Up and downs in Indo-China relations The Excelsior 19 Mar 2018
Indo-China relations have been witnessing a see-saw effect in recent times. The Doklam standoff had pushed the relations to the nadir. Even at present there are claims that Chinese presence continues in Doklam while it continues developing facilities in the region. India, on the other hand recently reversed its stand and issued instructions that political leaders and public servants should avoid attending Dalai Lama events, which have the possibility of impacting Indo-China relations. It stopped just short of restricting the Dalai Lama from visiting Arunachal Pradesh or addressing the media, to which the Chinese regularly protest.
Despite growing differences between the two, economic trade is on the upswing, with the balance of trade continuing in China’s favour. The two nations appear to be countering each other’s areas of interest. While Chinese forays into India’s neighbourhood is on the ascendency, so is India’s growing proximity with ASEAN nations, whose heads of state were chief guests for the Republic Day parade. Chinese investments and offers for joining the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) are being accepted by India’s immediate neighbours while nations of the ASEAN are increasing defence cooperation with India. India’s growing proximity to Vietnam is being strongly objected to by China.
There have been comments and counter-comments from both sides on enhanced naval powers being aimed at solely countering the other. India continues to refer to the Chinese string of pearls, implying naval bases in the Indian Ocean surrounding India and its naval forays into India’s backyard. China on the other hand, claims Indian naval engagements with other nations are aimed at countering it.
India’s reluctance to be drawn into Xi Jinping’s flagship project, the Belt Road Initiative (BRI), has immediately impacted its success. China has made numerous suggestions for India to join, but since the CPEC transits disputed territory in POK, India has been compelled to turn it down. China seeking to pacify India has officially refused to support Pak’s case for Kashmir, with the intention that India may change its mind. This one action by India has hit Chinese hopes on the BRI.
India’s growing proximity to the west, its joining the Quad, conduct of the Milan exercise, developing its missile power have all been criticized in Chinese government mouthpieces, as it visualizes these actions as a direct threat to China. India on the other hand closely monitors Chinese developments and increasing military infrastructure in Tibet but avoids criticizing.
China has staunchly supported Pak, denied India its rightful place in organizations like the Nuclear Supplier Group and objected to Indian support to nations in its immediate neighbourhood, enhancing distances. Chinese diplomatic actions including vetoing the declaring of Masood Azhar as a global terrorist, despite multiple engagements and international pressures, have openly pronounced their pro-Pak stance. Chinese media continuously resort to ‘blow hot, blow cold’ messages, occasionally patting India, mostly criticizing Indian actions.
The Chinese foreign Minister, Wang Yi, recently stated that the ‘Chinese dragon and Indian elephant must not fight but dance with each other’. He implied that the two nations must shed mental inhibitions, manage differences and meet half way to enhance bilateral ties. India responded positively stating that it is willing to work with China to enhance ties.
Thus, there has been an attempt to move forward positively. The next scheduled meeting of the top leadership, Modi and Xi Jinping, is scheduled in the middle of the year, when Modi travels for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting to China. Each time such events draw close, there is an extra effort put forth by both nations to improve relations and push differences into the background. Neither desires that meetings between the top leadership is impacted in any way. The resolution of Doklam last year was one such example.
However, on both sides, the press and the uninformed strategic thinkers play on irrelevant issues to raise media hypes within the nation. Doklam, in recent times, was a clear example. The Chinese press lambasted India and even threatened war, while the Indian government maintained a mature stance. Facts about the reality of recent Chinese actions in Doklam remain mired in confusion. The reality is different.
Doklam has always been under Chinese control, part of it remaining disputed between them and Bhutan. For India, status quo or enhanced military presence of Chinese forces in the region or even creation of structures and helipads is no major issue. Similarly, even constructing roads in the region away from the standoff site, provided it does not threaten Indian defences or Bhutan is of no concern. Hence, India only monitors Chinese actions, without objecting.
Further, in such trying weather conditions, Chinese troops staying in temporary structures is clearly an indicator of them seeking to counter Indian domination, rather than threatening Indian interests. This has been repeatedly stated by the army chief and defence minister in their comments, yet doubts remain within the media.
For India, the Dalai Lama would always be a trump card. China, fearful of his influence in Tibet desperately seeks to curb his activities. The recent note issued by the Cabinet Secretary restricting attendance at the Dalai Lama’s events led to the shifting of the high- profile event planned for commemorating the Dalai Lama’s sixty years in exile from Delhi to Dharamshala. This action alone would indicate a change in India’s stance and would be viewed positively by China, thus reducing diplomatic tensions between the two.
With Xi Jinping anointed as ‘President for Life’ there is a possibility of increased Chinese assertiveness in its foreign policy. There would be greater push for the BRI, seeking to draw in more nations into its fold. Chinese demands on Indian territory would remain unchanged. Meetings between the two leaders would result in conciliatory comments, however not much would change.
China would continue to expand its reach into India’s immediate neighbourhood, while India would enhance its outreach with ASEAN. The two nations would remain a challenge for each other, but near symmetry in nuclear and military capabilities, with close economic bonding would result in both being wary of the designs and strategic intentions of the other. Peace and resolution of the boundary dispute would remain miles away, possibly to be handled by the next generation.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army