Towards Joint Commands The Excelsior 30 Mar 18
The defence ministry recently announced new directions to enhance functioning of the two joint commands of the Indian armed forces, the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) and the Strategic Forces Command (SFC). These commands comprise of personnel from the three services who till now operated under their respective service rules and under directions of their respective service Headquarters (HQs), while deployed under the jurisdiction of the joint command. The new rules place them under the command of the force HQs, where they are operating, discarding their service specific regulations.
This small step is significant as it would enhance the functioning of the joint commands by replacing individual service control and management of forces placed under their jurisdiction. Each service has specific rules and regulations governing its members. These wary as service conditions are at variance. These regulations may remain applicable but would be implemented by the concerned joint force HQ.
It would also imply that joint force HQs now possesses the power to employ and deploy troops allocated to them without reverting to respective service HQs. It would break the shackles which has limited the operational command and control of joint forces. It may also be a precursor to increasing joint commands across the country, instead of the seventeen individual service commands existing presently.
Post this announcement, discussion has begun taking root on possible government actions to enhance joint operations within the military and the path such action is expected to take. Ultimately the government would need to consider creation of joint commands to suit the Indian context. This would have multiple advantages including economic benefits and optimum utilization of resources. However, the Indian situation is unique as also is the Indian approach to employment of military power.
India has no territorial claims on any country nor is the nation willing to employ its forces overseas, unless requested for by the host country. It has therefore created its armed forces for defence of the nation and to deter any adversary. India also has hostile neighbours who claim parts of our territory. Neither border is tranquil hence necessitates permanent troop deployment. Since Indian forces are unlikely to operate away from its borders, any joint force structure should consist of the services which are expected to battle together in our existing environment.
Operations against both our existing adversaries would comprise of the army and air force operating in tandem, with the navy handling its operations almost in isolation. The closer the coordination between the army and the air force, the better would be the results.
Flowing from the above, the ideal scenario for India is to create joint army-air force commands responsible for its western and northern borders. The number of commands would depend on how the government visualizes the threat and the manner it adopts to allocate resources. It could be either one or two against each adversary. The navy would operate independently, but in conjunction with the joint commands.
Another aspect is enhancing the capability and capacity of the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), essential for coordinating operations between the joint commands and the Navy. Resources, mainly of the air force, would always remain below the desired level of satisfaction. Hence, there would always be a need to redeploy them from one theatre to the other, depending on the nature of threat and urgency of the situation. This could always form part of options available to force commanders, responsible for the conduct of operations in their respective domains.
Another issue which needs comprehension is under whom should the joint commands function. In the international environment, they operate directly under the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), who in turn is responsible to the defence minister. The service chiefs have no operational role in commanding their respective services. This brings forth the concept of ‘force providers and force employers’. The service chiefs are force providers, responsible for the training and manning of their respective services. Operational employment (force employment) is handled by joint command commanders, irrespective of his service.
In the Indian context, despite recommendations commencing from Kargil Committee to the latest Shekatkar Committee, the government hesitates to appoint a CDS. The main reason being the fear that complete power of the armed forces would be under one individual, which could be detrimental to the present character of the state. While nothing could be further from the truth, this fear alone has blocked the creation of joint commands and appointment of a CDS. In case the government continues to hesitate, then it would limit its options of establishing joint commands. If it still does so, then it is severely restricted in establishing their command and control structure.
Its only option would be placing them under the existing Chief’s of Staff Committee (COSC), with comprise of the three services chiefs and headed by the senior most, as the defence ministry is incapable of handling military operations being unintegrated with service HQs. Such a case would have the service chiefs in a mixed role of being force providers and employers. It would further complicate the situation as the joint force commanders would have multiple bosses. Thus, while the force commander would remain accountable and responsible, those controlling would determine the allocation of resources.
Therefore, the government would need to act sequentially in case it is serious on restructuring management of defence at the apex level. It cannot consider creation of joint commands, unless it firms up its mind on appointing a CDS. It case it continues to have doubts on the issue, then clearly the experiment with the ANC is a one-off incident, which would akin to the rest of the government’s decisions, move into the sunset. It would leave the armed forces to fight the next war with second world war structures. Its only saving grace is that our main adversary Pak remains mired in the same condition. However, with China having unified its forces, it would remain a different ballgame.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army