbours into the Chinese lap. Nepal which already has a pro-China Oli in power, would have rushed deeper into China’s arms, solely to keep India at bay. The trust and respect which India developed over the years in the neighbourhood would have been blown to smithereens.

India flawed from the time Yameen took power. It should have ignored supporting his predecessor and made efforts to move closer, adopting a realist approach to diplomacy, rather than an idealist one. Even when emergency was declared, the crackdown was in progress it could have been more supportive and accepted the special envoy, as it could have been the means of conveying its strong message. It could have opened channels of communication and removed any fear of Indian intervention, which was being touted in Maldives as imminent. By ignoring, it closed all doors and enhanced distrust. Maldives has retaliated by indicating its displeasure, assured of Chinese and Pak backing.

India has no option, but to wait and watch. There would be a regime change sometime in the future, but by then, it may be too late, China would have waded in so deep, that no government would ever be able to distance it.

Maldives has clearly been an Indian foreign policy failure, based on our mistaken belief that we are too powerful in the sub-continent to be ignored. This lesson must sink in and we must learn from it in the days ahead. We are likely to have similar issues with other South Asian nation in the future, hence must be careful to avoid pushing it too far. India should move into realism in foreign policy, ignoring idealism.

Will Afghan peace talks commence? The Statesman 13 Mar 18

President Ashraf Ghani recently gave a call for talks with the Taliban, while addressing an international conference in Kabul. In his call, he offered to allow the Taliban to establish itself as a political party as also work to removing sanctions against them in addition to other incentives. There have been mixed reports following the President’s call.

One report stated that the Taliban were cool to the offer, while another stated that they were willing to negotiate, but would do so only with the US. In their opinion, the present government is a puppet regime, installed by the US and adopting US policies. All nations involved in the conflict, including Pakistan, supported the announcement made by President Ghani and encouraged the Taliban to come forward. India even raised the offer in the UN demanding nations with influence on the Taliban, to push it for talks.

Just prior to the call for talks was the path-breaking ceremony of the launch of the Afghan portion of the Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (TAPI) pipeline at Herat in Afghanistan. TAPI is expected to transfer natural gas from Turkmenistan to India via Afghanistan and Pakistan. The ceremony was attended by the Presidents of Afghanistan and Turkmenistan, Prime Minister of Pakistan and the Indian MoS for External Affairs, MJ Akbar. TAPI is expected to provide a revenue between USD 400 to 500 million dollars annually from transit duties to Afghanistan.

The Taliban realizing the potential income, which could be a boost in the long term, immediately offered to support the pipeline and even promised cooperation in providing security to the pipeline in the areas under its control. For them the pipeline implies manifold advantages. Firstly, it would earn from ensuring security in its territory. Secondly, if it does come to power in Kabul, this would be an invaluable foreign exchange earning annually. Finally, by hiring locals in its region of control, it could generate goodwill. The question remains whether this offer by the Taliban could be alluded as its desire to join talks or was it in their selfish interest.

The Taliban had in early Feb published an open letter addressed to the American public expressing a desire for talks. The letter called on the ‘American people’ to pressurize the Donald Trump administration into negotiations. The US on the other hand has always insisted that the talks would be led by the Afghan government. Even Pakistan had been stating that the only solution to the conflict is Afghan led talks. Thus, it is possible that the present offer by President Ghani is a result of this letter.

Another plausible reason for both to contemplate talks is the resurgence of the IS in Afghanistan. With the IS losing most of its territory in Syria and Iraq, it now needs new regions to reinvent itself. Afghanistan, presently in a state of confusion, is ideal. Its presence in the country has been established and is worrisome for all Afghanistan’s neighbours. Both the Taliban and the Afghan government are battling the IS. In case, the Taliban is willing to come forward for talks, then the concentration of force would shift against the IS.

The Taliban on other hand, apart from being sheltered by Pak has been in dialogue for multiple reasons with Russia, China and Iran. All these nations, though vehemently opposed to the US also have a stake in securing peace in Afghanistan. Spread of IS in the region would be detrimental to all of them. For China, its investment in the CPEC is also likely to be impacted by the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. Hence it would desire peace. In the present environment all neighbouring nations would prefer the US remains in the country for the present, providing security and containing the IS.

The Taliban control or influence almost fifty Afghan districts. From their bases in Pak, they can launch direct attacks onto Kabul, which they have been doing. Hence it is essential to force them out of Pakistan to enhance pressure on them. However, its suicide attacks in Kabul resulting in mass casualties would have impacted its support base. It is only when the Taliban realizes, that it is in a stalemate situation would it be willing to accept talks, which is possibly the state at present. In addition, it would also be facing pressure from Pak, which remains under international scrutiny for its links with the Taliban. Hence the Taliban leadership would have been compelled to recalibrate its strategy.

The US, while calling for the Taliban to accept the offer for talks, has been unrelenting on pressure on Pakistan, to stop supporting the group and push the leadership across the border. This pressure has been mounted from multiple directions. Stopping aid, cross border drone strikes and even through the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The US is also aware that Pak can be pushed thus far and no more, as it still needs to depend on Pak facilities and air space.

Thus, in the overall context there has been a forward movement, though small. Talks are being mentioned, with both sides still waiting for the other to take the first step. If the US comes in for direct negotiations, the Kabul government would be left embarrassed. Maintaining the legitimacy of the government is essential, despite all its shortcomings. The US may remain present on the table for discussions, but the leadership role would need to be played by the Kabul government. It is with this backdrop that the US recently refused to commence direct negotiations with them.

It is still early days however signs appear positive. The nation has witnessed immense bloodshed and deserves peace and stability. Pressure on the Taliban must continue from multiple directions to compel it to reduce its acts of violence and adopt steps to peace. Pak has direct influence on the Taliban hence should continue being pushed to the wall, to enhance pressure for talks.

India and the Maldivian crises The Excelsior 14 Feb 18

Maldives is back on the boil. The Maldives Supreme Court in a judgement ordered the release of political prisoners and demanded their retrial. The release order included that of former Vice President Ahmed Adheeb Ghafoor, former Prime Minister Mohamed Nasheed (presently in exile) and reinstating 12 members of parliament, thus giving the opposition a majority in the country’s assembly. Post this judgement, the President Abdulla Yameen declared a fifteen-day emergency and arrested all opposing him, including ex-President Gayoom and the Chief Justice Abdulla Saeed, who had passed the order. His predecessor, Mohamed Nasheed, has requested India, from his exiled location of Columbo, to despatch an envoy backed by military force to restore democracy in the nation.

Many western nations, including the US and UK as also the UN have criticized the emergency alongside India and demanded its roll back as also implementing the Supreme Court judgement. The fact remains, if this order is implemented, the opposition would gain majority and could impeach the President. India, as the big brother has maintained an official studied silence and only expressed dismay at the imposition of the emergency.

Strategically Maldives remains important to India. The Maldives archipelago comprises of 1200 coral islands and sits astride major shipping routes. It gained its independence in 1965 and India established its mission there in 1972. There are about 25,000 Indian residents there and India is a chosen location for Maldivians for education and health care. Indian tourists form about 6% of the tourists visiting the country. In 1984, when an LTTE breakaway faction had attempted to take over the country, India launched an operation involving the parachute brigade to rescue the nation. Maldives is also a member of the SAARC.

Since President Yameen assumed office, India-Maldives ties have been frosty, with the nation moving closer to China. The nation signed a free trade agreement with China, thus openly snubbing India. It subsequently did offer India a similar deal and commenced discussing granting India permission to develop an atoll as a naval facility. However, discussions have been deliberately progressing slowly.

In the present crises, India rejected the Maldivian offer of receiving a special envoy to place before the Indian government the state version of why it resorted to its present actions. The envoy did visit Beijing, Islamabad and Riyad. It was Maldives alone which hesitated to stand by India when it indicated its unwillingness to attend the SAARC summit in Islamabad claiming Pak’s support to terror groups. Thus, there is a cold distance between the two countries.

There have been press reports that India has kept ready a military force to intervene in Male if the need does arise, however has no plans for the same at present. China, aware of Indian concerns and its own direct involvement, has been warning India against taking any unilateral military action claiming that the present being an internal crisis should be allowed to be resolved inhouse. Clearly, geo-political battles are emerging at India’s doorstep.

Though not officially clear, yet all actions taken by the present Maldivian government would have had Chinese backing. Chinese investments and loans are slowly pushing Maldives deep into the Chinese camp. It is unlikely to be able to repay China, hence China akin to Shylock, would begin demanding its pound of flesh. It is almost a replay of Zimbabwe, where Chinese concurrence was taken before a coup was launched against Mugabe.

Militarily, any action by India would be unjustified in the international environment and send a wrong signal to the rest of the South Asian region. It would reduce India’s standing as a supportive big brother. Economic and diplomatic actions are being seriously considered as an alternative to military option. Such actions may be supported by the international community, as most nations including the UN have condemned the emergency. However, the stronger the economic and diplomatic action, the deeper would it push Maldives into the Chinese camp, as it would be compelled to bank on China for support.

For China, its own national interests and economic investments come first and hence in many cases, it has openly supported dictators, provided they remain pro-China. Zimbabwe and the Myanmar military regime are examples. Thus, it would continue to support the present government. India would not be keen to open another confrontation front with China in Maldives. Thus, it would not contemplate direct military intervention at this stage, unless the internal situation worsens and threatens the stability of the nation.

Hence, despite multiple calls for Indian intervention, it has not commented. However, it cannot remain a mute spectator too in the current environment. If it does, then again it would lose its importance in the region. Therefore, it would need to act in some form. Militarily, while it may not intervene, it should move its naval vessels close to Male, indicating a show of force and a willingness too act, in case the government begins to lose control. This show of force may be condemned by China but clearly is essential to indicate Indian interests in its immediate backyard.

Diplomatically, it should continue to exert pressure including through the UN, alongside likeminded western powers including the US. Its actions to push the UN to send a representative to Male is a step in the right direction. Its decision to not receive the special envoy was conveying a message of Indian anger on this action.

In the ultimate analysis, the Indian government may apply as much pressure as it desires, however some facts must be accepted. Yameen battling to maintain control over his island nation would never accept the court order as it would tantamount to him being overthrown. His previous actions would then be scrutinized and akin to his decision on his predecessors, he too may be compelled into exile or be jailed. Power has forced him to challenge everyone who questions him or even appears a threat on the horizon, hence he would do anything to remain in power.

Support from China would ensure that his government cannot be criticized internationally. The only way he would be overthrown would be by a mass uprising. Can this be engineered by Nasheed and his supporters remains a mute question?

US Afghan success lies in forcing Pak to act against terrorists ORF 01 Dec 17

As per Pakistan’s Dawn newspaper reports, the US Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford, and the Defence Secretary, James Mattis, are expected to visit them shortly, seeking cooperation from them in their war against the Taliban in Afghanistan. The visit comes after the US announced completion of deployment of an additional three thousand troops in the country and its readiness to commence joint operations with Afghan forces. It still awaits the arrival of an additional two thousand troops from NATO nations. Thus, Afghanistan would have over fifteen thousand NATO troops.

