The truth behind the Rafale deal (English Version) Amar Ujala 22 Feb 18
The forthcoming elections in Karnataka has the Congress battling for survival. Thus, with all gloves off, anything and everything is being questioned. The latest to be questioned by the Congress is the Rafale deal. For those not involved in matters concerning national security, this may be an issue aimed to counter the BJP’s claims of scams during the UPA rule. However, those who have been following national security are aware that development of military capabilities almost came to a standstill during the ten years of UPA.
The MoD under Anthony during the UPA regime just sat on proposals and refused to clear any defence deal, solely because he was concerned about his clean image. The ghost of the Bofors dominated every purchase decision. Ammunition reserves were at their lowest, spares almost non-existent and vital capacity shortfalls remained.
The hollowness in defence preparedness left the armed forces extremely vulnerable in every field. The air force would never have been able to defend the nation in the event of a two-front war. The artillery saw no deals post the Bofors, while the naval Chief resigned in disgust due to shortcomings in maintenance equipment, leading to multiple accidents, with resultant loss of lives. It even forced the then army chief, General VK Singh, to write an open letter to the government stating major capacity shortcomings. Yet Anthony and the government slept, unconcerned, only seeking to save whatever little reputation was left of theirs, since they feared being blamed for kickbacks.
It fell on the present government to recreate the capacities and capabilities that the armed forces were desperately seeking. The Rafale deal was amongst the first, which it cleared. There is a need to place facts to remove wrong claims being made by the Congress. This is being done in an impartial manner, as I, a veteran do not represent any party.
The air force had desired 126 aircraft to make up its shortfalls in the coming years with the phasing out of aircraft and maintaining the bare minimum fleet strength for a two-front war. The Request for Proposal for these aircraft was issued in 2007. From then to 2011 the air force conducted a series of trial evaluations to finalize the aircraft.
Finally, the Rafale and Eurofighter Tycoon were shortlisted. In 2012, the Rafale was declared the L1 bidder, which implied that its price was the lowest. The Eurofighter subsequently offering a discount implied nothing. From 2012 to 2014 (all during UPA rule), contract negotiations remained inconclusive mainly due to lack of agreement on the terms of the proposal and cost. It did appear that the UPA government was not serious in its endeavours.
The cost of the aircraft is never the basic cost, as being stated by the Congress. The cost is dependent on avionics, armament, maintainability and fitments, all of which remain solely the domain of the air force. These aspects remain secret as declaring them in detail in the public domain would impact security. Hence, these are included in a non-disclosure clause signed between the two countries.
The other issue raised is Transfer of Technology (ToT). This implies transferring technology to enable production in India. The most classical case of ToT is the development of the Dhanush, the indigenous 155mm Gun, based on the ToT from Bofors. ToT was amongst the main stumbling block between the two nations during the preliminary discussions during the UPA regime.
The manufacturing company of the Rafale, Dassault Aviation, after visiting HAL, where the manufacture of 108 aircraft was to be done, was unwilling to take responsibility for quality controls, since they were dissatisfied with their work ethics and quality checks. Further, while Dassault considered 3 crore man hours enough for production of 108 balance aircraft to be assembled in India, HAL was quoting almost double the number, thus shooting the cost of the aircraft. ToT was never discussed, only assembly in India was.
The NDA government under Modi, on assuming control decided to change tack, and opposite of the NDA decided to go in for a government to government deal for the purchase of the aircraft. It took the decision to purchase 36 aircraft in flyaway mode, rather than proceed for manufacture in India under the ToT. Thus, the company, Dassault Aviation, was out of the discussion phase and the deal, being between governments, removed any kickbacks. The agreement included that the aircraft would be delivered in the time requirement and fitted with avionics and weapon systems as per air force desires.
The proposals were then routed back to the defence acquisition council on more than one occasion and their suggestions incorporated. The final Inter-Government Agreement was finally inked in 2016 not 2014 as claimed by the Congress. The issue of costs having been escalated is also aimed at projecting a wrong picture to the public. Every defence equipment has a basic cost. However, as essentials are added on, spares to cater for a duration of time, specific armament fitments and maintenance requirements added, the cost increases. Since breakdown of cost details are unavailable in the public domain, details would remain shrouded in mystery.
The offsets would be implemented. The Dassault was clearly unhappy with the work ethics of the HAL, which is nothing new. It is the same impression being carried by all defence personnel who have ever been associated with it. Hence, it would choose a private company, where there would be better ethics and quality control.
In summary, the agreement was signed between two governments, with no private company or individual involved, thus removing any issue of kickbacks. The procurement process will also be on similar lines. This is the major difference between the approach adopted by the NDA and UPA. Every UPA deal including Bofors and AgustaWestland helicopters were between the government of India and a private company, hence have led to kickbacks, now under investigation.
For a political party, questioning national security purchases, seeking to garner votes may be acceptable, however asking the government to openly declare what additions were involved in the equipment is incorrect. Political entities who have lived their lives in glass houses should stop throwing stones at others.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army