Replacing army in Kashmir The Excelsior 20 Mar 2023

Replacing army in Kashmir The Excelsior 20 Mar 2023

Replacing army in Kashmir

Replacing army in Kashmir The Excelsior 20 Mar 2023

          Yes, the news is correct. CRPF will be the force responsible for counter insurgency operations in Kashmir in the coming months. They will be inducted in few districts of both Jammu and Kashmir regions before being given complete responsibility. The future of Rashtriya Rifles (RR), the primary force currently responsible for battling terrorists, has yet to be finalized. Initially, it is likely to continue with reduced strength and possibly act as a backup. With increased threat from the north, the Indian army must concentrate on border security as also change its basic military belief from counter insurgency to conventional conflict in a dynamically changing environment.

There are also media reports that the CRPF is working towards reducing the age profile of its troops in the valley by rotating younger soldiers from other battalions as also inducting newly recruited soldiers into the region. It had adopted a similar strategy in its anti-Naxal operations in 2018, when it moved in 10-12,000 newly trained soldiers around ages of 20-21 into battalions deployed on anti-LWE (Left Wing Extremism) grid.

The CRPF has some experience with counter insurgency having been involved in anti-Naxal operations for a prolonged duration. However the two scenarios are vastly different.

While the age profile of the common soldier can be reduced, the middle level leadership, tasked to lead operations, especially in difficult terrain, remains around the ages of 40-45. The leader and his team must possess similar levels of fitness to enable smooth conduct of operations. Differences in fitness could slow operations and frustrate those involved in its conduct.

Training in small team operations are essential as also is morale, which is largely dependent on leadership and logistics, both of which would necessitate vast improvements, especially as the senior leadership comprising of the IPS has very little experience in handling militancy. Most incidents resulting in casualties in LWE operations have been due to large troop movements, targeted by the Naxals employing ambushes and IEDs.  

The MHA is eager to project normalcy in the valley especially after removal of article 370 and imposition of central rule. It could be a major election plank for forthcoming elections in 2024, apart from being exploited for possible J and K elections, if held this year. There is no doubt that this decision is likely to be implemented in a rush as the government is seeking to draw political mileage from it, especially with the ongoing G 20 presidency. It could push all progress made over years into jeopardy over multiple shortcomings, which must be addressed prior to the changeover.

The army has altered the narrative after years of effort and has worked to winning hearts and minds. It has changed the belief of it being an occupier (as was the impression when it initially entered the valley) to an ally by providing support when most needed. There have been errors, but these have never gone unpunished. Checks and balances imposed by the army hierarchy has ensured this. The recent court martial of Captain Bhoopinder Singh is a case in point.

Very few members of the IPS, who would oversee operations in Kashmir, have risen in rank serving in counter insurgency regions. Most have only witnessed law and order scenario’s where employment of excessive force is acceptable to preserve public order and property. Central police forces, more trained for managing law and order, are known to operate beyond the concept of minimum force.

In Kashmir, Pakistan and its close allies await an error which could be placed on the global stage to embarrass India. Simplistically put, a tactical error by a force conducting anti-militant operations could have strategic implications.

          It would be ideal if the CRPF creates an RR type force, which is permanently deployed in specific regions with troops rotating at regular intervals. This will ensure that terrain information and intelligence remains within the force. Apart from its own cadre which would serve in rotation, members of other CAPFs can also be inducted for fixed tenures. These units should function at requisite strength and not be moved for other duties such as elections. Lessons learnt from RR should not be forgotten. 

          J and K is now in a crucial stage of transition from violence to peace. Tourism is at an all-time high. The smooth conduct of the ‘Bharat Jodo Yatra’ and recent national events indicate that the local public views themselves are part of the Indian union and demands for joining Pak are at an ebb. Recruitment to terrorist groups continues, though at reduced levels, as also overground workers and sympathizers to the cause are pushed into hiding.  

All agencies are working hand in glove to bring the situation to normal by targeting those seeking to encourage designs of Pakistan. Currently, narco-terrorism is Pakistan’s favoured strategy. Infiltration may be down but is not out. Infiltrated terrorists are tasked with motivating youth and training new entrants however, avoiding engaging security forces. Targeting outsiders and weaker elements to create fear and panic, as also gain media headlines continues.

Any shortcoming or gaps in execution in counter terrorist operations could result in the resurgence of terrorism. Simultaneously, the army needs to withdraw to barracks and assume its primary role of securing the borders leaving internal security to the plethora of CAPFs created solely for this purpose. Hence, the turnover, though essential, needs to be carefully planned and executed to ensure that the transition continues for the better. Avoiding any incident which could set the clock back must be the aim. Terrorists should never be permitted to launch a major operation which could tilt the balance in their favour.   

Hence, the force which replaces the army must be trained for its role. It must understand strategic implications flowing from tactical errors. AFSPA must continue to remain, at least for the moment, and only reconsidered once the army has been completely withdrawn. Political mileage should be given a backseat. India has nothing to prove to the world. The world is aware that Kashmir is part of India and lies emanating from Pak are meaningless. India’s credibility is at an all-time high and should not be marred by stray incidents.