The US strategy in Afghanistan is to apply pressure on the Taliban, by degrading its fighting capabilities and targeting its leadership, to come to the negotiating table with the Afghan government without any preconditions. For this strategy to move forward and produce results, it is essential that the Taliban and Haqqani leadership, presently located in safe bases in Pak, must be dislodged into the mountains of Afghanistan. It is only by dislodging would the US be able to target them, compelling them to come forward for negotiations. Further, if Afghanistan is to be stabilized economically, its military trained and equipped, it would need additional assistance. This is the role that the US visualizes for India, after all India has a major stake in seeking stabilization of Afghanistan.

Pak is a major player in the region, as being Afghanistan’s neighbour and an ardent supporter of the Taliban and Haqqani network, it needs to be compelled to act. There is clearly a mismatch in perceptions of the US and Pakistan, concerning Afghanistan, which unless bridged, would never bring about peace in the country, nor permit the NATO to withdraw successfully. Though peace in Afghanistan is in Pak’s interest, there is a difference in the nature of peace it desires.

For Pak, Afghanistan has always been its strategic backyard, which it seeks to control, by having a favourable pro-Pak government in place. Hence, it is unwilling for India to have any role in the nation. It has always had a few misconceptions, which need to be set aside. The first is that India is fuelling insurgency in Baluchistan, through Afghanistan. Secondly, India has the support of the Afghan intelligence agency, National Directorate of Security (NDS), in supporting anti-Pak militancy and insurgencies.

Thirdly, the NDS and the Afghan government are providing sanctuary to anti-Pak terror groups, which regularly target Pakistan, with tacit Indian support. In simple terms, India is already playing a destabilizing role in Pakistan, through Afghanistan. Hence, any incident occurring in Pak is blamed on Indian intelligence agencies. Even during the ongoing standoff in Islamabad, the Pak interior minister, Ashan Iqbal, claimed that the protestors were in contact with India.

It has also been stating that the Taliban does not need Pak territory for sanctuary as it controls almost forty percent of Afghanistan. Pak’s regular international cry has been that it has been the largest sufferer in the battle of terror and its anti-terror operations have forced all terror groups from its soil. Its accusations of India and Afghanistan of interfering in its internal matters and its own battle against terror are generally ignored by the world body.

The US views are at a variance. It is firm of the belief, that unless the Taliban and Haqqani network are choked of weapons and funds as also pushed out of Pakistan, there is little possibility of them engaging in peace talks. Further, the US is willing to up the ante by employing drone strikes across the border, into Pakistan to target those who are still located there. To further prove its seriousness, it has made release of funds to Pak, contingent to Pak action against these groups. However, to provide Pak some leeway, it has delinked the LeT from the Haqqani network.

The US knows that the Pak government has little to no control over support to terror groups as it is done by the deep state, comprising the army and the ISI. Hence, regular warning to the Pak government to act, have been conveniently ignored. With additional deployment completed, it is now time for pressure to be applied, to compel Pak to act or NATO would face failure. Thus, these crucial visits by the US top brass.

The US has limited options and time, if it must force Pak’s hands. As winter commences the Taliban hibernates, regrouping and reorganizing, while preparing for its summer offensive. The Taliban and Haqqani network leadership should not be permitted to enter Pak in the winters, but remain in the mountains of the Pak-Afghan border, open to US drone strikes.

Blocking flow of funds to Pak is one option, but with China backing Pak, it may not succeed. It needs to threaten Pak of it being projected as a sponsor of terror groups, while seeking to remove it from the list of non-NATO allies. This would be a diplomatic blow for a nation, which has prided itself as being a victim of terror. Simultaneously, it should commence enhancing drone strikes across the border, unmindful of collateral damage. Such an action would lower the prestige and standing of the Pak army, as it would be questioned for being unable to protect its own population.

Internally, the US could request Afghanistan to quit using Karachi as its export base and shift its exports through Chabahar, with Indian support. This would impact Pak’s supposed control over Afghan trade, which it implements by blocking the international border.

However, the biggest carrot in US hands is the Indian factor in Afghanistan. The very suggestion of enhancing Indian role in Afghanistan is anathema in Pak eyes. It may be willing to act, if assured that Indian role would not imply an increase in influence and deployment in the country. Since Pak views the world through an Indian prism, such a threat may be enough for it to change its perceptions. Another minor carrot could be a promise to target the anti-Pak Taliban in equal measure.

The US needs Pak to act, but has not been able to compel it to do. It needs to apply pressure on the deep state including threatening to increase drone strikes across the border, enhance Indian presence and influence as also embarrass Pak in international forums to force it to act. If it does not do so, it may well continue in Afghanistan for another few decades, or withdraw in failure akin to the Soviets.

Along with US’ new South Asia policy, India’s Chabahar initiative changing regional narrative ORF 14 Nov 17

The strategic initiative displayed by India when it moved its first shipment of wheat to Afghanistan through the Chabahar port has been well established. Bypassing Pakistan changed the narrative of the region. Simultaneously has been the opening of an air corridor between the two countries. All this, while the US increases deployment of its troops, adopts a new strategy for South Asia, seeking to end the war in Afghanistan on favourable terms, while applying pressure on Pakistan to curb support to terror groups. This movement of wheat has also put Pak in a quandary and caused it to reassess its policies and influence in its immediate neighbourhood.

Pak had always blocked Indian attempts to reach out to Afghanistan through the land route, despite the Afghan President, in a recent announcement, refusing to renew the Pak- Afghan transit trade agreement, closing doors for Pak to trade with Central Asia through Afghanistan, solely because of this reason. Pak has feared that opening the land route to India would impact its hold and presumed stranglehold over Afghanistan. Even in a recent meeting between the Pak army chief and the Afghan President, Ashraf Ghani, this issue was vociferously raised by Afghanistan, wherein the Pak army chief stated that India must request Pak for the same, which India refused.

The strategic advantage of India exploiting and developing the Chabahar port has been discussed in many forums, however there is a human angle, which has remained largely unexplored. For Afghanistan, India remains a close reliable friend and a major market. Its products which earlier took a circuitous land route, while even the air corridor could move limited stocks, would now be shipped at far cheaper rates. Simultaneously, India has an avenue to be able to provide assistance, in times of disasters and calamities directly to Afghanistan, bypassing Pakistan.

Thus, respect for India in Afghanistan would be on the ascend, while that of Pak, solely because of its support to terror groups, on the decline. This would enhance Indian soft power, which could prove decisive, in case the new US policy proves effective and a state of near normalcy returns to the country. Clearly the movement of the first shipment of wheat would impact hearts and minds of the local Afghan populace, as the government would proudly announce enhanced Indian aid.

This combined with Indian economic and training assistance would negate any positive steps even if attempted by Pak. India and Pak are both battling for dominancy in Afghanistan. Pak seeks to force it through its surrogate terror groups and India by soft power and assistance.

This would also add to existing tensions and worries within Pak. This was evident, as immediately post the movement of the wheat shipment, the Pak army chief rushed to Tehran to meet the Iranian leadership. One of his topics for discussion would be the impact of the opening of Chabahar port and if Iran could consider imposing conditions on the movement of goods and supplies to Afghanistan, through this axis.

After all, if today India could move essential commodities, it can easily move weapons and ammunition to strengthen the Afghan forces, provided it has Iranian support. Thus, If Pak adopts an anti-Iran approach, including supporting Saudi Arabia against it, it may permit move of military equipment into Afghanistan, through Chabahar, thus enhancing Pak’s threat perceptions. Pak would need to be very cautious and tow a thin line, failing which it could be the loser.

The other worry for Pakistan would be reduced Afghan dependency on it. Afghanistan remains poor, landlocked with no access for its products. It had always banked on Karachi, due to which it had to remain indebted to Pak. Every time there was tension and attacks along the Durand Line, Pak simply closed the border.

The last blockade, was for almost a month and adversely impacted Afghanistan, much more than it did to Pakistan. Thus, it was open to blackmail from Pakistan, which it regularly resorted to. The moment Chabahar opens, Indian support becomes freely available, dependency on Pak would reduce, other than for daily normal trade. This would provide Afghanistan more options and reduce its dependency on Karachi.

This changing narrative, resulting in enhanced positive support for India would also open doors for it to expand its footprint in the country, adding to Pakistan’s woes. The very issue over which Pak remains adamant would now become a reality. Further, if India is to operate Chabahar port, it would need to maintain a reasonable presence in the region. This was the same port from where Pakistan abducted Kulbhushan Jadhav, claiming him to be an agent. Indian footprints would enhance in just the very regions where Pak does not desire them.

It would also result in India exporting its own produce as raw materials in projects, which it undertakes in the country, thereby benefitting our own economy. Afghanistan would also open doors for enhancing India’s trade into Central Asia, akin to what Pakistan is presently resorting to. Enhanced trade and movement of goods through Chabahar also implies additional employment for Afghanis.

Pak’s desire to control Afghanistan would slowly become ineffective, its blackmail and closing of borders would become redundant, hurting its own trade more. Pak’s trade with Central Asia would reduce, while India’s would increase. Thus, respect for India and enhanced Indian soft power will be the future in Afghanistan. Simultaneously, it would increase worry and tensions within Pak, as Indian footprints would be more visible, in those very regions which Pak fears.

Will Tillerson’s visit have any impact on Pak? The Excelsior 09 Nov 17

Rex Tillerson, the US Secretary of state arrived, spoke what he was expected to and left. Now it is time to take stock of what this awaited visit meant for India and Pakistan. India was his final stop in Asia as part of his six-nation tour. He spent a few hours in surprise visits, possibly due to security reasons, in Iraq and Afghanistan. His visit to Pakistan was in total, four hours. India was expectedly special. The difference in duration conveys the importance that US attaches to India.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, his emphasis was on discussing the prevailing security environment. The Afghan visit bears relevance as the message specifically for Pakistan to change policies towards terrorism emanated from there. It was clear and concise, close terror camps and cease supporting terror groups. After conveying this message, he flew to Pakistan.

In Pakistan, there was a combined interaction with the polity and military leadership. Pakistan claims that it had so planned it, to convey to the US that all organs of the country are on the same page, however, what it conveyed was that the military is the dominating force and would remain, the rest being just puppets. Hence, the US would need to handle the Pak army, not its polity. In true democracies, the army is never at the forefront of diplomacy but always remains in the background.

Pak projected that it feels threatened by growing Indian power, has curbed terror groups and is no longer providing safe havens. This was in stark contrast to what their foreign minister had stated less than a month ago, when he mentioned that LeT and Haqqani network are liabilities which would take time to handle. There were no takers for Pak’s viewpoint.

