Restructuring the armed forces for the future The Excelsior 06 Sep 17
The previous defence minister, Manohar Parrikar, had formed a committee under Lt General DB Shekatkar (retired), to recommend measures to enhance combat potential of the armed forces. The committee submitted its finding in December 2016. It concerned itself with internal restructuring of the armed forces and establishments under the Ministry of Defence (MoD). It had no role in considering working conditions, pay and allowances and parity with other government services. Hence, it was tasked to enhance the capability of the armed forces of the nation in application of military power.
It submitted a total of one hundred and eighty-eight recommendations, of which the government recently announced acceptance of ninety-nine, from which directions to implement sixty-five have been issued. The committee had strongly stated that accepting only a part of its suggestions would be more damaging than beneficial, as most are linked for changing the armed forces from its present status to one prepared for meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century.
Most recommendations, implementation of whose directions have been issued, concern the army. The army in any case requires to be right sized based on changed realities. Over the years it has continued to grow in strength, adding manpower even in those services, where it should be cutting down. There is a requirement to restructure and reorganize the army, releasing manpower from establishments which can be closed or outsourced for more combat effective tasks. Restructuring of signals, ordnance, animal transport units, supplies and the education Corps have been specifically mentioned. Directions to close military farms have already been issued.
The recommendations, which the government appears to have glossed over, concern organizations other than the armed forces, solely because of political compulsions, though economically and considering government policies of ‘make in India’ and ‘made in India’ these need to be shut down or severely downsized. Recommendations for the navy and air force are also likely to be issued subsequently.
The defence budget allocated to the ministry, is in addition to the armed forces, also utilized to finance many deadwood organizations, who have far outlived their utility in the present era, but continue to exist for solely political reasons, as the unions hold sway. These include defence finance, Military Engineering Services (MES), Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) laboratories, ordnance factories and many quality control organizations, all functioning directly under the MoD, as also the MoD itself.
The army has a fighting strength of nine lakhs, a support base of four and a half lakhs, with another six lakh civilians, in organizations under the MoD and as part of it. Thus, the teeth, or the fighting element, to the tail, the supporting element, is 1:1 or even 1:1.5, when all the above unnecessary organizations and an overstaffed civilian run MoD are taken into consideration. This is a very awkward ratio for any modern army and severely impacts application of combat power. To comprehend why the army has such a mammoth structure is to understand its origins.
The army takes its roots from the British, which had created the Indian army as an expeditionary force as also the fact that the army fought in Burma in the second world war, just prior to independence, hence needed a collection of depots and bases, to support its war efforts. The British visualized that the army should be organized to fight a war on its own, without any support or help from the national population as its terrain for employment was difficult and communications poor. Hence it had to be self-sustaining.
In the initial years post-independence, when the army was employed in operations, till the 1971 war, development of industry, infrastructure and communication, remained fairly poor. Thus, most equipment used by the army was not locally available and imported or assembled under licence. India therefore had to create ordnance factories and DRDO laboratories. It also required its own specialists for their maintenance and repair. The army inherited from the British a collection of logistic bases and repair facilities to enable different levels of stocking, repair and maintenance, based on the Burma campaign, which it continued to run, albeit with some modifications. Thus, till 1971, wherever the army was at war, it was self-contained and possessed all support facilities to enable it to fight a sustained battle.
Over the years, with a strong industrial base, better production facilities and improved road communications, civil support to the army increased manifold. Most of the road transport fleet is now market driven, civil repair facilities are available almost everywhere and the Indian industry is being geared up to meet the demands of the military. During Operation Vijay and Parakaram, it was observed that most male border residents were unwilling to move from their villages close to the border, hence support and repair facilities are available all the way upto the border. Thus, restructuring was essential.
Surprisingly, the government only selected those areas, which are politically suitable and easy to implement. It has avoided touching organizations, which desperately need to be pruned, basically because of union issues and vote bank politics. It has not accepted recommendations to close down ordnance factories manufacturing uniforms, boots and many other personnel clothing items, readily available in the market. It has similarly refused to touch unwanted DRDO laboratories and establishments, which are defunct and presently, white elephants. There is no mention of downgrading the MES, defence finance and a collection of quality assurance establishments. Most companies providing products to the armed forces presently are self-certifying, hence quality assurance requirements are far lessor.
Most importantly, integrating of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has been completely ignored. This civilian manned organization controls the nation’s ultimate source of power, with staff who have little to nil understanding of matters military, as the armed forces are the only organization with no lateral absorption. Hence, every CAG and parliamentary committee on defence reports, lambast the MoD for its failures in maintaining defence preparedness and adequate reserves. It has had little impact. Unless the MoD is integrated with serving and civilians working together, India will always be affected by poor management of defence at the apex level.
The government even refused to consider extending the service of jawans who retire at an early age by two years, strongly recommended by the committee, thus cutting training costs and saving funds. The government has similarly made no mention on recommendations concerning restructuring of higher defence management, a very essential requirement of the present era. Future operations would require the armed forces to fight in an integrated manner, whereas they are geared for a war of a few decades ago.
There is no National Security Strategy (NSS) nor a National Military Strategy (NMS), nor any joint long-term plans. This is because the authority to create them, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), a single point military advisor, has still to be even considered. The major shortfall facing the Indian armed forces of the future continues to be lack of coordination in conducting joint operations and employment of complete national combat potential. Unless the CDS is appointed, with requisite powers, the armed forces will remain under-utilized and under-coordinated.
The present restructuring ordered by the government, with much fanfare, actually presents a bleak picture of government decision making. It has implemented only the easiest of points raised by the committee, ignoring major decisions, which would turn the defence budget, enhance combat potential and reduce dead weight. If it is serious on reforms, ignoring political compulsions, then it needs to close or downsize most Ordnance factories, DRDO laboratories, MES, defence finance organizations and DGQA amongst others. Appointing a CDS and restructuring the MoD would be a major step to preparing the armed forces for the future.
The Prime Minister had stated in his address to the Combined Commanders in December 15, that there is a need to restructure higher defence organization, defence planning and joint warfare, amongst others. It is these specific issues which have been ignored by the government when it made its last announcement. Statements on reforms resulting in releasing fifty-seven thousand soldiers for active combat duties may make headlines, but in reality, it is misleading the nation.
The new defence minister, Nirmala Sitharaman, has assumed her appointment. She should, with time, take the bull by the horns and push down major restructuring within the MoD and organizations under it, creating funds and manpower for modernization of the armed forces.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army