Unnecessary criticism of CDS appointment The Statesman 19 May 2026
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Unnecessary criticism of CDS appointment The Statesman 19 May 2026
The appointment of Lt Gen Raja Subramani as the next CDS has drawn criticism from multiple quarters, though the logic in some cases is bizarre. Even before the appointment was announced a number of publications appeared suggesting that the next CDS should be from the navy or air force as a sign of jointness and integration as also due to changing nature of warfare from land-centric to multi-domain. It appeared the authors presumed that any army appointee would lack employment awareness of other services. However, the government had its own views and appointed General Raja Subramani, who, with his vast experience, is ideally qualified.
An op-ed was published in the Japan Times titled, ‘Is Modi coup-proofing Indian Military.’ Wonder why should the Japanese public be interested in the appointment of an Indian CDS. Added is the warped logic in the article mentioning that by appointing retired officers, the government is ‘coup-proofing’ the country. It stated, ‘a retired officer re-entering service on a contractual basis inevitably derives authority less from institutional standing than from political selection.’ Possibly the author has neither understood the logic of appointing a retired three-star as also the military’s role in preserving democracy.
Two other critical articles were published in The Wire and The Indian Express by known defence analysts. In The Wire, apart from questioning the appointment of a third CDS from the army, also had an illogical comparison of Gen Raja being from the Garhwal Rifles and that the first two CDS’s from the Garhwal region of Uttarakhand. Such warped comparison does not even merit a comment.
Both articles raised the issue that Generals Anil Chauhan and Raja Subramani, were Military Advisors to the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) under the National Security Advisor, highlighting that this was the grooming phase for the appointment. The intent was to link Ajit Doval to the selection. What was ignored is that the government chooses its military advisors to the NSCS based on their capabilities and knowledge rather than anything else. Prior to Gen Subramani, the military advisor was Air Marshal Sandeep Singh.
The critics also possibly intentionally ignored government retirement rules solely to drive home a point. Government servants retire at 60, less members of the armed forces, for whom retirement ages vary with rank. Lt Generals and their equivalent retire at 60, while chiefs at 62 or three years as chief, whichever is earlier.
Apart from General Bipin Rawat who retired before he was 62 (having completed three years), all service chiefs generally retire after completion of 62 years of age. This makes them ineligible for the appointment of CDS. Considering this shortcoming, the pool was expanded to include Lt Gens and their equivalents, serving and retired, from all services.
There is just one service chief selected from multiple three-stars. The selection has always been on seniority (barring the case of General Bipin Rawat who superseded two others). Those who miss out becoming chief, having met all other criteria, is because of seniority and age, not capability. Hence, considering them ineligible for becoming a CDS is warped logic.
Another criticism has been why retired and not from serving three-stars. A retired is a better choice than serving for reasons of seniority. In a couple of months, post the appointment of the next air force chief, General Raja Subramani would be senior to all service chiefs. If a CDS is selected from amongst the serving, the possibility of the same happening is very low. The CDS simultaneously heading the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) makes him more an advisor and bureaucrat, apart from coordinating decisions. Command and control would rest with the VCDS (Vice CDS), a serving three-star.
Another criticism common to all published articles was the fact that war has shifted to multi-domain, increasing threats in the Indian Ocean region and the need to adhere to a tri-service nature of the appointment. However, once again there are aspects glossed over. Firstly, in the Indian context, while ‘nature of conduct of war’ may have changed, the end result will be determined by loss or gain of territory, others actions being a means to the end. Land will remain the primary battlefield. Comparing a skirmish like Operation Sindoor or a salami slicing operation like Galwan or even a limited operation like Vijay in Kargil, to future nature of war, for which the armed forces are preparing, is illogical.
Secondly, the critics have deliberately ignored proposals forwarded to the government by the CDS on Integrated Theatre Commands (ITCs). The proposal mentions that ITCs would function under the Chiefs of Staff Committee comprising of the CDS and service chiefs, with the CDS being the first amongst equals. Theatre Commanders would report to the VCDS, who would not be of the same service as the CDS. Thus, functional control of ITCs would not be with an army officer, but one of a different service.
Another aspect ignored is that the appointment of a CDS is the prerogative of the government. The government does not have to adhere to a rotational model, as desired by many. Further, assuming that an army CDS would lack employment knowledge of other services is moving the system back into compartmentalization, from which they are just emerging. Similar could be claimed no matter from which service the CDS emerges. ITCs would ensure that planning is centralized and employment optimized by involving service experts at every level. This structure would also be adapted by the IDS (Integrated Defence Staff).
Interestingly, the armed forces have proposed four-star generals as theatre commanders and VCDS, apart from the CDS and service chiefs. Whether the government would approve it is to be seen as the bureaucracy is loath to accepting additional senior officers from amongst the forces. The critics have also claimed that theatre commands would replace existing service commands, something unlikely to happen.
In the current security construct, wars, either limited in scope or enlarged, would ultimately aim at gain or loss of territory. Thus, the need to develop joint deterrence capabilities. With territory being the primary concern, the army would always remain the dominant force. The CDS’s major role would be making ITCs functional with cooperation from all branches of the armed forces, for which we need to support the appointment, rather than continue unwarranted criticism, a well-known Indian trait.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army
Admiral Dinesh K Tripath, one of the hero of ‘Operation Sindoor’ should have been appointed new CDS as in turns.