It also would have indicated its resentment to an enhanced Indian role in Afghanistan and as usual requested the US to initiate dialogue on Kashmir. Pak considers Afghanistan and Kashmir as interlinked. Resolution of Kashmir, in Pak’s perception, would result in peace in Afghanistan, no matter how preposterous it may sound. These are Pakistan’s pet topics, which are generally ignored.

The visit to India involved multiple interactions with those concerned with national policies and strategies. He interacted with the NSA, External Affairs Minister, defence minister and called on the Prime Minister. The most exhaustive meeting was with the foreign minister, post which a joint statement was issued.

The joint statement indicated commonality in thought and approach to the world in general and the region in specific. This is natural as both nations face almost similar threats, including containing a belligerent China, especially as it expands its footprints in the South China Sea. He declared the US’s willingness to share latest technologies for India’s military development and hoped India would look at the F-16 and F-18 aircraft favourably.

Major statements by both were on the future of Afghanistan. In contrast to Pakistan’s claims and objections, Tillerson openly stated that India is crucial to US strategy in Afghanistan. This sent a blunt message to Pak, that Indian footprint would expand in Afghanistan, despite their complaints, unless they behaved. Both nations openly condemned Pak for supporting terror groups, thus conveying that it does not believe Pak when it states that no groups operate from its soil.

Two contentious issues were discussed, in passing. India announced a drastic reduction in trade with North Korea, to the happiness of the US, but also refused to close its embassy. Secondly, the US had no objections to India building Chabahar port in Iran and enhancing its trade and diplomatic ties with it and through it with Afghanistan.

With Tillerson back in the US, will Indo-US relations get a fillip? The US is considering the sale of armed drones to India, which it may for quite some time more, keeping India waiting. Technology from the US may flow, albeit slowly, as they have their own processes. The technology which would flow would never be top of the rung, always notches below. Indo-US-Japan naval exercises would continue, possibly including Australia, also making right noises for the information of China. India is enhancing deployment in the Indian Ocean, not because US desires it, but for its own security.

The major fallout of the visit was on terrorism emanating from Pakistan. This has two parts. Firstly, is Pak’s support to terror groups operating in Afghanistan and secondly for terror groups operating against India. Tillerson appeared more concerned about Afghanistan than problems being faced by India.

While the US may have placed a bounty on Hafiz Saeed, it is aware he is roaming free, addressing rallies and collecting donations for waging Jihad against India. This issue was never mentioned nor discussed, indicating the US’s Afghan bias. Even the list of terrorists demanded by the US from Pak did not have his name, though the joint statement did mention that Pak must stop terror groups from operating from its soil.

The visit clearly indicated, that despite all closeness and proximity with India, their concerns are their own interests in Afghanistan and the challenges they face. Indian concerns are secondary in their eyes. While they would provide technological support in building Indian military power, it would mainly be in those fields, which could assist them in handling their challenges, naval and air power. Hence, this was realpolitik at its best.

While India is militarily capable of countering any threats in its own near environment, establishing closer ties with the US would ensure support in the international environment. For Pak, Tillerson needed to be convinced that it is for pro-Afghan peace talks, but it failed. The trust deficit between the two only widened. There was no mention of drone strikes in Pak, implying it would continue as hither to fore.

With Tillerson’s visit receding into the background, Pak is back to where it earlier was, supporting terror groups on its soil. Its Kashmir policy would remain unchanged, infiltration and border violations would continue. Pak would however remain wary of increased Indian footprints in Afghanistan, but will only rue over it, unable to restrict it. Life in the subcontinent would be as hither to his visit, unless the US applies more pressure on Pak.

How did US get Pak to change and implication for India CENJOWS 25 Oct 17

Pak has always used the US to its advantage, taking funds, making promises but failing to deliver. It paid Pak millions of dollars, provided it equipment, supposedly for targeting terror groups, in actuality for employment on the Indian front, yet got no support, in return. India understood the Pak game, having faced it over the years, cried hoarse to the US over it, but to no avail.

The US was desperate for Pak support, Musharraf made promises, even played bringing the Taliban onto the bargaining table on an odd occasion, but the reverse happened. The Taliban strengthened its attacks, occupied more territory and threatened the US with failure. It was set to once again prove the myth, ‘Afghanistan is the graveyard of empires’.

Trump gave his new team, mainly senior military officers and Afghan veterans time to evolve a new strategy. Terming it as the South Asian strategy, it involved not only Afghanistan, but also Pak and India as the region’s main players. The aim was to create conditions for launching strikes on the Taliban leadership, degrading it to the level that it is compelled for talks within the Afghan constitution. Troop induction was a part, but the strategy did not evolve around it, the induction being only to provide calling for air and drone strikes at points of contact to reduce own and enhance enemy casualties.

The US was aware that despite all rhetoric, it needed Pak. Its port of Karachi was essential for maintaining the force within Afghanistan. Further Pak’s position within the Islamic community, possession of nuclear weapons and delivery means implied, it could be pushed thus far and no further.

To compel Pak to change direction from supporting terror groups to acting against them required tact at the strategic level, threatening its sovereignty by drone strikes and enhancing its security concerns. To enforce this, it went back to its earlier ploy of carrot and sticks, but in the reverse order. The stick came first, which was the statement issued by Trump, openly threatening Pak, including removing it from the status of a non-NATO ally and cutting off all aid. The threat sounded real when it came.

Trump’s statement was backed by his staff when they raised the issue in different forums, including Senate hearings, where negative comments were made about the ISI, including its support to terror groups. Alongside this was seeking an enlarged role for India in Afghanistan. The visit by the US defence secretary Jim Mattis to India and his meetings with national leaders led to further speculation of an enhanced role for India.

India and Afghanistan, during the visit of the Afghan President, Ashraf Ghani, signed an agreement for training of the Afghan police in India and enhancing military supplies to Afghanistan. India responded with muted statements to the US policy, neither jumping at it, nor commenting, simply welcoming it.

Trumps speech made Pak uncomfortable, then undergoing a change in national leadership, post the removal of Nawaz Sharif. They were particularly perturbed about the enhanced role offered to India and direct accusations on their national policies and strategies. They claimed that they alone were being targeted, whereas they had stopped supporting terror groups.

Their foreign minister around the same time admitted that the existing terror groups based in Pak were a liability, but they needed time to eliminate them. Pak cancelled the visits of US delegations to their country in a display of anguish and worry.

Panic even set into their security establishment, compelling their army chief to go running to Afghanistan, seeking to offer training and cooperation. The fear which the US had wanted to create, by employing the stick had worked. Pak had reacted in the manner the US desired. To further add to its humiliation, during the UN assembly session, Trump met the Afghan President, but had no time for the Pak Prime Minister, who had to be satisfied, with meeting the US Vice President.

Post the stick, came the carrot. The US defence secretary stated in a senate hearing that the US would give Pak one more chance to act against terror groups. Post the meetings between Pak PM and the US vice President and their foreign minister and the US secretary of state, the visit of delegations, which had been stalled recommenced. Pak would have quietly projected to the delegations, its willingness to change, however kept this away from the public eye. An announcement that the US defence secretary and secretary of state would visit Pak soon, re-gave it confidence. The carrot was producing results.

The rescue of the US-Canadian couple and their children from the clutches of the Haqqani network, based on US inputs, by the Pak army was an indicator of the turn. The fact that they had remained on Pak soil all through, as stated by the CIA, and the captors got away, was not lost on US minds. It conveyed the message that Pak can act, provided it is compelled to. Trump thanked Pak and appreciated its efforts, the carrot moving well forward. Many Indian media houses and strategic experts expressed surprise at Trump’s statement, but the government was quiet. It understood the US policy.

The US recommenced launching drone strikes close to the Pak-Afghan border and within Pak, to drive home the point that they must continue to act or their sovereignty would be violated repeatedly. This time, objections by Pak were muted, as they had to object, solely to convince their own population. The forthcoming visits would be the time when Pak would be compelled to change its policies towards Afghanistan, at least.

India would be the final carrot through which the US could change Pak’s approach. The mere mention of an enhanced role for India in Afghan political affairs can cause panic within Pak security circles. The US would offer a reduced role, only if Pak acts. However, India should project through the US that if Pak does not control anti-India terror groups, India would enhance its footprints in Afghanistan’s political affairs. This message going through the US secretary of state, post his visit to India, onto Pak, would compel it to act in India’s favour. After all, India is investing in Afghanistan, hence, deserves a say in its political future. Pak has been handled by the stick and carrot policy this time as against the earlier carrot and stick ones.

An opportunity to corner Pak The Statesman 24 Oct 17

The US Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, is in India for his maiden visit today, as part of his South Asia tour which would also possibly take him to Afghanistan. He comes to India after visiting Pak, where he would have only heard a collection of false complaints against India, including their desperate objections to its enhanced role in Afghanistan. While his recent statements concerning growing relations between the US and India are making news, there are doubts on the US approach to Pakistan.

The US seeks closer cooperation with India at the strategic level to counter China, as also play a greater role in stabilizing and developing Afghanistan. Regular visits by the Afghan president to India only indicate their dependence on India. On the other hand, Pakistan, the main architect behind US failures, seeks the opposite. It has been crying hoarse about reducing India’s influence in Afghanistan, while it contributes nothing, other than supporting groups bleeding Afghanistan daily.

The US policy towards Pak under Trump has witnessed a reversal from previous administrations. Earlier policy was the carrot and stick, which included providing Pak military hardware and finances to obtain support in curbing anti-Afghan terror groups on its soil. The US did nothing even when Osama was traced and eliminated on their soil. The US only got more casualties and empty promises in return. It remains dependent on the Karachi port for its forces, hence needs to handle Pak with caution.

The present US South Asian strategy, was developed by serving and retired generals, with vast experience in Afghanistan and in handling the duplicity of Pak. They recommended a reverse of the carrot and stick policy, where the stick came first, which immediately began producing results. In the initial phase of the strategy, Pak was lambasted by Trump and his chief advisors, making their security establishment nervous enough to reconsider its approach.

The very mention of an increased role for India in Afghanistan, made the Pak army chief rush to Kabul offering all forms of assistance, including joint operations, desperately seeking Kabul’s support against enhanced Indian role. Their prime, defence and foreign ministers cried foul on increasing Indian footprints in Afghanistan in every possible forum. Subsequently, when their foreign minister admitted that terror groups do exist within the country and Pak needs time to dismantle them, did the stick slowly begin receding, as Pak had accepted and indicated a willingness to act, contrary to its earlier denials.

The recent action of the Pak army in rescuing a US-Canadian family kidnapped five years ago indicated a mild change in their policy. The announcement of the success of the operation by Pak was countered by the CIA, when it stated that the captives had remained in Pak all through and close to the HQs of the Haqqani network. This only proved that Pak could act, but only when pressurized.

The fact that none of their captors were arrested or killed raised doubts of whether it was a military operation or a sell-out to befool the US. There have also been comments in the media, that Pak acted, because a message was conveyed that a possible Bin Laden nature of surgical operation may be undertaken. This would have been a massive degrading blow to their army.

