Arunachal: the next frontier (English Version) Rakshak News 11 Apr 18
There have been regular reports of increasing Chinese infrastructure development in Arunachal and India responding with increased deployment in the region. While Doklam was a prolonged standoff, similar incidents of shorter duration are regular in Arunachal and Ladakh. Chinese road infrastructure in Tibet in the area bordering Arunachal has always been far better than ours for multiple reasons, hence his ability to move troops faster has always existed. Improving facilities for troops is an ongoing exercise, which both nations resort to.
In an article in the magazine ‘Force’, Gen Vinod Bhatia, a former Director General Military Operations and GOC 33 Corps, writes, ‘India shied away from constructing roads and building infrastructure along the Tibet border, in a mistaken belief that lack of roads will degrade the Chinese threat and deter deep incursions in the event of another war.’ This led to slow development over decades, while China maintained a steady pace.
Our road construction is only in valleys where we had a strong deployment. The China study group, constituted by the government, had recommended 73 roads which were to be completed by 2012, subsequently revised to 2019-2020. Of these only 30 were completed by Jul 2017. In simplistic terms, while Chinese soldiers arrive by road, Indian soldiers walk. This automatically places us at a disadvantage. Similarly, maintaining soldiers deployed in such standoffs becomes difficult.
Indian defences and troop habitat is continuously developed, and amenities increased for the troops located within. Chinese soldiers in most cases remained deployed in their permanent camps and travelled forward to patrol and visit areas which they claim. They had limited infrastructure close to the border. China, akin to India has now begun constructing similar structures for its soldiers close to Indian positions. This would imply that it either plans to move forces forward or is preparing habitat for future eventualities including periods of tensions.
Infrastructure would never always be habitat alone but also stock other warlike stores including ammunition and supplies, thus reducing time for operations. For any force planning to launch operations, movement of stores and equipment is time consuming. Since Chinese forces were generally deployed well behind, forward movement could be observed and acted upon. By now moving equipment and stores forward, it would reduce time and thus India would need to be more alert.
The reason for China earlier maintaining its forces behind at a distance was because it never envisaged any threat from India in the form of an offensive, as India has no territorial claims in Tibet. It also had very little defensive infrastructure. India, on the other hand had to maintain forces in readiness as it needed to be prepared for a Chinese offensive. Passes, if undefended could be occupied, giving China the advantage.
Thus, Indian troops remain permanently deployed, irrespective of terrain, weather and nature and quality of roads. Some Indian posts remain air maintained, troops moving in and out on foot. The recent press reports on Kibbitu, which indicates a road on one side of the river, while troops remain deployed on both sides is an example.
India, always wary of Chinese intent, has now begun enhancing its deployment at key places. We cannot question Chinese building infrastructure in their own territory, however being unaware of their true intentions, we need to be prepared. Chinese roads being better gives them the advantage of accessing even remote passes, which we only reach by patrols on occasions and are not held always.
What could be the Chinese intentions? An all-out offensive akin to 1962 is unlikely, as India is no longer the weak nation of that period. What could emerge is strong patrols moving into Indian territory to justify their claim lines. Whether the patrols would remain for a prolonged duration or return after leaving tell-tale signs confirming their visit remains a mute question. Limited offensive operations restricted to small areas, indicating their desire to convey a message is also always possible. In no case would both nations seek to enhance tensions which could lead to an all-out offensive.
It is with this intention that India is now seeking to enhance its patrols and deployment in the region, news of which has been flowing in the press in recent times. Doklam was a one-off incident, which no nation would desire to repeat. In addition, neither nation would seek to escalate tensions beyond local levels. With a ‘no first use’ nuclear policy declared by both nations, it is unlikely for tensions to rise beyond a point.
In the meanwhile, development of road infrastructure which would permit faster movement of forces needs to be speeded up, with special monitoring. There was a delay as India lacked capacity and capability to handle Chinese threat. As these grow, so does the confidence of the nation in countering the dragon. It is only by being able to resist Chinese offensive gestures and actions would it consider India as an equal rival and desist from misadventures.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army