Resolution of Doklam crises The Excelsior 20 Aug 17
The Doklam standoff has been ongoing for almost two months. What commenced on 18th Jun, shows no signs of abating. Rhetoric continues in Chinese media almost daily, threatening India with war, with occasional comments from their defence ministry and foreign office. Indian response has remained matured, seeking a diplomatic solution, neither escalating nor threatening. Bhutan, on whose behalf India interceded in the area continues to deal with India, seeking a diplomatic solution. Bhutan rarely issues a statement, except to counter Chinese territorial claims.
There have been writeups on whether the US and other allies would support India in this standoff. Most nations have commented that they would desire to see a peaceful resolution to the crises. In the ‘Realpolitik’ of today, nations may provide diplomatic support, military, unlikely. Hence, India would need to defuse the crises by itself, which it is capable off. Even if it escalates, India would need to handle the situation itself, for which it is prepared.
Militarily, neither nation seeks a confrontation. Even local actions have a tendency to escalate into a full-blown conflict, which could harm both. Local actions, involving forcibly removing those involved in the standoff may not be the answer, as it could be repeated by the other. For launching operations, one side must take the offensive. India has no desire to be the aggressor, thus it would have to be China.
Launching operations in mountains against prepared defences, irrespective of quantum of firepower, is costly in terms of casualties, with no guarantee of success. Indian defences, generally on the watershed, have been improved over the years and are presently fairly formidable. Hence, the going would be very difficult, but not impossible, for any attacker. China would have to weigh the consequences of a failure, prior to attempting one.
Media reports on forward movement of Indian forces is half baked. Troops normally move around this time for their annual operational alert. Since troops move from lower altitudes, they need to be acclimatized to the weather. This is an annual feature and is in progress, but is being blown out of proportion. China has its own problems. It’s one child norm has soldiers who have been pampered and are not as hardened as they were in earlier days.
While a diplomatic solution to the crises may appear possible, however it may not be easy, as the perception of affected nations are at variance. Media hype has brought the standoff into public domain; hence its termination must be to each nations advantage.
The conflict is on territory disputed between Bhutan and China, with India involved because of its security treaty with Bhutan. The road under construction moves towards Jampheri ridge, which is in Bhutan and defended by the Royal Bhutanese Army (RBA) and Indian forces during operations. The Jampheri ridge opens an easier avenue towards the Siliguri Corridor, also called the Chicken’s neck, a narrow stretch of land between Nepal and Bangladesh, through which move all lines of communication to the North east.
Construction of the road would also alter the status quo of the tri-junction point, which is presently disputed between India and China, thus affecting Indo-China boundary settlement. China is partially right when it claims India has transgressed into territory in which they are not involved in the dispute, hence demand the unilateral withdrawal of India.
India and Bhutan solely seek status quo of the region, till the boundary dispute is settled diplomatically between the countries. Indian troops moved in when China refused to accept protests and objections by the RBA. Media hype has now forced the countries to take a firmer stand in the dispute and compelled them to seek favourable conditions for withdrawal. Back channel discussions would help find a solution which could save face and lead to withdrawal of either side. Military talks at border meetings may not provide the answer as military personnel are bound by government stand. Failure in such talks should not be misconstrued.
India’s stand is not a rigid one. India would willingly be the first to withdraw once China either agrees to alter the alignment of the road away from the Jampheri ridge, thus reducing threat to Bhutan and the Siliguri corridor, or to no construction till the dispute over the territory is resolved, however it may continue to maintain its equipment in the location. Alternatively, China withdraws its road construction equipment and India pulls back.
The other option is the re-entry of Bhutan into the standoff, post a tacit understanding with the Chinese of non-overrunning the RBA. The RBA would replace Indian troops who would now be deployed in depth for support. The two sides would then commence dialogue, agreeing to maintain status quo till a resolution to the dispute. Finally, is the onset of winters, when road construction cannot be resorted to and both sides are compelled to pull back.
The timing of the standoff and in case China decides to adopt a military offensive solution would be more harmful to China than India. The BRICS summit is scheduled in China next month. Non-attendance by Modi, would make the summit redundant and a failure, impacting Chinese prestige, akin to the insult to Islamabad, when India refused to attend the SAARC summit. The Chinese Communist Party Congress is planned for Oct/Nov, where President Xi Jinping would be seeking a second tenure and place his nominees in the available vacancies, thus making him the most powerful President of China in a long time. Any failed action would impact his plans adversely.
In reality, the dispute also goes beyond the small plateau of Doklam. Nations in India’s periphery, Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh are watching. If India does not support Bhutan and withdraws prior to a tacit understanding of status quo or suffers major losses to China, they too could likely move into the Chinese camp. Similarly, nations in dispute with China, Vietnam, Philippines, Japan etc are observing Chinese reactions. If China displays weakness, it could result in similar incidents with other countries.
The two nations have now dug in at Doklam, with reserve and support troops close behind, ready to respond in case of any eventuality. War however is still miles away, with rhetoric being the order of the day. The hunt for a diplomatic face saving solution would continue, albeit with back channel diplomacy initially, before formal agreements. War is neither a solution, nor desirable at this stage. Till then China would continue to follow Sun Tzu’s teaching, ‘the supreme art of war is to subdue your enemy without fighting’ and hope it works as it did with other weaker nations.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army