Post the incident, US drone strikes have increased along the Pak-Afghan border, targeting militant groups operating in the region. A number of these strikes have occurred on Pak soil, which their prime minister brushed away, stating it was along the un-delineated border. Pak has refrained from adversely commenting on the strikes, solely because it fears the stick coming into play again. The US continues to warn Pakistan for its lack of resolve in curbing these groups especially as Taliban attacks on Afghan security forces are suddenly on the rise. This would have been the message Tillerson would have conveyed to Pak. In the same voice it openly calls India a major strategic partner. It is in this complicated atmosphere that Tillerson arrives in Delhi.

The visit of Tillerson has deliberately been coincided with a visit by the Afghan President, Ashraf Ghani. This would convey a message of a joint strategic approach, which could then be conveyed to Pak by the US, at an appropriate time. The US wants support from India in many fields, hence it should be willing to include Indian considerations while handling Pak. The US is keen for Indo-Pak talks to resume, but at the same time aware of the Indian stand, ‘terror and talks cannot go hand in hand’.

Further, both nations realize the level of fear within the Pak establishment of an increased Indian footprint in Afghanistan. India is already training the Afghan army, as also providing it military hardware and developmental assistance. It recently signed an agreement to also commence training the Afghan police, hence now possesses influence in every field of the Afghan security forces.

India’s agreement to the US desires of enhancing its assistance to Afghanistan, should be conditional to US pressure on Pak to do more in curtailing anti-India terror groups operating from its soil. Pak is a master in duplicity, making promises but refusing to adhere to them. India possesses first-hand knowledge of Pak’s duplicity, having witnessed regular turnarounds on the talks issue and hence can correctly convey the message.

The message to Pak through the US should be clear. India is investing in Afghanistan, hence wants a say in the political affairs of the nation. If Pak desires that India not be involved in the political future of Afghanistan, but solely in developmental, then it must curb its anti-India activities, including terror groups. Failure to do so, would result in enhanced Indian footprints and influence in Afghanistan, enhancing threat to Pak. With Ashraf Ghani being in Delhi at the same time, this message would carry immense weight and create more internal worry in Pak. Tillerson’s visit is an opportunity which India should exploit for cornering Pak.

US’s latest South Asia policy may not succeed CENJOWS 12 Sep 17

Introduction

Donald Trump finally announced his South Asian (read Afghanistan) policy. The policy had nothing new to offer, despite delays and discussions, prior to its release. Extended discussions were essential because unknowns dominated known factors, since more neighbouring nations began jumping into the Afghan cauldron. There is mention of a surge in troops, greater involvement in operations including air power as Trump stated that the aim is to fight terrorists and not nation building, as also a more aggressive approach towards Pakistan, all while seeking to enable withdrawal with grace.

The policy hoped India would contribute more towards nation building and development. This implies, the US would concentrate on battling terrorists, while India handles development, thus enhancing India’s role in the nation. There is mention that India had to be pressurized to enhance its commitment, which may not be true. India always had an interest in Afghanistan and was willing to be a partner in development, not boots on the ground.

The bottom line is the US desires to withdraw with honour and leave behind a fairly stable Afghanistan. There is a hope that by the time the US withdraws, the Taliban would have been on the negotiating table. Those behind this new strategy are military personnel, who have had service experience in Afghanistan and presently are decision makers. Afghanistan is the longest military engagement of the US, continuing since 2001.

Earlier policy failures

The US has been hesitant to mention that all its previous policies in Afghanistan have failed and this is possibly their last attempt to finding a solution, before they, akin to the Russians, withdraw in defeat. Pakistan is being blamed, basically as a coverup, for their failed policies, though Pak at one time was the key factor behind the failure of the US. It missed acting against them and now it may be too late.

They are also aware, that a withdrawal without degrading the Taliban and its allies, commencement of talks with the Taliban, could convert Afghanistan, within months, into a new Syria, much more potent and dangerous, whose main targets would be the US and its allies. India could also become a victim. Thus, the words which Trump used, “The consequences of a rapid exit are both predictable and unacceptable”.

Historically Afghanistan has never been a nation- state

Throughout its history, Afghanistan has never been a nation-state. It has always been an amalgamation of fiefdoms, dominated by local warlords, who have ruled their respective areas by the gun. Tribal affinities and loyalties have ensured that no outsider has ever been able to control the nation-state. Its boundaries have been determined by the British and other western powers, splitting tribes across borders, ensuring that the country remains in a permanent state of turmoil. Its rugged and difficult terrain has been the bane of occupation forces and enabled tribal lords to rule with an iron fist. Strategically, this landlocked country opens doors to Central Asia, which also landlocked, is rich in minerals, exploitation of which remains restricted. Whichever government rules Kabul, only controls the cities and roads leading to them.

Al Qaeda and Taliban

The rise of the al Qaeda and the Taliban was initially a Pakistan plan, into which jumped the US, solely to compel the erstwhile USSR to withdraw. The US provided weapons and funds, which the ISI routed to the groups. Their power grew alongside their loyalty to the Pak deep state, which provided the leadership with sanctuaries, assistance, funding and support. The same remains even today, though the Taliban and Haqqani network appear to have overcome its sole dependence on Pakistan. With the Taliban spreading its wings and power and the US creating more enemies than friends in the region, other neighbouring states have jumped into the fray, aiming to hand the US, its worst defeat since the Vietnam war.

The Taliban, presently designated as an international terror group by the security council, has been involved in diplomatic parleys with Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan. With multiple nations having strategic interests in Afghanistan, isolating the Taliban today appears to be nigh impossible. Within the Moslem world, Shia-Sunni rivalry is well known. Terror groups of one sect target the other. However, where strategic imperatives come into play, Afghanistan being one, such rivalries are ignored.

Regional powers in Afghanistan

Iran borders Herat and Farah provinces of Afghanistan. There have been claims by the Afghan government that Iranian support to the Taliban has been evident in recent strikes. Reports of Iranian soldiers being killed alongside the Taliban in these provinces has been reported. Mohamed Arif Shah Jehan, the governor of Farah province told the New York Times, “The strongest Taliban here are the Iranian Taliban”. The US drone strike, which eliminated Mullah Mansoor, the previous head of the Afghan Taliban, though in Pak, but was when he was returning from Iran, possibly after an important meeting, thus linking the Afghan Taliban to Iran.

Russia and China to have stepped up their interactions with the Taliban and have openly announced it. Both have advocated that the reason for their interaction was to contain the ISIS, employing the Taliban, which they consider as the lessor of the two evils. While, this may have some truth, as both the ISIS and Taliban are rivals in the country, however there would be a deeper sinister design.

The ISIS claims to have members from Chechnya and Russian dominated nations on Afghanistan’s periphery. Hence, Russia desires their containment rather than a return to their homeland. China faces similar problems as its nationals from Xinjiang province are also deep within the ISIS. The fact that these nations, in the garb of seeking a solution to Afghanistan, are officially interacting with a group, which they have themselves declared as an international terror organization, is clearly a deeper design.

Presently, US relations are strained with both these nations. For Russia, it is also payback time for US support to the al Qaeda. For China, the US is a rival, challenging it at every step, undermining Chinese claims to the South China Sea, hence would always prefer it being involved in the quagmire which it itself created. Iran and the US are anyway sworn enemies.

Iran has its own strategic interests in Afghanistan. It would desire to have ideal relations with whoever controls Kabul, including the Taliban. It supports the present government with funds, but also supports the Taliban. It would back anyone who is willing to challenge US forces. Hence, it not only harbours the Taliban, but also provides it with every form of support.

This international involvement in Afghanistan has grown as the US reduced its force levels, only adding to the unknowns.

Pak dilemma

Pakistan’s involvement is more peculiar. It created these monsters to fight the erstwhile Soviet Union, as it has always considered Afghanistan as its strategic depth. It would never desire a hostile power to rule the country. While the Taliban was in power, its Afghan mercenaries were being sidestepped to Kashmir. The US invasion did India a favour, by stopping this movement. Pak cannot control this multi-headed hydra now. Any attempt to do so, would force them to turn direction inwards to Pak. It is already stalemated by the TTP, an offshoot of the Afghan Taliban, many others would follow suit. Claims by the US of Pak resorting to selective anti-terror drives is correct, but Pak has no choice. It must consider its survival first, before worrying about US difficulties.

With China backing Pak and its nuclear weapon security, it is certain that no nation, can ever tamper with its survival. With more anti-US nations interacting with the Taliban, it is relatively safe from US actions, except drone strikes, which would continue.

US and NATO

The US headed the NATO led UN mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from Aug 2003 to Dec 14. At its peak, ISAF had over a hundred thousand soldiers involved. From Jan 15, the mission was reduced to approximately ten thousand and termed as Resolute Support, which was a training, advising and assisting mission. Since Trump’s ascendency, relations between the US and NATO have only been deteriorating.

The US Secretary of State had in earlier interactions with NATO leaders suggested enhancing force levels in Afghanistan, however received no positive response. NATO nations have refused to accept US demands for a troop surge. Thus, any change in strategy including induction of additional forces in the country would have to be undertaken by the US itself.

US strategic options

The new policy announced by the US sends a few clear intentions.

It is no longer seeking elimination of the Taliban, Haqqani network and the ISIS, which has already begun rearing its head in the country. It is only seeking to degrade them to a level which could bring them onto the bargaining table, within the constitutional framework of Afghanistan.

Its earlier strategy of outright victory would now be moving towards ‘withdrawing with grace’, neither winning nor losing, but leaving with respect, unlike the Russians.

It is compelled to battle alone, as its NATO allies have refused to participate, beyond their current role.

Pitfalls in US Strategy

The ISIS and Taliban attacks are being launched from almost all directions. The Pak-Afghan border and the Iran-Afghan border are most active. The ISIS is responsible for maximum suicide attacks. Hence induction of a few additional battalions, when over thirty percent of the territory is controlled by the Taliban, would be meaningless. It would only slow the Taliban, but not stop it. Additional drone or even air strikes, seeking to target Taliban hideouts in Afghanistan and their leadership in Pakistan would have limited impact, as they could well shift to Iran, which the US would hesitate to strike. Further, with likelihood of increased collateral damage, it could come under severe international criticism, as also push more into the Taliban fold.

The Taliban never had financial problems. Its source of funding was always through Opium and this would continue. It has suddenly come into the limelight by being courted by nations of the region, begun receiving support, sanctuaries and weapons. It is now powerful enough to officially refuse to enter into negotiations with the Afghan government, seeking first, a withdrawal of the US. The US, though desperate to involve the Taliban in talks, cannot consider withdrawal first prior to talks.

A US alone strategy for resolving Afghanistan, without indirectly involving other stake holders may only delay the inevitable, but unlikely to work. Iran is a major player with an active border and would only enhance its support to the Taliban.

US-Iran relations are at their lowest ebb. Hence, Russia holds the key as it could contain Iranian support to the Taliban, restrict its own supply of weapons, while the US simultaneously applies economic, diplomatic and even threatens cross border strikes on Pakistan, irrespective of collateral casualties. China may provide diplomatic support, but is unlikely to directly fund and supply the Taliban for the present.

However, with sanctions imposed on Russia, officially such an action appears unlikely. Ultimately, the US would need to engage Russia, even by back channel diplomacy, provided it seeks to end the conflict on favourable terms and withdraw with grace. Russian support would be key to its strategy in Afghanistan, an aspect which the US is wary of announcing.

Indian involvement

Despite Trump’s rhetoric of Indian trade surplus with the US, it is evident, they are aware that it is only India which can deliver. Its frosty relations with China, sanctions against Russia and Iran, the only regional powerhouse from whom it can draw support is India. Indian commitment and desire to stabilize Afghanistan is also to ensure peace and security in South Asia and prevent the country from becoming a terror base for the subcontinent, including moving terrorists to Kashmir. Further, Indian diplomacy can play a constructive role in resolving the internal leadership crisis within Afghanistan, enhancing stability.

For India too, playing a major role in the country has its own strategic benefits. A strong Indian political and diplomatic base in Afghanistan would enhance nervousness within Pak’s security circles, which can be exploited, if necessary. India could use this involvement to enhance pressure on Pak to stop support to all terror groups and not just those targeting Afghanistan. Increased partnership with the US would only strengthen Indian influence in the region. It would only be effective, if the US decides to go the whole way and not withdraw in haste.

Will Trumps’ Pak threat work The Excelsior 30 Aug 17

Trump lambasted Pakistan during the recent announcement of his government’s South Asia policy. He openly blamed Pak for supporting and providing bases to terror groups operating in Afghanistan on its soil. It was holding Pak responsible for the failure of previous US policies on Afghanistan. Pak support was neither a new discovery nor did it require rocket science, it was known all along, however, ignored by all US governments, as they hoped Pak would change.

General John W Nicholson, commanding the US forces in Afghanistan, stated in an interview to Afghan media outlet, Tolo news, that Washington was aware of the Afghan Taliban’s leadership presence in Peshawar and Quetta. His statement was open proof that the US finally wanted Pak to act.

US policies towards Pak kept changing with each administration. They varied from providing financial and mil aid to threats. Pak always promised, however did nothing. The US kept pumping good money, but only bought casualties in return. It required an administration which realized that there is almost no hope of success, unless support from the deep state comes to a standstill. Thus, the present policy where the carrot has vanished and the stick remains.

Since release of the policy, there has been an outcry of anger and resentment against the US in Pak. The most common statement, made by every political and military leader, is that Pak does not permit its territory to be used by terror groups. It has also claimed that no nation has suffered as Pak has in its battle against terror groups. Pak claims over seventy thousand casualties as a result of terror strikes since 2001, including seventeen thousand dead. Post the Pak national security council meeting, a statement issued stated that cooperation with the US and Afghanistan was contingent upon elimination of safe havens of anti-Pak terror groups operating from Afghan soil.

Pak’s claims of not providing safe havens have been rebuked solely because the world has proof of Pak’s complicity. Pak appears to have forgotten that Osama bin Laden was killed in Pak, just a short distance away from a major military training centre and Mullah Mansur was targeted in Pakistan, while returning from Iran. Terrorists eliminated while attempting to cross into Kashmir with weapons, are products of Pakistan’s terror factories. Sartaj Aziz, their erstwhile foreign affairs advisor, had stated in the US, that since Pak provides support to the Taliban leadership, it does possess some hold over them.

The Pak army chief met the US ambassador and conveyed that Pak does not need US aid, however, demands that the nation be treated with respect. There are calls within Pak to deny use of its territory to US forces presently deployed in Afghanistan, as all heavy equipment still moves via the Karachi port. Pak faces internal as well external pressures solely because of its terror support policies.

Pak has also been threatened that unless it acts it would no longer be considered a non-NATO ally. The US secretary of state refused to rule out the possibility of military action, involving air strikes, on terror groups on Pak soil. What has irked Pak is not the direct threat, but that the US echoes the words of India.

To add fuel to fire, has been the offer by the US for a greater role for India in Afghanistan, an area which it considers as its backyard, as also opens doors to its soft underbelly. Further, within Pak, all policies towards Afghanistan and India are beyond the scope of the elected government, being the sole prerogative of the deep state, hence there is increased anger and helplessness of the senate.

Within Pakistan, despite US threats, the realities are different. It has created and supported this multi headed hydra. Taliban and Haqqani leaders are well aware of Pak’s involvement in a similar manner as Dawood is, hence have to be protected. Pak is also aware of the growing power of the Taliban and the Haqqani network. Most of its financing flows through Opium production, which it controls in Afghanistan, hence does not lack funds. Pak must protect them, solely to prevent them from falling into US hands, which could open its involvement to the world.

The question being asked across the west is whether this strong statement and open threat by the US would compel Pak to act, or would it be another attempt wasted, as Pak must simultaneously protect its own international reputation. The basic fact is that for Pak to act, the cost of refusal must be very high. This is not easy considering the changing geo-political equations in the region.

China is Pak’s main benefactor. Its deep investments in the country, would compel it to ensure Pak’s security and sanctity, however the support may be only economic and diplomatic. Militarily, Pak would have to face US drone and air strikes in its territory. Russia, presently under US sanctions, has also come in support of Pakistan. The US is also aware of Iran’s involvement in Afghanistan, after all the drone strike which eliminated Mullah Mansur, did so when he was returning from Iran, however have remained silent on this aspect, basically because the main Taliban leadership is sheltered in Pakistan and the US and Iran are sworn enemies.

Pak has few options. Firstly, and the easier one is to push the leadership into Iran, thus ensuring their safety and away from US strikes. However, their movement is being monitored and hence it could backfire. Secondly, it could compel them to avoid making statements and reduce military engagements, which again is not easy. Finally, is the hard option of pushing them into Afghanistan.

If the US is to compel Pak to act, in the manner that it desires, then it must be ruthless in enforcing its will. This implies diplomatic pressure by removing Pak from being a non-NATO ally and employment of air strikes including drone and missile, irrespective of collateral damage on terror targets within Pak. It is only by humiliating the Pak army’s ability to ensure security of its borders will it force them to act. Thus, if it has shown Pak the stick, then the US much employ it to the maximum, or like all other earlier options, this too would be an empty threat which would be ignored.

Why Donald Trump’s South Asia policy will only drag on Daily O 23 Aug 17

President Trump recently announced with much fanfare his new policy towards South Asia, concentrated on US commitment in Afghanistan. It was eagerly awaited and when it was finally announced, it had all ingredients which were expected, with no new surprises. The policy, which had been under debate for months, was expected in Jul, but finally released a month later. In simple words, it is old wine in a new bottle, as it fails to take into consideration ground realities in Afghanistan.

The policy removes the option of US withdrawing on similar grounds as the erstwhile USSR, in defeat and confusion. The policy aims to create conditions for seeking a honourable exit from the country. His statement, ‘the consequences of a rapid exit are both predictable and unacceptable’, conveyed the fears of the west, that a withdrawal without stabilization, could result in it becoming the next Syria, however much more potent and dangerous.

The policy clearly conveys a few US thoughts. Firstly, Trump has committed the US into an anti-terror war, without any timeframe for pull out. The implication of this versus earlier is that the US will not be involved in nation building, but only in eradicating of terrorists. Secondly, as was expected, there would be a troop surge of approximately four thousand troops, basically upto four battalions implying possibly a composite brigade strength. It would also enhance increased air operations including drone strikes in support of ground troops.

Thirdly, considering his increased distancing from NATO, it will be a US surge of troops only, with no additional commitment from NATO allies, whose role would continue to be to train and equip Afghan forces, as part of the Resolute Support Mission. Fourthly, it envisages continuation of India’s contribution to nation development and building of infrastructure in the country. However, though not mentioned, India’s supply of military hardware and training support would continue.

Finally, Trump has openly warned Pakistan about its continued support to terror outfits operating from its soil and the support it provides to them. It has thrashed bare Pakistan’s claims that it is also a victim of terror strikes and is facing the brunt from anti-Pak terror groups operating from Afghanistan. This threat, despite continued dependence on the Pak port of Karachi for movement of major stores, indicates increased frustration in the minds of the planners on Pak’s support to the Taliban, Haqqani network and other associated groups.

The policy has ignored many ground realities and hence may only delay the inevitable withdrawal of the US, akin to the USSR. At its peak strength, ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) had a strength of over one hundred thousand troops, which could not eliminate the Taliban, while with a surge the present strength would be approximately fifteen thousand.

Pak was a major factor when the US waded into Afghanistan and in the initial phases of the war, however, it is no longer the only player in the country. While it still supports the Taliban and Haqqani leadership, also termed the Quetta Shura, however, many other nations have jumped into the fray, which would need to be simultaneously handled.

Iran is also openly supporting the Taliban by providing them funds, sanctuary and weapons, while simultaneously supporting the Kabul government. Operations launched by the Taliban in Herat and Farah provinces of Afghanistan, bordering Iran, clearly have Iranian support. The Afghan governor of Farah has claimed that Iranian commandoes have been killed alongside Taliban fighters in Farah. With increased US involvement, Iran a sworn enemy of the US, would only increase its support to the Taliban, adding to US woes.

Russia and China are openly in parleys with the Taliban. There are rumours that the Russians are also providing the Taliban with weapons. Financially the Taliban has no shortage of funds as it relies on Opium to fund its activities. For both, China and Russia, support to the Taliban is in their own national interests. Apart from impacting US operations in the country, the Taliban is a sworn enemy of the ISIS, which has established its roots in the country, close to the Pak-Afghan border. The spread of ISIS is of more concern to them, than the Taliban. Hence, Pak is likely to move closer to them, to offset US pressure.

The US is restricted in handling other nations which have begun dominating the Afghan landscape. It has imposed sanctions on Iran and Russia and relations with both are at the lowest ebb. Iran and the US remain sworn enemies. China and the US are competing in the South China Sea and relations are on the downward slide over North Korean antics. Hence, while it may threaten Pak, it would have limited control over the support being provided by the others.

Further, the US has also failed to consider the internal compulsions of Pak. Pak cannot do US bidding as it would place its own security at risk. Increased Indian presence in Afghanistan, while reducing Pak’s role would be opening its underbelly to Indian domination. Hence, Pak cannot let its strategic advantage, provided by the Taliban, from vanishing. Simultaneously, it cannot accept additional drone strikes across the border targeting the Taliban and Haqqani network leadership, as it would lower the standing and prestige of the army. Thus, it has limited choices.

The US hopes that Pak would act decisively against the Quetta Shura and push the leadership into Afghanistan, where it could be targeted and reduced in power. However, Pak may play the game differently and move the leadership temporarily into Iran, once pressure increases, where US may hesitate prior to launching drone strikes.

For India, persistence and positive support to Afghanistan has finally paid off. With NATO refusing to cooperate, the US needs other partners, partners it can trust in the long term, hence the entry of India. It will now be a major player in the region, with the ability to influence future outcomes. It has to convince the US to stick to its guns and ensure that it applies pressure on Pak to dismantle all terror groups on its soil, not just the Taliban and Haqqani network.

The simplicity of Trump’s announcement as against complications in the strategic environment may still spring a collection of surprises for the US. Its ability to negotiate with those with whom its relations are at the lowest, will be its main test.

US, Pak and Afghan embroil go The Excelsior 03 Aug 17

Afghanistan has remained an enigma for the US from the moment it entered the country. It defeated the Taliban, formed a government, but has never been able to establish control. Its casualties continue to mount, even though it has reduced its role from fighting to training. It cannot walk away leaving the country to its fate, as the Russians did, failing which Afghanistan can rapidly deteriorate and become a haven for global terror.

In fact, throughout its history, Afghanistan has never been controlled by any ruler. The terrain coupled with fierce tribal and feudal loyalties led to creation of states within a nation, each controlled by a feudal lord. The government in Kabul only controlled cities and arteries leading to it, the countryside and rural areas were always small fiefdoms. The Russians had to withdraw in haste after struggling to control the country. The Taliban then took control, provided sanctuary to al Qaeda, enforced Sharia law and brutalized the nation, finally overthrown by the US led coalition.

For the US, Afghanistan has been its longest military engagement. There is still no way out and peace remains an illusion. With the ISIS gaining a foothold, the country faces a series of suicide and terror strikes from both, the ISIS and Taliban. The reality is clear. The US, irrespective of incrementing its force levels would never be able to defeat both and bring a sense of normalcy in the country. The Taliban is also part of the geopolitical game involving Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan. The Afghan government is ready for talks, but within its constitution, which is unacceptable to the Taliban.

The US has yet to announce its latest strategy for Afghanistan. Questions remain on whether it would decide to boost its army strength, continue with its present holding and change rules of engagement for them or enhance support of air power alone. In either case, as has been stated by mass of US think tanks and strategists, peace and victory in Afghanistan is intrinsically linked to the manner it handles Pakistan. It must also be noted that US troops are supplied by the Karachi port for hardware, hence it needs to tread carefully.

For any strategy to be successful, the Taliban and Haqqani network need to be isolated and moved away from their present support bases. Thus, enters Pakistan, where both these groups have safe havens and receive support from the deep state. Once pushed out from Pakistan or faced with a two-pronged strike, from Pakistan and Afghanistan, their capabilities can be reduced. For Pakistan, Afghanistan is its strategic depth, an area where India cannot be permitted to establish a presence. If India does gain a foothold, it would open a new front and enhance internal problems by supporting terrorism and freedom struggle in provinces. Hence, it banks on the Taliban and Haqqani network to prevent that from happening.

The US declared Pak as a state providing ‘safe havens to terrorists’, cut down its share of coalition funds and has even threatened it with sanctions, sadly, nothing has worked. It has declared leaders of anti-India terror groups as global terrorists; however, they still roam freely, protected by the deep state. The fact that they openly address media and large public gatherings as also collect funds for terror activities is a slap on the US, but simultaneously, project the true image of Pakistan, a global exporter of terrorists. The Pak national policy, dominated by the army, of establishing terror factories to export products to India and Afghanistan, cannot be easily shut.

Pakistan cannot turn against the snakes which it has created, for if it does so, they would turn against them. It is already battling the TTP, the Pakistan Taliban, which is a breakaway faction of the Afghan Taliban and has roots across the country, resulting in suicide strikes as deep as Lahore and Karachi, apart from targeting minority Shia’s and security personnel in remote locations. Pak has launched a series of military operations against them and the ISIS, each being proclaimed a success, till the next terror strike, post which another name is chosen and area of operations changed.

Thus, for the US, it is a catch 22 situation. They are also aware that additional ground troops may not be the answer. Pushing in a few battalions, one for each sector, may strengthen defence, however would be insufficient for an offensive. What may work is additional firepower and special forces. Firepower implies enhancing air and drone strikes.

The first set of targets should be training bases of the Taliban and Haqqani network in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This could be supplemented by raids involving special forces, however, fear of their capture could be a limiting factor. Violation of the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan should not be a constraint. In fact, this is the message which should clearly flow. Either you push them across or we engage them in your territory, the choice is yours.

Pakistan is already firmly in China’s lap. No other means would work, as it has diplomatic, military and economic support from them. Thus, cross border strikes may result in Pak crying hoarse, but unless resorted to, Pak would never act. The west is aware that most Taliban leaders are based around Quetta and even referred to as the ‘Quetta Shura’, however restricted from acting to avoid collateral damage.

Earlier US governments attempted a carrot and stick strategy of getting Pak to cooperate against Afghan terror groups. Nothing worked and coalition forces continued to suffer losses. The lesson ultimately drawn was that possibly only a stick, implying military force applied across the border, to seriously harm the image of the Pak deep state, would compel it to act and push terror leaders across for elimination in Afghanistan. The last successful drone strike in Pakistan had opposition leaders in the Pak Senate questioning their army chief on his ability to defend their territory. More strikes may force them to act.

Pak’s reason for supporting terror groups to counter growing Indian influence will soon begin to bounce back, as the US has limited options. It could have achieved its aims of keeping India away, had it adopted better cooperation and enhanced diplomatic engagement, however its misconstrued policies have come back to haunt it. The US has almost no option, but to engage across the border. Pak may cry hoarse, but will either have to cooperate or be defamed.

Quagmire in Afghanistan South Asia Defence and Strat Review 21 Jul 17

Afghanistan as a nation has rarely witnessed peace. It has been engulfed in some form of conflict throughout its history. Its inter-tribal rivalry and within tribes, inter-clan rivalry has always been its bane. It continues unabated even in present times, when other problems like the Taliban and ISIS appear more overbearing. It is evident as the nation is compelled to create an additional appointment of a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to accommodate Abdullah Abdullah, in addition to a President, to minimize tribal rivalries.

In recent times, the Soviet invasion, their forced withdrawal and the rise of the Taliban and Haqqani network (both referred by a common term, Taliban) supported by Pakistan and funded by the US, led to 9/11 and the subsequent US led NATO invasion. It is presently the longest running war for the US, with no signs of abating and permitting the US to withdraw honourably. At the peak of its involvement in 2011, Afghanistan had over one hundred thousand NATO and US forces deployed. The numbers have since dropped, however, there is no end in sight. As per the Washington Post, Trump’s foreign policy and defence advisors, led by their NSA are likely to recommend a surge of another three to five thousand US soldiers to join the already existing fourteen thousand US and NATO troops.

The present situation in the country is precarious. The two main groups actively operating are the Taliban and the ISIS. Both possess different ideologies and hence battle each other for supremacy. Both have begun gaining ground, resulting in mounting Afghan army and civilian casualties. In 2016 the nation had over eleven thousand civilians’ dead or wounded, the highest since the surge of 2009. This year has only been worse. The US announced the intention of the Trump administration by dropping the GBU-43, the ‘mother of all bombs’ on 13th Apr on an ISIS base near the Pakistan border. A week later the Taliban attacked an army command centre near Mazar-i-Sharif killing about one hundred and fifty soldiers.

A recent announcement by the ISIS of capturing the Tora Bora caves from the Taliban indicates its expanding power. These were the caves where Bin Laden had remained hidden in 2001 to hold out against the NATO and Afghan forces and have always been under Taliban influence. The previous hideout of the ISIS had been destroyed by the GBU-43. Both the groups independently target Afghan and NATO forces. The increasing power of the ISIS has regional and neighbouring countries seeking solutions to restrict ISIS expansion.

Between the two, the Taliban is considered the lesser of the two evils, solely as it is presently restricted to within Afghanistan and does not draw global Jihadist supporters on the scale of the ISIS. The concept of a caliphate has grabbed the attention of Muslims worldwide, who on returning seek to establish the same in their areas. This threatens Russia and China as nationals from their troubled provinces, Chechnya and Xinjiang operate with the ISIS. The Taliban and the ISIS are both battling one another for supremacy and control of territory. Hence, Russia, Iran and China consider the Taliban as a part of the solution, rather than the problem. The regional group comprising Russia, China, Pakistan and Iran began deliberations on the issue. Afghanistan, the affected nation was ignored till much later. India is also a late entrant into this fold.

The diversity in thought processes between various players of the group, have further complicated any easy solution to the crises. Afghanistan and India view both the groups as terror groups unless they are willing to participate in talks without preconditions, which in the case of the ISIS, is unlikely. Afghanistan has no option but to battle both groups as they are responsible for its instability. For the rest, the Taliban could be supported to contain the ISIS, hence the regional grouping (less India and Afghanistan) is even willing to consider removing some Taliban leaders from the UN sanction list. China, Iran and Russia have been involved in unofficial parleys with the Taliban, possibly even providing it with weapons or funds.

For the US, the main player in the country, both the groups are anathema. It has been targeted by both. Recent lone wolf attacks on US soldiers by Taliban supporters within the Afghan army is only enhancing distrust. Unless it contains the situation, a withdrawal with some semblance of success appears unlikely. It also knows, that if it withdraws unilaterally, the country would plunge into chaos. Hence it is reassessing its Afghan strategy, which is likely to be released shortly. This strategy, as per reports is expected to indicate a hardened stand against Pakistan.

The Pakistan factor in Afghanistan is amongst the most debateable issues. Pakistan’s support to the Taliban is more to handle its conflict with India than Afghanistan itself. Indian influence in Afghanistan always existed. Today, India has immense influence and could also begin providing increased military hardware to the country. Economically, India is a major partner in its development, hence has substantial presence. Thus, Pakistan has to ensure Indian influence is reduced, if not completely eradicated, as it considers Afghanistan as its strategic backyard. A Pashtun dominated Taliban with Haqqani leadership is its best bet. There is no way, Pakistan can stop supporting this group, as it has proved over the years. Under immense pressure Pak did launch operations against select Taliban bases and only created another monster, the Pakistan Taliban, which now targets them.

The new US policy, as per reports, could also consider increased drone strikes within Pakistan, reduction in aid and removing Pak from the status of a non-NATO ally. However, there are always doubts whether such action would compel Pakistan to change, as it has its own concerns. Pakistan on the other hand has been crying hoarse on being singled out, claiming that the situation is worsening due to internal dynamics within Afghanistan. Ideally Pakistan would be happy, if the Taliban is unofficially permitted to control areas along the border, be a part of governance, thus enhancing its strategic depth and restricting Indian influence.

There have been suggestions of the Taliban and ISIS combining in some areas and opposing one another in others. These reports can never be verified, but the fact is that both are gaining ground, clashing in some areas, while maintaining safe distance in others. Abdullah Abdullah, the Afghan CEO stated in an interview to Fox news, ‘The interests of the two in the immediate term differ, but at the same time, both are against the state institution and want to replace the governance with their own system’. Hence both would remain a threat.

The reality emerging from the country is that options appear to be diminishing. The US desires withdrawal with honour, regional powers seek to contain the ISIS, Pak wants a pro-Pak government in place, India and Afghanistan consider both the Taliban and ISIS as enemies of the state, while the power of both the groups seems to grow. There was an option of containing the Taliban first, the ISIS later, which is again unlikely to succeed as the ISIS would only enhance its power and grow, as its holding in Syria and Iraq diminish and fighters relocate. This is the quagmire in Afghanistan.

If an all-encompassing strategy is not adopted, the country may only become a destabilising factor for the region, impacting Pakistan, a nuclear armed Islamic state, Iran, Chechnya in Russia and Xinjiang in China. It could ultimately become a base from where global terror strikes may be launched. The US seems to concentrate on handling the Taliban, while regional powers seek to eliminate the ISIS. Further, the approach adopted by Trump in handling his allies has pushed the US into security isolation, with NATO allies reluctant to contribute to a troop surge.

While the US and Russia appear to be heading for a confrontation in Syria, it is here that interests may merge, as both are equally affected. China also remains concerned as growth of ISIS would adversely impact its CPEC, as Xinjiang, from where it originates could be affected. Thus, this adhoc grouping of US, Russia and China, setting differences aside, need to seek a solution, possibly pushing it down Pakistan’s throat, if necessary.

Realistically and pragmatically there are extremely limited options. Pakistan must reign in the Taliban, restricting it into areas it now controls, without seeking any expansion, also forcing it to stop targeting the state. This could release the Afghan army, supported by US air and missile power with special forces to handle the ISIS. The Taliban in the meanwhile could be involved in talks to resolve the crises. If it does not agree for talks then options to target it by air, missile and drones at a later stage always exist, in addition to blocking its funding by imposing severe costs on Pakistan.

Present force levels, capabilities and terrain conditions restrict the state, even with US support from engaging both groups simultaneously. Hence, the more dangerous of the two, capable of destabilizing a larger region needs to be neutralized first. Indian influence, would naturally reduce, irrespective of our attempts and approach, as others view Afghanistan differently and are more likely to adopt the Pak stance, more from individual concerns than from a moral viewpoint. National interests would override all other considerations and obligations.

Brace yourself for a violent summer The Statesman 28 Mar 17

Afghanistan, India and Pakistan are three states, intrinsically linked, facing varying levels of militancy. Each country blames the other for supporting groups inimical to them. Politically the nations have grown so apart that resolution of any crises appears unlikely. The summer is yet to set in, passes yet to reopen, movement of militants across borders still to commence in earnest, thus probably a violent period ahead for security agencies and the population.

Afghanistan is rattled by militants belonging to almost eight different groups, the most prominent being the Taliban and the ISIS. For the nation, the summer offensive launched by the Taliban in 2016 was the worst in its history as casualties amongst the civil and military was high. The Taliban hierarchy is based in Quetta in Pakistan. The area that it controls in rural Afghanistan increased marginally in 2016, as compared to previous years. With a prelude to its 2017 summer offensive, the Taliban captured the opium rich Sangin district of Helmand Province last week. The ISIS has begun expanding its footprint and on the route inducted fighters of the Pakistan Taliban (TTP). While it has launched few open operations, it has announced its enlarged presence by suicide attacks in crowded areas and targeting remote military posts. Afghanistan blames Pakistan for harbouring and supporting the Taliban.

Pakistan on the other hand, faces the brunt of terror strikes spearheaded by the TTP and its breakaway factions. The ISIS has also established a foothold and claimed responsibility for suicide attacks on minority communities. The crescendo against the strikes rose to such levels that its army was compelled to deploy artillery and air power on the Afghan border to destroy terror camps near and in Afghanistan. Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad, the latest in a series of operations against terror groups was launched in Feb across the country. It shut its borders with Afghanistan, pushed back Afghan refugees and launched air and artillery barrages across the border. It has announced its intentions to fence its border with Afghanistan, an action which may not be effective, considering our own experience with border fencing. Pak always accuses India and Afghanistan for acting in cohorts to destabilize the country. While the groups are based in Afghanistan, direct support by the Afghan intelligence agencies has never been proved. Similarly, Indian support to the groups remains a conjecture by Pakistan, without any proof.

India faces militancy mainly in Kashmir and to a more controlled extent in the North East, with Kashmir being openly supported by the Pak deep state. It also has the tacit support of separatists in Kashmir, who continue to incite the population against the Indian state. The past summer was a violent one in the valley, post the encounter killing of local militant leader Burhan Wani. It resulted in over eighty local youth joining the militancy, the largest in the recent past. India has proof of Pak involvement in Kashmir.

Supporting terror groups in neighbouring countries of the region is of national interest and linked to national strategy, hence unlikely to be easily discarded. Pak has always considered Afghanistan as its strategic backyard and thus seeks a pro-Pak government in the country. With US and Indian involvement in Afghanistan, the local government is unlikely to change its policy of becoming pro-Pak. The present government did attempt, however, with Pak’s continued support to the Taliban, Ashraf Ghani was forced to switch allegiance to India. For Pak, gaining Kashmir is the sole purpose of its survival as a nation state. Four wars (including Kargil) and no success has compelled it to adopt a policy of bleeding India with a thousand cuts. Hence its support to the so-called ‘Good Terror’ groups.

For India and Afghanistan, it is simply a case of pay back. Terror can only be replied by terror. Whether support is direct, moral, financial or material, it matters little. It is only when the sponsor of terror faces the same, which causes him to bleed, will lessons possibly emerge. Thus, amongst nations in the region, Pak and Afghanistan are worst hit. Pressure mounts within Pakistan as minorities are attacked and suicide bombers tear internal security apart, however no lessons are learnt. Support to terror groups continues as hither-to-fore.

The coming months are likely to be tough for the three countries. The Taliban summer offensive would commence in Afghanistan, post its winter restructuring, compelling the Trump administration to re-evaluate its Afghan strategy. Whether the US increases deployment or leaves it to the Afghan security forces to handle, time would judge. Pakistan would see a quantum increase in strikes, as weather makes movement easier. TTP and the ISIS are likely to join hands to challenge the authority of the state. Its army would be stretched to limits, ensuring security of the CPEC and battling terror groups. Indian security forces would also brace for a violent summer, as the opening of the passes would result in an increased inflow of militants. The valley is again likely to be up in arms as civilian casualties mount when locals attempt to interfere in security operations.

Terrorism in the region is internally sponsored by nations against each other. Ironically, each country feels supporting terror groups operating in the neighbourhood would give it strategic leverage. However, with passage of time, relations have deteriorated to levels where rapprochement appears unlikely. While India battles militancy in just one part, the other two countries face terror strikes across their length and breadth. Ultimately, it is the population which suffers and development remains hampered, as selfish leaders sponsor terror groups solely to control and retain power.

Terror groups which were once assets are presently liabilities as any action contemplated to reign them in is likely to fail and compel them to turn inwards. There is almost no choice for sponsor nations, unless self-realization sets in and concerted actions are adopted. This is unlikely, considering increased differences and powerful terror groups, hence all that can be expected is a violent summer with enhanced casualties across the region.

Heart of Asia isolated Pakistan The Excelsior 14 Dec 16

The recently concluded ‘Heart of Asia’ conference witnessed theatrics and controversies as well as signalled a shift in regional dynamics. While a few common statements were expected, some came as a welcome surprise. The joint statement was clearly crafted, supported and pushed by India, with support from Afghanistan. In all common platforms, since Pathankot, India raised the Pakistan bogey of sponsoring terror, but in each one, Pakistan was not a member and India’s efforts were scuttled by China. This was the first platform, with Pakistan in presence, that the statement specifically mentioned Pak sponsored terror groups, operating against India. Promises continued to be made in the summit, some of which would be ignored with time while some would be fulfilled. However, all actions may be restricted by changing security scenarios.

The change in the schedule of the de-facto Pakistan foreign minister, to arrive a day before, led to a variety of speculations. Some suggested the intention was to avoid the early morning fog, which could delay flights, others claimed it was to enable him to attend the dinner hosted by the Prime Minister as also interact with key officials. Pakistan announced his schedule and claimed to have left it to India to plan or avoid meetings on the side-lines of the summit. India on the other hand, claimed that there was no formal request from Pakistan for talks, nor was India keen, as it was unwilling to change its stance that ‘talks and terror’ cannot go hand in hand. In a frosted relationship, as presently existing, no nation is willing to take the first step. Had Pakistan requested for talks and India denied, it would have soured relations even more. While Sartaj Aziz did attend the dinner, and walked some distance with the NSA, claims of talks varied. The Indian side claimed there were no talks, Pakistan claimed that discussions continued for about half an hour.

The Indian prime minister spoke as expected, blaming Pakistan for all the ills prevailing in the region, aiming to continue his attempts at isolating it. The highlight was the address by the Afghan President, Ashraf Ghani, where he praised India for its unilateral military and economic support, while simultaneously rebuking Pakistan for supporting terror groups operating in Afghanistan. His open comment to Aziz, that the money offered by Pakistan for its development, could be better utilized by them for battling terror groups, as unless those are eradicated, no development can occur in Afghanistan. Through all this ranting, Sartaj Aziz was compelled to sit with a straight face, even when Ghani addressed him directly by name. Aziz did attempt to regain the situation, stating the Pak’s attendance despite border tensions, indicated its serious desire for restoring peace in Afghanistan, cut no ice. Pak media downplayed the degradation in the conference, while all Aziz could state was, ‘it is easy to single one country’.

For Pakistan, it was a difficult situation. Had it avoided attending the conference as a tit for tat for SAARC, it would have been the loser, as the conference would have continued and ignored its absence. It would have also given Afghanistan an additional lever to accuse it even more, in addition indicating to the world Pakistan’s lack of interest in restoring peace in Afghanistan. There was an option with Pakistan to send a junior representative, however, if it did so, its position on the importance of resolving the Afghan issue would diminish. It was compelled to choose between the devil and the deep sea.

The conference cleared the air on many issues. Firstly, it indicated a change in regional dynamics. India has emerged as a key player in Afghanistan. Its support in both military and economic fields have made it Afghanistan’s most dominant partner. Pakistan has not only been relegated to the background, but also been directly accused of supporting and fermenting terror incidents there. An open comment that the Taliban cannot survive even for a month without its bases in Pakistan, highlights the distance which has emerged between the two states.

Secondly, by refusing to hold formal talks, India has stated that its policy of ‘talks and terror not going together’ is being adhered to. It conveys the message that India is willing to continue to up the ante, till Pak resorts to visible action in curbing known terror groups. Thirdly, the adoption of the joint statement by all members including staunch Pakistan supporters, Turkey and China, directly stating Pak sponsored terror groups including the LeT and HuM was indicative of Indian diplomatic success. Fourthly, the decision of India and Afghanistan to establish an air corridor, bypassing Pakistan was conveying the message that its importance can be diluted.

For Afghanistan, the year had been a difficult one. Increased Taliban offensives have resulted in higher casualties and greater loss of territory. For Ghani, the shift in his foreign policy from Pakistan to India and dealing with internal rumblings had compelled him to lash out against them, knowing that he would have Indian and US support. For Pakistan, bad ties with its western neighbour indicates that it would need to contend with handling two active fronts. It would also open doors for India to support anti-Pak groups in case it does not control the anti-India ones.

Realistically, Pak, India and Afghanistan do and in some cases, could support terror groups operating against each other. They can sit together and resolve their differences, permitting concentration on development. However, geo-strategic and ideological barriers prevent such a step. Therefore, in the near term, unless serious pressures are applied, there would be no change and the local population in both, Afghanistan and Pakistan would continue to suffer with groups operating from each other’s soil. Indian would remain affected by terror, though less than the other two. Finally, the conference only added to Pakistan’s isolation woes.

Brics, Bimstec and Pakistan bogey The Statesman 25 Oct 16

For every country, its national interests are paramount, irrespective of the collective view of any group of which the nation is a part off. Nations would be unwilling to bend if the common view moves against their national interests. The recently concluded BRICS summit with the BIMSTEC outreach in Goa, clearly indicated this. India expended maximum political energy raising the Pakistan bogie with the intention of cornering it and adding to its isolation. The Prime Minister termed Pakistan as the ‘Mother ship of terror’ in the region, while the NSA requested all nations to compel the UN to adopt the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT), which was again aimed at Pakistan. This was in our national interest, as it affected our security and development as also the present enhanced problems in J and K. However, it was not a matter of concern for other nations. In each of his interactions with heads of state of both organizations, Prime Minister Modi raised the Pakistan bogie.

The nations comprising BRICS and BIMSTEC come from different regions of the globe and hence each has its own view, based on its national interests, when dealing with problems on a common platform. Further, within the BRICS, pressures of economic cooperation and development assume greater importance, hence opinions vary. Brazil and South Africa are presently facing a recession in their economy with a shrinking job market, while Russia is under western sanctions for its actions in Crimea and Ukraine, resulting in a dropping economy. China, on the other hand, continues to grow, albeit at a slower pace than India, though its economy remains robust. Chinese largesse and economic leverage with nations forming part of the BRICS community, enables it to overshadow discussions and views, compelling nations to follow their lead, since in this forum, economic compulsions dominate national interests. It is an open fact that Brazil and South Africa had joined China in rejecting India’s membership claims to the NSG, on its pressure. Russia, since its isolation has also jumped deep into the Chinese economic bandwagon.

Further, threats facing each country vary, basically due to their diverse locations, which further impact their thought process. Brazil and South Africa are not directly affected by cross border terrorism in a similar manner as India, hence its views will never be similar, nor would it be very willing to support Indian opinion in a public forum, unless it had strong economic ties with India. Russia is deeply involved in Syria, supporting the Assad government and almost heading for a military showdown with the west. For Russia, terrorism implies the ISIS and groups battling the Assad government. Further, Russia, like most western nations, is convinced that the ISIS, after its defeat in West Asia would re-emerge in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which could then threaten its allies in Central Asia. Therefore, in its view, Pakistan would continue to play a major role in the future, hence cannot be discarded. China, on the other hand has never considered Pakistan as a terror state, for reasons which are well known to us. For India, directly affected by cross border terrorism, Pakistan is the culprit, whom it seeks to isolate globally. Therefore, expecting the nations as a group to censure Pakistan would have been asking for the moon.

While each leader, less China, in their one-to-one interactions with the Prime Minister accepted terrorism as a major international hurdle and in some way, the joint statements did indicate agreement with India, China remained defiant and openly announced its unwillingness to bend nor accept Pakistan as a terror state. Russia, while signing several defence deals, prior to the summit, supported the Indian stand against Pakistan. For India, the bilateral meeting statements should carry greater weightage than the group statement. The statement issued after the summit could never be expected to support one nation of the group, especially, in the present context of China being a dominating force, with others beholden to it, as also varying threats and national interests of nations. India’s insistence of raising the Pakistan bogie in the main summit, meant for domestic consumption, backfired. Logically, India should have stuck to an economic agenda along with critical issues at the international level, common to most nations.

The discussions within the BIMSTEC group was very different. The entire group is based around the region and has in some manner been affected by terrorism or Indo-Pak relations. Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bhutan are recipients of Indian economic largesse and are influenced by India as the dominant nation in the region. Bangladesh has been very vocal about its hostility with Pakistan in recent times. Myanmar is slowly moving out of its shell and would need Indian support in the times ahead. Most nations of the group also form a part of SAARC and have been equally affected by the lack of progress within the group, mainly due to Indo-Pak rivalry. There is also a slow realization that SAARC has outlived its relevance and hence bilateral Indian support is essential for future development. Therefore, their wholehearted support to India was clearly expected.

India did make a foreign policy error in projecting only Pakistan as the source of terror, without considering the ISIS or other terror groups, which affect the larger grouping. Pakistan was not an issue for BRICS nations, hence should never have been our major focus, especially since we are aware of our differences with China and its proximity to Pakistan. As a strong and powerful nation, considered a regional power, we needed to be careful before raising issues which were steamrolled, resulting in half-hearted justifications. The statement, post the BIMSTEC summit, was on expected lines and clearly elucidated Pakistan’s isolation within the region.

Afghanistan a game changer The Statesman 20 Sep 16

The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is the Durand Line, which has never been accepted by Afghanistan, however being weaker, it has limited options. Post the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, it was the Taliban which established the government, much to the cheer of Rawalpindi, the Pakistan army HQs. Bhutto, as Pakistan’s prime minister, established an ISI cell, well before the US entered the picture, to deal with Afghanistan and the Soviet occupation. The aim of the cell was to unite disenchanted Islamists fleeing from Afghanistan, to Pakistan’s advantage. It was the first birth of terrorist organizations on Pakistan soil, which then began to haunt India, Afghanistan and Pakistan itself. During Soviet occupation, Pakistan continued to support the Taliban and al Qaeda with financial and equipment support from the US. Pakistan always considered Afghanistan as its strategic depth, hence wants it dependent, weak and fragmented. India on the other hand, always desired a stable and democratic Pakistan, to enable progress of talks to resolve pending issues.

9/11 changed the way the world looked at terror groups. The NATO operation in Afghanistan was swift and forced the Taliban into its safe sanctuaries in Pakistan alongside the Haqqani network. The al Qaeda was degraded. Governance and security in Afghanistan had to be recreated from grass roots, due to the impact of Taliban rule. Pakistan became a major ally in the war against terror, as it was the transit route for all equipment and supplies into Afghanistan. Hence Pakistan was emboldened into assuming that it could continue to play a major role in Afghanistan. However, the monsters it created in the Taliban, al Qaeda and Haqani network could neither be closed nor completely controlled. It also realized, that capture of any top leader of these groups alive would reveal its direct involvement, hence it sheltered them. The killing of Osama by a surgical strike and subsequently of Mullah Mansoor, by a drone strike, on Pakistan soil, resulted in Pakistan being abandoned by the US and the west.

Geopolitically India-Afghanistan relations are natural. With Pakistan, sponsoring terrorist operations in both countries, India and Afghanistan have to grow closer. Further, as US-India relations grew, so did India-Afghanistan. The next India-Afghanistan-US trilateral dialogue is scheduled on the side lines of the UN general assembly this month. Therefore, India would always play a dominant role in Afghanistan. Ashraf Ghani, who assumed the presidency in Sept 2014, initially tried to rely on Rawalpindi, for bringing peace to his country, however, when nothing changed on ground and terrorist strikes only increased, he did what his predecessor, Hamid Karzai had done, turn to India. His visit to India last week, follows the visit of their army chief and ex- president, a fortnight ago.

India presently supports Afghanistan economically and had constructed its new parliament building, the Salma Dam, also termed as the Afghan-India friendship dam and strategic roads. In fact, during the Taliban era, India supported the anti-Taliban Afghan Northern Alliance, by providing it financial and medical support. Since its freedom from Taliban rule, India has invested over $10.8 billion in the economic reconstruction of the country. More projects are in the pipeline. In the meeting last week, Modi proposed to allocate a sum of one billion dollars for capacity and capability building in a variety of spheres.

While military cooperation was officially not mentioned, however, it would have been discussed. The Afghan army chief and the president would have presented a wish list of equipment and spares to India. We are already training Afghan police and military personnel in our institutions. Militarily, India commenced its support by providing Afghanistan with three MI-25 attack helicopters. One more would soon be on the way. With Western sanctions on Russia, for its actions in Ukraine, spare parts for Russian equipment operated by the Afghan army, cannot be obtained by the US or its allies. India is amongst the largest utilizers of Russian equipment and hence would be in a position to supply. Further, the US is keen for India to become a provider of military equipment. It would ensure India has a major role to play in the future of Afghanistan. The Taliban has issued a statement condemning India’s decision to supply military equipment. Logically, provision of equipment, spare parts and training would bring the two militaries closer as also open avenues for Indian military and intelligence advisors to deploy in Afghanistan. This could open a new front against Pakistan and expose its weakest vulnerability, Baluchistan, to exploitation.

India’s recent collaboration with Iran on the Chabahar port and the pursuant road connectivity with Afghanistan and Central Asia revolves around increased control by Afghan state forces. In Afghanistan, India is considered a friend, while Pakistan the enemy. Post the Prime Minister’s comment on supporting the Baluch movement, Pakistan flags were burnt on the Afghan side of the border, compelling Pakistan to close the border. Increasing Taliban operations and dominance in remote districts as also its merger with the Haqqani network and resurgence of the al Qaeda and the IS has pushed the Afghan military to its limits. It needs equipment and force multipliers to alter the ground scenario. India has the ability and resources to provide the same.

Strategically, it is in India’s interest that Afghanistan becomes stable, economically and militarily. Since Pakistan cannot bring the Taliban and the Haqqani network to heel, India can easily expand its dominance in Afghanistan. In reality, it would be Indian equipment, being employed by the Afghan military, to battle Pak sponsored terror groups, involving India in a proxy war against Pakistan and its terror groups. This would alter regional dynamics as the nations would open another front of operations.

The signing of the Indo-Afghanistan terrorist extradition treaty is a positive step in the two nations coming closer in dealing with the common threat of terror organizations. Further, providing them with military equipment as also military advisors to train and maintain the equipment, would open gates for countering Pakistan’s involvement in the valley. This tit-for-tat action could compel Pakistan to reconsider its support in the valley. It would compel Pakistan to reconsider actions like the Uri attack in the future. India has to up the ante if it needs to continue to be a force to reckon with in the region. Hence Afghanistan in the long term may be a game changer in Indo-Pak relations.